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Abstract
This thesis tests the claim that national differences in sectoral state traditions 
diminish over time. The case study covers telephone policy debates in France 
and Germany in five time periods fi*om 1876 until 1997: the ‘consolidation 
phase’ (1876 -  1900); the 1920s; the post-Second World War years; the debates 
leading up to corporatisation in the 1980s; and the debates around opening for 
full competition in the 1990s.
The analytical framework is founded in writings on state traditions and on the 
role of ideas and discourse in policymaking. The study’s object of investigation, 
‘sectoral state traditions’, is developed to allow for comparison both longitudi­
nally within one country and cross-nationally. It comprises the notion of 
authority and of who should be the relevant actors in the policy process; public 
ethos of sectoral policies; and criteria for legitimate decision-making procedures 
and discourse.
Central concepts and ideas in public debates are identified in both countries for 
each period. The investigation of public political debates (parliamentary 
debates, governmental and other public documents, and newspaper articles) in 
each country shows that sectoral state traditions were highly resistant to change. 
Cross-national comparison fiirther corroborates the persistence of the two 
sectoral state traditions, which, despite common external fectors (technology, 
international cooperation, supranational legislation), showed little or no 
convergence. The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking remained 
largely stable throughout the period under investigation. The French ethos of 
^service public", and the German ethos of efficient infi-astructure provision, 
remained central. Criteria for decision-making and discourse altered m France 
in the late 1980s, whereas they remained stable in Germany. Evidence therefore 
does not support a hypothesis of convergence between the two sectoral state 
traditions.
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more difficult had it not been for the invaluable help and support from these 
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Introduction 
The continuity of ideas in telephone policy
The recent focus among students of political science on ideas and their role in 
the policymaking process has led to various claims about the sustainability of 
distinctive national policymaking traditions. This thesis tests whether sectoral 
state traditions changed in French and German telephone policymaking between 
1900 and 1997, and whether such potential changes can underpin a convergence 
hypothesis. The thesis thus studies sectoral state traditions as an example of 
ideas.
Sectoral state traditions
Sectoral state traditions are a set of ideas about political authority and legitimate 
state action, expressed through political discourse. They are important to politi­
cal analysis because they increase the understanding of the ideational context 
within which policymakers operate. The thesis defines these as containing three 
essential elements:
• A notion of authority, of who should be the relevant actors in the policy 
process, and what should be their relative power;
• Public ethos of sectoral policies;
• Criteria for legitimate decision-making procedures and discourse.
A theoretical underpinning for the elements within the sectoral state traditions 
will be presented in chapter 1.
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Contributions and limits of this thesis
Two trends in Anglo-American political science literature since the 1980s make 
the study of sectoral state traditions important. First, increased attention has 
been paid to the role of ideas in the policy process. Second, there has been a re­
newed interest in the state as a socio-cultural phenomenon and as an institution 
that contributes to shaping policymakers’ preferences.
The renewed interest in the state as an object of analysis from the 1980s 
onwards was a reaction to the alleged low level of attention paid to nationally 
specific political frames and histories in the 1960s and the 1970s. ‘Modem’ 
state studies differed significantly from older studies, which had been largely 
comparative descriptions of a state’s bureaucratic makeup,^ and included 
analyses of policy-making and political processes that started taking into 
account the role of ideas, in particular, ideas about the legitimacy of state action 
(Dyson 1980; Hall 1986, 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Favell 2001). 
Ideas were introduced as explanatory variables to supplement rather than 
replace the explanatory powers of established theories (Reich 1988; Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993; Schmidt 2000).
The major reason for the recent academic interest in the role of ideas in the 
policy process is to achieve a fuller explanation of policy change.^ Most
 ^ A closely related group of studies, concerned with ‘cultural factors’ or ‘national styles’, have 
traditionally been acknowledged in comparative policy analysis (e.g. Bendix 1996 [1964]; 
Almond and Powell 1966; Verba 1965; Richardson 1982), but were, however, ill adapted for 
explanatory use (Hall 1986).
 ^Assumptions about the existence of changes that require explanation are found e.g., in writings 
on ‘mimetism’ (e.g., Dolowitz and March 2000; Ikenberry 1990), ‘globalisation’ (e.g., Eatwell
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political science literature on the role of ideas assumes that policy changes are 
accompanied by change in ideas, either prior to the policy change (as a pre­
requisite for change) or as a consequence of it.
The recent literature on ideas has, however, been criticised for failing to 
distinguish between the roles of ideas themselves and the interests and power of 
their advocates. This fundamental problem can be attributed to the fact that the 
role of ideas often has been analysed through policy? outcomes. This thesis 
therefore contributes to the general literature on ideas by investigating sectoral 
state traditions as an example of ideas. Sectoral state traditions are investigated 
through their expression in public political discourse, rather than through policy 
outcomes.
Consequently, this thesis does not attempt to explain policy outcomes. More­
over, it does not aim at explaining the potential longevity of ideas, but, more 
modestly, to investigate whether ideas expressed in public political discourse 
remain stable or whether they change.
The term ‘state tradition’ has been used by scholars to emphasise aspects of 
political life that are directly related to the cognition of a ‘state’, and as such 
finds its place in the wider literature on the role of ideas in policy-making.
‘State tradition’, as opposed to ‘national traditions’, has an intuitive 
interpretation of ‘something belonging to or emanating from the state appara­
tus’. However, not surprisingly, no general definition exists, even though most
1997; True and Mintrom 2001; Cemy 2000), and by authors seeking to explain either 
incremental change or policy reversais (e.g., Olsen 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; North 
1990; Hood 1994; Elster 1989; Bennett 1991).
The continuity of ideas in telephone policy 14
analyses involving state traditions emphasise the cognitive aspect and the role 
of ideas in the political process (Dyson 1980; Grimm 1991; Rohe 1993;
Laborde 2000). The thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on ‘state 
traditions’, through its identification of three central elements that makes the 
term itself more applicable to comparative analysis.
The fundamental empirical assumption about change or continuity in ideas has 
rarely been exposed to a detailed, sector-specific, long-term investigation. This 
thesis therefore fills a gap in existing literature, as it investigates the empirical 
foundations for assumptions about change in sectoral state traditions (as an 
example of ideas) and thus aims at answering the questions of whether sectoral 
state traditions change over time within one country, and, subsequently, whether 
the two countries’ traditions converge. It does not, however, aim at explaining 
such changes or convergence -  such a task would require analysis of the many 
factors that influence the development of sectoral state traditions.
The case study -  sectoral state traditions in telephone policy
In order to investigate the validity of claims about change and convergence in 
sectoral state traditions a long-term historical investigation is required. While 
other long-term studies of telecommunications have concentrated on either the 
pre-Second World War or the post-1945 period (Thomas 1995; Werle 1990; 
Bertho 1981; Cohen 1992; Thatcher 1999),^ this study traces ideas on both sides
 ^Exceptions are Libels, (1983), who traces the story of telecommunications in France from the 
second half of the 19* century untü the 1980s, and Schneider (2001), who discusses the 
development of forms of state intervention in the telecommunications sector in a broad sense 
from 1800 to 2000.
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of this ‘bairier’, illustrating that the conventional limit of the war is one of 
convenience for research rather than one that restricts the general model.
Although, in principle, any democratic, developed country could have been 
used,"  ^there are good reasons for a comparative study of France and Germany. 
Using these two countries permits a ‘most similar systems’ approach, because 
their formal telephone policy institutions have followed similar paths through­
out their history. The telephone was brought to the attention of public officials 
in both countries shortly after its invention in 1876. For a significant part of the 
20^ century both maintained a state monopoly in telephone service provision, 
and a comparison of the formal institutions in the two countries shows remark­
able similarities. Both France and Germany gave their telephone service budge­
tary autonomy in the 1920s, and both countries’ incumbent operators were 
transformed into public corporations in the 1980s, followed by privatisation in 
the 1990s.
When, however, public debate is the focus of analysis, as is the case in this 
thesis, significant differences appear. Whereas French policymakers in the late 
19* century used the safeguarding of the ‘general interest’ to justify public 
intervention in the sector and paid increasing respect to the emerging concept of 
service public, German policymakers were preoccupied with correcting econo­
mic dysfunctions and ensuring efficient management in public administration
It seems reasonable that the potential cases should be democratic and developed countries: 
‘democratic’ (in the sense of having a formal system for e?q)ression of popular wül and a 
relatively stable institutional cadre in which public political debate is conducted) because the 
object under scrutiny is public and parliamentary debate; ‘developed’ because the sector under 
investigation is the telephone sector and the instrument achieved similar status early on in the 
developed world, unlike in many poor countries.
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through cost-based tariffs. Their respective debates around the introduction of a 
separate budget {budget annexe) in the 1920s were similarly different. The 
French attempted to balance the service public and the industrial characteristics 
of the telephone service, whereas the Germans discussed the efficiency of 
different potential financial regimes. These differences in debate and in 
perception continued after the Second World War. The empirical evidence, 
therefore, indicates a variation in the conceptual frameworks and ideas of 
policy-makers in France and in Germany.
The periods chosen as case studies mostly correspond to periods where tele­
phone policy was relatively high on the parliamentary agenda. The literature on 
the role of ideas in policymaking asserts that ideas are most likely to change 
during crises and when policy areas are present in public debate (Hall 1993; 
Kohler-Koch 2002). Institutional reform can indicate that former decision­
making procedures, and possibly their underlying principles and norms, were 
contested (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Periods of major legislative reform 
should therefore provide a good opportunity to investigate possible changes in 
ideas. The chapter on the post-war period is an exception because of the lack of 
important legislative change throughout the period. However, this period is 
included because traditional ideas about the role of the state were fundamentally 
challenged in the two countries.
In sum, the story of telephone policy debate in France can be seen as the history 
of a service public, whereas German telephone policy history can be seen to be
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a succession of debates on tariffs, legal structures and technology, all within the 
framework of economic policy.
As the empirical analysis will show, French telephone policy debate in the late 
19^ century justified the state monopoly by referring to the state’s superiority in 
providing continuity and territorial equality of service. In the early 20^ century 
both principles were incorporated in the nascent concept of service publie, 
which retained its central place in French policymaking debates throughout the 
20* century. In the 1920s, the concept was made compatible with industrial 
management methods. Low parliamentary attention in the 1950s and the 1960s 
and the concept’s absence from technocrats’ debate illustrated its value as 
political myth rather than practical policymaking concept for bureaucrats. 
However, the latter’s’ adherence to the constituting elements of service public -  
continuity, equality and adaptability -  showed the pervasiveness of these 
principles. The service public concept regained its ubiquitous place in French 
policy debates in the 1980s and the 1990s, whilst being increasingly specified 
and defined between 1984 and 1997. Thus, despite change in content (and in 
what was perceived as the optimal instruments to achieve the state’s service 
public obligations), the service public concept itself retained its central place in 
public debates in France from its emergence in the late 19* century until 1997.
In Germany, principles of cost-based tariffs, indicating a view that the federal 
state’s main task was the efficient management of infrastructure provision, 
appeared in the late 19* century, and essentially remained constant throughout 
the period studied in this thesis. Legal circumscription of federal actions to
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protect local and individual interests equally appeared early in sectoral policy­
making. The debates around the Reichspostfinanzgesetz of 1924 showed that 
the ideas of efficient infrastructure provision were compatible with contempo­
rary ideas of the superiority of private enterprise management methods, whereas 
the subsequent Fermeldeanlagegesetz (FAG) of 1927 illustrated the continued 
role of legislation as a conflict-solver between federal, local and private 
interests. The post-Second World War emphasis on democratic structures and 
transparency in policymaking was not easily reconcilable with the existing 
sectoral state tradition. The conflict between the new emphasis and the sectoral 
state tradition from before the war resulted in proposals to separate (objective) 
operational tasks from broader political issues in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Equally, the corporatisation of Telekom in 1989, the law on privatisation of 
1994, and opening for full competition in 1997, is here argued to be a 
continuation of the German state’s attempts at providing efficient management 
of infrastructure provision. Thus, despite changing perceptions about optimal 
instruments, the basic ideas, as expressed in discourse to legitimise political 
decisions, remained constant throughout the period investigated.
Approach
The focus of this thesis is ideas as expressed in public political discourse. 
Sectoral state traditions are not about policy instruments, but are concerned with 
the political justification of instruments chosen. The empirical material is 
therefore collected mainly from public documents such as parliamentary 
reports, parliamentary debates, and government papers. Parliamentary debates
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were the most important single source of empirical evidence. Secondary 
material has, as far as practically possible, been verified against primary 
sources. Most policy documents have a 30-year confidentiality period, and 
internal (ministerial) documents were therefore available only until c. 1970.
The empirical evidence was first and foremost drawn from the legislative 
process related to institutional reform because in such periods the ideas 
contained in the sectoral state traditions were seen as most likely to appear in 
public political discourse. Moreover, periods of legislative reform also 
increased the potential amount of information available because actors from 
across the political spectrum and from various interested parties took part in 
these public discussions.
Archive search and selection
Legislative reform provided the practical starting point for research, because 
most parliamentary reports and debates relating to a particular piece of 
legislation are relatively easy to trace in the public archives.^ In addition to 
debates and reports on specific legislation, the national archives provided 
material that had not necessarily been presented to Parliament, but which had 
been used within the bureaucracy, typically the ministerial central offices.^
 ^The methods for classifying material changed throughout the 20^ century, which increased the 
complexity of empirical research. The appendix on sources gives more details on the situation in 
the different time periods. As the appendix shows, both the quantity and the accessibility of the 
empirical material varied in the different time periods investigated. Such variation does, 
however, reflect the salience of the issues in pubhc debate, and should therefore not present a 
major problem to this thesis.
 ^Examples of such documents include inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial reports and 
circulars, such as the ‘Le Sans Fil: Hebdomadaire: Organe d’information et de vulgarisation 
TSF’; ‘Note pour Monsieur le Chef du service central sur un programme des principales 
ameliorations de détail dont la réalisation a été envisagée en ce qui concerne la Direction’;
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These documents were particularly useful in increasing the contextual 
understanding of the debates.
Debates and reports relevant to specific legislation were in most cases traceable 
through nested references from the final legislative document presented in the 
Journal Officiel (France), the Reichsgesetzblatt (Germany pre-1945) or the 
Bundesgesetzblatt (Germany post-Second World War). For other archive 
material, thematic searches were done. The national archives were organised 
differently in the two countries, but all institutions provided means for thematic 
document searches.
The first step in researching these archives consisted in identifying important 
general themes: major legislation, policy development, regulation, and 
organisational structure and reforms. The major sources of documents were, in 
addition to the parliamentary and governmental reports, ministerial 
correspondence and various commissioned reports on the said themes, 
interventions (letters, research documents) from interest groups and industry, 
and some newspaper articles that had been seen as sufficiently important at the 
time of publishing to find their way into ministerial archives. This first phase 
resulted in the exclusion of several policy areas such as personnel policy, 
technological areas such as submarine cables, telematics, satellites, and 
digitalisation, logistics, transport, and most of the field of international co-
‘Zahlenspiegel der Deutschen Bundespost’; ‘Abschrifl Verwaltungsvereinbanmg zwischen 
BMPF & Finanze Minister’; ‘Zulassi^eit und Existenz von Sondervermogen’; legislative 
projects and decrees not debated in Parliament: ‘Projet d’arrêté modifiant la procedure de la 
Commission centrale d’avancement en ce qui concerne la selection des candidates à certains 
emplois supérieurs’, ‘Comité institué pour étudier l’ensemble des questions préalables à la mise 
en oeuvre de la procedure prevue par les paragraphes 2 et suivants de l ’article 102 de la loi de 
finances’.
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operation, including, in the case of France, relations between France and the 
former colonies. The documents archived under these themes mainly consisted 
of (short-term) administrative decisions and did not shed light on the research 
question in this thesis.
Subsequent research aimed at identifying documents that might illustrate how 
the contemporary issues, be they state monopoly, financial reform, 
corporatisation, or full competition, were perceived by central policymakers, 
and fiirthermore, how they were presented to the public. The second selection 
process entailed consultation of a large number of documents about policy 
development, regulation, organisational structure and reforms, productivity, 
budget, and other financial matters, which were subsequently studied in detail. 
These documents gave increased knowledge about the different issues, but not 
all were directly quoted in the thesis. The quotes used were selected as 
examples because they were representative of the debates and because they 
illustrated central assumptions held by participants. This selection process also 
implied excluding a large number of documents from further investigation. 
Purely administrative documents were excluded, as were documents relating to 
relations between the PTT administrations and end-users (relevant for the post- 
Second World War periods), most detailed tariff changes,^ and also commercial 
affairs.
 ^Particularly in the periods before 1960, parliamentary debates about tariff changes were 
instrumental in identifying how the ratioiiale for the telephone service was perceived among 
politicians. However, ministerial documents relating to these issues were mostly determining 
specific levels of tariffs, not adding significant value to the parliamentary debates, and therefore 
excluded from research.
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For example, the case of France showed a clear use of service public throughout 
the 20^ century by participants from all parts of the political spectrum, as 
illustrated by the quotes.^ In the case of Germany, where no concept was in a 
similar position to the French service public, the quotes used were chosen to 
illustrate the nature of the debates and to show that political debates were based 
on certain fundamental assumptions (that the telephone sector was an ‘industry 
like any other’ and that the federal state legitimately could use so-called ‘private 
sector management methods’ to ensure optimal use of scarce resources).
Attention was given to providing a fair impression of the different themes 
present in the different debates. The quotations used were chosen because they 
were seen to be representative of the debates concerning policymakers’ 
presentation of rationale for their policy choices,^ and statements by politicians 
from all parts of the political spectrum were used. For example, in the debates 
on financial reforms in the 1920s, the quotes used in this thesis were selected 
not to give an exhaustive account of the different political parties’ and 
institutions’ views on the details of reform (e.g., on how many members the 
administrative councils should have), but to show that the essence of the reform 
outcome (increased financial flexibility) was debated and justified within 
different frames of reference in the two countries. French policymakers saw it 
as imperative to emphasise the compatibility between industrial management 
methods and service public, whereas German policymakers saw and presented
* The notable exception was the AIT document from 1963, where no reference was made to 
service pubic whatsoever, a fact that is also included in the argumentation of this thesis (see 
chapter 4).
 ^Occasionally, quotes illustrate how the situation of the telephone service (financial, 
technological or legal) was perceived, thus aiming at giving contextual understanding of the 
public debate.
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the post-1924 structure as a plausible solution to a pressing problem facing a 
rational manager, namely the federal state. These characteristics were not 
specific to any one side of the political spectrum, but pervaded the debates and 
indicated the underlying assumptions used to argue the continuity of the sectoral 
state traditions.
Evaluating stability and change
The investigation of the large range of documents selected for more detailed 
analysis resulted in substantial support for arguments of stability of the sectoral 
state traditions. The first reading of these documents provided an overall sense 
of the debate and the issues at stake for different actors. The larger part of the 
interventions concerned elements and issues not directly relevant to the sectoral 
state tradition, but which were central for the completion of reforms. It 
became, however, relatively clear from the general reading what the underlying 
assumptions were in the two countries. Documents were then re-read both 
independently and with reference to other material from the same period to 
ensure a detailed understanding and also to find illustrative quotes to 
demonstrate the development of the sectoral state tradition.
For example, in the Assemblée nationale's debate on 10 May 1990 on the new law on France 
Telecom and La Poste, which covers 23 pages in the Journal Officiel, six pages contain 
information that was judged as potentially good quotes illustrating the development of the 
sectoral state tradition. Excluded were interventions on the principle of separating France 
Telecom and La Poste, on the future of the social bonds between employees of France Telecom 
and La Poste, on how existing debts should be taken on by the two new corporations and how 
they should be split, and on the potential economic viabihty of the two corporations. 
Nevertheless, although not used as direct quotes, these interventions were read to ensure that 
they did not provide counterarguments that would demonstrate a change in sectoral state 
traditions.
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The three elements of the sectoral state tradition were not all identified in the 
same way empirically. The most general element, the ultimate authority, was 
only very rarely referred to in any of the debates investigated,^^ and not at all in 
internal ministerial documents. Stability in the ultimate authority was thus 
inferred fi*om an absence of challenges to this authority, or absence of any 
statement or incident that could be interpreted as questioning the ultimate 
authority.
The public ethos was easily identifiable in France as service public, an 
evaluating stability or change of the public ethos was therefore mostly a 
question of investigating references to the service public concept. The task was 
made easier by the ubiquitous presence of the concept in all debates and almost 
all documents. Quotes were chosen because they illustrated the use of the 
service public concept as underlying rationale and justification for policies. The 
German public ethos was not as clearly labelled as the French, and document 
analysis to evaluate stability or change therefore emphasised a deeper 
contextual understanding of the debates. Flowever, quotes were chosen because 
they were seen to be representative of the general assumptions underlying 
debates.
Legitimate methods for policymaking concerned who was consulted for new 
policy proposals and the style of communication between these actors. The 
legislative process (parliamentary debates and reports, and governmental 
reports) gave information about the different actors that were consulted, and
” The exception was France in the 1990s, when parhamentaiy debate and also France’s 
challenge to the European Commission’s authority to issue directives, directly treated and 
confirmed the ultimate authority of Parliament.
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correspondence between the central bureaucracy and different actors, as well as 
the different actors’ reports and also their public statements (e.g., through 
newspaper articles and interviews) illustrated the style of communication used. 
Because the sectoral state tradition focuses on public discourse, and this thesis 
does not aim at explaining policy outcomes, it was not attempted to discover the 
‘behind the scenes politicking’. Rather, in the case of France, it was clear from 
ministerial correspondence and from commissioned reports, in addition to 
parliamentary debates, that the number of actors involved in policymaking was 
limited until the 1980s and the Prévôt commission. In the case of Germany, the 
formal rules for consultation included a larger number of participants, and 
letters, commission reports (e.g. the Monopolkommission, the 
Sachverstandigkommission, and the KtK) and newspaper articles indicated the 
continued involvement of a large number of actors. Furthermore, the different 
interventions made it clear that these actors were considered as legitimate and 
knowledgeable participants in the political process.
Weighting o f different actors ’ discourse
It is customary for legislative proposals to be presented to Parliament by the 
Minister responsible, who as a consequence has allotted more time than other 
discussants. The Minister’s (or Secretary of State, as the case may be) 
statements are therefore rich in potential empirical evidence, a fact that is 
reflected in the frequent use of Ministers’ speeches and parliamentary 
interventions in the material presented here. Moreover, governmental reports, 
which in addition to parliamentary debates have provided primary source 
material, are also expressing the government’s view. During the investigation.
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however, care was taken to look at subsequent intervention both from 
opposition parties and from other representatives of the government parties, as 
well as statements from the wider policy community in the cases where central 
parts of the debate took place outside Parliament. To the extent that other 
discussants questioned the proposed reforms’ basic rationale their statements 
have also been included.
Thesis outline
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical foundations for the development of the object 
under investigation, the ‘sectoral state tradition’. This is followed by five empi­
rical chapters examining the development of the sectoral state tradition in each 
of the five different periods under investigation, which all brought important 
economic, political and technological changes in the sector.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) examines the consolidation period up 
until c. 1900, showing how telephone policy was integrated into existing 
structures of the telegraph administrations and establishing the origin of a 
nationally specific coherent political discourse, and thus a sectoral state tradi­
tion, about telephone policy.
There follows a chapter on the financial reforms of the 1920s (Chapter 3), when 
both France and Germany established budgetary autonomy for their PTT 
organisations, and during which parliaments’ role in the decision-making 
process was strengthened. This chapter shows how internationally present ideas
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about ‘modem management methods’ were transformed and adapted to fit each 
national sectoral state tradition.
The subsequent empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigates the decades after the 
establishment of the post-Second World War legislative regimes, characterised 
by institutional separation in France, and démocratisation and transparency in 
Germany. This period did not see any major legislative or organisational 
changes, but ideas about state intervention were challenged.
The 1980s and the process of corporatisation of the two incumbent operators is 
the subject of Chapter 5, which demonstrates how public debates in France and 
Germany, despite leading to similar formal institutional structures for the 
incumbent telecommunications operators, showed continuity with their 
respective national traditions, although certain changes also can be identified.
The last empirical period under investigation is the 1990s (Chapter 6), with 
introduction of legislation for privatisation of Deutsche Telekom in Germany 
(1994) and for opening for full competition in the telecommunications sector in 
1996 (France) and 1997 (Germany). The chapter shows the continuity of the 
sectoral state traditions both in France and Germany.
Comparative analysis is undertaken throughout the work. The main conclusions 
are presented in Chapter 7 (a summary is presented in table 6), showing that 
sectoral state traditions are highly resistant to change, and that although a 
certain convergence can be identified between criteria for legitimate decision­
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making and discourse in the late 1980s, this thesis does not support a general 
convergence hypothesis.
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Chapter 1 
Ideas, state traditions, and political discourse
The sustainability of distinctive national policymaking traditions has recently 
been questioned in writings on ideas and their role in the policy-making 
process. This thesis tests the claim that sectoral state traditions change and even 
converge across countries faced with similar exogenous pressures.
A sectoral state tradition is a set of ideas about political authority and legitimate 
state action in the relevant sector. Sectoral state traditions are expressed and 
identified through public political discourse, which is a major vehicle to 
maintain and develop traditions in policymaking. Thus, the sectoral state 
tradition is a sub-set of the wider concept o f ‘state traditions’, which itself forms 
part of the even more general study of ideas and their role in policymaking.
This thesis’s major contributions to existing literature are the development of an 
analytical tool, ‘sectoral state traditions’, that allows for a long-term comparison 
of ideas about political authority and legitimate state action, and a substantial 
empirical investigation about long-term continuity and change in such ideas in a 
selected case study. The use o f ‘sectoral state traditions’ enables a longitudinal 
comparison within each country, as well as allowing an evaluation of whether 
different countries’ sectoral state traditions converge.
This chapter comprises four parts. First, it presents an overview of central 
writings on the study of ideas and state traditions, as well as their major
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shoi^comings. Second, it argues the case for investigating change in sectoral 
state traditions. Third, it discusses the role of political discourse in maintaining 
and identifying sectoral state traditions. Finally, the last part of the chapter 
defines and details the concept o f ‘sectoral state traditions’ as used in this thesis.
The importance of ideas
Over the last decade political science analyses have increasingly paid attention 
to ideas, as existing models of policymaking were seen to lack explanatory 
power, “suggesting instead that an adequate model [to explain policymaking 
and policy change] must also include ideas and institutions” (Majone 1992: 7-8; 
see also Elster 1989: 168; Schmidt 2001: 6). Rationalist and institutionalist 
models, which mostly see policies as a result of a process in which rational 
actors strive for outcomes that match their own preferences as closely as 
possible, generally do not seek to analyse the role of ideas. However, “even if 
we accept the rationality premise, actions taken by human beings depend on the 
substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles 
and conceptions of causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behavior” 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993:5).
Moreover, ideas about what is politically legitimate in a particular national and 
sectoral setting “affect groups’ perceptions of their interest and foster in them a 
disposition to explain their positions in abstract terms, to fit their particular 
concerns into a larger framework” (Dyson 1980: 3). Ideas at this level thus 
influence the frames within which politics are to be conducted, i.e. rules for
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‘what just is and isn’t done’, and they help to identify who are members of a 
political community (Kvistad 1999; 4). In the political process, commitment to 
common ideas and purposes is useful because it “creates ‘will’, and widespread 
agreement produces legitimacy” (Orren 1988: 27).
Ideas are therefore important to policymaking, and deserve attention. Several 
theoretical approaches exist that include the role of ideas in the policymaking 
process. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) claim that ideas principally have three 
functions in policymaking: they serve as road maps; they assist in consolidating 
outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium; and because they (sometimes 
but not always) become institutionalised, they sustain the influence of actors’ 
interests even in cases where the actors themselves or their interests have 
changed.
However, the approach of Goldstein and Keohane, although ambitious, lacks 
analytical clarity concerning the concept o f ‘ideas’. According to them, 
“[ajdvocates of an ideational approach to political analysis must begin by 
identifying the ideas being described and the policy outcomes or institutional 
changes to be explained. We must also provide evidence about the conditions 
under which causal connections exist between ideas and policy outcomes” 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 11). Their focus on the effect of ideas rather than 
the ideas themselves, i.e. their assertion that ideas influence policymaking when 
they fall into one of the categories cited above, complicates (indeed, renders 
questionable) the task of identifying ideas other than strictly programmatic 
ones. Ideas, defined by Goldstein and Keohane as ‘beliefs held by individuals’.
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affect policy outcome, but the role of these ideas is confused because “choices 
of specific ideas may simply reflect the interests of actors” (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; 11). It therefore seems difficult if not impossible to separate 
cases where ideas, as defined and used by Goldstein and Keohane, exert their 
own independent influence from cases where a traditional interest analysis 
would provide adequate analysis. Moreover, in addition to the difficulty in 
showing any causal relationship between ideas and policy outcomes, their 
approach suffers from great difficulties in defining which ‘beliefs held by 
individuals’, of which there are many, are relevant to policymaking.
Favell (2001), in his study of French and British integration policies, develops 
an approach where the question of distinguishing between ideas and interests 
becomes less prominent. He envisages ideas as systems of meaning. For 
political debate to be meaningful, actors need to agree on certain basic 
assumptions. Favell’s ‘official political theory’ is a consistent argument about a 
political issue that actors adhere to. Such a theory includes guidance on how to 
interpret basic facts (epistemological claims); causal beliefs about means and 
ends (explanatory claims); and core values specifying the ideal end-goal 
(normative claims). An ‘official public theory’, however, is not a theory in a 
strict scientific sense, but rather a ‘workable compromise’ resulting from the 
political process. It thus shares important similarities with Hall’s (1993) policy 
paradigm, “a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goal 
of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also 
the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing (...) [which] is 
embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate
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about their work” (Hall 1993: 279). Like Hall’s paradigms Favell’s ‘official 
political theories’ can change, under similar conditions of long-term sub­
optimality or political crisis.
Favell’s definition of an ‘official political theory’ is useful because it provides 
an analytical tool that operates on a ‘medium level’ of ideas, i.e. his ‘official 
theory’ is wider than simple programmatic statements, but because of its quality 
o f ‘workable compromise’ remains less extensive and less abstract than a fully- 
fledged political theory.
The ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (Sabatier 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Sabatier and Schlager 2000) 
develops a more detailed concept of ideas, distinguishing between ‘core’ and 
‘secondary’ beliefs, where the core beliefs comprise elements such as “the 
proper scope of governmental vs. market activity and the proper distribution of 
authority among levels of government” (Sabatier 1991: 153). Core beliefs, 
similar to ‘sectoral state traditions’ as used in this thesis, are hypothesised to be 
relatively stable over a decade or more, and form the basis around which policy 
coalitions are formed. The basic assumption about long-term stability of core 
beliefs is not tested in the advocacy coalition framework, mostly because the 
focus of the advocacy coalition framework is on explaining policy output and 
policy change.
Thus, the introduction o f ‘ideas’ into political science analyses has not always 
resulted in increased clarity regarding the ideas themselves or their role in
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policymaking. There are two main reasons for this, and hence two major 
challenges for the literature on ideas. A major problem with the body of 
political science literature concerned with ‘ideas’ is that there is no general 
agreement as to the content of relevant ideas. A wide range of ideas has been 
studied, from relatively narrow ‘programmatic ideas’, or policy programmes 
(Jacobsen 1997; Notermans 1998; Woods 1995; Goldstein 1989; Blyth 2001), 
to broad ideas about the nature of the state and political theories. Studies on 
narrow, programmatic ideas suffer from an inherent difficulty in distinguishing 
between the role of the ideas themselves, and the power of their advocates, thus 
questioning the potential value added to traditional interest based models.^ The 
broader concepts of state traditions and political theory, however, are difficult to 
operationalise in a specific policy setting, and it remains unclear how such 
broad ideas could be seen to influence either the policy process or the outcome.
The second major difficulty for the literature on ideas is related to how ideas 
have been studied. Much literature on ideas has been criticised for failing to 
show what role ideas have in the policy process (Kohler-Koch 2002), which is 
not surprising, given the imprecise nature of much of the ‘ideas’ under 
investigation. However, most analyses of ideas and their effect on policymaking 
use policies as an indicator of whether ideas have influenced the policy process, 
instead of studying the arena where ideas are likely to be used more determined­
ly by policymakers, i.e. in political discourse.
 ^ For example. Hall’s (1986) study of ‘paradigmatic change’ in economic policy in France and 
Britain in the post-war period has been criticised because it fails to show the independent force 
o f an idea, and rather establishes “an eclectic, though effective, blend of elite and institutionalist 
analyses (...) the more powerful the sponsors who appropriate ideas, the more powerful the 
ideas” (Jacobsen 1997: 32).
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Recent studies of ideas thus often suffer from a difficulty in identifying and 
analysing the ideas themselves rather than their probable effect on the policy­
making process and on policies. This thesis attempts to resolve this problem by 
using public political discourse rather than policies as an indicator of sectoral 
state traditions. Furthermore, the effect of these ideas (the sectoral state 
traditions) on policy is not discussed, because such a discussion would 
inherently be fraught with potentially circular arguments, as in some of the 
approaches discussed above.^
The 'state traditions ’ concept
Studies on ‘state traditions’ narrow the range of ideas under investigation, from 
broad definitions such as ‘beliefs held by individuals’ to conceptions about the 
role and authority of state in society. The term ‘state tradition’ has been used by 
scholars to emphasise aspects of political life that are directly related to the 
existence of cognition of a ‘state’, and as such finds its place in the wider 
literature on the role of ideas in policy-making. ‘State tradition’, as opposed to 
‘national traditions’, has an immediate interpretation o f ‘something belonging to 
or emanating from the state apparatus’, and most analyses involving state 
traditions emphasise the cognitive aspect.
Dyson (1980) shows the pervasiveness of the concept o f ‘state’ in French and 
German intellectual tradition by illustrating how it has impregnated all 
discussions about the state, within, among and through education of state
 ^This is not to say that such a study would be impossible or without value. However, it seems 
reasonable to achieve clarity about the continuity and change of ideas themselves before 
attempting to analyse their effects, a clarity that is currently lacking from the literature.
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officials, and outside the state apparatus itself, by political philosophers, jurists, 
and other intellectuals. His seminal work contrasts ‘state societies’ (typically 
found in Continental Europe) with ‘stateless societies’ (Britain and the US 
being his foremost examples) and identifies a set of characteristics for ‘state 
societies’ :
• ‘State societies’ have a conception of ‘public power’;
• They deny that the public interest is only the sum of private interests, 
and so exemplify non-economic, non-utilitarian attitudes to political 
relations;
• They stress the distinctiveness of state and society, whether in terms of 
the special function of the state or in terms of the peculiar character of 
its authority;
• They have a concern with institutions, reflecting legalism and codifica­
tion, as well as depersonalisation of the public power;
• They display a moralistic view of politics which involves strongly 
collectivist and regulatory attitudes (Dyson 1980: 51-52).
The ‘state’ thus functions as a generalising, integrating, and legitimating 
concept. It is generalising because it combines political society with ideas of 
collectivity and the general good, integrating because it integrates an array of 
institutions either through centralism (as in France) or through co-ordination of 
autonomous units loyal to the federation (as in Germany). Its legitimating 
aspects imply that institutions and individuals are seen as elements in a political 
community whose coherence and unity are established by the explicit
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articulation, identification, and ordering of certain principles or norms (Dyson 
1980; 208-214).
Dyson’s study (1980) also outlines a conceptual model to classify states, which 
focuses on “the character of the authority relations contained within the 
‘associative’ bonds that hold men together in state and society” (Dyson 1980: 
50). Here, the conception of legitimate political action is closely connected to 
the nature of authority in a society. For continental European countries, the 
‘state’ is seen as the “institution of political rule” (Dyson 1980: vii), so that an 
increased understanding of the nature of the ‘state’ can be said to increase the 
understanding of the political processes. In this model, certain elements of the 
state concept are seen to be common across countries. The state concept 
“identifies the leading values Of the political community with reference to 
which authority is to be exercised; emphasizes the distinctive character and 
unity of the ‘public power’ compared with civil society; focuses on the need for 
depersonalisation of the exercise of that power; finds its embodiment in one or 
more institutions and one or more public purposes which thereby acquire a 
special ethos and prestige and an association with the public interest or general 
welfare; and produces a social-cultural awareness of (and sometimes dissocia­
tion from) the unique and superior nature of the state itself’ (Dyson 1980: 206).
The values, institutionalisation of the depersonalisation of power, and public 
purposes themselves, however, vary between states, and can also vary within 
states over time. Different regimes, such as the III, IV and V Republics in 
France, and the German Reich, Weimar Republic and the ‘Bonn Republic’,
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embody different sets of institutions. The thesis investigates whether ‘leading 
values’, the ‘distinctive character of the public power’ and the ‘public purposes’ 
in the telephone sector changed or remained stable over the period 1900-1997.
Other authors have applied the term ‘state traditions’ in their analyses. Grimm 
(1991) gives an overview of the major political and intellectual events from the 
sixteenth century onwards as they relate to central characteristics of the state in 
continental Europe, in which he focuses on the intellectual reasoning and ideas 
behind state authority and sovereignty in relation to society. Rohe (1993) 
analyses the German state tradition as political culture, emphasising the 
existence of three different sub-cultures (dominant, Catholic and Socialist), the 
relative weakness oï'Gesellschaftskultuf (‘society culture’, or the allegiance to 
the macro-level in society) compared to ''Gemeinschaftskultuf (‘community 
culture’, or allegiance to smaller, club-like entities) and maintains that the 
problem of mediating between the political system and civil society remains in 
German political culture. Laborde (2000) reassesses the importance of the 
concept of state in British and French political thought. Her study primarily 
argues that the ‘statelessness’ of Britain is greatly overstated, but it also 
contributes to the refinement of the picture of the existence of a strong state 
concept in France. There are other examples of the use of the concept o f ‘state 
traditions’ in literature. For example. Crouch (1992) used the concept to denote 
different styles of industrial relations. In his approach, however, the concept is 
used to refer to commonly agreed-upon (but not necessarily empirically 
substantiated) prototypes, rather than being studied in its own right.
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State traditions therefore, as presented in literature, contribute to the study of 
ideas a precision of the ideas under investigation. State traditions are thus a 
specific set of ideas relating to the normative distribution of power and 
authority in society, and to the institutionalisation of such norms. State 
traditions are seen to contribute to individual policy-makers’ perception of 
politics, to socialising policymakers and to providing shared norms for a policy 
community. State traditions confine the range of policy options because of the 
limits they set on cognitive processes. Policies that are perceived as 
contradicting the state tradition will be seen as lacking in legitimacy and thus be 
difficult, or even impossible, to implement, if indeed they are even considered. 
State traditions are expressed as values in political discourse. However, a state 
tradition is not necessarily unchangeable and static; it can be manipulated and 
changed from within, as well as altered in response to exogenous forces.
The major difficulty with analysing state traditions is their level of generality, 
which complicates the operationally of the concept. Ideas on the role of the 
state and on the ideal distribution of authority and power in society are so vast 
and so complex that analysis must remain general. This thesis attempts to meet 
this problem by applying the general state traditions model to a sector-specific 
setting. The sectoral state tradition concept used here is therefore a sub-set of 
state traditions that is relevant to a particular sector. It embodies a notion of 
authority and of who should be the relevant actors in the policy process and 
what should be their relevant power. It also encompasses public ethos of the 
state and of sectoral policies, as well as criteria for legitimate decision-making 
procedures and discourse.
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Change in ideas and state traditions
State traditions are not static. The ‘idea of the state’ is by its very nature open- 
textured (Dyson 1980: 2), and its meaning depends on the context in which it is 
used. Although the chronological change in the idea of the state is not the major 
part of Dyson’s work (his main focus being the link between the idea of the 
state and society), he nevertheless concludes that “a sense of direction [of the 
development of the idea of the ‘state’] is only likely to be achieved if 
philosophy is prepared to marry conceptual analysis to a more comprehensive, 
historical understanding of social and political experience” (Dyson 1980: 287). 
Despite this call for further research, he sketches a development where the 
Western European ‘state’ can be said to experience (in the late 1970s) a sense of 
‘crisis’. He illustrates this tendency with growing international interdependence, 
both economically and politically, partly through the increased sense of the 
failure of the traditional state to tackle contemporary problems. However, this 
thesis provides evidence that the leading values and public ethos as expressed in 
public political discourse of two major West European states remained 
remarkably stable over a period of more than a century, including the period 
Dyson considered ‘in crisis’ and the subsequent two decades.
Change is also a recurring theme in the literature on ideas. Although much of 
this literature has problems defining the exact content of relevant ideas, it is 
nevertheless frequently claimed that ideas change, particularly as policy 
changes (either as a prerequisite for, or as a consequence of, change). Hall 
(1993: 276) attempts to specify the role that ideas play in policymaking.
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According to his approach, actors’ ideas and preferences can change through a 
process o f ‘social learning’. If policy paradigms (defined as a framework of 
ideas and standards that specify policy goals, the appropriate instruments, and 
the nature of the problem) are to change, the change is likely to be associated 
with a process in which the overarching terms of policy discourse radically 
change. A movement from one paradigm to another is also likely to be preceded 
by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy. Since ideas form a 
major part of a policy paradigm, a paradigm change can be seen to indicate a 
change in ideas, and potential paradigm changes are thus identified by radical 
changes in the political discourse, by politicisation of the issue, and by a change 
in locus of authority (Hall 1993: 279).
Hall’s model is of interest to this thesis because it uses discourse as the main 
indicator of a policy paradigm, and because the ideas he includes in his ‘third- 
order change’ resemble those in the sectoral state tradition. It does however 
remain unclear from his model whether a paradigm shift (and thus change in 
ideas) is possible without major change among the policymaker individuals, and 
without a change in the governing political parties. If ideas (paradigms, sectoral 
state traditions) cannot change while the actors remain constant, it might be 
impossible to draw conclusions about the independent power of ideas.
‘Ideas’ are also referred to, albeit less stringently, in a host of studies on policy 
convergence (Dolowitz and March 2000; Bennett 1991; Peters 1997; Eatwell 
1997; Levy 1997). Although the ‘ideas’ mentioned in these works mostly are 
not the type of ideas included in a sectoral state tradition, there seems to be a
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‘common (mis)belief that ways of thinking about the nature of a problem (i.e. 
ideas) become increasingly similar as policy converges across countries. 
Ikenberry (1990), in his study of the spread of privatisation policies, argues that 
change in policies can indicate either a change in the state’s goals, or a change 
in what instruments it sees as appropriate to reach its goal (Ikenberry 1990; 92), 
and that the ‘wave’ of privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s indicated that such 
goals and instruments converged. “‘Efficiency’ is perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned reason for privatisation” (Ikenberry 1990: 91), indicating that 
governments from across the world increasingly valued efficiency as one goal 
of public policies, although they previously had (supposedly) different ideas 
about the value of efficiency. This relatively recent emphasis on efficiency 
across the world can thus be interpreted as a convergence of (certain) ideas.
The argument that convergent policies indicate convergent ideas becomes even 
more pronounced in writings on ‘globalisation’. “Globalization is not under­
mining the state system, but it is producing increasingly strong pressures for 
states to be of a certain sort -  open, democratic, flexible, and respectful of the 
rule of law” (Ikenberry 1997: 2). Ikenberry (1997), holds that “information 
globalization [distinguished from market and production globalisations...] is 
helping to create a single global society and culture, or at least one that is in­
creasingly homogenous (Ikenberry 1997: 14-15). Economic imperatives linked 
to an open world economy imply that “the opportunities that participation in the 
world economy produces, also create great constraints on governments. The 
choices are fewer. Certainly, the choices about how to interact with the world 
system shrink. Policies that once were driven by political ideology and societal
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coalitions are now economically irrational. (...) The policy dilemmas are 
second tier: how to adjust, how to mitigate, how to facilitate” (Ikenberry 1997: 
24).
‘Globalisation’ is also seen to be a driving force behind policy convergence 
because states face increasingly similar socio-economic environments (Eatwell 
1997: 252-269), or because of facilitated communication and interaction 
between interest groups through trans-national networks that constitute common 
pressures for change across nations (True and Mintrom 2001). Alternatively, 
politicians and bureaucrats can potentially play a similar role: “New constel­
lations of interests are being built up by politicians and bureaucrats in their 
interaction with transnational pressures and interests, resulting in the state itself 
becoming a major collective agent (...) and creating (...) a complex new set of 
opportunity structures rooted primarily in the search for competitiveness”
(Cemy 2000: 449). Globalisation, promoting change through economic and 
industrial interdependence, is thus seen to foster not only similar solutions 
across countries, but indeed similar policy goals, such as economic efficiency 
and international competitiveness.
Studies on policy transfer and ‘mimetism’ emphasise the role played by new 
rapid means of communication between policymakers from different countries 
to opt for convergent policies. Policy transfers are thought more likely in cases 
of geographical closeness, or linguistic and cultural similarities (Wolman 1992: 
33). National policymakers are seen to have less power to determine their own 
agenda in face of growing international economic dependencies, and
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supranational institutions such as the EU^, the World Bank and the IMF are 
fostering policy convergence through their demands. “These changes, by 
subjecting countries to similar pressures and expanding the amount of 
information available to policy-makers, have meant that policy-makers 
increasingly look to other political systems for knowledge and ideas about 
institutions, programs and policies and about how they work in other 
jurisdictions” (Dolowitz and March 2000; 7).
Thus, although only rarely explicit, studies on policy convergence have shown a 
tendency to assume that convergent policies indicate convergent ideas, not only 
about policy measures, but also about goals for state activity. However, this 
assumption has not been subjected to a long-term historical investigation. This 
thesis will therefore provide important information to studies on convergence.
Discourse as indicator of sectoral state traditions
Political discourse is an important vehicle for the communication, maintenance, 
and development of state traditions. As Dyson (1980: 1) comments, “[Ijanguage 
is part of the social and political structure; it reveals the politics of a society”. 
Language is an active tool in the political process. The way in which issues are 
approached, and what concepts are employed, helps to determine the ensuing 
politicking, the issues’ chances of reaching the agenda of a particular institution, 
and the final outcome (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 9). “Issue definition is central 
to studies of (...) politics (...) because different definitions generate different
 ^The term EU or European Union is used throughout the work to denote what has been known 
as the European Communities, the European Community, and the European Union, unless there 
are strong reasons to do otherwise.
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cleavages in society. Public debate and policymaking concerning important 
policy issues rarely consider all elements of an issue at once” (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1994; 50).
Discourse is therefore a good indicator of sectoral state traditions. Although 
political discourse should not be taken prima facie as expressing the ‘true’ 
beliefs and values of the speaker, or be seen to be solely produced (as a cynic 
might suggest) in order to manipulate the policy community or the general 
public into accepting prominence of certain interests, it nevertheless reveals the 
speaker’s perception of the environment’s requests for legitimate behaviour. A 
long-term historical investigation into public political discourse makes it 
possible to determine the sectoral state tradition’s sustainability and 
development.
Using ‘discourse’ as an indicator of sectoral state traditions is, however, not 
limited to study of the concepts used in public debate, which essentially 
(although not exclusively) focus on public ethos. The form  of discourse is a 
good indicator of the relative power of policymakers. In her analysis of how 
discourse impacts on the political process Vivien Schmidt (2002; 2001; 2000) 
distinguishes between two main types of discourse: the communicative and the 
coordinative. The former is prevalent in states where policymaking is 
predominantly centralised, determined among an inner group, and 
communicated to the public only when the decisions have been made. The 
communicative discourse is, therefore, directed mainly towards the general 
public. Conversely, the coordinative discourse is more common in countries
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where policymaking is more dispersed, and where larger parts of the population 
are involved in negotiating reform. Coordinative discourse is mainly aimed at 
knowledgeable co-deciders, and tends to be more technical than communicative 
discourse. Thus, a public discourse of either of these types indicates how 
policymakers perceive rules for legitimate decision-making. A communicative 
discourse indicates that policymakers are confident that policies, once agreed 
upon by the relevant actors (which, because of the communicative nature of the 
discourse, excludes the general public), are legitimate. A co-ordinative 
discourse, however, points to greater dispersion of power among the relevant 
actors, and (ideally) greater possibilities for the general public to participate.
Discourse is thus used to indicate the way in which policy-makers frame the 
issues at hand. Sectoral state traditions operate partly at a sub-conscious level 
and discourse is therefore used to decipher (hidden) assumptions, what is taken 
for granted and what remains unquestioned by policymakers. To the extent that 
state traditions are explicitly known and expressed, policymakers can delibe­
rately manipulate the framing of emerging issues and certain preferred solutions 
in such a way that they are adhering to the principles of the state tradition, thus 
increasing their perceived legitimacy in a policy community.
The role o f institutional reform
The thesis studies sectoral state traditions through public political discourse 
about institutional reform. Institutional reform opens up opportunities for a 
change in the formal set of relevant actors in a policy area, as well as in their
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formal relative power (Hall 1993; Kohler-Koch 2002). There is therefore a good 
case for using periods of debate about major institutional reform as empirical 
cases.
The thesis does not attempt to explain institutional reform, nor does it use the 
reform outcome to indicate stability or change in sectoral state traditions. The 
reform periods themselves therefore provide the occasions for debate where 
change in the sectoral state traditions are most likely, because of the issue’s 
presence in public debate.
In addition, the formal institutional framework provides a natural setting within 
which debate takes place. Moreover, one period's institutional reform often 
provides the starting points for debates about reform in the following period.
For these reasons, brief descriptions of the major points of reforms implemented 
are therefore included in chapters."  ^However, it must be emphasised that the 
thesis does not attempt to explain why these reforms were undertaken. Rather, 
its focus is on discourse about reform in order to analyse the continuity of 
sectoral state traditions.
Analysing sectoral state traditions
Having presented the theoretical foundations for the development of this 
thesis’s major empirical tool, the object under investigation, sectoral state 
traditions, will be defined and outlined in greater detail. The establishment of
 ^The exception is the descriptions of the reform outcomes in the late 1990s. Although not 
central to the argument, they provide a natural end point to the empirical study.
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this object will enable an analysis of the persistence of ideas in national policy­
making in the telephone sector. Three aspects are of particular importance if 
sectoral state traditions are to be of analytical use; First, its essential elements, 
i.e. the types of ideas present in a sectoral state tradition. Second, the original 
sectoral state tradition must be established to give a starting point for analysis of 
change or continuity. In this thesis the original sectoral state tradition is defined 
as the one in place when telephone policy had been consolidated in the two 
countries (c. 1900). Third, a method for identifying change must be established.
Defining sectoral state traditions: Central elements
A sectoral state tradition is a sub-set of state traditions relevant to a particular 
sector. The constitutive elements are chosen based on the theoretical works 
outlined earlier, in particular the elements identified as belonging to the 
(Continental European) state tradition by Dyson (1980). However, this study’s 
focus on a particular sector has necessitated certain adjustments to Dyson’s 
model. The notion of authority remains central for sectoral state traditions, as 
does the public ethos. Moreover, the ideas about state as legitimating concept, 
and its implications for practical decision-making procedures and political 
discourse, are included in a sectoral state tradition. But, because the level of 
study is sectoral, all elements are interpreted with respect to the particular 
sectoral setting. This does not imply that the sectoral state traditions would 
contradict the general state traditions, but rather, that the level of detail 
regarding actors, institutions and legal framework is greater in this study than if 
general state traditions were being studied. Furthermore, similar studies of
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different sectors might require further adjustments to capture essential sectoral 
characteristics. The list of elements presented here is therefore not necessarily 
exhaustive for all possible empirical cases, but should provide sufficiently 
general to be of use in cross-national, as well as cross-sectoral, comparisons.
A sectoral state tradition includes:
• A notion of authority and of who should be the relevant actors in the 
policy process, and an institutional framework delineating power 
structures between these;
• A public ethos of sectoral policies;
• Criteria for legitimate decision-making procedures and discourse.
Origin o f a sectoral state tradition
Identifying a point at which a sectoral state tradition is consolidated is central to 
the question of whether such traditions remain stable over time. The search for 
state traditions, and for explanations of social organisation and state structures, 
can be drawn far back into the past.^ However, practicalities necessitate limiting 
empirical research: For telephone policy the limitation is relatively easy, the 
starting point being 1876, when the telephone was invented and brought to the 
attention of policy-makers in both France and Germany.^
 ^E.g., Barrington Moore’s (1966) study on the ‘routes to modernity’, and Bendix’s (1996 [orig: 
1964]) on the process on nation-building, both trace the origins of modem regimes back to me­
dieval times. Dobbin (1994), in his study on industrial policy paradigms in the railway sector in 
France, the UK and the US, draws on developments from the nation-building phases in each of 
the three cases. All these works, therefore, establish important links between existing social 
structures and the first institutions of a ‘modem’ society.
 ^It could be argued, because the telephone was initially viewed as a special case of telegraphy 
and handled by national telegraph authorities, that one should trace the institutional roots back
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The consolidation of a sectoral state tradition is expressed through the 
establishment of a language common to all interested parties, through which 
problems are perceived and solutions defined. In the case of telephone policy, 
the period up to c. 1900 (when both countries had basic telephone legislation in 
place, telephone services were institutionalised as an integral part of state 
services, and the principal actors in the policy-making environment were 
defined and established) is seen as the ‘consolidation phase’.
Determining change in sectoral state traditions
Sectoral state traditions are ideas about political authority and legitimate state 
action in a specific sector. Identifying change can be difficult, because the 
identification in many cases must depend on subjective measurements (ideas, 
norms and values, are in most cases implicit rather than explicit). To minimise 
the risk of subjectivity in the process of determining change in sectoral state 
traditions (although it would be impossible to eliminate it altogether) certain 
parameters should be used as a ‘checklist’ to indicate stability or change. The 
parameters used in this study are;
The notion of authoritv. relevant actors, and their relative power 
The formal institutional framework for the sector partly determines both rele­
vant actors and their relative power. However, ideas about who should possess
to the first telegraph legislation in the 1840s (see Schneider 2001). However, although some 
‘institutional baggage’ from the pre-telephone era is discussed here, telephone pohcy clearly 
emerged as a separate policy area with a relatively solid body of special legislation around 
1900. Subsequent impact of telegraph pohcy (as well as the initial institutional challenges 
connected with the merging of telegraphy with the postal administration) has been covered in 
the relevant chapters.
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ultimate authority are not necessarily corresponding to the de facto  power these 
actors have in practical policymaking. Because the essential elements of a 
sectoral state tradition are ideas about the ideal distribution of power, expressed 
in public political discourse, potential changes to such ideas must be evaluated 
by how policies are presented, rather than by how they were practically formed. 
The empirical investigation will show that the notion of authority remained 
stable throughout the period studied, but that the set of perceived relevant actors 
and what powers they should have changed, particularly in France in the 1980s.
Public ethos of sectoral policies
Common agreement on the identification of the sector’s product is crucial to the 
maintenance of the state tradition. It establishes a common language for all 
interested parties and frames the relevant questions and issues in the sector 
based on shared values. If  this consensus is questioned and a new consensus 
appears, the sectoral tradition can be said to have changed. It is, however, 
important to distinguish between the public ethos and its implications for policy 
instruments. A change in the latter (e.g., from direct state service provision to 
regulation of private service providers) does not necessarily imply change in 
public ethos, which depends on how the (new) policy instruments are legiti­
mated in public political discourse.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making and discourse 
Legitimate methods for policymaking involve formal and informal rules about 
who is consulted for new policy proposals and about the style o f communica­
tion between these actors. The nature of the public discourse changes if central
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concepts identified in previous time periods are no longer in use, or are used 
significantly less, or if new concepts are given prominent place; if the set of 
participants in the public debate changes; or if new technological possibilities 
are couched in terms different from existing ones. Examples of such changes in­
clude the focus on ‘efficiency’ and ‘modernisation’ in the immediate post-war 
years (concepts that became prominent only after the Second World War and 
which had not been in consistent use in previous time periods) and increased 
attention to ‘managerialism’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ in the 1920s, and again in 
the 1980s in Germany.
The empirical cases -  French and German telephone policy debates
The use of French and German telephone policy debates as empirical cases 
allows for a ‘most similar systems’ approach. France and Germany are both 
characterised by Dyson as ‘state societies’ and can therefore be expected to 
place great emphasis on their respective state traditions. They are of relatively 
similar size and economic and political importance, and have followed 
comparable paths of economic and technological development.
A study of the telephone policy sector potentially provides significant informa­
tion on the strength of sectoral state traditions in an area where convergence, 
according to literature presented in this chapter, could be expected. The French 
and German telephone policy sectors experienced similar exogenous pressures 
(technological changes, increasingly interdependent economies, supranational 
legislation) and similar institutional frameworks throughout the period (minis­
terial bureaucracies, separate budgets, corporatisation, regulation of full compe-
Ideas, state traditions, and political discourse 53
tition). Despite these similarities, national debates showed significant differen­
ces with reference to the elements of the sectoral state tradition throughout the 
120 years from 1876 until 1997.
The periods chosen as foci for the empirical research correspond with periods of 
fundamental institutional reform, when changes in ideas expressed through 
public political discourse are assumed to be most likely. The chapter on the 
post-Second World War period is an exception, but is included because ideas 
about the role of the state were generally challenged in this period.
Having presented the case for the empirical investigation, and having estab­
lished the main elements of a sectoral state tradition and a set of parameters 
within which to evaluate change, it is time to identify the original form of the 
sectoral state tradition in telephone policy in France and Germany. The task is 
undertaken as an empirical investigation of the period 1876-1900, and is 
presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 2 
Consolidation of State monopolies -  the first 25 years of 
telephone service provision
As argued in chapter 1, analysis of change or continuity in sectoral state 
traditions necessitates knowledge about the sectoral state traditions in their 
original form. This chapter therefore aims at analysing public debates around 
the state’s monopolisation of telephone service provision to identify the initial 
elements of the sectoral state tradition; a notion of authority; public ethos; 
criteria for legitimate decision-making and discourse. The result of this analysis 
will form the baseline against which change or continuity is evaluated in the 
next chapter.
This chapter shows that the sectoral state traditions were consolidated at the 
turn of the century. By then legal frameworks were in place defining telephone 
service provision as a state monopoly. The ultimate authority of Parliament in 
the case of France, and of legislation in the case of Germany, was unquestioned 
in the telephone sector. Moreover, the period 1876-1900 consolidated the set of 
actors perceived as relevant to policymaking, as well as ideas about how much 
relative power they should have.
Public debates in the consolidation period illustrated the differences in French 
and German responses to a similar problem: How to justify a state monopoly in 
telephone service provision for it to be in line with contemporary views on the 
role of the state in the economy? The two different responses form the origin of
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the public ethos in the two countries; the ‘general will’, and continuity and 
equality of service in France, legal circumscription of federal rights and cost- 
based tariffs (as indication of economic efficiency in infrastructure provision) in 
Germany.
The case of France
This chapter will show that the first 25 years of telephone legislation in France 
were marked by agreement on the formal ultimate authoritv of Parliament, 
despite the wide de facto  discretionary powers of the P&T administration. The 
actors perceived as relevant to policymaking at the end of the consolidation 
period were essentially Parliament, the P&T administration, and, once 
budgetary unity was introduced in 1892, the finance ministry. In 1887 a 
consultative commission was established to provide a continuous link between 
the central administration and Parliament, but the empirical evidence does not 
suggest that this commission was perceived among the relevant actors in the 
policy area (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1887). Private 
enterprise was excluded from the policy-making arena when the telephone 
service was nationalised, and industry was given no formal representation in the 
decision-making process.
The French public ethos in telephone policy at the turn of the century consisted 
of quality (continuity) and equality in service provision, and budgetary unity. 
The licence conditions from 1879 and 1884 provided a certain protection of the 
consumer through territorial equality of tariffs, and from 1884 onwards they
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included an obligation to provide a service. Both territorial equality and 
obligation to provide service (subject to local financing of necessary 
investments) were integrated in the public ethos once the telephone service was 
nationalised. (Continuity and equality would subsequently be integrated in the 
concept of service public in the early 20^ century, whereas budgetary unity 
would disappear.)
Legitimate decision-making procedures focused on the role of Parliament and 
the public administration, and emphasised procedural correctness as the basis 
for legitimacy. The introduction of budgetary unity in 1892 cemented telephone 
policy’s position within the state bureaucracy to the detriment of external 
influence. Industry and the general public had no place in the policymaking 
environment, and discourse was of the communicative type, coherent with 
expectations of V. Schmidt’s model when political decisions are taken among a 
closed group of state officials, and subsequently communicated to the public.
Telephone policy and the state: 1876-1900
Before investigating the first two decades of telephone service provision in 
greater detail in order to identify the original sectoral state tradition more 
clearly, it is necessary to first set out the principles of the role of the state in the 
late 19* century.
Two intellectual problems proved particularly significant for political thinking 
relevant to the telephone issue in 19* century France. The first was the inherent
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tension between Parliament as the representation of the ‘nation’ and its ability 
(or lack thereof) to control the executive branches of government, reflecting the 
problem of sovereignty and de facto  power. Second, the founding principles of 
the Republic -  liberty, equality, and fraternity -  posed the problem of upholding 
individual liberty through minimal state intervention vs. the promotion of 
equality through positive government action. For telephone policy, this problem 
translated into the debate on competition vs. monopoly of service provision.
Sovereignty, the government, and societal interaction
The state was established as a fundamental legal concept in France by the early 
seventeenth century. The idea of the state, “connoted a territorial unit ruled by a 
single sovereign; the continuity of royal government and its vast apparatus of 
offices apart from the mortal life of the king; and a community enjoying a unity 
of sentiment as a consequence of living under a common sovereign” (Dyson 
1980: 27-28). After the Revolution, the conception of sovereignty was allocated 
in the abstract ‘nation’. The sovereignty of the nation and the democratic 
principle of direct representation meant that the legislator as the highest and 
most legitimate representative of the ‘general will’ was all-powerful. The 
administration was the machine that implemented parliamentary decisions 
(Rosanvallon 1990).
The government possessed wide discretionary powers. Parliament could allow 
government to issue decrees (governmental decisions without parliamentary 
debate) about specific matters, whilst retaining the right to repudiate such
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decisions ex post (Cole 1960: 202). Early telephone legislation (before 
nationalisation in 1889) was in the form of decrees or arrêtés (ministerial 
decisions). The initial treatment o f ‘the telephone’ as a special case of 
telegraphy gave the Post and Telegraph (P&T) Ministry large discretionary 
powers in the policy area. As long as Parliament did not protest, which the 
young institution did not do because it had more urgent political problems 
(Leroux 1987), the P&T Minister and his bureaucrats could continue their 
pragmatic policies relatively undisturbed. On the occasions when they presented 
telephone issues to Parliament, as, for example, in the demand for extra- 
budgetary resources in 1882 and the renewal of licence in 1884, the political 
discourse was, as will be shown, in line with contemporary views on legitimacy 
of state intervention (e.g.. Parliament’s ultimate authority, ideas on monopoly 
vs. competition, and the (potential) superiority of state provision over private 
enterprises).
The particular role of Parliament in the definition and expression of the general 
interest led to other channels of interest mediation and communication, such as 
the bureaucracy and political parties, being downplayed. Government ministers 
were perceived to be corrupt (Gildea 1996: 12-15), and political parties were 
seen as ‘inappropriate’ and a ‘source of disorder’ (Bastid 1954: 148). These 
factors strengthened the relative autonomy of the P&T ministry in the 
policymaking process, which in practice rendered the ministry the sole public 
institution interacting with private potential service providers, who had, 
themselves, no direct access to the legislator. The actors seen as relevant to
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policymaking at this early stage, therefore, were Parliament and the P&T 
administration.
Liberty or equality, competition or monopoly
Another fundamental source of tension in the idea of the state at the time of the 
invention of the telephone was the founding republican principles of Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity. Those advocating ‘liberty’ as the main aim of govern­
ment sought to limit governmental authority, whereas those emphasising 
‘equality’ valued positive governmental action to “keep certain individuals or 
groups from oppressing weaker individuals” (Cole 1960; 191). The telephone 
policy issue linked to this debate was whether to establish state monopoly over 
telephone service provision, and the idea of equality rendered the state capable 
of legitimately monopolising certain scarce resources that the markets could not 
be trusted to distribute fairly, such as the telephone and telegraph infrastructure 
(Rosanvallon 1990).
Those in favour of ‘weak government’, in the sense of minimal administrative 
machinery, were supported by liberal economists. According to Jean-Baptiste 
Say, an influential political economist in the late 19^ century, the best measure 
of governmental quality was economic efficiency (Leroux 1991: 25). “It is by 
the nature of the public expenses that one can know if a nation is represented or 
not, if it is well administered, or not” (Say, quoted in Rosanvallon 1990: 59). 
Thus, demands for a reduction in the number of public officials did not 
generally originate from a desire for less governmental intervention, but from a
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belief that a large bureaucracy was a sign of a mal-functioning direct 
government. Political economists tended to advocate a ‘one-way liberalism’, i.e. 
as little state intervention as possible unless national industry directly benefited, 
for example through protectionist measures. ^  “[T]he most famous among [the 
economists] held as principle that everything that could be undertaken by 
private initiative should be forbidden [for the state]” (Picard 1906:451). A 
(state) monopoly, according to the liberal credo, would result in neglect of the 
consumer, excessively expensive products, low quality, and indolent producers.
At this time, economists distinguished between ‘natural’ and ‘legal’ monopolies
(Leroux 1987: 26-29). A ‘natural’ monopoly would occur if it was impossible
for more than one actor to efficiently provide a certain product or service. This
might be because of some specific characteristic of one actor, such as unique
excellence or talents, or unique access to material or natural resources. ‘Legal’
monopolies were of two sub-categories; those based on certain ‘general
interests’ (such as education), and those whose sole purpose was to increase
state revenues (‘fiscal monopolies’, such as the tobacco and matches monopoly,
see Citroën 1925). Of these two main types, only the ‘natural’ monopoly was
considered legitimate (Leroux 1987: 26). If, however, the monopoly served a
purpose in the ‘general interest’, the situation was somewhat different.
For a [state] monopoly to be completely legitimate, it must have as its 
objective a service that could not be undertaken by an individual or by a 
collection of individuals left to themselves, or that the service demands 
certain security measures which could not be brought about from private
’ “For [Jean-Baptiste] Say, it would be crazy to believe that good State action was equal to not 
doing anything bad (...) an enlightened government supports industrial experience in order to 
improve the conditions of production; (...) the government has to ensure property rights, 
through chfiusion of the Lights {Lumières) without which economic activity cannot prosper” 
(Steiner 1998: 30).
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actors. In one word, the monopoly is legitimate only to the extent that it is 
established and operated in the interest and to the benefit of the community.
Rousseau 1882: 7
To legitimise a monopoly in telephone service, the government invoked the 
general interest and used its superiority as service provider in a ‘natural 
monopoly’ such as communications. Fundamentally, the state held a monopoly 
right to transmit communication from 1837 onwards, a right it had never 
renounced.
Early telephone legislation
Telephony was initially viewed as a special case of telegraphy -  a ‘talking 
telegraph’ (Siemens 1879) -  and placed under the authority of the P&T 
ministry. The telegraph service had after lengthy discussions been merged with 
the postal services to form a common administration in 1878, finally achieving 
the status of a separate ministry in 1879 (Aufavre 1871; Blavier 1872; Bulletin 
Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1879a: 62). However, this organisational 
merger resulted in latent conflicts between postal administrators and telegraph 
engineers (Bertho-Lavenir 1989). The postal monopoly had been 
institutionalised under Napoleon in 1804, because it provided a source of 
considerable income to the state,^ whereas in the case of the telegraph services, 
national security was given as the main reason for a public monopoly (Coe 
1923: 3-4), although the services were also profitable.
 ^The letter service had been subject to competition in the 18* century, but this was ended in 
1804. The pecuniary importance of the postal services was in the order of a 50 per cent profit 
margiiL According to Heinrich von Stephan, the German Reichspostmeister, the French postal 
profits were the highest of all European postal administrations (Stephan 1859: 630).
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After a devastating war, the Treasury must concentrate on fecund tasks that 
will have as little impact as possible on transactions, private income and 
manual work, and simultaneously contribute efficiently to the material and 
moral well-being of the country. The post and telegraph services seem to 
reunite these precious advantages.
Aufavre 1871; 1
One of the most remarkable measures in French telecommunications legislation 
was the general wording of the state monopoly in signal transmission from 
1837. The Law of 2 May 1837 stipulated that “[w]hoever transmits, without 
authorisation, signals from one place to another, by telegraph machines or bv 
anv other means, will be punished with imprisonment” (Law of 2 May 1837 §1, 
emphasis added). The reference to effect (transmission of signals) rather than 
technology implied that the state’s general rights in telephone service were 
never questioned, contrary to the situation in Germany, where earlier legislation 
referred directly to telegraph technology. The law of 1837 placed legal 
responsibility for telegraph services within the P&T administration, who had 
large discretionary powers regarding the establishment of new telegraph lines, 
tariffs for both public and closed private networks, and the expropriation of 
telegraph lines.^
Even if the state’s initial rights in telephone matters were secured, it did not 
follow that it would or should undertake provision of the service. Legislation
 ^For ‘telegraph lines of private interests’ the state could either construct and maintain its own 
lines, which remained connected to the public network, or it could in the case of private, closed 
networks allow hcensees to construct and maintain the lines. All lines with access to the public 
network were subject to state tariffs, and for private networks a special arrêté determined the 
tariff to be paid to the state (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1879b). The state 
was not responsible for acquisition and maintenance of terminal equipment for ‘private interest 
telegraph lines’, except in the case of lines serving local public offices. It did however retain the 
power to control communication on these lines, and, if and when evaluated ‘useful’, to integrate 
private lines into the public network. (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégr^hes 1879c). 
These provisions illustrate the large discretionary powers of the Ministry. No measures existed 
to protect private investors from state expropriation or to ensure any return on investments.
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from 1851 opened the way for private operating licences for telegraph services 
but only for a limited period of time. Telephony, because it was considered a 
case of telegraphy, came under the same legislation. Private operating licences 
did not remove the legal monopoly of regulation from the state, but instead, 
paved the way for alternative forms of provision in addition to direct state 
production (Law of 24 December 1851, Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et 
Télégrcq)hes 1881a).
The French administration did not believe in the profitability of the new means
of communication, and refused to allocate time and resources to a system whose
future was highly uncertain.
It was difficult at that time [in 1879] to be aware of this new and 
marvellous application of electricity, to suspect the place it would take in 
everyday life, and finally to calculate the expense that the telephone 
network would entail. From that moment, the administration could not 
imagine to immediately take charge o f such exploitations. (...) One thought 
that, while totally preserving the state’s monopoly, one had to let private 
industry undertake this enterprise of which it was impossible to measure the 
results in advance.
Projet de loi sur concessions des réseaux téléphoniques 1884,
quoted in Belugou 1888: 39
Existing legislation, however, did place responsibility for telephony within the 
telegraph administration, which the latter had no reason or wish to avoid.
Private sector interest in providing the telephone service necessitated clarifica­
tion of public policy, and because of economic constraints and scarcity of 
resources, the public administration did not have the capacity to undertake 
provision of a project whose future was relatively uncertain, and whose costs 
and benefits at the time were unknown. It chose therefore to issue operating
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licenses to private service providers/ Separate licence conditions for telephony 
appeared in June 1879/
License conditions
For ten years, until nationalisation in 1889, the centrepiece of telephone legisla­
tion was the arrêté of 26 June 1879, outlining the licence conditions for the 
telephone service (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1879d). The 
central points of the conditions were:
• The licence was given for five years only;
• External lines, i.e. all cabling with the exception of those inside a 
building and its connection to the outside cable, should be installed and 
maintained by the P&T Administration, at the expense of the licensee;
• The state should control the operation of the service through:
o approval of terminal equipment (while allowing for competition 
in its supply);
o setting of tariffs, on an equal basis for all subscribers; 
o ensuring that price reductions were given to public offices;
The licence conditions were given in answer to “diverse demands for obtaining the 
authorisation to estabhsh and exploit a telephone communications system in Paris and the larger 
cities.” (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1879d: preamble).
 ^The telegraph authorities also used problems with electric induction to argue their control of 
telephone installations: “the use of telephone needs to be specifically authorised because lines 
originally intended for use with other instruments can be used with telephones only when they 
are completely isolated, and it is for the state to verify whether the lines fulfil the necessary 
conditions. Installation of underground cables for private telephone connections can take place 
only through the telegraph service.” (Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1881b: 
789). Aerial fines were used only to a limited extent in France, and the proximity o f trajectories 
of telephone and telegraph fines necessitated measures to avoid induction and noise. Such 
measures were best provided for through centralisation in one office, and the telegraph 
authorities were given this task.
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o determining that the city of Paris would receive an allowance for 
the right to pass telephone cables through the sewer system; 
o giving public officials the right to at any moment enter the 
licensees’ offices for controls;
• 10 per cent of annual total income should go to the Treasury, with a 
minimum of 5.000 Fr for Paris and 10.000 Fr for provincial networks;
• The government could at any moment buy back the concession as well 
as the equipment. If the parties were unable to agree upon a price the 
matter was to be settled by ‘independent experts’;
• The State had no responsibility, economic or technological, for the 
quality of the operation of the service;
• The telephone service was for personal use only and ‘third persons’ 
were not allowed access to the service (thus closing the possibility for 
commercial telephone offices competing with the local telegraph).
The first license conditions thus left the state with much freedom and little risk. 
Technological conditions were unsophisticated, and no specific regulation 
existed for different kind of networks. Telephone connections were only local; 
the first inter-city connection, between Rouen and Le Havre, took place in 1885 
(Libois 1983). There was therefore no need for specific regulation for different 
kinds of networks and more care was taken to defend the state’s economic 
interests than subscribers’ rights. The telephone, with its low penetration rates, 
was considered a toy for the few rather than a basic public good so that the 
telegraph filled the role of providing individuals with a means for long-distance 
communication, without unnecessarily putting state finances under pressure.
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In addition to granting licenses, the P&T administration retained the right to 
operate its own telephone service. The approach of the P&T administration was 
purely demand-driven; the customers paid all costs related to the extension of 
the network themselves, they carried all costs of terminal equipment, and the 
administration took no responsibility for the functioning of either lines or 
equipment. The public authorities claimed the right to control the 
communications over their networks (Ministère des Postes et des Télégraphes 
1882).
Even under these relatively unfavourable conditions, three companies applied 
for a telephone service license in the late 1870s. Of the three companies, two 
merged early 1880, and in December 1880 the remaining two entities joined 
forces and established the Société générale des téléphones (SGT). The 
contemporary lack of interconnection increased the disadvantages of having 
more than one network, and so from 1881 onwards there was only one private 
telephone service operator in France.
The 1880s -  principles and pragmatism
Despite having issued three licences to private telephone operators, from 1881 
the P&T administration found itself with only one private provider; the SGT. 
The public administration, however, had itself built a telephone infrastructure in 
larger industrial centres, financed through supplementary budget credits from 
1882 (Belugou 1888; 43; Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1882). 
The P&T administration’s hands-on experience helped to temper the state’s
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initial reluctance to engage in telephone service provision, and it became 
gradually more positive to undertake provision itself.^ Opponents of a telephony 
monopoly would, in order to strengthen their argument, point to the ‘bad 
industrial record’ of the state in other monopolised industrial sectors. Public 
administrators fought to refute these criticisms through public reports showing 
the state’s success in managing industrial sectors. ^
The state’s continued tight control of the telephone sector and the incapacity of 
the SGT to determine its own cost structure (because tariffs were set by the 
public administration) reduced the SGT’s incentives to extend the network in 
rural areas. The P&T authorities were able to promote themselves as the only 
operator not driven purely by capitalism but by concerns for citizens’ welfare 
(Bertho-Lavenir 1988: 161). The state’s advantage in this socially beneficial but 
economically dubious segment was used to argue its de facto superiority as a 
service provider throughout the territory. This would prove to be politically 
important when the state’s legitimacy was increasingly based on the outcome of 
state actions and their benefits to citizens, rather than on a ‘simple’ unique right 
to violence and maintenance of public order (see Chapter 3). The P&T 
administration could thus claim to be the sole guarantor of territorial equality of 
users, which formed part of the public ethos at the end of the consolidation
® There is little evidence about this debate, both because it took place mainly outside of 
Parliament (the Ministry being responsible for implementation of the law of 1851 and the 
succeeding telephone legislation), and because ministerial archives were destroyed during a 
flooding of Paris’ official archives around 1910.
’ Leroux (1987) shows in her study, based on numbers from Brault (1890), that for the first two 
years of the subscription the prices of the SGT’s and the state’s services were approximately 
similar. For any longer period, however, the P&T Ministry’s services became economically 
advantageous ^eroux 1987: 19). However, the central administration’s continued tight, short­
term regulation of the telephone service provider created important differences in incentives to 
invest. An unstable regulatory environment imphed an uncertain rate of return on investments.
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period, and which would increase in importance with the development of the 
concept of service public.
However, the state was not in a position to view telephony as a basic public
good. The idea of the welfare state was only in its inception and telephony was
not yet characterised a service public. It was therefore central for the public
administration to demonstrate its industrial capabilities.
One can rest assured, that sacrifices made to develop the post and telegraph 
offices, like couriers and telegraph communications and also the improve­
ment of the personnel, will bear fiuits (...) The Posts and Telegraphs 
services have lost their fiscal character and ought therefore to follow the 
rules and norms for industrial exploitation; increase, improve, ameliorate 
their instruments, every day increase the public's satisfaction, hence 
augmenting the turnover by the growth of circulation, which directly 
corresponds to the commercial development of the country. The postal 
service can be compared to a factory that produces with ca. 20 per cent 
profit.
P&T Minister Cochery 1884, cited in Musso 1987:61
SGT’s first licence ended after five years, and although a renewal could have
been given directly by the Ministry, the P&T administration used this occasion
to prepare Parliament for future necessary investments. The P&T
administration, reporting to Parliament in 1884 concerning renewal of the
licence, viewed direct state provision in principle as a feasible alternative to a
licensing regime, but considered it premature at this stage. The central reason
for a continued license regime, according to the Ministry, was the uncertainty
involved for state finances.
The results of these early tests [of telephone service operation] are so far 
satisfactory, but the experience is still not sufficiently complete for us to 
ask Parliament for the credits necessary to exploit all the networks in
which rendered the P&T administration’s numbers questionable. Moreover, much of the costs 
were hidden within the larger national budget.
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France. The necessary expenses would be impossible to find at present, and 
one would also be exposed to a situation with lack of educated personnel.
Ministre des P&T 1884: 1015
However, the Ministry clearly preferred direct service provision by the state
once the financial risk could be determined and dealt with.
The rights of the state, however, are absolutely reserved. No monopoly 
rights are conceded, the administration can at any time license competing 
companies or operate the service itself.
Ibid.
The new SGT licence, granted for a further five years (Cahier des charges pour 
rétablissement, f  entretien et l’exploitation de réseaux téléphoniques du 18 July 
1884), revealed a mood change in the state administration. The licence regime 
of 1884 was more detailed than the previous one and introduced significant new 
measures, which can be read as a pragmatic compromise between the 
conflicting obligations of the state. The germ of universal service provision was 
introduced, which forbade the licensee to refuse a potential subscriber 
connection in their license area unless the ministry expressly allowed it (§1). 
During the first five years of telephone service provision, the network had 
developed to include ‘suburban networks’, and tariff regulation was introduced 
for connections between the different types of networks (§§18-19).^ The 
demand for equal treatment of users entailed the need for centrally fixed tariffs, 
to prevent private service operators exploiting their market power. The new 
licence conditions thus strengthened the P&T administration’s control over 
telephone service operation, but it also reduced the potential profitability of the
This measure was a means to facilitate access to a so-called ‘principal network’ for smaller 
communities close to urban areas, especially to the benefit of local smaller enterprises. 
Communications within a network was paid for through a fiat-rate subscription rather than call- 
by-call, and this new measure reduced the hcensee’s potential profit of operations in subinban 
areas, reducing the attractiveness of smaller network licences.
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SGT. Equal treatment of users became an important part of the sectoral state 
traditions public ethos.
The 1884 licence conditions and the P&T administration’s report to Parliament 
were strong signals of the public administration’s appetite for eventually taking 
over service provision. The SGT’s reaction was to put forward a proposal in 
March 1886 to create a limited company. This société fermière des réseaux 
téléphoniques de l'État would be given the right to operate the telephone 
service for a period of 35 years before handing the networks over to the state.^ 
Under this law, any town with more than 30 demands for telephone connections 
would have the right to a network. Furthermore, the state would own the 
networks throughout the period, but without investment obligations (Belugou 
1888: 56; Leroux 1991: 29). The proposal, however, was rejected by 
Parliament. A similar law proposal was put forward less than a year later, but 
again rejected on the grounds that the envisaged concession would break the 
absolute monopoly of the state in telephone service matters, which was 
considered to be untenable (Ricard 1931: 81-82). The obligation to provide 
service (when financial difficulties were resolved), however, would be 
incorporated in the public ethos by the end of the consolidation period.
The SGT’s lobbying activity had strengthened telephone policy’s place on the 
political agenda, and changing administrative structures from 1887 indicate 
increased politicisation of the issue. For example, in 1887, the Ministry for
 ^The State could, with a certain financial compensation to the company, buy back the networks 
at any time after the 15* year of operation
Consolidation of state monopolies 71
Posts and Telegraphs was transformed back into a Directorate General and 
placed under the Ministry of Finance (Décret du 30 Mai 1887 portant 
suppression du Ministère des Postes et des Télégraphes); the open credits of the 
former ministry were transferred to the Ministry of Finance (Décrets du 2 Juin 
1887 rattachant au Ministère des Finances les crédits ouverts en 1886 et en 1887 
au Ministère des Postes et des Télégraphes), and new financial control measures 
were introduced (Ministre des finances 1887). Awareness of the financial 
potential and the importance of funds involved also increased. In addition, the 
laws proposed by the private operator had made the need for a strong state 
monopoly in telephone service provision, as well, quite explicit, underlining the 
need for Parliamentary authority and control.
The case of Limoges -  administrative solutions to financial challenges
The financial uncertainty that had led the P&T administration to postpone direct 
state provision in 1884 was resolved in December 1888 in an arrangement made 
for the establishment of a telephone network in Limoges and the concurring 
financial arrangement. The convention, confirmed by law on 21 December 
1888, obliged Limoges to pay for the initial network construction, i.e. the 
central switch and connection to the national network, whereas the State would 
lend money to the city in order to facilitate subscriber access to the network.
The State remained owner of all lines, and was also responsible for invoicing 
and collecting contributions from the subscribers (Chaperon 1889). It was clear 
that this arrangement was intended as a general measure, soon extended to other 
cities and municipalities.
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To ensure the execution of the convention between the P&T administration 
and the city of Limoges (...) the following measures have been adopted 
(...) as much for the adopted convention as for similar ones that might 
intervene at a later stage.
Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et Télégraphes 1889: 440
The Limoges network was local, and hence no prime responsibility for the 
central administration. However, by using the local administration (Limoges) as 
a Uender’ and simultaneously holding onto rights of invoicing as well as 
operation, the P&T administration gave itself direct access to the telephone 
service subscribers whilst decreasing its financial risk. In this way, the state 
directly provided its citizens with a telephone service, which was politically 
advantageous, and the local organisation played a legitimising and risk-reducing 
role towards Parliament.
Once the problem of legitimising the financing of investments was solved,
nothing blocked the way for the P&T administration to take foil responsibility
for the operation of the telephone service, which was nationalised in 1889. The
central piece of legislation was the Law of 16 July 1889 (Loi qui autorise le
Gouvernement à traiter avec les villes pour l’établissement de Réseaux
téléphoniques d’intérêt local et à emprunter â la Caisse des dépôts et
consignations les sommes nécessaries pour effectuer le rachat des réseaux
éxploités par la Société générale des Téléphones), which placed responsibility
for telephony service provision with the Government.
[The government is] authorised to accept (...) payments to the Treasury 
(...) of the amounts necessary for establishment, maintenance and 
exploitation of urban telephone networks and to provide the products that 
have been paid for in this way, without any further engagement on behalf 
of the state.
Law of 16 July 1889, Art. 1
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Nationalisation
The Law of 16 July 1889 gave the Government responsibility for providing 
telephone infrastructure to communities that found the financial means to do so. 
In the same year, the P&T administration was transferred to the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (Decree transferring the administration of posts and 
telegraphs from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry 9 January 1889; Decree on the open credits 6 January 1889), and the 
P&T office was given responsibility for administering the telephone service 
following nationalisation. Furthermore, the government was given authority to 
buy all of SGT’s telephone networks for FrF 10 million, and place them under 
state ownership (Law of 16 July 1889, Art. 2; see also Revue générale 
d  ’administration 1889).
The biggest changes due to nationalisation were on the operational side: The 
licensee lost its right to operate, and service provision was brought under the 
auspices of the ministry. A fimctional division was introduced for service 
provision, with postal, telegraph and telephone services organised as different 
offices. The law of 16 July also established the first separate budget for the 
telephone service, so that telephone service accounts would be treated 
separately fi"om the postal service’s, which protected the postal service’s 
finances fi’om risk associated with the telephone.
Art. 4: “During the budgetary years of 1889 and 1890, the necessary credits will be opened 
under the general budget of the Ministry for Commerce, Industry and Colotties.” Art. 5: “As 
from 1891, income and expenses for the telephone service will for a budget aimexed to the 
general state budget.” See also Musso 1991: 62.
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The telephone service’s perceived financial risk must however be assumed to
have diminished rapidly after nationalisation, when the telephone was
increasingly used as a telegraph substitute/^
Thanks to this innovation [of telephonic transmission of telegrams] the 
municipalities can economise on the installation of a [telegraph] office, 
because the price compared to the profit for the telephone apparatus is 
lower than that for the telegraph. It also presents greater ease concerning 
personnel.
Revue Générale de l’Administration 1889: 372
During 1890 and 1891 the number of telephone networks throughout the French
territory (including the colonies) grew rapidly, and the importance of the new
technology augmented (Annales Télégraphiques 1892). The innovation also
inspired visions of a fiiture central place for the telephone:
It is therefore allowed to envisage the day when all persons physically 
away from a rural agglomeration, business manager, farmer, owner, 
through limited expenditure could possess, even within his home, an 
instrument to connect him to the local telephone network and, via this, to 
the general telegraph network.
Tirard 1889: 5299
Budgetary unity vs. industrial activity -  the 1890s
According to the developing doctrine of service public, the unity of the state 
was absolute; the body of administrative law was intended to ensure that all 
state action served the general interest, which was the only legitimate reason for 
infiinging on individual liberties. The implication of this idea for organisational 
structure was that a state entity, undertaking all action in the general interest, 
should operate one unitary budget -  the ‘doctrine of budgetary unity’ (Jèze 
1926: 3-27). This doctrine led to the abolition of the separate telephone budget 
from 1892, after which the P&T services had to get parliamentary approval for
French regulation of this service appeared in 1889, much later than in Germany (Tirard 1889).
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investments that required extra-budgetary resources (Law of 28 December 
1892, cited in Musso 1991: 62). This situation would entail great practical 
difficulties for investment programmes, and was used in the 1920s to argue the 
need for financial reform.
The conflict between those who saw the telephone as a vital part of the 
country’s infrastructure, at the service of economic enterprise, and those who 
regarded it as an integral part of state administration, did not disappear with 
nationalisation, but was translated into a dispute about financial regime. Those 
viewing telephone service provision as an industrial activity advocated financial 
flexibility, whereas their opponents favoured budgetary unity.
The P&T administration was divided between the two views. The potential
benefits of greater financial flexibility were not ignored by the administration
(Revue Générale de 1’ Administration 1889; Mir 1899), whose arguments
emphasised the importance of higher quality and lower prices of telephone
services, vital both to inter-regional and international business:
These communications [that are neither purely local nor national] are meant 
to link either an existing urban network to its suburbs, or several urban 
networks in one region, in order to increase the facility of correspondence 
between actors with similar industrial and commercial interests.
Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1890: 709
One must [through the increased financial control of the telephone service] 
avoid useless expenditure (...) that would have as result to deprive the 
public of facilities to which it has right, or that would leave the French 
businesses in an inferior situation compared to its foreign competitors.
Rouvier 1887: 143
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However, the debate continued on the assumption that the state monopoly was
irrevocable, thus emphasising the view that the telephone service was an
integral part of the public administration. Strong criticisms of the quality of
service in the late 1890s never led to suggestions that the service should be
taken out of the public service. Improvements were needed, it was agreed, but
they should take place within the ministry structure.
Regarding the telephone service in the North of France, it is a unanimous 
concert of complaints. (...) [butjthe number of phone connections have 
doubled since the beginning of the year (...) does this prove a 
malfunctioning service? I do not think so (...) and it would be unfair to be 
too hard on ourselves because of some few irregularities, which I certainly 
regret, but which are difficult to avoid completely.
Sous-sécretaire d’Etat [P&T Minister] debate Sénat May 1899
Monopolisation and nationalisation of the service constrained subsequent debate 
and decision-making in the sector. The state had consolidated its supremacy over 
telephone service provision, which would not be challenged for 70 years, and it 
would take almost another three decades before the monopoly would be broken. 
However, the nascent concept of service public and the problematic relationship 
between a service public and an industrial activity led to debates in the early 20^ 
century. This conflict remained central until the financial reform of 1923 and 
resulted in several parliamentary reports, as well as repeated law proposals 
aimed at increasing the financial flexibility of the telephone service (Musso 
1991: 62; Berenger 1923; see chapter 3). Rather than eliminating debate on the 
optimal institutional framework for telephone service provision and financial 
flexibility, nationalisation ensured that subsequent debates assumed the state 
monopoly to be irrevocable.
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The case of Germany
The empirical material from the first 25 years of telephone service provision in 
Germany shows that the notion of authoritv in the German system was closely 
linked to legislation. “The Rechtsstaat is the state governed by the law of 
reason, the state that realises, in and for human coexistence, the principles of 
reason embodied in the theoretical tradition of the law of reason” (Bockenfbrde 
1991: 49). Legislation also provided circumscription of federal rights. However, 
the invincibility of legislation was less directly expressed in German debate 
than the ‘general will’ was in French discussions.
The relevant actors in German telephone policy making were the Reichspost- 
und Telegraphenverwaltung (RPTV), the Bundesrat, industry and the Lander. 
The public monopoly delineated power structures between central actors, but 
the large set of relevant actors implied a complex institutional cadre regulating 
interaction in the policy-making process. The close relationship between state 
and industry clearly created strong circles of power into which it was difficult 
for outsiders to penetrate.
Due to the requirement for self-financed services and the need to make a 
positive contribution to federal finances, as well as needing to position itself 
among several strong policy actors, the telephone administration was obliged to 
provide economically sound management. This translated into cost-based 
tariffs, which indicated a public ethos of economic efficiency in infrastructure 
provision.
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Regarding criteria for legitimate decision-making, non-infringement of 
individual and organisational rights by the Reich was paramount. Unless special 
powers of the federal administration were specifically founded on legislation, 
they were challenged in the courts, which illustrated the conflict-solving role 
and the ultimate authority of legislation. Decision-making took place between 
several strong, knowledgeable actors, which led to a coordinative type of 
discourse, also seen by the high level of technical detail.
The telephone and the state: 1876-1900
The German political-administrative entity of 1871 consisted of three separate 
layers of political decision-making and influence: the Reich, the Bundesstaaten 
{Lander), and the local municipalities {Gemeinden). The relations between them 
and their respective areas of competence were regulated by law, and the legiti­
macy of the federal state was contingent on the policy areas of the Lander not 
being infringed upon. The right to local self-determination was central and 
legislation created clear boundaries between the powers of the Reich and local 
levels.
This structure became important in the sectoral state tradition for telephone 
policy because of conflicts arising particularly over the issue of rights-of-way. 
Disputes between federal and local authorities were settled through specific 
legislation, which showed the ultimate authority of legislation. The conflicting 
areas of competence also implied a larger set of relevant actors than was the 
case in France.
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In Imperial Germany, “political power [was] legitimated chiefly by a deliberate 
policy of state intervention which [tried] to correct the dysfunctions of the 
economy, in particular the disturbances of economic growth, in order to ensure 
the stability of the social system” (Blackboum and Eley 1984: 130). This made 
for a ‘managerial’ state whose performance should be judged on efficiency and 
policy results, rather than on appropriateness of political process, incorporated 
in the public ethos of the sectoral state tradition by the end of the consolidation 
period.
Legitimate telephone policy would, therefore, ideally benefit the whole of the 
economy, distributing the economic growth ensuing from access to rapid com­
munication systems equally throughout the territoiy. Accordingly, communica­
tion systems, including telegraphy and telephony, were seen as part of the 
public infrastructure and a prerequisite for a functioning economy. Thus, a pro­
active federal state was not only an efficient way to implement a national 
communications system; it was a means to further economic development.
[The state’s] authority was necessary to clear many of the obstacles in the 
way of economic development ... [the state] stepped in more positively 
when a first generation of entrepreneurs hesitated through lack of 
confidence ... Above all, through institutional reform, changes in 
communication and educational provision the state helped to establish the 
possibility and desirability of a new kind of homo oeconomicus.
Blackboum 1984: 178
The nature o f the telephone monopoly
The post and telegraph administration, the Reichspost- und Telegraphenverwal­
tung, the RPTV, which was established in 1876 when the former Generalpost-
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amt and the Generaldirektionen der Telegraphen merged (Feyerabend 1927; 
154), was a constitutionally regulated direct Reich responsibility (Verfassung 
des Deutschen Reichs’). According to article 48 of the 1871 constitution, post 
and telegraphy were to be administered as an einheitliche Staatsverkehrscmstal- 
ten; i.e. a ‘centralised Imperial communications institution’ (see Herrmann 
1986: 92). Under article 50, the post and telegraph services were placed directly 
under the organisation of the Chancellor so that the Post and Telegraph 
authorities were answering directly to him and not to the Reichstag. The 
Chancellor was “entitled to decide the regulatory provisions and general 
administrative arrangements, as well as the exclusive performance of the 
relations to other Post and Telegraph administrations” (Art. 50 §2). Public 
officials “had the duty and the right” to ensure unity of bureaucratic 
organisation and service provision (Feyerabend 1927: 154).
Such unity in bureaucracy and service implied that all citizens should be offered 
access to the telegraph service without territorial discrimination. In other words, 
the service offered should be equal throughout the German Reich (Verfassung 
des Deutschen Reichs Art. 50; see also Buol-Berenberg 1891: 1958).
Operational responsibility did not logically ensue from defining post and 
telegraph services as centralised Imperial undertakings but was legislated for 
separately. Prior to 1892 the state held a monopoly in telegraphy services, but 
the legal texts referred specifically to telegraph technology rather than to 
‘transmission of signals’, as in France. A public telephone monopoly was 
therefore not given, so that service provision was theoretically open to would-be
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private service providers. After 1879, several private enterprises did express an 
interest in providing public telephone service and the American International 
Bell Telephone Co started to construct a network, but was stopped on the 
grounds that foreigners were not allowed to operate telephone services 
(Schneider 1998). The threat of competition provided an impetus for the federal 
telegraph administration to extend public service provision. Moreover, the 
RPTV wanted a monopoly for economic reasons; the RPTV should “support the 
Reich’s fiscal independence from the federal states” (Thomas 1989: 4) and any 
private network operation would diminish state revenues.
The RPTV’s response when the state monopoly was challenged clarifies the 
nature of the public monopoly that was consolidated around 1900. Whereas the 
French monopoly was based on the belief that the state was the only institution 
capable of providing the telephone service, whilst at the same time respecting 
important values, such as territorial equality and tariff homogeneity, the 
German monopoly was seen as the most rational way to avoid multiplicity of 
networks and efficiency loss for users. The German monopoly was theoretically 
not opposed to private industry; it provided a communications service that, 
because of classical regalia rights {Postregal), should be administered 
(regulated) by the Reich, but that in principle could be provided by private 
enterprise.
Although the state was the only operator of telegraph and telephone services. 
Parliament was reluctant to call the regime a ‘monopoly’. The telegraph
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monopoly was neither a fiscal nor a protectionist measure, but rather a
communications institution {Verkehrsanstalt) emanating from the o\d Postregal.
The legislation was no ‘sovereign right’ {Hoheitsrecht) in that it did not
instigate domination over land or people, but rather an (almost) exclusive right
to operate the service.
There can be no doubt that the [telegraph monopoly] is not about a 
sovereign right, because we are not talking about a domination over land 
and people. Rather, we are considering an exclusive right of the Reich to 
operate a communications institution; this right is not even necessarily 
exclusive, and §§2-3 regulate cases in which the right to operate could be 
shared. (...) One has called what is to be regulated a telegraph monopoly, 
but the concept of monopoly is not well chosen. It concerns neither a 
financial nor an industrial monopoly, only a communications institution. 
(...) Concerning the necessity of the legal regulation of the telegraph Regal, 
one must acknowledge that the state needs to control the telegraph 
administration. (...) §48 of the constitution only stipulates that the post and 
telegraph should be administered as a centralised Imperial undertaking; it 
does not exclude all competition.
Reichstag 1891: 1958
The Regal established that the Reich administration was to provide communica­
tions services throughout the German territory, enhancing national security, and 
further economic prosperity. In the context of German cameralism in the 18^ 
century, the Regal concept had been modified to include only services that were 
paid for (Lindenfeld 1997: 15).
The telegraph and telephone service administrations belong to the state. 
That the telephone is included in this exclusive right is not absolutely 
necessary, since it is a local means of communication with numerous pri­
vate interests. In any case will local telephone communications (analogous 
to the post) be excluded from the ‘Postregal’ if the communications are 
free. The regal hence comprises only community-wide communications 
that are paid for.
XVI. Kommission 1890-91
12 The impossibility of denying private persons the right to erect private closed networks was 
first established by an Imperial court on 20 September 1881 (RPTV 1885: 131). These 
conditions were later confirmed in the Telegraphengesetz §§ 2 and 3.
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The threat of competition suggests that the RPTV competed for power with 
other economic and political actors, such as regional and local authorities, large 
industrial firms and business associations. The telephone service was rapidly 
utilised by private enterprise, larger as well as smaller firms. Banks, stock 
exchanges, and business associations, exerted pressure on the RPTV to initiate 
network expansion to new areas, so that an even broader spectrum of the com­
mercial community started using the telephone service (Holcombe 1911; Carré 
1990; Reinke 1988; Von Stephan 1896). ThQ Reich authorities legitimated its 
actions through high quality services and a willingness to serve all geographical 
areas and through exposing itself to a threat of competition. In cases where the 
state administration did not want to undertake service provision, private 
operators could provide the service.
Private networks would not only mean a breach of the Imperial monopoly; they 
would also mean a loss of income to the state administration. Loss of revenues 
would lead to more difficulties in extending the communications network to all 
comers of the German Reich, which was one of the public administration’s 
explicitly stated goals. The public authorities therefore faced strong incentives 
to install telephones (RPTV 1885; 131-132). A strategy whereby the public 
administration would also provide telephone service to less profitable areas 
reduced demand for alternative service providers rather than legally excluding 
any possible competition.
First established through Imperial court ruling of 20 September 1881, later verified through 
Telegraphengesetz §2
The German telegraph service was supposed to be self-financing, and although excessive state 
revenues were criticised as possibly hampering German industry, it was important for the public 
administration to show that the service was not loss making. The telephone was cheaper to
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In the 1870s the RPTV enjoyed a position of relative discretion over policy­
making. Interference from interest organisations and Parliament was limited. As 
head of an office with close ties to the Ministry of War that was more interested 
in a functioning system of command than in reducing state expenditures, the 
Director of Posts (Generalpostmeister), Heinrich von Stephan, was able to 
instigate a modernisation programme for telegraph services (Thomas 1991).
The programme aimed at,
• increasing the stability of the service;
• geographically extending the network;
• lowering the price and increasing the speed of the service.
Hence, state intervention in the telegraph sector was legitimated through 
efficiency and high quality of service, an element that became part of the public 
ethos for telephony. The Generalpostmeister’s programme would meet the 
demands of existing users for improved quality of service, as well as creating 
new users and increasing the income potential for the state. Furthermore, 
communication between different parts of the Reich was fundamental to the 
political, industrial and social integration of the country. The short-term aim for 
the service might have been to facilitate long-distance communication, but the 
state benefited politically in the process of unification.
install and use than the telegraph, in particular training costs for personnel approached zero, 
obviously beneficial for the state service (Podbielski 1899c).
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Early drivers o f  network expansion
The telegraph monopoly played an important role in the consolidation of the 
new Reich in that the associated bureaucracy, central to the establishment of the 
new state, also acted as a unifying element for the complex collection o ïLander 
with their different histories. Access to a communications network that could 
ensure territorial coverage at low cost also had high political value. In order to 
compensate for the lack of specific telephone legislation in the late 1870s, and 
to ensure that telephony was covered by the telegraph monopoly, the public 
authorities initially treated telephony as a form of telegraphy. At this time, 
telephones could only be used in local networks, as long-distance telephone 
lines were not yet developed. Since the functional responsibilities of the 
German Empire did not extend to local matters, viewing telephony as a form of 
telegraphy made it possible to argue that telephony fell under the RPTV’s 
competencies.
The case of Germany is characterised as pioneering the public network through 
its extension to rural areas (RPTV 1894; Schneider and Werle 1991: 100-101). 
The rationale for this and the rapid integration of the telephone into the existing 
telegraph monopoly was the early recognition by the public authorities of the 
telephone’s potential as administrative and economic instrument, although its 
potential for private households was perceived as less important.
The telephone was in the beginning not promoted for private households. More than a decade 
after the introduction of the telephone, the then Secretary of State for Post and Telegraph, 
Podbielski, concluded that: “for the telephone, however, only a restricted number of citizens 
will possess one. Nor in the future will the telephone be connected to aU private households” 
(Podbielski 1899a).
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The longer the telephone connections are in operation, the clearer it 
becomes that places with access to the telephone system have a significant 
competitive (economic) advantage compared to places where the citizens 
are not connected to the public telephone network.
Reichskanzler 1899a; 1034
The simple operation and low price of the telephone compared to traditional 
telegraphy (due mainly to low expenditure on education and training) made it 
the ideal substitute and supplement in a telegraph network that formed an 
important part of the unifying strategy of the young German Reich. The RPTV 
had a double set of incentives to promote network expansion: socio-political 
obligations to stimulate macro-economic development and provide 
infrastructure; and internal obligations to be economically self-sufficient and, 
preferably, to contribute to state finances. This latter point also meant that 
private service provision was perceived as a potential loss of income, which 
made it paramount for the RPTV to further extend its networks. Therefore, as 
early as the end of 1879, 788 German villages and smaller communities, too 
small to be profitable for a regular telegraph service, had been granted this new 
means of long-distance communication (RPTV 1894).
The initially relatively weak judicial basis for the telephone service had 
provided the RPTV with few powers within which to enforce the necessary 
restrictions on the environment to ensure a stable and high-quality service. 
Conflicts arose over rights-of-way, as a direct consequence of the lack of 
legislation in a system where it was necessary to secure the Reich’s powers over 
local authorities and individuals through legislation. Another conflict arose 
between the RPTV and providers of electricity and other services depending on 
electric cables, such as tramways, because of electrical induction between
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cables. These shortcomings led to the passing of the Telegraphengesetz 
(Telegraph law) of 1892 and later the Telegraphenwegegesetz (Law on 
telegraph lines) of 1899. The two conflicts illustrate the pervasive existence of 
legislation as conflict-solver, and the existence of several strong actors in the 
policy-making environment, both important elements in the sectoral state 
tradition.
The 1880s -  legislative confusion and political neo-mercantilism
From 1880 onwards the RPTV’s power was threatened by a new set of actors 
that included the Lander, the Reichstag and organised private business interests. 
The initial enthusiasm from Generalpostmeister Von Stephan, envisaging that 
one day, each citizen of Berlin would have his own telephone, gave impetus to 
the idea of telephone networks in smaller communities (MatschoP 1916: 535). 
However, the early attempts to build local networks in Berlin failed, officially 
due to lack of demand, but also because of conflicts between the different 
decision-making layers. The Imperial authorities did not have rights of way in 
Berlin, and the Berlin police opposed the installing of over-earth cables, which 
made von Stephan drop the project. The tight financial regulations for the 
RPTV left it with little room for manoeuvre in economically risky situations, 
such as building networks in smaller communities.
The legislative framework of the German telephone service provision gradually 
emerged during the 1880s and 1890s. As already noted, the early part of this 
period saw a solution to the local problem of rights-of-way by the passing of the
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Telegraphengesetz in 1892, and other, unsolved issues (particularly concerning 
long-distance infrastructure) led to the passing of the Telegraphenwegegesetz 
and the Fernsprechgebiihrer-Ordnung, both in 1899. These three laws together 
consolidated the Reich's monopoly.
The weakness of the federal judicial framework for telephone service provision 
had created complications in Wurtemberg in 1880, when the American Bell 
Company had started constructing telephone lines without the appropriate 
licences but stopped because the telephone service could not be operated by 
foreigners. The lack of interconnection would, however, have implied that a 
Bell network and its customers would remain isolated from the national 
communications network, which was against the official policy of the telegraph 
authorities. Generalpostmeister Heinrich von Stephan therefore stated in 
October 1880 that “the erection of telephone connections as Verkehrsanstalten 
(i.e. means of communication for the general public) by other than the imperial 
postal authorities, or those to whom the latter should assign their rights, was 
forbidden” (quoted in Holcombe 1911; 28). The Generalpostmeister, however, 
had no strict legal basis for this statement, but nevertheless calculated that such 
legislation would be forthcoming from Parliament when it was confronted with 
the practical difficulties arising from the contemporary state of affairs.
These events must be seen in connection with the general political develop­
ments at this time. In the mid- to late-1870s, the majority in the Reichstag 
shifted from supporting liberal, pro-free market economic policies, to being 
dominated by conservatives and Catholics, who promoted neo-mercantilism.
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Economic history of Germany prior to 1870 was to a large degree based on 
domestic demand for industry, and the financial crisis of 1873 led important 
actors in the public debate to press for protection. Economists, politicians (not 
only conservatives but also to some degree the liberals) and industry, therefore 
supported protective measures for industry (Ramm 1973; 341-342). “Absence 
of empire also meant absence of international trading connections. German 
industrialisation bad been more dependent on the domestic market than the 
industrialisation of France or Britain” (Milward and Saul 1973: 428).
The conflict between economic liberals and neo-mercantilists mirrored diverg­
ing views within the RPTV. The liberals opposed detailed regulation of tele­
phony, on the grounds that the technology was immature and regulation could 
stifle technical innovation. The neo-mercantilist fraction, represented by the 
leader of the legal department in the RPTV put forward two main arguments for 
state monopoly and control over telephony. Firstly, the economic risk would be 
reduced if telephony remained under the auspices of the public administration. 
Secondly, private networks would not be secure enough in times of severe 
political crisis and war (Thomas 1995: 71). The neo-mercantilistic position, 
therefore, was the one that came closest to the sentiments of the majority in the 
Reichstag.
Bismarck, the Chancellor of Germany at this time, was known for his skill in 
reading public opinion, from which he had undoubtedly benefited. Therefore, 
when von Stephan approached Bismarck concerning the installation of tele­
phone networks in the cities, he was told that they “should be constructed by the
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imperial administration. Concessions should not be given” (von Stephan quoted 
in Thomas 1995; 75). The main argument that convinced the Chancellor seems 
to have been that it would be cheaper for the State to construct networks from 
the beginning, rather than to buy them back from private entrepreneurs at a later 
stage. If private investors were allowed to profit from the burgeoning telephony 
industry, an eventual nationalisation would be more expensive for the public 
finances.
The Telegraphengesetz of 1892
The law of 1892 {Telegraphengesetz) was effectively the first substantial piece 
of political legislation regulating the provision of the telephone service in 
Germany, by formally extending former telegraph regulation to the telephone 
service (Duch 1991: 125). “The rights to erect and operate telegraph installa­
tions belong to the Reich. Telegraph installations comprise telephone installa­
tions” (Reichskanzler 1891: 2103, §1). Its most salient feature was to retain the 
status quo in the sector, establishing a legal basis for what was already 
implemented in practice (Schneider and Werle 1991: 101). Hence, the state 
monopoly found a judicially strong base -  although not invincible, as 
developments showed less than a decade later.
The government’s proposal emphasised the view that state monopoly in the 
sector could be justified by concerns for the ‘general good’, social order, and
Nationalisation of Prussian railways at the same time provided a good example of a non­
successful policy. See Thomas 1991; 256
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the functioning of the communications system. Intervention was also legitima­
ted through the need for efficient management of public infrastructure, all 
indicating the emerging sectoral state tradition for telephone policy.
The question of a legal basis for the Regal has in recent times gained in 
practical significance, especially with the growing importance of telephone 
communications. (...) §1 expresses the exclusive right of the Reich to erect 
and operate telegraph bureaux [including telephones]. (...) It is extensively 
accepted that in the interest of the general public as well as public order, 
and in line with earlier communications practice, the telegraph service 
should be treated as a Regal. (...) It is especially prohibited, in the interest 
of the public communications systems, to allow private operation and com­
mercial exploitation of telegraphy, since this would unavoidably mean 
several parallel systems and it would be impossible to uphold a well 
organised and well-functioning telegraph system.
Reichskanzler 1891: 2104
The parliamentary discussion on the 1892 law showed that equalising the 
telephone and the telegraph posed no problems for the parliamentarians. 
“Telegraph and telephone will at present be treated absolutely equally, even if it 
at a later stage might be advantageous to separate between the two” (Buol- 
Berenberg 1891: 1957). Extending monopoly rights to the telephone service 
was justified with reference to other countries: “the German Reich cannot be 
without this monopoly, just as the majority of other countries have a system of 
telegraph monopoly” (Buol-Berenberg 1891: 1959); by the need to legalise 
what was already in practice: “in order to ensure the extension of the ‘Regal’ 
postal rights to telephony I believe we can all be in favour of the base of this 
law” (Kurtz 1891: 1961); and through the need to avoid parallel networks: 
“without this monopoly the users [of the telephony service] might choose never 
to connect to and make use of the public network at all” (Kurtz 1891: 1961).
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The legislation of 1892 ensured that no other telegraph or telephone network 
would compete with the public one, as long as service exploitation was 
economically viable. The central points were:
• The state monopoly over provision of telegraph infrastructure and services 
was formally extended to comprise telephony (§1).
• Private networks with public access were authorised to the extent that the 
public administration did not undertake operation (§2).
• Private networks internal to an enterprise, administration or transport system 
(closed circuits) were authorised without a licence (§3).
• All persons were entitled to access to the telephone service and to 
connection to the network upon payment of a service charge (§5).
• Local circuit subscribers could demand connection to the public network 
(§6).
• All tariff increases needed legal approval in the Reichstag (§7).
• Communications over telegraph and telephone connections were allowed 
secrecy under certain conditions (§8).
• If two electrical installations causing induction for each other had to pass 
along the same lines, the costs of insulation were to be carried by the last to 
be installed (§12) (Telegraphengesetz 1892; see also Thomas 1991: 262- 
263).
The law thus mostly retained the status quo and gave it a firm legal base. 
However, the public administration’s powers were curbed on one point: the 
setting of tariffs. Tariff increases were to be approved by Reichstag, which 
introduced the Parliament as a new and important actor in the policy-making
Consolidation of state monopolies 93
arena. The Reichstag was not particularly strong in Imperial Germany, and the 
country’s regime has been accused of displaying “backwardness and aristocratic 
dominance (...) expressed in a number of institutional ways: the executive 
power of the King-Kaiser, the autonomy of the military, (...), and the limited 
powers of the Reichstag” (Eley 1984: 128; see also Smith 1982). In the case of 
telephone tariffs, however, the Reichstag acquired formal powers that would 
prove real and important in the policy-making process. Since the setting of 
tariffs was the only point where the institution had regular, formal power, the 
annual (and sometimes more frequent) tariff debates would prove an arena for 
expression of general comments and feedback on the service.
The Telegraphengesetz also changed the status of telephone users. Whereas 
they previously had been under the jurisdiction of private law, and hence 
‘subscribers’ to the system, the new legislation put the regulation of the 
relationship between the RPTV and the users under public law (through §§ 5, 6 
and 8), which gave the user status as ‘participants’ (Thomas 1995: 127-128). 
With relatively low household penetration, the majority of telephone users 
outside public administration were private enterprises, organised through trade 
chambers and other regional organisations to provide a voice in telephone 
policy.
Hence, 16 years after the appearance of the telephone, Germany had a law- 
based state administrative and operational telephony monopoly. Two conflicts
Theoretically, the RPTV had also been responsible to the Reichstag before 1892, but practice 
from the Bismarck era had rendered this responsibility non-significant in practice (Holcombe 
1911:39).
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had been particularly important for its emergence. First, private actors were 
interested in operating the service in competition with the RPTV, and second, 
former legislation was based on technology rather than function. Although the 
telegraph monopoly was well consolidated through law, specific texts were 
necessary to regulate telephone technology. The law of 1892 excluded private 
operators in practice and included telephone technology in existing legislation.
The Teleeraphenwegegesetz of 1899
The 1892 law soon proved to be insufficient for solving conflicts that arose 
between the Imperial and local authorities when long-distance telephone lines 
were extended. Consequently, two areas of difficulty arose, each with their own 
set of opponents to the RPTV.
The first of these difficulties stemmed from the federal structure of Germany 
and the continuing problem of the division of legal jurisdiction over the German 
territory between the Reich and local authorities. For example, in 1894, the city 
of Breslau brought a case before the courts to determine the limits of the Reich 
administration’s powers to erect telephone infrastructure on Lander territory. 
The court ruled against the Imperial authorities, thereby providing impetus for a 
new ‘Law on telegraph lines’ {Telegraphenwegegesetz) from December 1899. 
The law was seen to “relieve the insupportable situation which had been 
produced by the law of 1892 and the subsequent judicial decisions, and laid the 
foundation for good working relations between telephone and power-circuit 
interests and between the telegraph and local authorities” (Holcombe 1911:
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104). Again, the legislation was asserted as the ultimate authority in telephone 
policy. Moreover, contrary to the situation in France, legislation did not 
diminish the set of actors relevant to policymaking. Although the state 
monopoly was gradually consolidated through law until 1899, there is ample 
evidence that participation from a large set of actors was considered the 
legitimate basis of policymaking in Germany.
The public administration emphasised the need to formalise the RPTV’s right of
way in its effort to equip the German territory with telegraph and telephone
lines. Whereas during the first years of telephone operation -  when the
emphasis was on inter-city connections -  the RPTV had been able to use public
thoroughfares or other traffic ways without legal difficulties (mainly erecting its
lines along railway lines), the spread of the telephone to smaller communities
had rendered the situation more complex.
Through conflict between certain interested parties, a telegraph line 
erection -  crucially important in the interest of the communications system 
-  can be more difficult or outright impossible.
Reichskanzler 1899b: 1256
The administration admitted that the use of public thoroughfares might conflict 
with private interests and private rights, (Reichskanzler 1899b: 1258) and 
argued that this conflict, together with the RPTV’s overarching goal to extend 
the telephone service to smaller communities, could only be solved through new 
legislation (Podbielski 1899b).
The other main reason for the law of 1899 was the problem of induction on 
telephone connections from high-voltage electricity lines. In the late 1880s,
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high-voltage currents were used in the development of public tramways, street 
lightning, and later, in industry in general. The electricity infrastructure 
distorted the transmission of the telephone signals and a conflict arose between 
the telephone and telegraph authorities on the one hand, and industry (users of 
electricity) and municipalities (suppliers of electricity infrastructure and local 
transport) on the other. Both latter groups had influential supporters in the 
Reichstag, as well as among the media and interest organisations, and their 
views therefore carried much weight.
The law of 1892 had settled a compromise between these groups and the RPTV, 
by deciding that the owner of the last installed electric lines should pay for the 
insulation of the telephone lines to avoid induction. This, however, proved 
difficult to manage and the same conflict arose before the 1899 legislative 
debates. The spread of telephone lines to smaller communities, the growth of 
high-voltage lines both over and under ground (due to growth in the electricity 
industry), and the development of electrical public installations, such as 
tramways and street lighting, all contributed to deepening the conflict 
(Reichskanzler 1899b: 1257).
Through the Telegraphenwegegesetz (1899) the RPTV gained the right to 
establish subterraneous and aerial telephone lines throughout the German 
territory, with certain constraints regarding private landowners’ use of the 
space.
The telegraph administration is authorised to use communication paths for 
telegraph lines serving the public, as long as the common use of these paths 
are not unduly constrained thereby. By communication paths is meant
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aerial and subterraneous space of public roads, places, bridges and 
waterways. ‘Telegraph lines’ includes telephone lines. (§1)
( . . . )
Planting of trees on communication paths should ideally be avoided. (...) 
The telegraph administration has to give landowners a certain time of 
warning before it can install new lines. (...) In case of damage, the 
telegraph administration is responsible for carrying the costs. (§4)
( . . . )
The telegraph administration is authorised to establish aerial telegraph lines 
over territory not included in the ‘communication paths’ as referred to in 
this law, as long as the use of the territory in question is not unduly 
constrained. (§12)
Telegraphenwegegesetz 1899
At a time when several laws were passed to create German unity in practical 
matters (Penal Code from 1871, Mass and Weight Law from 1872, Monetary 
Law from 1873), the RPTV achieved a homogenous regulatory regime 
throughout the German territory (Thomas 1995; 133). Moreover, the Imperial 
administration’s obligation towards the ‘general interest’ of the German 
economy gave it preference over regional authorities. However, the relations 
between different legal strata in the Empire made it imperative to found the 
authority and the limit of its competencies on solid legal ground.
The conflict between the RPTV and the suppliers of high-voltage networks
(such as street lights and tramways) was also solved through the
Telegraphenwegegesetz of 1899. The burden of insulation expenditures was laid
on the public telephone administration.
If the maintenance of the communication paths is complicated through the 
telegraph authorities’ use, then the latter will carry all extra expenditure. 
(§2) (...) If, after the erection of a telegraph line, the common use of a 
communication path is restricted, (...) the telegraph line should be changed 
or removed altogether. (...) In all cases, it is the telegraph administration’s 
responsibility to carry the costs of such changes. (§4)
T elegraphenwegegesetz 1899
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The legislation put the entire economic burden on the public administration, to 
the benefit of landowners, regional public authorities and heavy industry. This 
arrangement indicates that regional and sectoral pressure groups carried much 
weight in the Reichstag, and that the public administration’s powers were 
curbed. It fiirthermore illustrates the strong position of individual (enterprises or 
local communities) rights vis-à-vis the bureaucracy of the Reich. Were the 
federal administration to infringe on the formers’ scope of action in any way, it 
was considered legitimate that they carried the costs.
The Fernsprechgebiihrer-Ordnung from 1899
The financial burdens added to the RPTV’s responsibilities through the 
Telegraphenwegegesetz were one of the main reasons for the introduction of a 
new tariff model at the end of the 19^ century, thus presenting an idea that 
would become part of the sectoral state tradition, namely the idea of cost-based 
tariffs.
The costs of insulation against interference from other electrical equipment 
added serious expenditure to the administration, which therefore proposed to 
restructure the subscription tariff system. The new regulation, the 
Fernsprechgebiihrer-Ordnung [Telephone tariff regulations] of 1899, whose 
novelty lay in the differentiation of tariffs and subscriber models, was first 
proposed to Parliament in April 1899 (Reichskanzler 1899a). Whereas 
previously there had been one unique, flat tariff for a telephone line 
subscription, the RPTV now suggested varying the price according to the
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number of participants in a local loop, so that access to a large local loop would 
be more expensive than to a small one. The rationale behind this was to make 
subscriptions cost-based, in line with the principle of an economically self- 
sustaining service.
If the tariff rate shall be in line with the rest of the Reich administration’s 
performance, two factors must be incorporated (...). The one is the costs of 
establishing and maintaining of the technical equipment both with the 
customers and the [public] switching offices. The other is the cost of 
establishing the actual connections. The first (...) is larger the greater the 
number of subscribers to the local network. (...) The second (...) increases 
with the number of communications.
Reichskanzler 1899a: 1036
The RPTV argued that the previous flat subscription rate meant that urban areas 
(where connections were more costly for the operator, due to the increased 
complexity of the network) enjoyed subsidised access rates to the detriment of 
subscription rates in rural areas and smaller networks, ^ince one of the principal 
goals of the RPTV was to “extend the telephone to smaller communities and 
rural areas”, it followed that this system, whereby “undoubtedly some are 
burdened more heavily than others” should be stopped (Podbielsky 1899a).
The new tariff regulation (Femsprechgebühren-Ordnung) was finally passed in 
December 1899, although Parliament had made some important changes to the 
original draft. Instead of a compulsory model, whereby the subscription was 
paid through both an access fee and a rate per connection, subscribers were 
given the possibility to choose between two main models. Either they could pay 
a higher access fee and enjoy free local calls, or they could pay a lower access 
fee plus a charge per connection (at the time a novelty in Germany). The system 
meant neither gain nor loss for subscribers to very small networks on either of
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the two models, whereas subscribers in larger networks would be able to save 
substantial sums of money with the appropriate model. The principle of cost- 
based tariffs was to play a significant role for the German telephone provider 
throughout the next century.
The political beneficiaries of this system were the Social-Democrats (SPD), 
industry and their representative Chambers of Commerce (Thomas 1995; 136). 
The Chancellor was given the right to lower tariffs without asking the Reichstag 
(§6), to set conditions for use and access to the system, and to agree to certain 
‘special’ tariffs (i.e. night time taxes, fees for those living more than 5 km away 
from a main switch, prices for transmission of telegrams over the telephone, and 
-  within certain restrictions -  international tariffs (§10)). However, on 1 April 
1900, when the Femsprechgebühren-Ordnung vidiS enacted, the policymaking 
environment of the telephone service policy in Germany was relatively settled, 
and the Chancellor had only a limited role to play.
Conclusion: Consolidated sectoral state traditions in the telephone sector in 
France and Germany
This chapter has examined the first 25 years of telephone service provision in 
France and Germany to identify the original elements of the countries’ 
respective sectoral state traditions. The investigation showed that despite similar 
institutional structures (in both cases the original telegraph administrations were 
extended to include telephone policy, and the established state monopolies were 
both central ministerial bureaucracies with ministers responsible to Parliament),
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public political debate and their justification for the state monopoly were 
different. The findings are summarised in table 1 :
France Germany
Ultimate authority 
(UA), relevant 
actors (RA) and 
their relative 
power
UA: Parhament as the 
embodiment o f the general will. 
RA: Parhament, PTT 
administration (much 
discretionary powers). Ministry 
o f Finance through budgetary 
unity.
UA: Legislation -  Parliamentary 
output as opposed to the temporary 
assembly o f representatives o f a 
‘nation’.
RA: PTT administration, Reichstag, 
Lander, industry.
Pubtic ethos Continuity and territorial 
equality o f service, budgetary 
unity
Correction o f economic 
dysfunctions.
Economic efficiency in 
infrastructure provision (cost-based 
tariffs).
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision-making 
and discourse
Procedural correctness. Private 
enterprise and general public no 
place in policymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of 
federal rights.
Bureaucratic correctness. 
Coordinative discourse.
Table 1: Summarised findings from the consolidation period
In France, justification of the monopolisation of the telephone service centred 
around the state being the only potential service provider that was guided purely 
by general interest and not by a search for profit. Parliament’s ultimate authority 
in the late 19* century was based on it being the embodiment of the general 
will, which was seen as the sole reason to infringe on individual liberties. 
Ultimate authority in Germany rested with legislation (i.e. parliamentary output, 
rather than the physical (temporary) assembly).
The relevant actors in France comprised the P&T administration. Parliament, 
and the finance ministry because of budgetary unity. Parliament obtained 
important powers particularly on the issue of tariffs, although the P&T
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administration undoubtedly remained the central policymaker. Despite the 
public administration’s wide discretionary powers, however, policies were 
legitimated with reference to the final authority of Parliament, which indicated 
that, ideally, the role of the bureaucracy should be to execute Parliament’s will.
In Germany, the set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking was wider 
than in France, comprising the RPTV, the Reichstag, the Lander, and industry 
(individual enterprises as well as their representative organs such as Chambers 
of Commerce). The public administration was not legally obliged to provide 
‘universal service’ and thus faced some level of threat of competition to drive 
network extension. The fundamental rationale for a state monopoly was not to 
exclude private enterprise from service provision because of a lack of trust but, 
rather, because a public monopoly was perceived as the only possible solution 
for reaping the growing benefit of the network. The industry’s legitimate 
participation in policy-making was greater in Germany than in France, 
indicating a more equal distribution of powers between the relevant actors than 
in the French case.
The French public ethos at the turn of the century comprised continuity and 
equality of service, and budgetary unity. Economic growth and efficiency were 
not central to justification of state actions. Thus, whereas very early the German 
telegraph administration emphasised the benefit of public communications 
services to firms and to the economy in general, the French telegraph service 
was perceived a tool for the public administration that the public could benefit 
from only as long as it did not interfere with the state administration’s own use.
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However, nationalisation of telephone service provision was justified with 
reference to the state’s ‘proven’ superiority in quality (continuity) and territorial 
equality of service provision.
In Germany, the public ethos was economic efficiency in infrastructure manage­
ment. The telephone service was initially perceived as a direct competitor to the 
publicly provided telegraph service, and telephone tariffs were required to be 
based on costs of service provision. This corroborates the view of the German 
administration as a managerial institution whose legitimacy of intervention was 
based on it correcting economic dysfunctions rather than on providing social 
goods to the public. This view did not necessarily exclude private service 
operators, if they could provide the telephone service throughout the German 
territory. The practical problem, however, was the lack of interconnection, 
which rendered communication from one network to another impossible. The 
Reich administration’s task was to provide telegraph services throughout the 
German territory. The service included communication with any other point in 
the public network, which was possible for all telephone customers only if there 
was no more than one network. Moreover, the RPTV’s obligation to contribute 
positively to the federal bureaucracy’s financial situation, or at least not to 
deteriorate it, made it possible to claim that direct telephone service provision 
was the rational choice of responsible bureaucrats. Individuals’ rights and the 
protection of citizens against undue Reich actions implied that this choice had to 
be consolidated through law to ensure clear boundaries between federal and 
local authorities. Legitimacy of state action through bureaucratic correctness 
can, therefore, be argued to be fundamental for early German telephone history.
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Debate in France after nationalisation often referred to the basic legitimate 
values for state intervention (the pursuit of the general interest, continuity and 
equality in service provision) and to the principles for budgetary unity. Public 
records show almost no debate on technical issues such as technology, opera­
tional guidelines for the public administration, or tariff models, as were found in 
the case of Germany, and which to a certain extent had been debated before 
nationalisation in connection to the licence conditions. A ‘communicative’ 
discourse model fits these facts well (predominantly centralised policymaking, 
determined among an inner group, and communicated to the public only when 
the decisions have been made).
In Germany, the debates around the three main laws from the 1880s and 1890s 
showed a stronger emphasis on the coordinative discourse (more dispersed 
policymaking, larger parts of the population involved in negotiating reform, 
discourse aimed at knowledgeable co-deciders, tends to be more technical than 
communicative discourse): the set of policy-making actors were broader, the 
RPTV’s powers were relatively weaker than those of the French public 
administration, and the different actors all had technical expertise and power to 
engage in discussion with the public administration.
Thus, despite leading to similar institutional outcomes, telephone policy debates 
in the late 19* century in France and Germany displayed significant differences 
regarding sectoral state traditions. The two countries’ organisational models.
It is necessary to condition this statement because of the incomplete archives from this period, 
but no reference to such debates was found in ofBcial parliamentary minutes.
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their modes of argumentation, and their different forms of discourse, would all 
be challenged by the financial difficulties following the First World War but, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, the monopoly structure was never seriously 
questioned in the 1920s. Rather, the initial elements of the sectoral state 
tradition would be refined and adapted to contemporary needs.
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Chapter 3
The reforms of the 1920s
The investigation of the consolidation of the public monopolies in the 19* 
century resulted in identification of important principles in the different sectoral 
state traditions in France and Germany; parliamentary control, quality and 
continuity of service and territorial equality in France; economic efficiency and 
cost-based tariffs in Germany. Economic difficulties following the First World 
War, and new demands from the public in the 1920s, engendered debate about 
organisational form and particularly modes of financing.
In the international ideational environment private enterprise management 
methods were held up as the most important remedy to increase efficiency in 
industrial organisations, including public administrations o f commercial or 
industrial activities. Financial flexibility and managerial autonomy were 
perceived as necessary conditions for a well-functioning industrial enterprise, 
whereas political decision-making structures were seen to hamper efficiency 
and the organisation’s capability to deliver and meet public demand.
Despite the occurrence of common ideas about ‘modem management’, which 
the empirical analysis shows were present in both countries’ parliaments, the 
public debates in the two countries differed significantly. Within each country, 
there were important similarities with previous national policymaking. This 
chapter, therefore, illustrates that similar ideas (as they were coming from the 
same international trend o f ‘scientific management’) were interpreted
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differently in different national settings, and that these interpretations correlated 
with existing sectoral state traditions.
The case of France
By the mid-1920s, the French sectoral state tradition had been challenged by 
new concepts emerging in public debate since the turn of the century. "Service 
public ' was to be the most central of these new concepts, but also concepts 
inspired by private enterprise management methods, such as ‘flexibility’ (both 
financial and managerial), ‘commerciality’, and ‘modem management’, were 
frequently used.
The ultimate authority of Parliament was not questioned in the 1920s, despite 
reform proposals to give the telephone service provider increased managerial 
and financial flexibility. The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking 
remained constant: Parliament continued its powers of control; the PTT 
Ministry increased its role as political centre of telephone policy; and the 
Ministry of Finance tightened its control over the services’ finances. The ‘new’ 
administrative council, introduced at the same time as the financial reform of 
1923, was left without real powers.
The public ethos changed in that budgetary unity was abolished and service 
publics were no longer perceived to be incompatible with industrial manage­
ment methods, thus opening up for the establishment of a separate budget for 
the PTT services, the budget annexe. The two other elements of the public ethos
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from the consolidation period, namely territorial equality and continuity of 
service, were incorporated in the nascent concept of service public. This 
development made the service public concept ubiquitous in French telephone 
debate, and remained the central rationale for a sustained state monopoly in 
service provision, prohibiting competition from private operators.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making in French telephone policy were 
challenged by proposals to establish an administrative council who, together 
with the ministry and the government, would gain some degree of financial and 
managerial discretion, to the detriment of parliamentary intervention. The 
debate showed, however, that the ideas about Parliament’s ultimate authority 
and the needs to safeguard the general interest were not changed.^ Criteria for 
legitimate decision-making did therefore not significantly change between 1900 
and 1925. Discourse remained communicative.
The French sectoral state tradition’s most important development in the early 
20^ century was therefore the growing importance and increased precision of 
the service public concept, effectively incorporating the earlier elements of 
continuity and territorial equality of service (while discarding budgetary unity), 
as well as the new ‘fashionable’ ideas of financial flexibility and modem 
management. The development therefore extended and reformulated earlier 
traditions, rather than changing them.
 ^ The reform outcome seriously watered down initial proposals and left and administrative 
council with virtually no powers.
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The reform process of the 1920s in France can thus be seen to corroborate the 
view that sectoral state traditions modify new ideas to fit old ones. The radical 
new ideas, although globally fashionable, as well as attractive both 
intellectually and economically, were, as will be shown in this chapter, in the 
end rejected in a French setting where the appropriateness of political process in 
the name of democracy and the general interest was more important than the 
immediate economic profitability of state activities.
French telephone policymaking in the early 2(f^ century
The consolidation of the state monopoly in telephone service provision had 
institutionalised principles of territorial equality and continuity of service. After 
nationalisation, the telephone service was consistently argued to be in the 
general interest of the nation, as well as of the national economy, but disagree­
ment remained on the optimal form of state intervention in the sector. The 
nationalisation of 1889 had removed the private telephone service operator, but 
proponents of private service provision were still present in the policymaking 
environment, albeit without a parliamentary majority.
The debate preceding the 1923 reform was principally a discussion on the basic 
character of the telephone service, in which defenders of budgetary unity (who 
insisted on viewing the telephone service as a service public) opposed advocates 
of financial autonomy, who emphasised the industrial nature of telephone
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service operation. The reform outcome was a budget annexe that allowed the 
PTT services to borrow money through issuing state bonds.^
When the 1923 reform and subsequent political debate are looked at in detail, it 
can be seen that principles about territorial equality, continuity of service, and 
parliamentary control as safeguards of the general interest, were all adhered to 
throughout the process on both sides of the political spectrum. However, it is 
also clear that ideas about financial and administrative organisation (reflecting 
both legitimate decision-making methods and, implicitly, the distribution of 
power among the relevant actors) were seriously challenged. Several issues 
were at stake:
i) Was the telephone service mainly a service public or an industrial 
activity? The answer was crucial for the next two questions:
ii) Which control mechanisms and administrative/management tools 
were optimal to safeguard the general interest?
iii) What financial instruments were best adapted to promote the 
principles of territorial equality, continuity and quality of service and 
financial viability?
Service public
The issue of whether telephone service provision should be perceived as a 
service public or an industrial activity was at the heart of French telephone 
policy debates around the financial reform of 1923. At the turn of the century
 ^The 1923 reform included the establishment of an administrative council and was paralleled 
by an important investment programme, but the budget annexe remained the most significant 
element of the reform.
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territorial equality, continuity of service, and parliamentary control were central
elements in the sectoral state tradition for French telephone policy to which
policymakers across the political spectrum adhered. However, social and
political developments in the late 19^ century provoked new ideas about the
state in France. The growing importance of socialist ideas and industrial
development spurred demands for a more active, interventionist state,
increasingly focusing on the social justice of the outcome of state actions rather
than on the appropriateness of minimal state interference.
However individualist one is, one has to realise that society’s reaction is not 
sufficient in economic matters. From the beginning we claimed that social 
science should be individualist, in the sense that it considered the action as 
the individual’s fact, but that this individual action always called for a 
collective reaction. This collective action is named intervention. Society 
must intervene to hinder exploitation and injustice of individualism in cases 
where it would compromise national territorial equality. However, in our 
era, the need for intervention is evident. There is too much competition, too 
much overproduction, too many commercial and monetary crises (...) there 
is in industry, in the large businesses, in capitalism and in mechanics, in the 
relations between managers and workers, quantities of relations which are 
not organised; the socialist movement of this century is only a symptom of 
this need for social organisation.
Hauriou 1896: 556-557
State intervention was given a legitimate basis through the development of the 
service public concept, whose origin dates back to the latter half of the 19* 
century, and whose definitions varied between professional groups. In the 
beginning it was dominated by the conception of jurists who applied it to 
establish a raison d ’être for a unified body of administrative law. A service 
public was a public administration with special legislative instruments attached 
to it (Guibert 1956: 19; Demichel 1974: 5) and since it required a unique set of 
laws and regulations, its content was defined first and foremost by its 
organisation. Early notions of service public, therefore, can also be described as
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‘organisational’, in that they concentrated on the organisation of the service 
provider: “A service public is a public organisation with powers, competencies, 
and norms which undertakes the fonction of providing to the public, in a regular 
and continuous fashion, a specific service, under the auspices o f ‘police’ in an 
enlarged meaning of the word” (Hauriou, quoted in Guibert 1956). Such an 
organisational conception of service public would rapidly include all public 
administrative actions, whereas private actors by definition could not undertake 
service public, even if their output were undoubtedly in the general interest.
The concept achieved a clearer meaning from the turn of the century, systema- 
tised by the law scholar Rolland around the principles of continuity, equality 
and mutability (Chevallier 1997: 20). The systématisation and development of 
the concept rendered it more than a juridical classification, it touched upon the 
basic values of the regime of administrative law, establishing that public 
administration worked in the interest of society, and not according to particular 
privileges (Chevallier 1997: 20). The doctrine was further developed by another 
law scholar, Duguit, who used service public as ‘supra-political’ criterion for 
state action to supplant the former much-criticised notion of sovereignty 
(Laborde 2000: 545-546). In 1920s juridical debate, public administration 
action became equated with service public, ensuring the execution of the 
general interest to the benefit of individual citizens and of the society as a whole 
(Laborde 2000: 545-546).
The service public concept also contributed to delimitate legitimate action on 
behalf of the state through establishing constraints on public agents and public
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actions. The role of the state was no longer to dominate its citizens, but to serve, 
and to serve as efficiently as possible. “[An] honest manager, a loyal servant; 
the power transforms itself accordingly, the ‘right to command’ becomes 
‘obligation to administer’” (Chevallier 1997: 22). The change of emphasis from 
the policing state {Ètat-gendanné) to the welfare state {État-providencé) where 
the state was increasingly seen as provider of public goods at the expense of its 
exercising some unique power, gave state monopolies increased legitimacy 
(Musso 1997: 272). A public monopoly was legitimate because its basic motive 
was not that of accumulating profit, but the general interest. The state should 
therefore not engage in profit-seeking enterprise: “It is today generally accepted 
that the PTT services should not be organised so as to generate revenues by 
government. A loss-making operation is completely justified” (Jèze 1926: 44).
Service public, as it encompassed the general interest of the nation (and thus 
required Parliamentary control), remained the central rationale for a sustained 
state monopoly in service provision, prohibiting competition from private 
operators. The concept did not oblige the state to provide individual households, 
municipalities or other institutions with a telephone service, unless they 
themselves arranged ways of financing it.  ^The introduction of public phone 
boxes and new services (wake-up calls, extended directory enquiries and 
separate lines for taxi services (Machet 1923)) did, however, signal a
 ^“The establishment of main lines should be in part paid by the subscriber; In Paris: 1.000 
francs for the line on Paris territory, 80 francs per 100m aerial or underground cable (...) A 
subscriber providing her own telephone is responsible for maintenance and possibly modifi­
cation if the Adminsitration deems the instrument no longer workable within its network.” 
(Bulletin des Postes, des Télégraphes et des Téléphones 1930: 225, 228). The principle of 
contributing to connection to the network, so-called access charge, remained used throughout 
the 20* century, but social policy considerations about the importance of access to a network 
and the extension of a modem telephone network resulted in standard access charges not based 
on distance from the nearest switch.
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willingness to make services more attractive and is a sign that the principle of 
territorial equality present in the sectoral state tradition influenced PTT Ministry 
decisions. The lack of public resources to fund such extensions and the 
pragmatic search for alternative financial methods is not exceptional in the 
history of French services publics'. “The public powers’ choice between 
different administrative methods [operation, licensing, infrastructure provision 
to limited companies, direct service provision] for services publics vary over the 
decades. For each epoch, the choice is the result of a compromise between 
technological developments, social demands and collective resources. In 
particular, the wish to reduce public financial participation to a minimum often 
leads the public powers to change financing formulae” (Stoffaës 1995; 50).
Budgetarv unitv
The sectoral state tradition from the end of the ‘consolidation period’ comprised
budgetary unity. The principle of budgetary unity was contested in Parliament
on several occasions after the separate budget had been abolished in 1892.
Proposals to separate the PTT budget from the general budget appeared as early
as 1900, when the PTT minister suggested that
the material and moral status of the P&T services should be reported in 
writing every year. This document, which would inform the national 
representatives about the needs of the service, would allow Parliament to 
take knowledgeable decisions.
PTT Minister Millerand 1900, quoted in Musso 1991: 60
As seen in Chapter 2, ‘the doctrine of budgetary unity’ was a corollary to the theory of the 
unity of the state: The unity of the state was absolute; the body of administrative law was 
intended to ensure that all state action served the general interest, and a state entity, undertaking 
all action in the general interest, should operate one unitary budget.
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The conflict over budgetary unity paralleled the conflict of whether telephony 
principally should be considered a service public, which would strengthen the 
case for a unitary budget and was the opinion of those viewing the telephone 
service first and foremost as a state administrative tool; or whether it was an 
industrial activity, in which case modern management methods (as opposed to 
traditional public bureaucracy) and flexible financial instruments were 
necessary.
Immediately after the turn of the century both the P&T administration and
Parliament were divided on the issue. Proposals to recreate a separate budget for
the PTT services were put forward first in 1904, and the Commission des
Finances reflected that
there are two kinds of budgets and ministries. On the one side the 
administrative ones, on the other side the industrial. There might be reasons 
for some budgets, such as for posts and state railways, to acknowledge the 
industrial character of revenues and expenditures.
Commission des Finances, 1906 budget, quoted in Musso 1991: 63
However, advocates of budgetary unity again referred to the sectoral state 
tradition to argue their case. For example, during a debate on the budgetary 
status o f ‘productive state services’ in 1906, then Finance Minister Poincaré 
claimed that,
[through establishment of a budget annexe] we would enter onto a road that 
is diametrically opposed to that which has been followed for fifteen years, 
(...) and which until now has been met with approbation from the 
republican majority, that is, budgetary unity. ^
Poincarré 1906, quoted in Musso 1991: 64
 ^One should note, however, that Poincaré, as Minister of Finances, wanted to achieve 
soundness of the state finances in order to support welfare reforms, and the PTT services had 
until this point in time shown considerable profit (Keiger 1997: 73-111).
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Proponents of budgetary autonomy stressed the economic benefits for the state
and citizens of PTT services’ implications for economic prosperity, tax
revenues, and the development of democracy.
These services constitute the life of the nation (...) The effect of the PTT 
services for commercial prosperity, and, consequently, for tax income, its 
influence regarding the development of the deep and increasingly general 
penetration of democratic ideas, constitute for the State the first and most 
important of ‘benefits’. The profits indicated in the budget are only 
secondary. (...) [T]he state should concentrate less on direct profitability of 
the postal system and more on the indirect profits resulting from lowering 
tariffs and reducing the transportation time, i.e. be a service for the national 
commerce and industry and give them all necessary means of correspon­
dence.
Steeg [MP] 1910: 509-510
In face of plummeting revenues after the First World War, the service public 
aspect of telecommunications was downgraded and the industrial character of 
the sector highlighted in political debate. According to the early conception of 
service public a state bureaucratic organisation was the guarantor of territorial 
equality of service provision. ‘Budgetary unity’ was, however, easier to defend 
when the PTT services contributed positively to the state finances. Economic 
difficulties increased policymakers’ willingness to give the PTT services 
responsibility for their own debts, i.e. ‘financial flexibility’. In 1920, the poor 
state of public finances resulted in references to the state’s obligations to keep 
all services publics under one budgetary heading being replaced with confirma­
tion that “the methods of exploitation of the PTT services need to be modified, 
and they should be perceived as industrial and commercial services” 
(Commission des Finances 1920a: 984). Emphasising the industrial qualities of 
the sector, therefore, represented a solution to the political dilemma of 
increasing the financial flexibility of a service public.
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Changing views of the end-user
The industrial character of the PTT services remained central to the debate on
financial organisation. A legislative proposal put forward in 1910 provides an
interesting list of elements considered inherent to the industrial character of a
service, and which made it different jfrom purely administrative state activities,
such as security and education.
Today, the posts, telegraphs and telephones, the latter removed from a 
private enterprise in 1889, constitute an immense industrial enterprise 
comprising the fastest means of communications. They utilise a complex set 
of constantly changing tools, and they provide multiple services; transport 
and transmission of all sorts of correspondences, and a financial service 
manipulating impressive sums of money.
Steeg 1910: 509
Rapidly changing technology and complex services, even though they 
necessitated large sums of investments, would not, however, be sufficient 
criteria to characterise an industrial activity. What was essential was the 
character of the services provided, together with the relationship between the 
provider and the users. A parliamentary report of 1910 (Steeg 1910) talked 
about the PTT administration’s clients, which implied that users were no longer 
viewed as mere recipients of a standardised product, but rather as people in a 
position to make demands in return for payment. Tariffs, which under the 
doctrine of budgetary unity had been seen as a form of indirect taxation, were 
increasingly viewed as payment for services, which again emphasised the 
changing relationship between the state and its citizens. Users who paid for a 
service did not have the same relationship to the service provider as citizens 
who paid general taxes and received security and other public goods.
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The principle of budgetary unity and universality responds to what one 
might call an accounting emphasis: the science of finance fixes a certain set 
of financial rules which allow the state to avoid having to borrow money at 
the end of the year for expenses that normally should have been covered by 
general tax income. (...) But the question that arises is exactly whether the 
revenues from the PTT services are economically speaking state revenues. 
They have until now been treated as such; it seems to us that at this moment 
they have no longer this character. The stamp tax, for example, is no longer 
perceived as a tax paid for a service rendered by the state to a citizen, it is 
first and foremost the remuneration of costs undertaken by the public 
administration for transporting a letter. The public want, vulgarly speaking, 
value for money, and oppose that postal revenues be used for military or 
educational purposes.
Steeg 1910: 510
The changing view of the relationship between the state and its citizens and the 
industrial nature of the PTT services would be instrumental to re-orienting the 
debate on telephone policy in post-First World War France. It was furthermore 
coherent with the general development of ideas on the welfare state, “whereby 
society stops seeing itself as a ‘body’ (corps) and starts conceiving itself as a 
market” (Rosanvallon 1986: 25). However, until the outbreak of the war, PTT 
services had a positive contribution to the state coffers, and no parliamentary 
majority existed to legislate a new financial or administrative regime for "les 
Pastes". This situation would change after the war.
Financial and technological deterioration
After the First World War the PTT services changed from being a net 
contributor to the state coffers to one accruing huge deficits. In particular, up to 
1914, they had been a source of revenue for the Ministry of Finance. During 
and after the First World War revenues plummeted and the situation for state 
finances in general was deplorable (Musso 1991). The question on the political
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agenda was, therefore, no longer whether autonomy should be given to the PTT, 
but just how much autonomy it should have.
In the early 1920s there was a general consensus on the worrying state of affairs
of French telecommunications. First, the First World War had had disastrous
effects on the state of affairs of the French telephone network.
Derailed through five years from its normal goal, deprived of a major part of 
its professional personnel. Equipment ruined in all of the northern and 
eastern parts of the country, dilapidated and outdated in the whole country. 
Absolutely insufficient to assure the needs resulting from the rapid 
economic upturn. Financially out of equilibrium.
Le Troquer [PTT Minister] 1924a
Second, customer complaints remained rife, the major concerns being low
quality of communications and slow connection^, -  problems which largely
stemmed from the late automation of the network. Whereas in the US,
automatic switches had been installed as early as 1892, in the French capital
they were still manually operated in the 1920s.
For Paris, the problem is more complex [than merely too few circuits]; the 
expenses necessary to improve the service will no doubt be very high. With 
today’s telephone technology, the completely legitimate customers’ 
demands, and the increase in the number of customers, which, despite the 
bad functioning of the service continue to grow, it is indispensable to give 
higher priority to the material element than to the human one. Paris should 
have, as so many large cities abroad, this system which is the ‘latest fashion’ 
in technological perfection, that is, the automated telephone.
Sous-secrétaire d’Êtat [PTT Minister] 1923
The PTT administration did not have in-house equipment manufacturers and 
consequently approached private firms to provide the necessary technology. In
 ^Senator Hirschauer remarked in parliament in 1923 that he once had demanded a call to his 
home in Versailles from his Paris office, then got in his car, and when reaching his home, the 
coimection from Paris was established (Hirschauer 1923).
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order to enhance national autonomy it was vital not only to equip the country 
with well-functioning telecommunications systems, but also to retain and 
develop technological knowledge in French hands. Therefore, a programme for 
technological improvement was launched at the same time as the financial 
reform of 1923, and was seen as complementary to the latter.
Parliamentary dehate
The bad state of affairs for French PTT services induced consensus on the
necessity for a separate budget and drastic change in management methods. The
Finance Commission’s report on the PTT budget proposal for 1920 criticised
contemporary practices and advocated profound change, reiterating proposals
from former PTT officials and ministers.
The complaints about the management in the PTT administration have 
reached a considerable number, and it seems that (...) the administration is 
passing through a crisis period. This situation is particularly serious for the 
telephone service (...). The operating methods for the PTT services must be 
modified and should be conceived of as commercial and industrial activities. 
(...) This project [the Commission des Finances’ examination of the 1920 
budget proposal] essentially retraces the previous proposal of M. Clementel, 
then PTT minister (...). One o f its essential propositions is the constitution 
of the PTT budget as a budget annexe (...). Another concerns the finance 
minister’s possibility to issue state bonds to increase the revenues of the 
PTT separate budget (...). I limit myself, as did my predecessors, to insist 
on the prompt discussion and adoption of a reform whose principle is 
generally agreed and which firstly should give financial autonomy to the 
PTT services, to exempt them from the general budget, to give the 
possibility to obtain fhnds necessary to renew and modernise their 
equipment, and secondly should conceive management methods as 
commercial and industrial as possible within existing limits.
Commission des Finances 1920a; 984
The Commission des Finance’s proposals for 1920 were never implemented. 
Only eight months after their damning report its budget proposal for 1921
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upheld budgetary unity and renounced proposals concerning new investment
both in employees and in equipment because of the sad state of French finances.
In a letter to the Minister of Finance dated 5 November 1920, the 
honourable president of the Commission des Finances formulated the policy 
to be implemented as follows: The Commission, he wrote, shall obtain that 
everyone in public administrations have the sentiment that an expense that 
can be postponed, or the development of a service which is not absolutely 
and urgently necessary, are inadmissible at this present hour.
Commission des Finances 1920b: 442
The principal criticisms and recommendations on the state of affairs in the PTT 
administration, however, were upheld in the December report (Commission des 
Finances 1920b), which emphasised the advantages of creating an administra­
tive council to supervise the actions of the public administration, as well as 
assisting the minister. Furthermore, public ownership per se was not seen as an 
obstacle; the recent problems would have been just as disastrous for a private 
enterprise as they had been for the public administration.
Administrative methods in the sector were also perceived to be in need of 
change. If financial deterioration, economic difficulties and technological 
devastation led policymakers to wish for change, it was the strong emphasis on 
the industrial aspect of all PTT services in public discourse that made change 
legitimate to the public. Giving budgetary flexibility to any service public 
would necessarily, because of the doctrine of budgetary unity, be open to the 
criticism that the state had renounced its responsibilities in times of financial 
hardship, which was unacceptable. Equipping an industrial activity with 
appropriate financial and management tools and procedures, however, was not. 
And because of the novelty of these management methods, it became all the
The reforms of the 1920s 122
more important to emphasise the continued parliamentary control of the sector 
as a safeguard of the general interest.
The possibilities of long-term financial planning under the system of budgetary
unity were perceived to be insufficient for a complex, high-investment
technological area like the telephone sector. The guidelines for a reformed
system, therefore, originated in private enterprise management’s methods for
financial planning. An administrative reform was seen as a “necessary corollary
to the financial reform” (Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1854) and the
substance of the proposal was inspired by the contemporary ‘management
gurus’, notably Taylor of the USA and the Frenchman Fayol.^ The French
government particularly emphasised
the principal conditions for the prosperity of an enterprise are in particular 
the possibility to foresee the future, unity and continuity, stability and 
competence of the management, and initiative and responsibility at all levels 
of the organisation.
Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1854
From the early 1920s both government and Parliament increased their focus on 
the technical services and their personnel. The proposed administrative reform 
fi'om July 1922 emphasised the need for reinforcement of the technical staff as 
well as their contribution in management if a financial and administrative re­
organisation inspired by industrial management methods should succeed 
(Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1857).
’ Fayol had characterised the PTT administration as ‘the archetype of public industrial 
incapability’ (Fayol 1921), and criticised the French state for being incapable of long-term 
planning: “The annual forecasts (budgets) are seldom finished early enough to be of much use, 
long-period forecasts are rare, and in this vast undertaking, which calls for exceptional 
foresight, we appear to be working rather from hand to mouth. What is the reason for this? Its 
immediate cause is the instability of our present ministerial system. (...) Stability is essential” 
(Fayol 1930: 41).
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In July 1922 the government proposed an administrative reform of the postal 
and telegraph services, including the telephone service. A new financial 
structure could only be put in place at the start of a financial year. Therefore, so 
as not to lose another year before implementation, the government launched the 
administrative reform in 1922 to be able to incorporate it in the Loi des finances 
of 1923 (Ministre des travaux publics 1922; 1854). The three main motives for 
reform were:
0 The PTT administration would have to be ‘depoliticised’ -  because the PTT 
had taken on a clear characteristic of an industrial activity and its services 
could no longer be seen as the political instrument they once had been;*
0 Although the basic principles for state activity in the sector made it possible 
to classify the service as a service public, public opinion was seen to have 
changed, and the general interest remained the sole legitimate reason for a 
service public^
“The primitive conception of the PTT services: political and local institution. (...) An 
economic revolution has taken place. The railway, the car, the plane have replaced the 
diligence. Progress in electricity has created the telegraph, the telephone and radio 
conununications. All sorts of exchange have developed, the difiiision of credits and of 
commerce have created new needs. (...) It is therefore the satisfaction of the clients’ needs who 
must be the ‘raison d’etre’ for a conunercial service such as the PTT’ (Ministre des travaux 
publics 1922: 1854).
 ^“The idea is that of service public, but at the same time, the ideas and the morals have 
developed. It is no longer the reason of the state’ or the regent’s wish’ who justify 
governmental action, but only the general interest. It is in the general interest that certain 
services, considered indispensable for social life, are exempted, whatever their mode of 
operation, from simple individual initiative to be ensured with special guarantees about 
continuity and impartiality” (Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1854).; “The minister’s role is 
to be able to, at any moment, and under his responsibihty, to put forward the national will”  
(Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1856).
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0 The complexity of the services offered called for modern management and 
administrative methods, for a focus on commercial principles and for 
financial long-term equilibrium.
The government admitted that a public administration had particular needs and
concerns that made it impossible to implement management methods identical
to those in a purely commercial enterprise. Social considerations, the fact that a
public administration was not profit maximising, and above all the supremacy
of the general interest, which implied continued parliamentary control, all
contributed to limit the extent to which private sector methods could be applied.
One cannot wholly copy the organisation of private firms to establish the 
future administrative statutes for the PTT services. The management of 
private enterprises are focused on one unique goal: that of maximising 
profits. This is not the case in a service public such as the PTT services, 
which is established not with a fiscal motive but in the country’s general 
interest.
Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1855
A ‘Board of Management’ was proposed. In a private enterprise the Board 
represents the link between the managers and the company’s shareholders. In 
the case of the PTT services such an institution, named an ‘administrative 
council’, would represent the link between the managers (i.e. the government 
and the ministry -  in particular the minister, -  which remained solely 
responsible towards Parliament) and the ‘shareholders’, i.e. the citizens. The 
proposed administrative council would consist of
“The management of large industrial enterprises have recently been the subject of serious 
studies, undertaken particularly by Taylor in the USA and by M. Henri Fayol in France. These 
studies show that the principal conditions for the prosperity of an enterprise are in particular the 
possibility to foresee the future, unity and continuity, stability and competence of the 
management, and initiative and responsibility at all levels of the organisation. Such conditions, 
let us admit it right now, do not exist iu the PTT enterprise” (Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 
1854).
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0 15 representatives of ‘the general national interests’, chosen among the
grands corps, chambers of commerce, the media, some representative for 
the rural population, and a management expert;
0 4 representatives of the PTT Ministry staff;
0 The directeur du budget in the Ministry of Finance and the inspecteur 
général for the PTT services.
The proposed council would be a consultative organ, and therein lay the biggest
dilemma of the proposed organisation. The inspiration for the new structure was
evidently drawn from private enterprise but;
Having such completely different goals, the public and the private enterprise 
cannot be administered in the same way. However, from the profound study 
of the management of private enterprise, a doctrine is emerging whose 
administrative principles have general value. It is necessary to apply to the 
services publics the principles and exploitation methods that have shown 
their usefulness in industry.
Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1855
Recognising the fundamental differences between public and private enterprise 
to be the lack of profit-maximising stakeholders in the public sector, as well as 
the complicating yet overriding importance of the ‘general interest’ in the public 
services’ operation, the government opted for a medium-level solution 
regarding the new structure’s autonomy. The service public status was not 
questioned, and the minister in charge of the PTT portfolio, who had final 
responsibility for both the technological and the financial side of the services, 
remained answerable to Parliament. In addition, since the administrative council 
was not itself responsible to Parliament, and as the PTT budget remained an
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annual parliamentary decision, full financial freedom in the hands of the council 
was impossible.
Despite these restrictions, it was emphasised that the council needed
‘independence’ and ‘integrity’ (Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1855). This
was to be achieved by making the council a non-political organ, in the sense
that its 21 members were to represent national economic and general public
interests, and not be elected through traditional political channels.
The frmction of a member of the administrative council is incompatible with 
holding a parliamentary seat in either of the two chambers. No member of 
the administrative council can at the same time be administrator of an 
enterprise receiving subventions or being controlled by the PTT 
administration, undertaking work or supplying goods to the administration 
under any pretext.
Art. 2, Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1858
Integrity was also to be ensured through compulsory consultation with the
minister. If the minister and the council disagreed, the minister was obliged to
hear the council a second time before taking a decision. However, because the
final responsibility for decisions would according to parliamentary principles lie
with the minister, who was solely answerable to Parliament, this ‘extended right
to pronounce its views’ was as far as government was willing to go to give
rights to the administrative council.
In order to give the administrative council all the necessary integrity, 
without conflicting with our fundamental constitutional principles, the 
project estimates that the minister cannot take a decision contrary to the 
advice of the council without inviting the latter to look into the issue once 
more.
Ministre des travaux publics 1922: 1855
 ^' In this respect although not in others, it was echoed 55 years later in 1996 with the 
establishment of the regulatory body the Autorité de regulation des télécommunications.
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Technological, managerial and economic expertise was assumed to be the most 
important features of the council. However, a certain corporatist arrangement 
can be traced in the proposition, since the grand corps and chambers of 
commerce were among those organisations stipulated to nominate members. 
Both PTT service users (mainly industry and governmental bureaucracy) and 
employees were to be represented, whereas the equipment industry was 
completely left out. Here, the situation differed fi'om that of Germany.
Reform outcome -  the Loi de Finances o f  1923
The law of 1923 was the result of a compromise between conflicting interests so 
that the much sought-after profound organisational reform of the internal 
administration of the service in the PTT Ministry didn’t happen. The Loi de 
Finances of 1923 did, however, bring changes for the telephone service regime 
in France, especially in that it instigated the ‘new’ administrative council. The 
financial reform did not give full autonomy to the PTT Ministry, even if it 
formally increased the financial flexibility of the PTT administration; and the 
technological programme was given fewer resources, and lasted for a shorter 
time period than initially proposed by the government. The debate of 1920, 
which brought to the fore ardent opposition to a possible profound 
administrative re-organisation of the PTT model, had limited the scope of 
feasible options for the government (Musso 1991: 70-74). Parliament finally 
voted in favour of a ‘mixed system’ solution, which gave increased financial
A council had been in place, albeit less formally, to advise the minister, from 1919, and the 
‘invention’ of 1923 was hence strictly speaking not a novelty (Pehsse 1923: 1200).
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autonomy and flexibility to the PTT services, but retained the PTT
administration under ministerial control.
The Loi des Finances of 1923 brought the following changes to the regime:
0 The new article 69 confirmed that PTT services were placed “under the high 
authority of the minister for the PTT, who administers with the assistance of 
the directors and a council”. The council had 28 members: the minister; 6 
representatives appointed by the minister from among technicians and 
bureaucrats in the service; the directeur du budget au ministère des 
finances', the contrôleur des dépenses engagés-, 6 employees; and 13 
representatives o f ‘the general interest of the nation’ (i.e. Conseil de Flat, 
business interests, agriculture, different administrative levels, and the press).
0 Article 69 also regulated the use of potential profits from the service.
Highest priority was given to the reimbursement to the Treasury of deficits 
from former operation. Second came depreciation of capital debts prior to 
the budgetary reform. Further profits would be transferred to a reserve fund, 
until this reached 150 million francs. Any other surplus would go to the 
general budget.
0 The new article 72 established three permanent funds; equipment
procurement; depreciation of installations and equipment; and ‘unexpected 
events’.
0 The new article 75 gave the PTT Minister the possibility to borrow by 
issuing state obligations running for maximum 30 years.
0 Article 80 instituted a separate budget added to the general budget, the two 
subject to the same procedures.
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Loans (the issuing of state obligations) were to be used only for new
installations, and were not meant as a means for easing the general financial
situation of the PTT services. The poor financial situation and the incapability
of the state to find sufficient means of investment for new installations left loans
as one of very few options to improve the situation of the PTT services (Allix
1923; Ministère des PTT 1939; 4). Albeit reluctantly, the Commission des
Finances of the Sénat recommended the government’s solution under the
condition that the loans remained interest free and that they were handled
outside of financial market structures, such as banks.
[The Commission des Finances] does not much like the politics of loans, but 
still, when it recognised that with annual credits and the legal difficulties 
connected with transferring such credits from one year’s exercise to 
another’s, it was impossible for the postal administration to implement its 
programme and to find the necessary means to defend itself from sometimes 
violent complaints from the public opinion, then the Commission des 
Finances deliberately entered into the government’s system.
Rapporteur, Commission des Finances 1923
The Treasury’s ‘loans’ to the PTT budget would hamper investments in 
technological improvement for decades. The administrative reform was also 
watered down even further compared to initial proposals, the depoliticisation of 
the policy-area proved unattainable, and the administrative council was left with 
no real powers. The working period for members of the administrative council, 
the Conseil supérieur des postes, télégraphes et téléphones, was initially 
proposed for six years, but was finally set to two years with possible re­
appointment (Ministère des travaux publics 1923). Such short mandates 
compromised the possibility to engage in long-term planning. The 
independence that had been put forward as a precondition for the council to be 
able to function as in a private enterprise was hampered because the PTT and
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finance ministries were responsible for the nomination (and hence approval) of 
members, after receiving proposals from the interested parties.
The compulsory consultation by the Minister, which had been seen as a guaran­
tee for the council’s integrity, was in the final law reduced to “[t]he council 
must be consulted for all matters concerning the general organisation of the 
services (...) The council gives, in addition, its opinion on all questions put 
before it by the Minister” (Ministère des travaux publics 1923: preamble). 
Moreover, the minister was solely responsible for the council’s agenda, which 
treated “only those questions designated in the agenda” (Ministère des travaux 
publics 1923: Art. 8). Thus, the Minister was no longer obliged to re-consult the 
council in cases of disagreement. The council therefore had little scope for long­
term planning, no financial authority, no agenda-setting powers, and no right to 
be consulted in case of disagreement with the Minister. It was however an organ 
whose existence and fimctioning was in accordance with central political 
democratic procedures, and thus politically legitimate.
The financial and administrative reforms were supplemented by a programme 
of technological improvement, with economic resources to underpin larger 
programmes aimed at extending and improving the national network. The 
National Assembly initially proposed 1.2bn francs for programmes running 
over a ten-year period, but this was later reduced to 756 million francs to cover 
developments in the period 1923 to 1928 (Rapporteur Commission des Finances 
1923: 1201; Musso 1991: 75-78). Rapid technological development was seen as 
the major reason for keeping the programmes within a five-year period. In
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reality, what it did do was safeguard Parliament’s regular control of the public 
administration’s economic plans.
1923 thus saw an institution aimed at improving the PTT services by giving 
policymakers and administrators greater financial flexibility and the possibility 
to plan financially over a longer period. The inspiration was taken from private 
enterprise, budgets were to be balanced and obligations, i.e. capital from 
(private) investors, would form the economic basis from which to implement 
the desired technological improvement of the French telephone system.
Despite private sector inspiration, service public remained the core justification
for state activity in the telephone sector, providing continuity of the sectoral
state tradition. In May 1924, the president of the administrative council ensured
that the PTT services in general, and the telephone service in particular, were
firmly defined as services publics, and that the new financial tools changed
nothing of this core element. The minister wanted to couple healthy economic
management with the basic sectoral principles of territorial equality and justice.
Profoundly convinced of the necessity that a service such as the PTT service 
should be managed in the interest of all because it is, in the strongest 
meaning of the term, a service public, I believe that there are no reasons 
why it should not be managed as well and with methods as healthy and 
modern as any well-managed large enterprise. (...) Regarding the telephone, 
we [the PTT Ministry] have calculated that it was not possible to purely and 
simply augment taxes that are already prohibitive for the majority of small 
urban users and all rural subscribers. One should first remedy the injustice 
of the current division of charges between subscribers (...). This is not only 
an act of justice; it is also good commercial and industrial management.
Le Troquer 1924b: 2, 7
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The case of Germany
Throughout the period studied in this chapter, the notion of authority in German 
policymaking remained with legislation, whose role as conflict solver was again 
illustrated through the passing of the Fernmeldeanlagengesetz from 1928, which 
arose as a result of the conflict over rights-of-way between the DRP and the 
Lander due to the budget balancing requirements.
The set of actors perceived as relevant to the policy area remained largely 
constant. The general powers of the Ministry of Finance were increased in the 
Weimar republic, and a Verwaltungsrat was established in 1924. The 
Verwaltungsrat’s composition (representatives from the two parliamentary 
chambers, the Ministry of Finance, PTT employees, and the ‘general 
economy’), together with the fact that the council itself was central in post-1924 
policymaking showed that interaction with a broad group of interest was 
important for the legitimacy of policies. Subsequent debate illustrated the 
continued presence of a multitude of actors including the different Lander and 
industry.
Regarding the public ethos, it has been observed that the principles of 
commercial undertakings were early on important for German telephone policy 
(Feyerabend 1927: 186), and the reforms of the 1920s can be seen as a 
continuation of this trend. Some new concepts appeared during the reform 
process, notably ‘autonomy’ (for the RPTV) and ‘consultative councils’ as 
proxy for private enterprise management methods. During the debate of the
The reforms of the 1920s 133
Reichspostfinanzgesetz calls appeared for institutional separation of business 
and politics as a response to the administration’s need for greater flexibility 
(Kuhn 1971: 13), but such changes were not legislated. The concept of 
‘enterprise’ (Untemehmen) was used in connection with the public telephone 
service provider for the first time. The new concepts were a logical continuation 
of the already existing idea of commercial management of telephone provision. 
From such an angle, the developments tie in with the strengthening of cost- 
based tariffs and budget balancing.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making did not change in Germany in the 1920s. 
The RPTV was one of several powerful actors in the telephone sector. Although 
it remained the most powerful, because of its agenda-setting powers and the 
legal monopoly in telephone service provision, it faced a set of opponents and 
co-deciders to consult for policy decisions to be legitimate. Discourse remained 
coordinative. The German debate from 1900 until the 1924 reform focused on 
tariffs and financial arrangements more than on the political role of the PTT 
services.
Telephone policy in Germany in the early 20^^  century
In Germany, following the consolidation of the legal state monopoly around the 
turn of the century, telephone policy debate was characterised by a firm legal 
foundation that delimited the Reich’s powers over both Lander and individuals. 
The telephone service, alongside the telegraph, was perceived as a vital part of 
the infrastructure supporting German industry, and the principal aim for the
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Reichspost- und Telegraphenverwaltung’s (RPTV) telephone policy was to 
provide telephone and telegraph services to the industry throughout the German 
territory.
The basis of modem industry is transport. First after the freeing of 
humankind from its binding to the local environment and the change this 
freeing caused for the individual’s perception of its environment, can we 
speak of a modem national and global industry. (...) The telephone is 
certainly the origin of a fundamental alteration in the means of exchange of 
news and a profound redefinition of interpersonal communication.
Feyerabend 1927: 197
The sector-specific characteristics of network effects and the importance of 
territorial coverage were used to defend a state monopoly, without excluding 
competition in principle. The public administration would only operate a 
politically legitimate monopoly to the extent that it succeeded in meeting 
customers’ demand for communications services, which entailed a rapid 
extension of the network, whilst simultaneously ensuring that state finances 
were not burdened. Cost-based tariffs and demands for financial viability of the 
public telephone service were thus early institutionalised.
The debate leading up to and culminating in the 1924 reform reflected the 
constrained role of the Reich authorities, notably that the by then well-defined 
policy arena comprised several strong and powerful actors with technical 
knowledge (in particular the electro-technical industry) and the Lander, who 
had regional authority over both territory (the right-of-way issue) and provision 
of public goods. Three questions were particularly central to the debate 
preceding the financial reform:
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i) What degree of autonomy should the RPTV have over a sector 
perceived as crucial to the health of the German economy?
ii) What financial regime would fulfil the conflicting criteria of 
providing good and cheap communications services to the German 
industry, being socially acceptable and at the same time enhancing 
financial viability of the telephone service provider?
iii) Should the RPTV continue to carry all costs connected with 
conflicting interests between telephone and the electrical industry 
when the two used the same trajectories for their installations?
Economic and technological difficulties, particularly after the First World War, 
added to the urgency for reform, and although the communications 
administration’s role in ‘social and cultural matters’ was acknowledged, the 
financial viability of what was to become the public enterprise ‘Deutsche 
Reichspost’ remained the principal preoccupation of the legislators, 
acknowledging the public ethos of efficient management of infrastructure 
provision.
The investigation will show that the telephone continued to be perceived mainly 
as infrastructure for the economy, as a communications institution similar in 
importance to other transport institutions. The Deutsche Reichspost (DRP) was 
officially named an enterprise {Untemehmen). Contrary to the situation in 
France, the telephone service’s industrial nature and hence the appropriateness 
of management methods similar to those used in profit-seeking companies were 
never questioned in Germany. Although the concepts of ‘autonomy’ (for the
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RPTV) and ‘administrative councils’ (used as proxy for private management 
methods) were included in the debate, they enlarged the existing sectoral state 
tradition rather than broke with it.
The situation prior to reform
The main issues in the institutionalisation of a telephone service monopoly in 
Germany had been the legal foundation for extending the telegraph monopoly, 
rights-of-way, and tariffs. The rights-of-way problem concerned the conditions 
under which Imperial authorities could erect telephone and telegraph masts and 
run cables on German territory, where the Lander authorities traditionally had 
final rights, except in cases of vital interest to the Reich. The question, 
therefore, directly concerned the limits of the Reich’s legitimate sphere of 
intervention, circumscribed through legislation.
The tariff question became the technical issue that embraced social and political 
questions, on numerous occasions highlighting the view within the public 
administration that the role of the Reich authorities was to provide an 
infrastructure for the economy in general, and to secure its own diffusion 
through efficient communication methods. Questions concerning the social 
aspects of telephone service (and communications in general) seldom merited 
their own headings, but were discussed through the issue of tariffs. The basic 
principle of cost-based tariffs strengthened throughout the early parts of the 20* 
century.
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Changing power structures -  the Weimar republic
Following the war, the Weimar republic (1919-1933) brought some minor 
changes to the power structure of the telephone sector in Germany. The new 
constitution implied only minor changes to the institutional make-up of the 
decision-making system. However, for the first time, all the telecommunications 
authorities throughout the Reich formed one common institution when the 
Bavarian and Wurtemberg organisations were merged with the Reichspost in 
1920 (Feyerabend 1927: 174). Thus, the Reichspostminister was the highest 
authority of the telecommunications administration and directly accountable to 
the Reichstag. Nevertheless, as the institution’s finances were part of the 
national budget, the Reichspost could not operate autonomously in financial 
markets. Borrowing was also prohibited, and any budget surplus went directly 
to the Ministry of Finance.
The biggest change to the institutional landscape for telephone policy in the 
Weimar republic was the strengthened position of the Finance Minister. No 
decision implying state expenditure could be taken without his approval, and if 
the Minister of Finance disagreed with another member of government, the 
latter was
free to seek the decision of the government, as long as the issue is of 
constitutional or otherwise utmost importance. (...) For a decision to be 
taken against the vote of the Finance Minister, more than half of the total 
number of Reich Ministers, in the presence of the Chancellor, is needed.
Reichspostministerium 1920
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The situation also gave the Ministry of Finance important powers regarding 
telephone policy, which further strengthened the emphasis on tariff issues. In 
order to reach a balanced budget, “increased expenses must be met with higher 
income” (Reichspostminister 1920), and tariffs were the only source of income 
that could be increased, since borrowing was prohibited. Tariffs and other 
central changes had to be based on legislation, thus involving Parliament. 
Hyperinflation, however, required a much more flexible decision-making 
system if the budget was to be balanced, and this problem contributed greatly to 
the perceived need for reform in 1924.
Public debate
After the legal consolidation of the state monopoly telephone policy debate 
focused on the degree of autonomy of the public telephone administration. 
Subsequently, as the financial situation deteriorated and the principle of cost- 
based tariffs forced tariff increases, the model of flat-rate tariffs came under 
scrutiny, as did the system whereby the public administration carried all costs to 
insulate telephone and telegraph lines from other electrical installations.
The initial growth in the German telephone network was impressive compared 
with the situation in France and other European states but it did not prove 
sustainable. Once the economic costs of expanding the network started to
The number of telephone connections in Germany had reached 1,2 miUions in 1914, i.e. 2 per 
100 inhabitants, whereas the same rate of penetration was not reached in France until 1927 
(Petzold 1990; BMPT 1957).
The reforms of the 1920s 139
increase, politicians paid increasing attention to telephony expenditures.
Growing political control negatively influenced the availability of investment 
capital, and as a consequence growth rates of telephone penetration declined, 
especially from 1914 (Duch 1991; 127).
Network developments during the First World War were naturally affected by
the extraordinary conditions:
Network extensions and new constructions could generally be provided only 
if they were immediately necessary for warfare, stocked equipment had to 
be given up for military means, (...) numerous workers were drawn from 
the telegraph services so that only the most basic maintenance could be 
executed.
Reichspostminister 1921a: 5
Consequently, after the war the German telephone system was in a bad 
condition, and network capacity was not sufficient to meet demand.
RPTV autonomv
The Telegraphengesetz of 1892 (§7) required Reichstag approval for tariff 
increases. As cost-based tariffs meant that the telephone was not to be financed 
through general taxation, the Reichstag was reluctant to spend public resources 
on the extension of the service. The RPTV, therefore, had to rely on its 
customers funding network extension through subscriptions and 
communications fees. Consultation with business interests provided a link 
between customers’ demands and the administration’s activities:
Price increases in the telephone sector during the war years (from 1914 until 1920) were 
estimated to around 4000 per cent for equipment and more than 500 per cent for salaries 
(Reichspostminster 1921a: 7)
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[S]ome administrations have [because of the enormous growth and 
complexity in traffic] for years consulted business interests on important 
questions concerning the public resources, which for them are of utmost 
importance. (...) Also the Imperial postal administration has (...) consulted 
representatives from trade, industry and agriculture on issues of general 
interest.
Berlin Chamber of Commerce 1909
At the turn of the century, however, business was not formally represented in 
the decision-making structures of the RPTV, unlike in other public utilities. The 
public administration should consult industry about issues of central 
importance, but it retained the power to set the agenda, and no formal 
representative organ of business interests existed. The Berlin Chamber of 
Commerce therefore suggested the establishment of a permanent consultative 
council “that when needs be, and at least twice annually, would meet” (Berlin 
Chamber of Commerce 1909). The suggestion was met with criticism fi'om 
other Chambers of Commerce on the basis of experience in other transport 
sectors;
It is known that the consultative councils in the transport administrations 
have limited influence and only a decorative character, even in transport 
administrations (railway councils, waterways council) where the businesses’ 
viewpoints are of vital interest.
Handel und Gewerbe 30.10.1909
The Berlin Chamber of Commerce thought that ‘decorative’ measures would be
a waste of time and resources if the outcome was only marginally influenced.
However, although the real power of business representatives was doubted in
some quarters, there was a growing opposition to the wide degree of discretion
in the hands of the RPTV.
The demand that certain of the government’s services interested parties 
should be heard, is in several public administrations rightly implemented.
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Our waterways and railway policies lean on co-operation with experts’ 
opinions. Why should the Reichspostamt, whose services touch almost 
everyone, have a monopoly on decisions?
‘Deutschland; Ein Postbeirat’ in Kolnische Zeitung 18.8.1909
The suggestion for a consultative council was launched just months before the 
law on tariffs of 1909, and with direct reference to the tariff setting regime.
The tariff law proposal, however, did not at any point discuss these suggestions 
(Reichskanzler 1909), although it would re-emerge some years later and form 
the basis of institutional structures in the financial reform of 1924.
Budget balancing
As a result of economic difficulties following the war, the RPTV had increasing 
problems balancing its budgets. Unlike in France, where a deficit in PTT 
services would be covered over the general budget, a German PTT deficit had 
to be met with increasing revenues, decreasing expenditure, or both.
Tariffs were the major source of revenue and were therefore fi’equently debated. 
The 1899 tariff regime had been adopted to promote the extension of the 
network and to redress the unbalanced economic burdens between customers. 
Small customers subsidised large users, which was perceived as socially unfair 
as well as economically unsustainable. Nevertheless, flat-rate tariffs (fixed
“Some decisions have been taken without prior consultation with affected business interests, 
which have learned about these decisions through the press. This was the case for the increase in 
postal tariffs from July 1906. (...) We are persuaded that our proposition [to establish a 
consultative council] would be in the interest for the state finances as well as for the health of 
industry” (Berlin Chamber of Commerce 1909).
The proportion of customers paying an access fee to flat-rate customers grew from 29 per cent 
in 1900 to 79 per cent in 1907. The effective fee per communication in 1907 for flat-rate 
consumers was on average 4.5pf, vs. 17.3pf for customers paying per communication 
(Reichskanzler 1909: 4,6).
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periodical amounts entitling unlimited calls in the period), which effectively
worked as a discount to large customers, had been important to increase
telephone utilisation. By 1909, however, the RPTV considered flat-rate tariffs
unnecessary and unjust.
One should not be surprised that well organised interest groups (...) 
vigorously support the current tariffs. They argue that trade and industry 
have got used to flat-rate tariffs and have organised accordingly. It is 
however impossible to deny that today’s tariff regime unjustly favour the 
high-consumption clients to the detriment of low-volume users.
Reichspostminister 1921b: 11
Abolition of flat-rate tariffs strengthened the perception that telephone tariffs 
were payment for a service, an element that was vital to the German sectoral 
state tradition. As telephony grew in importance and reached larger parts of the 
population, it became paramount to balance the need for increasing revenues 
against the social acceptance of higher tariffs. The long-stated requirement of 
cost-based tariffs could, in the current economic situation, legitimately be 
maintained only if the cost-covering principle extended to each consumer.
Budget balancing through cost cutting could be achieved by shifting 
responsibility for the extra cost of insulation in cases where telegraph and 
telephone cables conflicted with cables from other electrical infrastructure. The 
Telegraphenwegegesetz from 1899 stipulated that the RPTV should carry all 
costs related to extra insulation of telegraph and telephone cables against 
problems of induction, amounting to 11.000 Mark in 1900, 558.000 Mark in 
1914 (Reichspostministerium 1924: 5). The political problem with these costs 
was not only the large sums involved in financially difficult times, but also that 
they effectively subsidised private capital interests:
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The use of §6 of the Telegraphenwegegesetz [stipulating that the public 
administration was economically responsible for maintaining cable 
trajectories and insulation] has therefore taken a direction whereby large 
industrial concerns do not contribute their share of maintenance costs, but 
rather benefit from public expenditure to further their own development. 
The result is that the Reich is charged with ever increasing unproductive 
costs, (...) and private capital has added to its expense.
Reichspostministerium 1924: 11
The RPTV thus tried to transfer the costs to the electricity operators by calling
on an ‘emergency jurisdiction’ {Notverordmmgsrecht), whereby the Reichspost
achieved higher judicial priority than other utilities. It was therefore proposed
that the unequivocal obligation to cover all costs of insulation was changed in
favour of the general public interest.
[T]he change or repositioning of a telegraph line to benefit a later electrical 
installation can be requested and paid for by the public administration only 
in cases where the new installation is in the public interest, particularly for 
the national economy or for transport.
Reichspostminister 1924b: 2
The Prussian government, however, opposed the proposal, which was said 
would lead to increased costs for the Land as electricity supplier (Preussische 
Minsiterprasident 1924: 1). Conversely, the Reichsrat supported the 
government’s proposal because of the financial impossibility of maintaining the 
former regime.
The government has departed from the principle that if a later installation 
creates disturbance for installations already in place, the public 
administration’s duty to cover all or parts of the costs of insulation and 
maintenance depends on the particular installation’s legal, industrial and 
technical value. (...) The duties laid upon the RPTV by §6 TWG 
[Telegraphenwegegesetz] will cost no less than one million Goldmark per 
annum. The size of this cost in addition to the administrative costs from 
keeping the system, would weigh so heavily upon the public administration 
that not changing the law is an impossibility.
Reichspostminister 1924a: 2, 4-5
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Before the war Germany had been the largest economic power in Europe, and
the state had played an active role in its industrialisation (Bookbinder 1996:
162). Industry therefore played a significant role as legitimising power for the
state machinery, and was not likely to approve of a new telephone financing
regime that increased their economic burden. However, penetration rates
remained low, and it was politically not acceptable that a service for the few
should be paid for by general taxation.
For tariffs charged by a public enterprise, there are in principle three forms 
to be considered:
11. The state provides the service free of charge, using public means;
11. The costs of the enterprise are paid by the immediate beneficiaries of the 
service;
11. The enterprise is managed according to principles from private
enterprise, i.e. the state attempts to extract the greatest possible utility
( . . . )
Hence, for the telephone, income should cover costs, (...) since the users are 
relatively limited and the service should therefore not be paid for by the 
general taxpayer.
Reichspostminister 1921b: 4
This early focus on cost-based tariffs is in stark contrast to the French case, 
where PTT tariffs traditionally had been classified as an indirect tax rather than 
directly linked to the service provided. It is true that tariffs were increasingly 
perceived as payment for service also in France in this period, but the point 
never reached the same significance in French political debate as in Germany. 
Rather, in France, social justice and affordability became important elements in 
the setting of tariffs, because the state provided telephone service to citizens in 
the general interest, ensured by Parliament’s supervision. In Germany, social 
and cultural issues as well as affordability were important, as shown by the 
states argument for cost-based tariffs because the service did not extend to the
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whole population. Even so, the level of tariffs were always ultimately linked to 
production costs (Reichspostminister 1924c; 3).
Commercial management principles
The German telephone service has from the beginning been administered 
according to commercial principles, it shall keep itself; that is, its total 
operational costs shall be covered by its revenue.
Feyerabend 1927: 186
The problem that posed such difficulties for the French policymakers -  i.e.
whether the telephone policy should be treated as a service public or as an
industrial activity -  was never an issue in Germany. The industrial character of
the telephone service was recognised from the very introduction of the
telephone, and commercial principles of budget balancing were inherent in the
German view of the necessary tools for managing the sector. Early legislation
had, however, put certain administrative routines in place that hampered the
possibilities for rapid decisions, particularly the tariff-setting powers of the
Reichstag and the Minister of Finance in the Weimar republic, a problem
aggravated by hyperinflation.
One of the main reasons for the deficit is, in addition to the disadvantageous 
economical conditions [hyperinflation, lack of personnel, repercussions 
from warfare], that the RPTV is judicially dependent upon the Reichstag, 
the Reichsrat, and partly the Minister of Finance, and does not possess the 
possibility to manage its service according to enterprise management 
principles.
Reichspostminister 1924c: 3
Thus, although the huge gap between costs and revenues in the early part of the 
1920s constituted the main rationale behind the financial reform of 1924, its 
solution would logically be found in implementing means of private enterprise
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management into the state administration for the telephone service. One
important new institutional feature was an administrative council that would
assist the Reichspostminister in his work. The proposed administrative council
would have 25 representatives from the two chambers of Parliament, the
Ministry of Finance, civil servants from the PTT administration, and
independent experts with competence in industrial and transport matters.
The nature of the tasks of the administrative council is such that when 
electing its members, the emphasis must be on personal capability, because 
of their knowledge and experience, to promote the DRP’s commercial 
viability.
Reichspostminister 1924c: 5
The council could, therefore, be seen to fulfil tasks similar to those of a board of 
management in private enterprise, a model clearly copied by the public 
authorities.
Reform outcome -  the Reichspostfinanzgesetz o f 1924
Reform was perceived necessary because of economic difficulties and 
cumbersome legal procedures that restrained economic flexibility, particularly 
through the setting of tariffs, and it is in this context political debate and 
discourse must be evaluated. First and foremost, the government proposed to 
reduce political control of the telephone service administration.
The Reichspostfinanzgesetz was a balancing act between commercial and 
political constraints whose most important feature was the creation of a separate 
budget for what was to be the public enterprise named Deutsche Reichspost.
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The government embraced the implementation of private sector management
methods in what it saw as a commercial sector. Increasingly throughout the
1920s, telecommunications were perceived as so important to the economy that
they should be treated like other transport sectors.
The new form of communication must today be considered as just any other 
form of communication. The concept of communications beneficial to the 
community {gemeinnutzigen Verkehrs) cannot any longer be restrained to 
news and the transport of persons and goods, and they must therefore result 
in the Reichspost’s administration being given the character of a private 
undertaking.
Preussische Ministerprasident 1924
Any ideas of privatisation were held off by reference to the Postregal, which
had been important in consolidating the monopoly in the 19^  ^century, and to
‘cultural duties’, which in Germany signified territorial equality of service
provision (as explained in Reichspostminister 1924c on §1).
The task the RPTV will be given through the partitioning [of the budget], 
namely to balance costs and revenues in its own budget, is in the long run 
only possible if the administration has extensive management authority over 
its dispositions. (...) The reform does not open up for a privatisation of the 
postal and telegraph administration. Its important public duties, such as its 
role in defence, in providing equal infrastructure for enterprises, in 
transporting public information, and in taking care of cultural matters, can 
only be achieved through a public enterprise. However, within these frames 
the RPTV must accomplish its many duties as well as protecting its business 
interests, and hence needs a certain amount of flexibility and room for 
manoeuvre.
Reichspostminister 1924c: 4
The view that political and business issues should be separated was aired for the 
first time during the parliamentary debate in 1924. Such separation could be 
accomplished only through a reduction of political intervention in the daily 
management of the organisation, which would meet the need for managerial
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flexibility in the hands of the administration. However, the Reichspost remained 
under direct state control (Kuhn 1971: 13).
The 1924 law introduced the following main changes into the policymaking 
environment of the telecommunications sector in Germany (Reichspostminister 
1924c; Scheda 1932):
• An autonomous public enterprise, the Deutsche Reichspost (DRP) was 
created, administered by the Reichspostminister assisted by an 
administrative council {Verwaltungsrat).
• The DRP’s budget was separated from the national budget and 
established as a separate entity, a Sondervermogen (special fund), whose 
resources could not be affected by other obligations of the State.
• The Sondervermogen was required to balance, resources could not be 
transferred from the general budget, and loans should be used for 
network or equipment expansion only.
• The administrative council was responsible for conditions and tariffs 
related to use of the telephone service. It consisted of a maximum 40 
members, representing the Reichsrat (10), the Reichstag (10), the 
Ministry of Finance (1), the PTT Ministry’s staff (7), and ‘the general 
economy and experts’ (12). The twelve representatives from the 
economy at large were also to be drawn from different parts of the 
country.
17 This composition of the council was confirmed in a lecture by the Ministerialrat in 1926 
(Andersch 1926). The number of members was originally proposed to be maximum 25, in later 
drafts of the law extended to 31. The final council, however, counted 40 members.
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• Part of the income (between 6 and 6 2/3 per cent) should be transferred 
to the Ministry of Finance, and means should be set aside to cover 
earlier debts.
§1 of the law stated that “The Post and Telegraph Service of the State is an 
autonomous enterprise with the designation o f ‘Deutsche Reichspost’. It is 
managed by the Minister of Posts and Administrative Council according to the 
regulations of the present law” (L’Union Postale 1924). This is the first time the 
concept o f ‘enterprise’ {Untemehmeri) is used in relation to the PTT services. 
The DRP was not a free commercial enterprise (it remained part of the state 
administration regarding organisational and personnel matters), but its legal 
provisions went far in placing responsibility for economic viability with the 
Minister and the DRP itself, rather than with Parliament.
This rendered the DRP somewhat of a novelty in the state administration. The 
unit was “not a trade unit, not a business unit, but a department under the 
sovereign state authority in transport and communication matters” (Scheda 
1932; 12). As part of the transport sector, the DRP was under obligation to 
provide its services throughout the German territory. It was not formally a non­
profit organisation, but profitability was not its main goal. Tariffs should be 
kept as low as possible, but the budget should balance; conditions that left little 
room for commercial manoeuvre (Scheda 1932: 13).
The Sondervermogen separated the DRP’s budget fi*om the national budget. A 
savings account of up to 100 million Reichsmark was established to cover
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possible deficits, and the money was to be held in cash or as assets (Finanz- 
gesetz §8). Between 6 and 6 2/3 per cent of the profit should be transferred to 
the Treasury. The wording of the paragraph concerning the special funds was 
changed twice between 1924 and 1926; initially relating to the broad expendi­
tures of the DRP it was changed to specify 100 million Reichsmark in July 
1926. A fixed amount to cover deficits would create no incentives within the 
Reichspost to maximise profits (Scheda 1932: 35). Although the DRP was 
theoretically granted some autonomy in financial matters, the country’s eco­
nomic difficulties and the Treasury’s tendency to demand increasingly more 
money from the DRP severely limited the Reichspost’s room for action. The 
Reichspostfinanzgesetz came into force on 1 April 1924 (DRP 1924: 8).
Policymaking after 1924
The Reichspostfinanzgesetz was introduced to give the telephone service 
provider increased financial and managerial flexibility to make it more akin to a 
private enterprise. Subsequent debate and actions from the Ministry and the 
administrative council -  the Verwaltungsrat -  focused on the financial situation, 
particularly in relation to tariffs, on the infusion of business spirit to all 
employees, and on increased efficiency through modem management methods. 
The administrative council was established by Parliament to oversee daily 
operations of the DRP, in particular to ensure sound financial behaviour.
Through the Law of 1924 the Ministry of post and telegraph was given both 
political (regulatory) and operational (managerial) control of the DRP. The
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Verwaltungsrat’s tasks were threefold; It should advise the Minister in his work, 
decide in certain matters, and supervise the DRP’s activities (Andersch 1927). It 
was assigned many of the regulatory tasks previously undertaken by the Reichs­
tag, including “the Reichspost’s budget, user regulations, tariffs, personnel, 
wages and salaries, borrowing, and other areas of administrative policy” (Duch 
1991: 132). The council was an invention in the structure of the DRP, inasmuch 
as it was one single regulatory organ. The minister retained the possibility to 
call on the government’s opinion whenever he saw potential conflicts between 
the council and political considerations and in this way the DRP remained a 
state administration in practice as well as in principle.
The extent of the administrative council’s powers was contested by certain 
Lander.
The question of a fundamentally correct interpretation of the limitations of 
the Verwaltungsrat’s responsibilities weighs heavy upon me. (...) The 
Verwaltungsrat’s actions are limited by the legislator’s decision. According 
to the Reichspostfinanzgesetz the council’s tasks comprise the supervision 
of the law’s correct implementation. (...) However, the council’s 
supervision is necessarily limited to that of written material. This implies 
that unwritten rules and administrative practice are not being supervised. 
(...) The Reichspost is an autonomous enterprise. This requires broad 
competencies within its organs, the Reichspostminister and the 
Verwaltungsrat. (...) Should one’s views however conflict with those of the 
DRP’s organs, the Reichspostfinanzgesetz will not provide a satisfactory 
channel. This might shake the weak agreement on the legislation. Such a 
result is not in Bavaria’s interest.
Reichspostministerium Abteilung München 1924
The Bavarian authorities’ reactions to the limitations of the administrative 
council’s competencies was not only a recent adherent’s worries in face of a 
new system, it was also a sign of the conflict between the two levels of 
government in Germany. In the Weimar republic, as well as under earlier
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regimes, the Lander authorities held considerable powers, and legal provisions 
were put in place to ensure that Reich authorities stayed within their boundaries.
In 1925, the council expressed concern about the DRP’s revenue policy:
The revenue policy was in 1925 a subject of continued worry for the 
administration. The DRP is not a typical financial institution; it is a transport 
company, whose main tasks make it an instrument for the national and 
global economy. (...) As a transport institution intimately linked to the 
general industry, the Reichspost must be prepared to change and improve its 
installations. In performing this task the Reichspost must minimise its 
outlays and rationalise its organisation. (...) The Reichspostfinanzgesetz 
requires the Reichspost to implement a policy of revenue whereby income 
will cover costs. It is therefore allowed to keep tariffs as high as required to 
meet this demand. (...) The institution is ‘inundated with debts’ and can 
therefore not raise tariffs. (...) When it is demanded that the DRP on the one 
hand lowers tariffs, and on the other hand increases revenue through a 
decrease in management tasks at the same time as transport and 
management instruments should continuously be improved, then the 
manageriability of the DRP becomes an industrial impossibility.
DRP 1925: 92
The DRP remained a public entity and part of the public administration, but its 
role was different from that of any other part of the central bureaucracy. Its non­
political nature and importance to the economy in general were both central 
values for the policy sector, which resulted in clear guidelines for the setting of 
tariffs.
The Deutsche Reichspost is established as a public transport enterprise to 
the benefit of the circulation and distribution of public economic goods. It is 
after the railway and the marine the biggest transport company. (...) The 
Reichspost is in the service of the general community; it knows of no 
limitation of its customer base. Its nature is non-political and it has no 
political boundaries.
(Reichspostministerium 1928: 3-4).
According to the Reichspostfinanzgesetz the Reichspost must follow an 
income policy that ensures covering of operational costs by business 
revenues. Thus, as the complete infrastructure for the general economic 
interest, it is obliged to keep its tariffs so high that they unconditionally
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cover the considerations of the posts activities, not higher, but also not 
lower.
Andersch 1927; 31
Although the DRP was not a profit-seeking enterprise and thus had to find a
socially and politically acceptable level of tariffs, it still had a clear obligation
to deliver high-quality technical installations and continuity of service, both of
which would have to be covered by tariff revenues.
One should also remember, that the principal aim is not that of low tariffs, 
but the highest possible development of technical installations and no 
interruptions in the operation of the installations. It would not be possible to 
defend keeping tariffs low if this were to the detriment of the quality of 
instruments and installations. Then the whole general economy would 
profoundly suffer.
Andersch 1927: 32
Modem management and rationalisation measures
Following the implementation of the new financial regime, public documents
illustrate the importance o f ‘objective’ financial methods. Increasing the
financial strength of the DRP was perceived as the administration’s main task,
whereas political considerations were left to Parliament. Hence, a priority list of
the DRP’s tasks from 1925 includes:
0. Implementation of business policy of the DRP. (...)
0. Evaluation of the results of the general economic activity and the 
connections with the DRP.
0. Frequent business reports. Publication of economic results of the DRP.
0. Continuous examination of the economic results in all parts of the 
organisation, implementation of business-economic principles.
( . . . )
9. Participation in basic questions on tariffs.
( . . . )
These business tasks extend hereafter to all parts of the administration, 
operations and technical service.
Reichspostministerium 1925b
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The Minister emphasised the need for the ‘business spirit’ to penetrate into ail 
levels of the organisation, “so that the discussion of general business 
considerations will prevail”, in order to make in the DRP “a stronger and 
generous adaptation of the spirit and the infrastructure to the modem society’s 
requirement, which the economy, industry, people and Reich rightly demand” 
(Stingl 1925: 385-388).
‘Adapting the spirit’ of the DRP within existing bureaucratic structures was
seen as problematic. If the Reichspost was to behave like a tme commercial
enterprise, and thereby respond to its clients’ needs, it would have to change its
institutional form and accommodate the new needs.
The Minister’s program cannot be implemented through bureaucratic 
measures alone. An institution is needed that can allow personal initiative 
and at the same time know the requirements from the general economy.
Andersch 1926: 2
Certain institutional changes were introduced to the DRP in the aftermath of the
Reichspostfinanzgesetz: Contemporary administrative practices were seen as
too cumbersome and decentralisation was introduced to ease the situation. This
resulted in the central management bureaux (Oberpostdirektionen and the PTT
Ministry) being released from
all tasks that [were] not constitutionally assigned to the ministry, and 
[regional and local offices] turned into independent final entities with their 
own responsibilities.
Andersch 1926: 2^ *
see also Reichspostministerium 1925c
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At the same time, ‘simplification measures’ were introduced both in its 
organisational design (e.g., the merger of smaller organisational bureaux into 
larger units) and accounting practices (DRP 1927; 13). The DRP staff numbers 
were reduced by over 40.000 employees in the period 1924-1926 to ameliorate 
economic results (Reichspostministerium 1928: 3; Reichspostministerium 
1925a). These measures were also seen as a necessary precondition for the DRP 
to fulfil its ultimate goal, namely to “be a servant for the economy and 
communications” (Reichspostminister 1925).
Relations between the Reich and the Lander -  the Fernmeldeanlageneesetz of 
1927
The practice introduced after the change in the Telegraphenwegegesetz of 1924, 
whereby additional insulation costs for telegraph and telephone lines resulting 
from new electrical installation were not entirely paid by the RPTV, was 
abolished by the Reichsrat on the insistence of the Lander authorities. The 
Femmeldeanlagengesetz (FAG) of 1927 was introduced to solve the conflict 
(Thomas 1994: 218-219). The FAG gave the Reich monopoly powers over the 
construction and operation of telecommunications networks, including 
telegraph, telephone and broadcasting equipment (§1). The monopoly covered 
networks, services and terminal equipment. The Reichspostminister had the 
right to delegate his powers on a case-by-case basis. According to the FAG 
exemptions to the network monopoly could be granted for closed networks, 
such as within the public administration of a Land or within transport
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companies (§3). Furthermore, owners of parts of land no more than 25 km apart 
could construct private telecommunications networks within their own territory.
However, the Telegraphenwegegesetz from 1899 had granted the telegraph 
authorities rights-of-way along the lines of other public utilities such as 
electricity and water. Since this regulation had been made also to cover the 
telephone networks, the effect of the TWG was to further reduce the exceptions 
to the federal monopoly introduced in the FAG (Werle 1990: 73-74). Therefore, 
in the late 1920s the RPTV enjoyed something very close to full legal monopoly 
in the area of telecommunications.
Conclusion: Stability and change in sectoral state traditions during the 
1920s
This chapter has shown that public debates on the reforms of the 1920s were 
shaped by existing ideas and practices for the telephone service both in France 
and Germany. Despite new administrative arrangements in both countries, 
which bore a certain resemblance (e.g., separate PTT budgets and administra­
tive councils were introduced in France in 1923, and in Germany in 1924), the 
sectoral state traditions remained largely the same as they had been at the turn 
of the century in each country. The findings are summarised in table 2:
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France Germany
Ultimate authority, 
relevant actors and 
their relative 
power
UA; Parliament.
RA: Ministry of Finance seen 
as increasingly relevant 
because of industrial nature of 
telephone service.
UA: Legislation.
RA: Ministry of Finance increased its 
powers in the Weimar republic. 
Establishment of a Verwaltungsrat.
Public ethos Service public, comprising 
continuity, territorial equality 
of service, adaptability, was 
no longer inherently 
contradictive to ‘efficient 
management’ and financial 
and managerial flexibility
Principles of economic efficiency 
continue. ‘Autonomy’ and 
‘consultative councils’ (proxy for 
enterprise management methods) 
specify organisational implications of 
pubhc ethos. ‘Enterprise’ used for the 
first time.
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision-making 
and discourse
Procedural correctness. 
Private enterprise and general 
public no place in 
pohcymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of federal 
rights. Bureaucratic correctness. 
Coordinative discourse.
Table 2: Summarised fin dings from the 1920s
The notion of ultimate authority was not questioned in either case, remaining 
with Parliament in France, and with legislation in Germany. The set of relevant 
actors and their relative power changed slightly through the financial reform as 
a result of the strengthened position of the Ministers of Finance, and the 
establishment of a Verwaltungsrat in Germany. The members of the latter, 
however, were representatives of actors already seen as relevant to policy­
making during the consolidation period, and can therefore be argued to be a 
strengthening of existing actors relative to an autonomous Reichspost, rather 
than a new actor in the policymaking arena.
In France, the public ethos principles of territorial equality and quality/continui- 
ty of service from the consolidation period was incorporated in the concept of 
service public. The doctrine of budgetary unity was abolished in favour of a
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budget annexe, which was made possible by the idea that a service public and 
industrial management methods were not incompatible. In Germany, principles 
of economic efficiency in infrastructure provision remained central to the public 
ethos, as indicated by the strengthening position of the idea of cost-based tariffs. 
‘Autonomy’ and ‘consultative councils’ were used to specify the organisational 
implications of the public ethos rather than changing it.
Thus, despite meeting similar practical challenges (economic as well as techno­
logical difficulties), and similar international ideational trends (modem manage­
ment and efficiency of commercial enterprise management methods), and 
despite implementing similar financial stmctures for their respective PTT 
services, the justification for the final reform outcome differed significantly in 
the two countries.
The French response to ‘modem management’ ideas was initially a proposal to 
transfer decision-making and financial authority to an ‘independent’ body 
(albeit with certain political connections), in line with the new ideas. The 
political process did however water down the proposals to the extent that the 
new council had no real powers, and financial flexibility was non-existent. The 
state’s obligations, social and otherwise (the state’s lack of profit as sole motive 
for action; the ‘general will’ as ultimate rationale for state intervention also in 
services publics, and the need for parliamentary intervention to secure this 
general will), impeded complete implementation of pure commercial 
management methods.
Budgets separate from the general national budgets, special financial tools for the industrial 
activity of telephony, and administrative councils to ensure a link between the organisation’s 
management and stakeholders.
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In Germany, however, the ‘failure’ to create a commercial enterprise was per­
ceived as a result of the tight financial regulations imposed on the telephone 
service provider, partly because of national economic difficulties, rather than a 
necessary consequence of political need for parliamentary control over a public 
service provider.
The respective national debates and argumentations in each country thus 
retained close links to previous national debate and ideas, supporting stability in 
the sectoral state traditions.
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Chapter 4
The post-war regime
This chapter investigates telephone policy debates after the Second World War 
until c. 1970. The main question remains whether the French and German 
telephone policy debates showed continuity with earlier national debates, or 
whether the sectoral state traditions changed.
Once the institutions of the post-war regime were in place (1946 in France,
1953 in Germany) no major legislative change took place in the telephone 
sectors of France and Germany, and the national parliaments therefore had few 
if any occasions to debate telephone policy. Policy debates in this period mainly 
took place between experts within the public bureaucracy, and, particularly in 
Germany, academics.
The lack of parliamentary telephone policy debate in France implied an 
increased relative importance o f ‘technocrats’\  whose debate primarily focused 
on technical issues such as financial status, efficiency, and cost accounting 
rather than on the broader issues related to service public. The relative absence 
of references to service public illustrated the concept’s central role as a political 
‘myth’ and legitimating factor in public policy, whose level of precision and 
technical detail was too low to be of use in sectoral experts’ discourse. The fact 
that the technocrats’ discourse differed significantly from that of Parliament 
underlines the communicative character of public political discourse in France.
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In Germany, recent experiences from the Nazi regime led to a strong emphasis 
on ‘democratic’ structures in the post-war regime. Subsequent political and 
academic debate showed an increasing unease with this temporary decreased 
attention to traditional ideas about efficient management of infrastructure 
provision. As this chapter illustrates, by 1970, prominent ideas in public debate 
comprised calls for separation of regulation and operation of telecommunication 
services, and favoured referring more ‘political’ issues (such as the telecom­
munications services’ characteristic as public good, and their importance for 
democratic development) back to the political institutions. Thus, by 1970 the 
debate showed a clear continuation of pre-1933 principles, whilst incorporating 
ideas on the optimal organisation of telecommunications policy’s enlarged 
social role.
The case of France
Centralism, planning and dirigisme were central characteristics to state 
activities in France in the post-war period. All three could be assumed to lead to 
a higher degree of politicisation of policymaking, because central political 
channels would be used rather than private enterprise. Sectors not included in 
the Plan, however, gained little attention from Parliament, a development that 
allowed increased relative power for experts within the public bureaucracy. As 
this chapter shows, bureaucrats were reluctant to involve Parliament even when 
the latter was actively seeking information, indicating that Parliament was 
perceived among the technocrats as a less relevant actor when no legal change
* A ‘technocracy’ is according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, “organisation and manage­
ment of a country’s industrial resources by technical ejqrerts for the good of the whole
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was forthcoming. This cannot, however, be taken as evidence of a change in the 
sectoral state tradition, which is evaluated by public political discourse. Rather, 
there is no evidence that the ultimate authoritv of Parliament was questioned by 
bureaucrats, only that the latter sought pragmatic solutions to perceived prob­
lems within the existing sectoral state tradition.
In the immediate post-war period, the social compromise that effectively 
excluded public debate about organisation and relationship between service 
provider and end-user, helped consolidate the public ethos of the concept of 
service public as the ultimate rationale for state action, while failing to specify 
its content. The concept became increasingly vague in the decades after the war 
(Demichel 1974: 17-25), and its prominence in public interventions and relative 
absence in debates among technocrats indicates its high symbolic but relatively 
low practical value at this time, although its role as embodiment of common 
values for the telephone provision regime remained.^ Vivien Schmidt’s 
assumptions about communicative v. coordinative discourse correspond with 
the fact that the highly political concept of service public figured low in the 
technocratic debates of the 1950s and early 1960s, but became more prominent 
as Parliament regained interest in the issue and as public debate increased (as 
will be shown in chapter 5).
community” (COD 1976).
 ^Service public was not the only concept with which French policymakers had problems. Also 
the public sector itself escaped definition in the late 1960. The INSEE (Institut National des 
Statistiques et d’Etudes Economiques, the public statistical agency) reported in 1972 that ‘a 
fundamental difficulty (...) dominates all this work: that is the problem of the definition of the 
French public sector (...) until now, because of very difierent jinidical and economic situations, 
it has been impossible to find a definition of the public sector which is unanimously accepted’ 
(INSEE 1972, quoted in Bonnetblanc 1985: 12).
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In the 1950s and the 1960s telephone policy debates references to service public 
were undoubtedly less frequent than in parliamentary debates both before and 
after this period. However, the empirical material from the period showed that 
policymakers’ perception of the problems facing the telephone sector was in 
line with the existing sectoral state tradition. Bureaucrats were striving to 
achieve ‘continuity and quality, equality, and adaptability’ of service, whilst 
meeting requirements of a balanced budget, targets that translated into a search 
for efficiency and knowledge of real costs. Continuity and quality of service 
became worse throughout the two decades, especially as demand for telephone 
connections increased, and this inability to fulfil an essential element of the 
sectoral state tradition became a major contributor to the calls for fundamental 
reform in the 1970s.
Equality of service effectively hampered decentralisation measures in the late 
1960s, when increased ‘commerciality’ of the telephone service was implemen­
ted through a reorganisation at regional and local levels that did not remove 
close political control from the central bureaucracy. The adaptability of the 
telephone service was sought through new financial structures. The central 
elements of the service public concept were therefore significant in shaping 
policy debate and perceptions among policymakers in the post-war period.
Their proposed solutions, however, centred around ‘efficiency’ and ‘rationali­
sation’, both new to French telephone policy debates. They must therefore be 
said to have enlarged the sectoral state tradition, but, because they were not 
contradicting ideas from the 1923 regime, they cannot be used to argue 
substantial change.
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Criteria for legitimate decision-making did not change compared to the 1920s. 
Public discourse remained communicative, as the varying use of the concept of 
service public among parliamentarians and bureaucrats indicates.
That calls for reform and the reforms themselves were not forthcoming in the 
period investigated in this chapter shows the power of existing sectoral 
traditions. If the technocrats gained power in the post-war era they were safely 
embedded in a tradition in which commercial management of a service public 
was not perceived as contradictory but rather as a question of correct implemen­
tation of policies.
Telephone policy in the post-Second World War years
After the financial reform of 1923 the French sectoral state tradition contained 
ideas about continuity and quality of service, equality, and adaptability, em­
bedded in the concept of service public, which during the first part of the 20^ 
century had become the foremost rationale for state action. Commercial 
management principles were not perceived to contradict the requirements of a 
service public, and efficient service provision was expected to increase the 
state’s legitimate intervention in the sector through its relentless pursuit of 
implementing the general will and by its management of scarce resources to the 
benefit of the nation.
Two major developments provide interesting evidence regarding continuity or 
change in sectoral state traditions in the two decades after the Second World 
War: First, in parliamentary debates (seen in this chapter in attempts at having
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the telephone sector defined as a ‘basic sector’ in the late 1940s), elements of 
the sectoral state tradition were frequently referred to, even if such references 
were absent in non-parliamentary documents. Second, the absence of the 
service public concept from bureaucrats’ debate in the 1950s and the 1960s 
indicates that the concept was not sufficiently detailed to be useful in practical 
policymaking, despite its central role in legitimating policies towards the 
general public.
Public political discourse: the continued importance o f  service public
What direction should I give to the economic effort so that it will respond 
to the political orientation in which I want to lead France? (...) [M]y main 
idea is simply that of common sense. Our country cannot accommodate its 
needs internally and be of importance outside unless its activities are 
accorded to its time. In the industrial era, it must be industrial. In the age of 
competition, it must be competitive. In the era of science and technology, it 
must cultivate research. But, in order to produce much, and to do it so that 
exchange is facilitated, to constantly, by invention, renew what is produced 
in its factories and cultivated in its fields, it has to transform itself, and 
profoundly so. (. . .) For me, on my level, this is about the Plan.
De Gaulle 1970: 141, 143
The French state took on a new role in economic policy in the immediate post­
war years, conducting its economic policies through Plans, in which public 
investments in infrastructure were laid out for between four and seven years at a 
time. During 1945 and 1946 it became “the country’s major investor, it became 
banker and industrialist, and installed a planning system” (Rosanvallon 1990: 
243).^ ‘Planning’ and ‘modernisation’ became bywords for public policy 
development, penetrating telephone policy debate at all levels. Whereas
 ^The idea about centralised pubhc plans to manage economic dynamics had emerged in 
socialist circles in the 1930s (Rosanvallon and Viveret 1977:60), and a centralist policy-making 
trend emerged under the Vichy government (Kuisel 1981), but the post-war era was the heyday 
of central economic planning,
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economists from the 19^ century believed that an economic system was 
governed by ‘natural’ laws and therefore sought its natural equilibrium, post­
war economists and policymakers believed that key parameters, such as 
economic growth, employment, and purchasing power, could and should be 
modified and optimised by the state (Rosanvallon 1990: 251). This broadened 
the scope of the state’s legitimate sphere of action.
The high investment necessary for telecommunications infrastructure'^ made it 
essential to have telecommunications defined as a basic sector, i.e. among those 
sectors targeted in a Plan. A commission for the modernisation of telecommuni­
cations was therefore established in 1947 to develop a programme for 
improvement of telecommunications equipment, and to study the modernisation 
o f ‘specialised industries’.^
The modernisation commission’s presentations show that increased investment
in telecommunications was justified through references to the ‘general interest’,
the centrepiece of legitimacy for services publics'.
The obvious obstacle to the expected and wanted telecommunications 
development is the lack o f investment. (...) In our country, governmental 
will has established different telecommunications networks (telegraph, 
telephone...) at the nation’s service through state administration. All 
financing is therefore through budgetary measures (...). However, because 
of quasi-permanent financial problems, the public authorities have been 
obliged to reduce costs and slow investment in sectors that did not appear 
immediately profitable. (...) The paradox is therefore that the state which 
subsidises nationalised (and even private) enterprises because of political.
 ^By the end of the war, the French telephone network bad sustained significant damage. 
Approximately 30 per cent of switches had been destroyed and telephone connections did not 
meet the needs of the national administration (Direction des télécommunications 1945).
 ^The commission consisted of 23 members, comprising representatives from various govern­
mental and pubhc administration offices, employees of the PTT service, and from the industry 
at large (Carré 1996; 56-57). The ‘speciahsed industries’ were radio and television, and the 
electronic industry (Commisariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et d’équipement 1949b: 5- 
7).
The post-war regime 167
economic or social consequences of their actions, is not interested in its 
own administrations responsible for telecommunications and consequently 
for industries heavily dependent on this activity, and which presents a 
general interest.
Commisariat General du Plan de 
Modernisation et d’équipement 1949b: 77
However, the general interest was not the only legitimate reason for giving
telecommunications more attention. In addition, ‘economic and social life, both
nationally and internationally’, were seen to benefit from good
telecommunications services. This point indicated an increased emphasis on
economic competitiveness. Such references to telecommunications policy’s role
in providing an essential infrastructure for a well-functioning economy were not
new, they were also present in the debates in the 1920s. However, the point was
more important in the late 1940s, mainly because of increased penetration rates,
and was used to justify financial autonomy of the telecommunications services.
The question of financial autonomy would reappear in public debate in the late
1960s, then presented as a way to fulfil the tasks of a service public within
existing economic constraints.
When one rightly considers transport a basic activity it is normal to include 
all activities based on electrical transmissions and which one has convened 
to call telecommunications. One might say that these are the nervous 
system, just as indispensable for economic and social life, both nationally 
and internationally, as the blood system constituted by transport.
Commisariat General du Plan de Modernisation et d’équipement 1949a: 19
Experience has shown that the telephone service regime, which every year 
called into question the programmes that could have been established, and 
which, given the resources, only insufficiently followed up financial and 
economic projects, was the main cause of the long-deplored paralysis. (...) 
The commission was not qualified to define the autonomous regime that 
should be given to telecommunications: the question surpasses it. But it is 
necessary that the autonomy is not simply verbal, which has been the case 
too often. It needs to be real.
Girousse [President, Commission for Modernisation 
of Telecommunications] 1948
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Despite these arguments, telecommunications remained outside the basic 
sectors, so that their economic situation suffered: open credits were reduced 
from 24.3bn Francs in 1948 to lObn Francs in 1952 (Carré 1996: 78). The 
neglect of national politicians left the policy area in the hands of public 
officials, whose focus on modernisation and rationalisation fundamentally 
marked the telephone policy debate in the 1950s and the 1960s.
The 1950s and the 1960s: 'efficiency ' and 'autonomy '
Parliament’s refusal to include telephone policy in the Plan implied that 
bureaucrats and sectoral experts in practice became sole policymakers. It also 
all but removed telephone policy from the public agenda. Sectoral state 
traditions are identified through public political discourse, and cannot therefore 
be expected to change in the 1950s and the 1960s. This period, however, 
provides interesting evidence on how bureaucrats’ discourse continued to relate 
to the separate elements of the public ethos, even though the concept of service 
public itself was absent from debates. Furthermore, general ideas about state 
intervention were challenged in the ‘inner circles’ of policymaking, which 
became important for subsequent political debate (in the 1970s and the 1980s).
The telephone service continued to be classified as a service public, whose 
effectiveness was a prerogative for economic growth and modernisation. All 
service publics partook in a broad social compromise, which excluded explicit 
discussion of the services’ organisation as well as their relationship with end-
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users.^ In 1946, the nationalisation of basic industries, such as gas and electri­
city as well as several banks and insurance companies, cemented the idea of 
direct intervention and public service provision (Stoffaës 1995a: 64-72; 
Rosanvallon 1990: 244).
The Diréction générale des télécommunications (DGT) had been established in 
1946,^ and was paralleled by the establishment of d, Diréction générale des 
postes (DGP), which institutionally separated the two branches joined almost 
seven decades previously. A new term; ‘telecommunications’, was used to 
connote both telephone and telegraph services, entailed two important conse­
quences. First, it provided a unifying term for the ‘technological’ services, and 
thus gave increased prestige and power to the telecommunications engineers to 
the detriment of postal workers.* (By the late 1950s, telecommunications would 
also be profitable, unlike postal services that from this time were running a 
deficit.^) Second, it coincided with a realisation that ‘telecommunications
 ^The absence o f public discussion on services publics ' organisation did not mean that it 
remained static. From 1938, insurance companies were considered a service public despite their 
private law status, and the trend strengthened with among other agricultural co-operations in 
1946, social organisations in 1956, anti-cancer centres and defence organisations, both in 1961, 
techrtical industrial centres in 1963, sports federations in 1974 being considered the same 
(ChevaUier 1997: 28; Demichel 1974: 12-13). The main characteristic of a service public 
remained its general interest, which for pohtical, economic or technological reasons (such as 
‘natural monopohes’) necessitated some form of state intervention. Intervention could, however, 
be in the form o f regulation, controlling private enterprises, or hcensing regimes (Waline 1949; 
Guibert 1956; Trévoux 1938). The variation in organisational form, basic rationale, and juridical 
regime, for services publics grew, resulting in the concept being increasingly vague. This 
development would eventually be important for the discussion on telephone monopoly in the 
1970s.
’ Its predecessor, the Diréction des telecommunications, had appeared in 1941 by the merger of 
radio, telephone and telegraph services into one ministerial office, giving the telecommunica­
tions sector a unity and coherence it had not possessed before (Libois 1983: 215; Carré 1994).
* Recruitment o f engineers had increased between the wars, and from 1941 onwards engineers 
were given managerial responsibihty in local organisations, through the creation of the 
ingénieur en chef régionale (Vedel 1984: 65-67).
 ^According to cost-benefit analyses for the 1959 budget, postal services had a surplus of 2bn 
francs in 1955, deteriorating to a deficit of 3.5bn in 1956 and 1.4bn in 1957, whereas the 
telecommunications service ran a consistent surplus in the same years of 16bn, 11.5bn and 
15.5bn, respectively (Ministère des Finances 1958). These numbers are meant as rough 
indicators only.
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policy’ was about more than just providing telephone and telegraph services. It 
was also about creating and sustaining an industry to ensure national indepen­
dence, which in turn would function as a ‘locomotive’ for other domestic 
enterprises, thus entailing economic growth.
Electric communications with or without cable -  telecommunications -  
have seen a formidable development over the recent years. (...) Thus 
grown, the telecommunications take on, in the life of the Nation, and in its 
relations with the world at large, an ever-increasing importance.
De Gaulle 1946, quoted in Libois 1983: 228
Despite Parliament’s low interest in telephone policy and the resulting 
discretion in the hands of the public administration, documents from the 1950s 
and the 1960s illustrate the bureaucrats’ adherence to central principles in the 
existing sectoral state tradition, within existing economic constraints. The fact 
that Parliament had to approve the PTT budget was seen (by the bureaucrats) to 
hamper possibilities for long-term planning and much debate focused on 
potential ways of giving the PTT authorities increased autonomy to develop and 
implement long-term plans. The financial regime of 1923, lacking clear rules 
for issuing of bonds and obligations, and for supervising expenditure, proved ill 
adapted to long-term planning. In 1939 the separate PTT budget had started 
receiving funds in the form of loans directly from the general state budget 
(Ministère des PTT 1954). The basic requirement of budget balancing was 
theoretically not breached, but the PTT organisation built up serious debts 
towards the general budget.
The requirements of a balanced budget and the ensuing economic problems led 
to attempts to cut costs and to determine the real costs of the telephone service 
public^ thus reflecting a conception among state officials (in line with the
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established sectoral tradition), that a legitimate state monopoly in telephone 
provision should optimise its benefit to society through efficient management 
procedures within the legislative framework laid down by Parliament. However, 
the question of organisational autonomy for telecommunications services was 
increasingly raised in the 1960s, justified by its proponents as a solution to the 
lack of funding.
Efficiencv
In the 1950s, as in the 1920s, lack of increased revenues was met with cost- 
cutting measures. ‘Rationalisation’ and ‘modernisation’ of the state apparatus 
were seen to provide important savings and ‘independent’ observers suggested 
measures to rationalise and increase efficiency (Boumiquel 1949; Emery 1966).
‘Efficiency’ of service provision is relative, and as measuring efficiency 
requires a comparative tool, cross-national, and, subsequently, cross-temporal, 
productivity studies were initiated (Pellenc 1960, 1962; Robert 1953; Vaquier 
1966). The studies had no immediate effects for the telephone provision 
bureaucracy, and questions from the Sénat were all but ignored by the ministry 
(Pellenc 1960). These studies and their subsequent treatment illustrated the 
conflict between Parliament and government as well as the powers of the 
bureaucracy in this period.
The fourth Republic (1946-1958) was marked by ministerial instability, seen by 
contemporaries to “underline that the all-powerful Parliament implies a reduction of 
governmental authority” (Bastid 1954: 145). In the fourteen years from June 1945 to June 1959 
France saw 26 governments, ten different PTT ministers, and ten reorganisations of 
responsibility for the PTT within the government (Cheveigné and Lajanige 1994: 91-97). Civil 
servants provided continuity of service, and constituted the second pole of opposition for the 
government’s search for power after Parliament Civil servants further increased their relative
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During the 1960s political awareness of the inferiority of French telecommuni­
cations services grew. The services were perceived as ‘inferior to what they 
should be’, demand was not being met, they were expensive, equipment bought 
and employed by the French PTT ministry was inefficient, and its high price 
served to sustain private industry to the detriment of the nation’s interests 
(Pellenc 1962: 30; see also DGT 1963). Solutions to the problem were sought in 
changing financial and organisational structures:
Does the PTT administration pay normal prices for its products? Is the 
French industry competitive? It has not been possible to give a clear answer 
to this question. The group (...) has not been able to prove that French 
prices are abnormally elevated (...) But this industry at present definitely 
suffers from certain weaknesses: modest size; large degree of dispersion; 
absence of specialisation. A better structure could certainly give a better 
rate of return.
PTT Ministry 1967: 1
Determining the cost of service publics
The tension between social obligations and economic viability, i.e. the conflict
between telecommunications as service public and as an industrial and
commercial activity, remained problematic for French policymakers, indicating
continuity of the sectoral state tradition.
If “the vocation of a service public is not to create profits, (...) [but rather] 
to provide the best possible service with the least possible input (...) 
[then, in order for it] not to be a traitor of its social obligations, (...) [it 
cannot employ industrial economic models in its financial affairs, since 
this would] penalise the current generation to pay for services that only 
future generations would benefit from”.
Anonymous 1952^^
power in 1946 with the introduction of the statut for employees in services publics (Rosanvallon 
1990: 88-90).
” The authors’ argument was that private enterprises would include the need for future 
investments in their calculation of benefits also, and therefore in the price of their products, so 
that the current buyers would not only pay for the cost of the actual products they received, but 
also for the enterprise’s capabihty to invest in future equipment (Anonymous 1952).
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Applying industrial economic models to a service public was not without 
complications and much effort was made to develop cost-benefit analyses for 
services publics
The observations regarding the complexity [of assessing the costs of 
services] retain their value: the indications given must be considered only 
as by order; they do not permit to answer the original objectives until 
several years of studies have been undertaken and perfections have taken 
place.
Ministère des Finances 1958: 5
If however ‘the current generation should not be penalised’ and only pay 
according to the service received, it was vital to be able to calculate the real 
production cost of the service. The technical accounting difficulties were not 
solved by the rationalisation and modernisation effort of the central 
bureaucracy, but contributed to increasing discontent and lustration with 
French telecommunications services. The absence of parliamentary debate, 
however, meant that technocrats continued their search for organisational and 
administrative solutions within the existing legal framework of a state 
monopoly provider whose adaptability (central to any service public) was 
traditionally sought through new financing formulae (Chevallier 1997).
Organisational autonomv
Among the first to claim the potential profitability of increased autonomy for 
telecommunications was the Association des ingénieurs des postes et télécom­
munications (AIT):
Another conflict superposed the practical difficulties of assessing the real costs of services. 
The postal trade union was categorically opposed to running the PTT services as an industrial 
activity, because ‘investments [in equipment] increases the wealth of the national patrimony and 
the general budget should therefore cover the costs’ (Rédon 1960).
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Whether one is talking about buildings, personnel, social services, transport 
or accountability, telecommunications are in need of a high degree of 
autonomy, for reasons of both efficiency and economy. (...) The goal is the 
harmonious functioning of the postal and financial services and the 
telecommunications services. This objective necessitates the internal 
autonomy of telecommunications. (...) The increasingly sound economy, 
the perspectives on the development of international relations, particularly 
in the European Community, and the industrial, commercial and social 
blossoming of our country, imply that it needs to be given modern 
telecommunications systems. If this decision is taken (...) telecommunica­
tions should be given a financial autonomy that allows it to be managed as 
an industrial and commercial enterprise.
AIT 1963; 15-16, 48
The telecommunications engineers also argued in favour of increased economic 
autonomy to increase investments levels. One should note that the AIT’s 
demands for autonomy were not in any way justified with reference to the 
concept of service public, which was not once mentioned in their report. Rather, 
the argument was based on a conception of telecommunications services as an 
industrial activity. According to the AIT, a common postal and telecommunica­
tions services organisation would deter investment because of the postal 
service’s constant deficit, so the AIT’s call for autonomy was not only to ensure 
some degree of financial autonomy from the state, but also from the postal 
service (AIT 1963). Postal service employees not surprisingly opposed such 
autonomy (Emery 1966: 22). Relations between the two groups of employees 
were difficult not only because of the different potential profitability, but also 
because of the low status of administrators within the central bureaucracy. 
Telecommunications engineers were members of one of the grand corps and 
enjoyed higher prestige than postal workers who were mainly internally trained 
and lacked formal education (Rosanvallon 1990; Vedel 1984).
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The rigidity of the employment status for fonctionnaires was thus perceived as a 
problem, both by the government and some employees, but drastic change (for 
example, freeing PTT Ministry employees from standard public administration 
rules for recruitment and advancement, as suggested by one government 
commission) was considered premature (Emery 1966; 31-32). Although rules 
for recruitment and employment had changed in 1946, engineers and 
administrators continued to be suspicious of each other and to argue in favour of 
an organisational split up until the late 1960s (Emery 1967).
In 1967, calls were made for increased transparency in policy-making and for a 
separation between policy and regulatory development, and between the 
operation of network and services (Thatcher 1999: 108; Stoffaës 1995a: 70). 
Organisational changes took place in 1968 and again in 1971 (Ministère des 
postes, des telecommunications et de Tespace 1990: 272). A certain reorganisa­
tion took place locally, with some responsibility of policy implementation being 
transferred from the central administration to local organisations to render the 
local agents more commercially focused (Bertho and Carré 1984: 34-40). The 
‘commerciality’ was, however, constrained by the fact that the telephone 
service continued to be defined as a service public
Financial autonomv -  the CNT
Demand for telephone connections increased rapidly in the 1950s and the 
1960s. The DGT was unable to meet demand, and public dissatisfaction grew.
The post-war regime 176
Consequently, throughout the 1960s, there was increasing pressure for 
fundamental reform of the telecommunications sector. The low quality of the 
French telephone service was argued to be against the general interest, thus 
contradicting the sectoral state tradition, and solutions were sought within the 
existing regime dating from 1923. The 1960s were characterised by changing 
financing formulae for telephone services, but did not entail changes in the 
justification of policies.
The Commission des Finances proposed in 1967 to create a public corporation 
{établissement public) with financial autonomy, operating under private law, 
responsible for the telephone service only (separated from the postal service) 
(Libois 1983; 241). Parliament rejected the proposal, but both issues -  
separation of posts from telecommunications and financial autonomy for the 
latter -  had been reintroduced on the public agenda. The limited possibility of 
raising money through international financial markets was perceived as a major 
obstacle:
In 1971, service public implied “a service of equal nature and equal quality, where the only 
acceptable reasons for temporary disparities [were] related to equipment or of purely technical 
nature” (PTT Ministry 1971).
One should note here that the company France Câbles et Radio (FCR) was established in 
1959, merging former submarine, telegraph and radio cable activities, mainly in the colonies 
and overseas. The FCR was 100 per cent state owned but operated under private law, which 
made it more suitable to engage in foreign activities, since other countries would be hostile to 
allow a French state administrative office operate on their territory. This reorganisation was also 
part of the modernisation of the state apparatus and was indeed important for the organisation of 
French telecommunications services. Moreover, the increased international activity created 
competition and new possibilities for comparison between different countries’ telecommunica­
tions industries. French industry in the late 1960s did not appear fevourably in such compari­
sons, which led the PTT Ministry to suggest restructuring and specialisation within the industry. 
These points did however not concern domestic telephone provision directly and therefore falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. For the Ministry’s debate on industry structure, see Ministàre 
des P.T.T. 1967a. For further information on the subsidiaries of the French PTTs, see Vedel 
1991.
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The absence of a judicial personality of the PTT administration, now that 
state services are given only a budget annexe, particularly excludes use of 
borrowing possibilities that certain financial organisations offer in inter­
national markets.
Guèna 1967
Following Parliament’s rejection, several policy options were discussed:
Three solutions [to finding a judicial support for emission of PTT bonds in 
international markets] can be envisaged: creation of a “Caisse nationale des 
Télécommunications”; use of the enterprise France-Cables; use of a private 
law enterprise created for this purpose. (...) The Caisse nationale des 
Télécommunications could be used not only for the realisation of the euro­
dollar project, but also for long-term borrowings. (...) The creation of a 
limited company can judicially be easily realised. (...) But it is clear that 
such an enterprise could not possess sufficient “financial surface” to 
undertake international loans on the necessary scale, and à state guarantee 
would not be sufficient to remedy this.
Ministère des PTT 1967b: 1-3
The Caisse nationale des Télécommunications (CNT) was subsequently 
established as a ‘public administrative body’ {établissementpublic national) 
operating under private law and with financial autonomy by decree on 3 
October 1967 (Decrét portant creation d’une Caisse nationale des Télécom­
munications). The PTT minister proposed that in order to accommodate (par­
ticularly non-French) financial institutions’ need for guarantees that the body 
effectively would be financially autonomous, the CNT’s administrative council 
(consisting of just six members, three from the Ministry of Finance and three 
from the PTT ministry) would not be obliged to seek the Finance Ministry’s 
approval for all financial decisions.
I fear effectively that such dispositions would render borrowing more 
difficult by openly displaying the absence of the borrower’s legal 
personality and real autonomy in the eyes of interested bankers and 
international lenders. Meanwhile, the absence of these dispositions does not 
in any way question the extent of your ministry’s right of control.
Guèna 1967
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The final decree did, however, stipulate, after intervention fi'om the Conseil 
d'Etat, that bonds should be issued with the authorisation of the Minister for 
Economy and Finance (Art. 4). The Finance Ministry thus retained important 
powers, but the CNT remained outside the annual budget and did not need 
parliamentary approval (Thatcher 1999; 107). The CNT would issue bonds “to 
the benefit of the budget annexe of posts and telecommunications” (Art. 2), 
which effectively amounted to a ‘débudgétisation’ of PTT investments (Cohen 
1992: 47).
The case of Germany
The German sectoral state tradition for telephone policy was challenged in the 
late 1960s. Whereas Parliament retained and even strengthened its formal 
powers through the 1953 PverwG, they were in practice diminished compared 
to those of the 1924 regime. The final authority did however remain with 
legislation. The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking remained 
constant, albeit with a strengthening of the Ministry of Finance’s position.
The post-war telephone policy regime in Germany also resulted in a conflict of 
central goals, and, therefore, of the public ethos, for the sector. On the one hand, 
democratic structures and procedures (e.g., parliamentary control) were the new 
ubiquitous base for legitimacy of state action; on the other hand, the DBP was 
required to provide efficient management of federal resources. However, the 
DBP’s efficient management (compared to a private enterprise’s) was hampered 
by the fact that it was embedded in the general public administration, and it had
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to follow bureaucratic procedures in central matters (personnel and recruitment 
policy, compulsory transfer of funds to federal coffers, accounting systems).
In addition, the fundamental agreement on the sector’s product was challenged 
in the post-war period. Whereas the previous emphasis had been on telephone 
services’ role as infrastructure for the economy, the policy area was now 
perceived in a broader context of social and industrial policy. Although debates 
on ‘affordable rates’ (which could have indicated a stronger perception of 
telephony as a social good) were absent, increased political attention implied 
that telephony was perceived as politically more important than before 1933. 
The 1965 commission’s view o f ‘political burdens’ as the root of much of the 
DBP’s problems resulted in a proposal of separation of operational and 
regulatory functions.
Two different interpretations can be given of the development of the public 
ethos of the German telephone regime between 1924 and the late 1960s. Kuhn 
(1971) argued that the development from 1924 to the 1960s demonstrated that 
the ‘true’ and ‘German’ approach to telecommunications was to treat it as 
primarily a business sector like other business sectors, which would entail a 
certain set of guidelines for practice and operation. This view emphasises the 
continuity and similarity in the situation in the two periods.
However, cross-national business activity was increasing from the 1960s, as 
was international telephony, and to some extent data transfer (Genschel and 
Werle 1992). At the same time, telephone demands from households were 
increasing, bringing in a new set of customers. As a consequence, ideas about
The post-war regime 180
the telephone service -  what it was and what it should be -  and its raison d'être 
changed, thus challenging the sectoral state tradition. This line of argument 
would conclude that rather than Germany temporarily ‘diverting’ from its 
principles about treating the telephone sector as another industrial sector, the 
new sectoral characteristics resulted in a changed sectoral tradition.
The investigation of ideas in the post-war period reveals that the prominent 
problems in the telecommunications sector at this time were perceived as 
legal/organisational and economic problems, more than political ones, even if 
the organisational problem indeed encompassed a degree of political 
intervention in DBP matters (see Garbe 1969). The DBP was legally under an 
obligation to balance its budgets, something it did not manage in the two 
decades after the war, and the financial difficulties functioned as a trigger for 
reform demands. Four years after the introduction of the PverwG, the 
Sondervermogen was seen to provide the much-needed managerial flexibility 
for the telecommunications organisation (Steinmetz 1957). As stated by the 
Secretary of State for PTT in 1961, “judicially [the DBP] is a public 
administration, but economically a real enterprise, which like any private 
enterprise must manage with its income” (Steinmetz 1961; 425). Five years 
later, however, the same author describes a different reality (Steinmetz 1966). 
The DBP’s economic problems were seen as a result of political constraints, and 
politically determined obligations and prices were perceived to be incompatible 
with enterprise management and cost covering. The concepts of ‘Daseins- 
vorsorg’ and ‘Flachenversorgung’, which might be seen as German parallels to 
French ‘social Justice’, ‘equality’ and ‘territorial coverage’ (central elements in
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the ser-vice public), did not play a significant role in German telephone policy 
debate/^
‘Cost-based tariffs’ and ‘budget balancing’ remained strong in the German 
tradition, but the increasing investment needed to maintain and develop 
installations required more resources than politically could be assured through 
tariff revenues. The growing importance of telephone services for the 
population in general meant that telephone tariffs were politically sensitive, 
especially because of their influence on public perception of costs, which led to 
severe conflicts between the PTT Ministry and the Ministry of Finance. 
Investment needs implied that DBP debts should be serviced through public 
funds, which increased the political power over the institution.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making remained consensus-seeking among a 
broad set of interests, and thus did not change in the period investigated in this 
chapter. However, the nature of public discourse changed in the decades after 
the passing of the PverwG. Although no legislative changes took place, new 
ideas were put forward and discussed both in government and among other 
actors in the policymaking environment. In particular, the idea of separating 
operation from regulation is interesting for the development of the sectoral state 
tradition. Although a clear parallel can be drawn to the 1920s’ call for 
separation of ‘business’ and ‘politics’ in telephony, the difference was more 
than just linguistic, and echoes the broadening of the fundamental idea about the 
telephone service. The fact that the telephone sector’s main product was
 ^^  When th^  figured in debates linked to the DBP, they related to the postal service rather than 
to telecommunications activities.
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increasingly perceived as more complex than mere infrastructure provision 
(e.g., its importance as a public good), implied that some form of political 
intervention was legitimate for reasons of social justice. The debate showed no 
signs of negating the legitimacy of such control and supervision, only demands 
that these should be clearly separated from the operational tasks of the DBP. 
Telephony was thus still viewed as a commercial activity for which the 
manager, i.e. the public administration, needed sufficient distance from political 
considerations to safeguard efficient management. Even if the ideas did not 
result in legislative change, their presence in public debate implied that the rules 
for ‘what just is and isn’t done’ had visibly changed.
Post-Second World War debate on telecommunications policy
German telephone policy debates in the three decades after the Second World 
War can be organised around three major nodes, the first being the new 
legislative framework from 1953, the two latter constituted by two expert 
commissions from 1965 and 1970. Neither of these commissions resulted in 
immediate legislative change, but marked clear challenges to the sectoral state 
tradition.
The Postverwaltungsgesetz from 1953 reintegrated the PTT services into the 
German political system following their management by the Allied powers 
during their occupation of the West-German territory. The 1953 regime showed 
a clear continuity with the regime from 1924. The search for legitimate and 
transparent structures for state intervention resulted in the Postverwaltungs­
gesetz from 1953, based on the 1924 regime, which allowed the country to
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distance itself from the Nazi period and to enjoy a liigh degree of institutional 
continuity in its telephone sector. However, the need for democratic structures 
and accountability ensured that the PTT sector was organised as a public 
administration rather than a public enterprise, although it was endowed with its 
own special fund, the Sonder-vermogen.
The German sectoral state tradition was challenged in the late 1960s, when the 
conflict between democratic legitimacy (i.e. parliamentary control, transparency 
and accountability in policymaking) and efficient management became more 
pronounced. The German sectoral state tradition had viewed the telephone 
service as an industry much like any other. This, however, conflicted with the 
new perception of telecommunications services’ broader political and social 
impact, which implied a rapprochement between telephone policy and social 
policy, foreign to the German tradition. The result was eventually a proposal for 
separation of operations and regulatory functions. Political considerations 
related to the broader political impact of telecommunications services could 
thus be potentially catered for without interfering with the management of the 
telephone service provider.
The end o f the Reichspost
Under the Nazi regime the Deutsche Reichspost had become a part of the war 
machine, and democratic control had largely disappeared with the introduction 
of the Simplification of Administration Act in 1934. This abolished the admin­
istrative council and gave the Minister for Posts exclusive authority over con­
ditions and tariffs for use of PTT equipment (Gesetz zur Vereinfachung und
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Verbilligung der Verwaltung 1934), although it conserved some of the main 
principles of the 1924 Reichspostfinanzgesetz, such as budgetary and organi­
sational autonomy (Kâmmerer 1958). Hence, economic (cost) arguments 
remained relevant, but “the economic logic in network expansion was reduced 
in favour of a political one that accentuated equal access to the GroPraum 
Mitteleiiropd' (Thomas 1989; 16; see also Flanze 1940: 62-63; Reichspost- 
minister 1941).
The end of the German Reich in May 1945 was also the end of the German 
Reichspost. All normal service stopped, international telephone calls were 
prohibited throughout the country, and the Allies took control of the remains of 
the telephone network, fifty per cent of which had been destroyed during the 
war.^  ^Reconstruction started in the autumn of 1945, organised under the former 
Reichspostdirektionen, supervised by the Allies (Reuter 1989).
The organisational structure of German telephone services largely survived the 
war. Relations between administration and industry were not heavily influenced 
by the events of the preceding decade, so that they returned to former practices 
when the Allies left (Thomas 1995: 277). The administrative structure remained 
stable at the local and regional level throughout the period of occupation. In the 
British zone a central administration was formed based on the model of the pre- 
1933 Reichspostministerium, whereas the authorities in the American zone 
delegated power to the Landerrat to establish an Oberpostdirektionen in
The totalitarian military regime had preferred manual switching to automatic solutions, since 
this was operated on a first-come first-serve basis. It changed the network design and promoted 
underground cables (see Reichspostminister 1941, Aniage 3), both expensive measures that did 
not contribute to a modernisation in switching technology, from which (Germany suffered for a 
long time after the war.
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Munich (Reuter 1989; 13; Schilly 1987). The administrations in the British and 
American occupational zone merged in March 1947.
Legal provisions in the new Bundesrepublik
The new Constitution
Telephone policy was integrated into the German political institutions from the 
establishment of the new federal state in 1949. In October, the Bundestag 
established a PTT Committee and few months later the Bundesrat followed suit. 
The German authorities regained control over their telephone system when the 
PTT administration was transferred back to the government administration. On 
April 1 ,^ 1950 the powers of the Hauptverwaltung fiir das Post- und Fem- 
meldewesen des Vereinigten Writschaftsgehietes and the Oberpostdirektionen in 
Baden, Rheinland-Pfalz and Württemberg-Hohenzollern were transferred to a 
new body, the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP) (Amtsblatt des Bundesministeriums 
fur das Post- und Femmeldewesen 1950: 92). The DBP was organised as a 
Ministry; the Bundesministerium fiir das Post- und Femmeldewesen (BMPF).^^ 
The post-war era in German telecommunications can therefore be said to begin 
in 1950. The fact that it had remained a separate organisation from before the 
Nazi period gave it much-needed democratic administrative traditions to return 
to. The new constitution established that the DBP was identical to the DRP 
from the Weimar republic (Schilly 1987: 510). The main laws from the pre-war
The two abbreviations, DBF and BMPF, were used interchangeably, emphasising that the 
DBP was an integral part of the State administration.
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era were still in place and provided organisational reference for the sector,
ensuring institutional continuity.
With this public Act the federal administration for post and 
telecommunications is established. It is given the name ‘Deutsche 
Bundespost’ and will be headed by the Federal Minister for Posts and 
Telecommunications. (...) For the first time since the breakdown in 1945 
we have a form of administration that springs fi’om German law.
Amtsblatt des Bundesministeriums fur das 
Post- und Femmeldewesen 1950: 91
In the German constitution of 1949, Article 87 regulated the telecommunica­
tions sector and established a constitutional state monopoly in telecommunica­
tions services. This confirmed the Ministry of Posts as the executive arm of 
government in public services, and the DBP was thereby granted exclusive 
provision of public services. In addition to Article 87, which defined posts and 
telecommunications as a direct federal administration, Article 73 laid down that 
they were subject to exclusive federal legislation. “Since amendments to the 
Basic Law require a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat, Article 87 for a long time provided a decisive source of stability, 
mling out both corporatization and privatization” (Schmidt 1996: 47).
The DBP, however, had a somewhat ambiguous role under the new constitu­
tion: According to the law of 1924, which was still in force, it was supposed to 
run a profitable (cost-covering) service, but under direct political control 
whereby the Bundesrat had to approve tariffs. Wages were still set annually, 
under a bargaining scheme common to all civil servants, and the main source of 
income, the telephone tariffs, was subject to political considerations more than 
pure market-economic principles (Haid and Müller 1988: 157-158).
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This institutional design paved the way for a conflict that would mark German
telephone policy for decades -  i.e., the conflict between the Ministry of Finance
and the PTT Ministry. The PTT Minister needed the Finance Minister’s
approval in the setting of tariffs, but the roles of the two ministries were not
easily reconcilable. The PTT Minister was responsible for balancing a budget
whose main source of income was users’ fees in post and telephone services,
the very same tariffs that the Minister of Finance was eager to keep stable
because of their impact on inflation.^* In a letter to the DBP in 1952, the
Ministry of Finance agreed to a tariff increase for the DBP services, as long as
postage and telephone call charges were excluded.
I hold the opinion that both these DBP services, namely the sending of a 
letter between different towns as well as telephone calls within towns and 
between different towns, is not only an expense for nearly all business 
enterprises, they also play a decisive role for the general perception of the 
value of money.
Bundesminister der Finanzen 1952
The PTT Ministry, on the other hand, argued that the Minister of Finance was 
responsible for the DBP budget only to the extent that he was responsible to 
Parliament, and that the ministry could oppose the budget only on general finan­
cial policy grounds. The PTT Minister did not accept a reduction in the finan­
cial autonomy of the DBP, and rejected the notion that the post and telecom­
munications sector executed ‘public investments’ {offentlichen Investitionen). 
Rather, it was felt that tariffs should be cost-based in order to bring demand for 
services economically in harmony with supply (Bundesminister fiir das Post- 
und Femmeldewesen 1952).
18 Both telephone and postage changes were included in the product basket on which price
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Whereas the Minister of Finance used his position as the guardian of public 
finances, the PTT Minister fought hard to preserve his autonomy. As a practical 
answer to the conflict, the two ministers signed an understanding in April 1953 
concluding that the Minister of Finance’s duties were constrained to 
the guarantee of
) observing the (...) current basic administrative regulations, especially 
with regard to salaries of civil servants and employment projections, as 
long as it [the Ministry of Finance] takes the special requirements of the 
DBP as a “business administration” into account,
) the transfer from the DBP to the federal budget according to §21 of the 
PverwG [Postverwaltungsgesetz, the Postal Administration Act],
) the observance of the basic rules of federal financial politics, to the 
extent that this can be reconciled with the “business administration” nature 
of the DBP.
Bundesminister fiir das Post- und Femmeldewesen 1953
The ‘basic mles of federal financial politics’ was left open for interpretation but 
did not exclude the need for the Ministry of Finance’s consent in tariff policy, 
which would prove a major problem for the financial health of the DBP in 
subsequent decades.
The Postverwaltungsgesetz fPverwG) of 1953
The constitution required subsequent legislation to develop a comprehensive 
regulatory regime for the PTT sector. The most important piece of legislation to 
this end was the Postverwaltungsgesetz (Postal Administration Act, PverwG) of 
1953 that re-instated the administrative council (the Verwaltungsrat).
There was a relatively closed debate from November 1950 onwards concerning 
the government’s draft bill on the PverwG. The draft was initially confidential,
stability was calculated.
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but was finally made public as a result of parliamentary pressures (Werle 1990: 
75-76). With the overall aim of reinstating “normality” after the totalitarian 
regime, the law had three main objectives:
0. The PTT services were to be administered according to democratic
principles, so a democratically elected organ (Parliament) was given final 
decision-making power;
0. The main principles from the 1924 Act were to be reinstated, in particular 
the Sondervermogen-,
0. The PverwG should specify and complement the ‘organisational 
framework’ laid down in the Basic Law’s Article 87.
Principle of democratic administration
According to legislation prior to the PverwG, i.e., the Simplification Act of 
1934, the Minister for Posts was in principle politically responsible to the 
government and Parliament, but exclusive decision-making power regarding 
conditions for use of equipment and tariffs ensured considerable autonomy for 
the Minister. Prior to 1953 there were also no legal guidelines for political 
intervention in matters concerning technical development and reconstruction. 
The Simplification Act of 1934 had thus rendered the management of the PTT 
services undemocratic as well as ill adapted to handle the problems at hand, and 
remedying this became the government’s highest priority. Keeping structures 
and decision-making democratic and accountable must therefore be seen as the 
expressed public ethos of the German state administration just after the war, an 
ethos that would increasingly conflict with the existing one of providing 
economically efficient services.
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This overarching need for democracy and accountability was rooted in the PTT
services’ importance for society in general.
Because of the particular need for communications services in the state the 
PTT services shall not be organised as a separate entity with its own top 
management, but rather as a proper federal administration under the 
management of the Bundesminister.
Bundesregierung 1950: 10
Re-instating the administrative council, the Verwaltungsrat, became the first
and foremost remedy to ensure democratic decision-making in the sector.
This draft reinstates the Administrative Council, in order to offer adequate 
PTT services to as wide a circle of the public as possible. The 
administrative council should have representatives not only from the 
legislative organs, but also from other parts of the public economy, so that a 
living relation between the DBP and its users is created. (...) The current 
legislative situation, whereby only two ministers (Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications and Minister of Finance) decide the DBP budget, is 
not any longer acceptable: The Bundespost must come out of the dark!
Bundesregierung 1950: 9
The administrative council should approve of strategic investment decisions 
and tariff policy, prepare the DBP’s budget for approval by the Ministry of 
Finance, and provide assistance to the Minister of Post and Telecommunications 
when needed, especially on financial issues (PverwG §12). Although the 
administrative council still had to be heard, in most cases its powers were 
drastically reduced from the 1924 Act.^°
The Council’s tasks under the new PverwG have been likened to those of the 
board of directors in a private enterprise. However, this ‘board’ had its hands
The council’s members comprised representatives from the Bundestag (5), the Bundesrat (5), 
the trade union DPG (7), the ‘economy at large’ (5), and two experts, one financial, and one 
technical, from the private sector.
The 1924 Finanzgesetz had given the Administrative Council decision-making powers over 
the budget, tariffs and wages, under certain conditions from the Reichspostminister.
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tied with regard to income, as long as prices were determined politically.
Representatives from the industry were seen to strengthen the ties between the
DBP and its users (Kuhn 1971: 15).
It seems practical to ensure that the DBP remains in frequent contact with 
its users if it shall be able to fulfil the changing demands from transport and 
enterprises and the needs of the general public. (...) [The Administrative 
Council] will provide this link between DBP and the mentioned interested 
parties.
Bundesregierung 1950: 11
The representatives from the Bundesrat also ensured that the ‘federal idea’ -  
another heritage from the Reichspostfinanzgesetz -  was kept in mind. Each 
Land was given the right to sit in on Council meetings, albeit without voting 
powers. The principle of democratic administration, therefore, challenged the 
pre-Second World War sectoral state tradition with regard to the relative power 
of the relevant actors, as well as to the public ethos, giving more weight to 
transparency (process) than to efficiency (outcome).
Principle of Sondervermogen
The ‘democratic practices’ the German telecommunications regime had to
return to were those from the 1924 regime and its Sondervermogen.
The aim of the present law is to ensure that legal practice changes from that 
under the 1934 Simplification Act, through replacing it with legislation 
built on democratic principles and the guidelines laid down in the Basic 
Law. These regulations therefore build on the experience from the decade 
between 1924 and 1934 and the applied regulations from the 
Reichspostfinanzgesetz from 28 March 1924.
Bundesregierung 1950: 9
The post-war regime, however, was not identical to that of 1924. In particular, 
the PTT service provider was not given the same legal status it had enjoyed in
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the Weimar republic. The emphasis on democracy and accountability in post­
war Germany ensured that the PTT services were organised as a Federal 
Ministry (a public administration), which was given less flexibility than its 1924 
counterpart (a public enterprise), particularly in setting tariffs.
However, the need for managerial and financial flexibility led to the 
continuation of a Sondervermogen as the budgetary basis for the DBP 
According to the PverwG, the DBP was responsible for balancing its budget, 
and external financial resources (loans) were to be sought only for equipment 
investment that would increase the value of DBP’s assets (PverwG §22; 
Bundestag 1949). In particular, earnings from post and telephone tariffs should 
cover running costs. However, setting tariffs was not up to the DBP alone; it 
was considered a political decision and needed government approval, in 
particular from the Ministry of Finance (PverwG §17). The draft bill included 
provisions whereby the power of setting tariffs was delegated to the 
Administrative Council, in co-operation and understanding with the Minister of 
Industry, but tariff increases were a sensitive issue in the late 1950s and early 
1960s and gave rise to significant conflicts.
Despite arguments about ‘democratic procedures’ and ‘bringing the Bundespost 
out of the dark’, parliamentary control of the sector remained restricted. First, 
the PverwG left the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications with a high 
degree of autonomy (in that he was directly responsible to the Chancellor and 
could thus ‘bypass’ Parliament). Second, the Administrative Council could 
plead confidentiality in sensitive cases, again leaving Parliament uninformed 
(Steinmetz 1957). Such arrangements were reminiscent of those in place in the
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very early years of telephone provision, but one should also remember that 
although confidentiality could be pleaded by members of the administrative 
council, they were representing the Bundesrat and the Bundestag and were 
responsible for ensuring that PTT policy was conducted in harmony with other 
policy areas such as industrial, financial, transport, and social policies. Policy­
making practice responded to the dilemma of reconciling parliamentary 
openness and public administrative procedures with the call for managerial 
flexibility and commercial secrecy.
Despite the clear similarities and institutional heritage from the 1920s, there 
were two, partly conflicting, differences between the situations in 1924 and in 
1953. First, in the 1920s debates had encompassed the possible division of 
political and managerial/business issues. This issue was not raised in the 1950s. 
The Bundesminister was placed at the apex of the hierarchy, safeguarding the 
link between politics and management. Second, telecommunications were 
defined within a broader socio-political frame than in 1924. According to art. 2 
of the PverwG, German political priorities in the areas of transport, industrial, 
financial and social policy were to be considered by the PTT Minister in his 
work. Just as the PTT Minister considered broader social and political goals, so 
the PTT organisation was more closely intertwined with the rest of the public 
administration in 1953 than in 1924 (Garbe 1969), with the consequences for 
the public ethos as discussed above.
Subsequent telecommunications debates in Germany tried to come to grips with 
the nature of the DBP, and methods for handling the persistent conflict between 
its public administration and commercial characteristics. Despite the legal
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clarity about it being an integral part of the government administration, its
Sondervermogen and financial arrangements rendered the DBP unquestionably
commercial, a trait it had in common with other public services (e.g., gas,
electricity and railways). Nevertheless, the classification of the organisation as a
commercial enterprise was not straightforward;
In this way [with its separate budget that was required to balance] the 
service provider [the PTT Ministry] was made autonomous, but only 
organisationally. The PTT administration remained what it had always 
been: a state administration.
Eckener 1952: 99
The main point of contention was the extent o f ‘political’ (i.e. not purely 
commercial) influence on DBP business, particularly on tariff levels, with the 
conflict between the PTT Ministry and the Ministry of Finance at its core. 
Despite the clarifying agreement from April 1953, the relationship between the 
Ministry of Finance and the DBP remained troublesome. Tariff increases 
continued to meet political opposition, but were nevertheless necessary to 
finance network investments.^^ “The financing of large and extensive 
investments especially in telephony is conducted as in private enterprises 
through the different paths the capital markets offer” (Steinmetz 1961: 425).
Most of these investments were financed through short-term loans rather than 
revenue from increased tariffs, and so the DBP quickly accumulated significant 
debt, serviced through public funds. Cross-subsidisation and transfers from a 
profitable telephone service to a loss-making postal service meant that postage
Local telephone tariffs remained unchanged from 1949 until 1954, and thereafter again for 
another nine years until 1963. Telegram and telex tariffs remained stable throughout the period 
1949-1962, but long-distance call tariffs changed more frequently, in aU 10 times from 1949 
until 1963. They did however not always increase, but sometimes decreased and their (nominal)
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income was not covering the costs of the service, whereas revenues from
telephone operation could not be used to invest in new technology and networks
(Steinmetz 1961; Schubel 1957; Stücklen 1960; Stücklen 1961). The Ministry
of Finance also questioned the viability of the DBP’s borrowing policy:
This unusual increase in investment needs in my opinion to be considered 
carefully, as the rate of return strongly decreases and the rationalisation 
effect sinks. (...) The lack of balance between revenue and expenses is 
unsustainable in the long run. Every effort for a real improvement of the 
financial situation of the DBP is doomed to fail as long as this situation 
remains.
Bundesminister der Finanzen 1963a
Investment needs were high, not only as a result of the devastation during the
war, but also because of large-scale growth in traffic.T ogether with the
weight of existing debts the financial situation of the DBP became so bad in the
first half of the 1960s that politicians and the Ministry of Finance alike agreed
to increase tariffs (Hildebrand 1984: 129).
Even if one were to increase capital in a way that would significantly 
decrease the interest payments, a continuation of the current tariff policy 
could not ensure lasting profitability. Showing to the situation regarding 
annual interest payments, salaries, compulsory contributions to the federal 
budget, liquidity, need for assets, and cost-based tariffs, (...) all conditions 
for a tariff increase are in place.
Bundesminister der Finanzen 1963b
Tariffs were increased in spring 1963, but did not give the expected extra 
revenues. The difficulty of the DBP was partly that in practice, its tariffs were 
not cost-based. There is evidence that the Ministry itself argued for cost-based 
tariffs in the late 1950s, whereas the Ministry of Finance was reluctant to
price in 1963 was only 87 per cent of the 1949 level. Tariffs for postal services showed a similar 
development (Steinmetz 1966: 109,114).
^  The number of calls had increased with 78 per cent between 1953 and 1958, with a fiirther 46 
per cent from 1958 until 1963, and continued to show strong growth into the 1960s (Stiiklen 
1960: 9; Steinmetz 1961: 427; Verwaltungsrat 1964).
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renounce the principles of overall price stability (see Stücklen 1960; 1961). In 
part, the problem was that the telephone service’s surplus (running to DM800 
million in 1964) went to cover the huge deficit of the postal services (Aschoff 
1966: 387). When the financial situation in the DBP worsened, however, the 
Ministry of Finance also spoke in favour of increasing tariffs, as well as linking 
them more closely to costs.
The Sachverstcmdigkommission 1965
The organisation of the Deutsche Bundespost in the 1960s was formed around 
classic principles of public administration. The Minister was responsible on 
behalf of the government to Parliament, and directly to the Chancellor, and also 
controlled the DBP’s actions. Scholars at the time were voicing worries about 
public administrations being ‘captured’ by industry, and the classic organisa­
tional structures met with distrust from many sources and spurred countless 
demands for ‘rationalisation’ measures both inside and outside government (see 
Schubel 1957; Stücklen 1960; 1961). This was reflected in public debate about 
the best possible organisation of the telecommunications sector.
The continuous worsening of the financial situation led the Bundestag in 1964 
to establish a commission to ‘investigate whether the Deutsche Bundespost in 
the long term is able to fulfil its tasks in an optimal way and without deficit’ 
(Bohm 1966: 343). The ‘Sachverstandigkommission’ had seven members: one 
technical and one financial expert, one trade union representative, two members 
from the ‘economy at large’, and two from academia. They were commissioned
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to analyse ‘all factors relevant to the financial situation of Deutsche 
Bundespost’ (Bohm 1966; 344).
Although poor financial performance was the triggering factor for the 
commission, it was the intertwined roles of commercial and state administrative 
institution that formed the core of the commission’s discussion. Various factors 
were seen as decisive for the problem and its solution. In the main these were: 
the level of cross-subsidies between telephone and postal services, or more 
generally tariff policy; politische Lasten (‘political burdens’, i.e., obligations of 
a non-commercial nature: economic obligations towards former Lander banks, 
deficits from the postal cheque and banking services, pension obligations to old- 
age pensioners and war victims, special services to the military and for defence 
purposes, and special rates for distribution of newspapers (Bohm 1966: 355)); 
hind transfer from the DBP revenues to the federal coffers; organisational 
structure; personnel and recruitment policy; accounting systems; and research 
organisation and funding (Bohm 1966: 346). Apart from the three latter points, 
which were relatively technical (accounting systems and research) or uniquely 
linked to the postal services, the factors identified as contributing to the problem 
were all connected to the level of political interference and influence over DBP 
matters.
In its report the commission gave recommendations on all the main problem 
areas and concluded that a “far-reaching reform of the Postal Administration 
Act was necessary to improve and safeguard the economic health of the 
Bundespost” (Duch 1991: 152). Their most radical suggestions were:
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• fundamental reform of the PverwG, including a splitting of the DBP’s 
supervisory and operational roles;
• restructuring of the financial and capital structure of the DBP;
• introduction of a cost-covering tariff policy (Bundesregierung 1965; 25).
Had the commission’s suggestions been followed, the DBP would have changed 
status from a public administration to a federal 'Anstalf, a more autonomous 
organisation, with its proper organs and budget. The commission proposed a top 
management iVorstand) consisting of five members appointed by the 
Administrative Council and responsible for the daily management of the 
enterprise, but subject to decisions from the Administrative Council. This latter 
organ would, in turn, be slightly smaller than the existing council, with one 
third of its members being independent individuals from industry and science. 
There would be no need for a fully-fledged PTT Ministry, and the role of the 
‘responsible Bundesminister’ {zustandingen Bundesminister, which implicitly 
was not a separate PTT Minister) would hence be narrowed down to overseeing 
that federal principles were followed, and to ensuring that government was 
consulted when needed (Bohm 1966: 359-360). The ‘responsible minister’ 
would thus take on the role as guardian of political principles and leave service 
provision to a semi-autonomous organisation (Arndt 1970).
This would have been judicially feasible in Germany because according to 
existing legislation “[t]he PTT administration is not an administration with 
exclusive obligations {obrigkeitliche Verwaltung) but rather a public service 
provider which fundamentally can decide its own methods of action. The PTT
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services therefore maintain an important freedom of organisation” (Arndt 1970;
10).
The Sachverstandigkommission’s report was an attempt to establish a clearer 
commercial character in the DBP and made several references to political 
influence being damaging and “a stranger to business” (Bohm 1966: 345, 346, 
353). It suggested separating postal services from the telephone service 
financially in order to address the problem of non-transparent cross­
subsidisation of the postal services that aggravated the DBF’s financial 
problems (Bohm 1966: 345). The report also stated that the long-term goal of 
tariff setting was to approximate prices to those in other European countries, 
and emphasised the need for better operation of local networks and improved 
medium to long term capacity planning (Bohm 1966: 353).
The government was sceptical of many of the commission’s proposals, 
particularly regarding the new organisational and financial structures of the 
DBP. Some of the recommendations, such as improved use of local networks, 
were met with the claim that the DBP had already done as the commission had 
proposed (Bundesregierung 1965: 12-13). Others resulted in a demand for 
further investigations, such as the suggestion to finance the politische hasten 
through another budget. The whole process indicated that the PTT Ministry and 
the DBP felt the commission to be an attack on its own performance rather than 
‘constructive criticism’, -  something that would increase resistance to change 
within the DBP itself
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Interestingly, the main trade union, the DPG, was positive about the initial 
committee proposals on most points, including the need for financial 
restructuring and abolition of the politische hasten of the DBP. These tasks 
were broadly referred to as political goals of the federal state that interfered 
with a strict business-approach to the running of the DBP. (This trade union’s 
approach was in stark contrast to the situation in France.) However, the DPG 
emphasised that financial restructuring could be done only if the government 
financed the ‘political obligations’ and reorganised the transfer from the DBP to 
the federal budget (DPG 1966; 8).
By postponing making a decision for three years through the establishment of
another expert committee, the government finally concluded that
the PTT Minister has come to the conclusion that the goals outlined by the 
commission [in 1965] could be reached within existing organisational 
forms, and that the Bundesregierung is of the opinion that the complex of 
the problem should be treated as part of an exhaustive administrative 
reform.
Kuhn 1971; 21-22
As in the discussion in France, elements in the German political debate saw 
modem management principles and flexibility as the means to ensure a strong 
economic development and technological innovation in the sector. Although the 
major contribution of the expert commission of 1965 was identification and . 
highlighting of problems more than the provision of solutions, its efforts 
resulted in certain political concessions. In 1969, the government declared that 
the DBP would be more capable of fulfilling its obligations if political control 
and intervention was reduced to a minimum.
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The Kommission Deutsche Bundespost 1970
The Sachverstandigkommission of the mid-1960s did not have any immediate 
organisational effects, but it was nevertheless a sign of a profound development 
and change of ideas about telecommunications in Germany. Increasing 
fragmentation of demand and economic difficulties were obvious driving-forces 
for this change, but they did not result in a simple change of organisational 
structure. Telecommunications were increasingly seen to suffer from ‘political 
intervention’, a point admitted even by the government. In order to find 
organisational solutions, the government established a new commission, the 
‘Kommission Deutsche Bundespost’, set up in 1969 (Bundesregierung 1969).
The ‘Kommission Deutsche Bundespost’ was larger and represented a wider 
variety of interests than its predecessor. It was meant to continue the debates 
initiated by the Sachverstandigkommission and two of the new commission’s 
members had also been members of this earlier commission. The will to reduce 
the level of political intervention was clear in the definition of the commission’s 
task: “The post and telephone administration would better fulfil its obligations 
towards the community if ministerial supervision were constrained to the 
absolute minimum” (Laue 1971: 104).
The main task of the commission was to discuss and recommend a new 
organisational form for the DBP. In light of this, four theoretical possibilities 
were outlined:
i) Maintaining the status quo;
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ii) Establishing a public enterprise under a separate federal administration. 
Here, the enterprise would be responsible for service provision, whereas 
the government would maintain its supervisory (regulatory) function;
iii) Making the DBP into a judicially responsible autonomous enterprise 
under public law;
iv) Privatisation of the DBP (Laue 1971 ; 105).
Options i) and iv) were excluded because they were politically unfeasible, and 
option iii) would require a change in the Basic Law, which was equally 
improbable. It was hence alternative ii) that formed the basis for the 
commission’s subsequent discussions.
There were clear links to the 1924 Reichsfinanzgesetz -  increased autonomy for 
the public service provider was argued on the basis of economic and political 
principles, with poor financial performance being the triggering factor. Even 
though the 1924 text had been used as basis for the post-war regime from the 
early 1950s, over the following two decades it had become clear to policy­
makers that keeping the service provider part and parcel of the government’s 
administration was unsustainable.
When presenting its report in May 1970, the commission emphasised that the 
proposal was not a polished reformulation of administrative guidelines, but 
rather a “model aiming to clarify and illustrate the fundamental problems at 
stake” (Laue 1971 ; 111). However, its ideas about organisational structure were 
similar to those of the Sachverstandigkommission of 1965: it proposed to split 
supervisory (regulatory) and operational responsibilities, and to make the DBP a
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public enterprise with its own management institutions run according to ‘private 
sector principles’.
[T]he future goal of the DBP cannot be reduced to simple economic profit 
or profit maximising, because the need for profit is judicially due to the 
state’s role as provider of public goods (Daseinsvorsorge), and 
economically due to the state’s service provision capabilities. Ensuring that 
industry and households are provided with the best possible PTT 
infrastructure is the responsibility of the state; service provision itself is not 
a political task.
L aue1971; 107
Despite evidence that several actors demanded change, Parliament did not act 
on the commission’s proposals to change the PverwG. In particular it rejected 
making the DBP a public enterprise, refering to ‘constitutional problems’ 
related to “erasing the distinction between direct and indirect public 
administration” (Bundesrat 1970). Hence, the first decades after the Second 
World War left Germany without fundamental legislative reforms of the 
telephone service, even though several of the basic principles and ideas had 
been challenged during the period.
Conclusion: Sectoral state traditions in the post-war period
This chapter has treated telecommunications policy debates in the post-Second 
World War period until c. 1970/ The analysis has shown that the sectoral state 
traditions in both countries were seriously challenged (although more 
profoundly in Germany than in France), but that by 1970 it was possible to 
identify clear similarities with the sectoral state traditions of the 1920s. The 
findings are summarised in table 3.
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France Germany
Ultimate 
authority (UA), 
Relevant actors 
(RA) and their 
relative power
UA; Parliament.
RA: Parliament, PTT 
administration. Ministry of 
Finance (despite that Parhament 
was neglected).
UA: Legislation.
RA: PTT administration. Bundestag, 
Lander, industry. Ministry of Finance, 
Verwaltungsrat
Public ethos Service public: continuity, 
equality, adaptability. 
Rationalisation and efficiency 
translation of these principles 
into practical policymaking.
Democracy and transparency at start 
of period. Changing to cost-efficiency 
and separation of political and 
managerial issues. Separation of 
operation and regulation.
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision-making 
and discourse
Procedural correctness. Private 
enterprise and general public no 
place in policymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription o f federal 
rights. Consensus-seeking among a 
broad set o f actors. Coordinative 
discourse.
Table 3: Summarised findings from the post-Second World War period
In France, the ultimate authority of Parliament was not challenged, despite the 
institution’s low level of attention to the policy area. The set of actors perceived 
as relevant to policymaking remained constant. The fact that telephone policy 
was all but absent from public debate in the 1950s and the 1960s, and the 
practical consequence of the increased de facto relevance of public officials and 
sectoral experts, do not alter the conclusion of stability in the sectoral state 
tradition. Sectoral state traditions are identified through public political 
discourse and no evidence has been found to suggest that such discourse at any 
point challenged Parliament’s ultimate authority.
In Germany, the ultimate authority remained with legislation. Due to demands 
for democratic structures and transparency Parliament was given much formal 
authority over policymaking by the 1953 PverwG, but the public discourse by 
1970 again called for increased autonomy of the public service provider. The set 
of actors seen as relevant to policymaking remained constant, and continued
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participation by these actors was important for the legitimacy of policymaking, 
in line with the sectoral state tradition of the 1920s.
The public ethos in France remained service public. The introduction of 
concepts such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘efficiency’ is argued to be an extension of the 
existing sectoral state tradition and a translation of the principles contained in a 
service public into practical policymaking. The initial French conception of the 
problems in the telephone sector was that lack of efficiency, which was the root 
of the poor state of affairs, could be solved through centralisation of planning 
and decentralisation of implementation -  both of which had been present in the 
debate before the war. Contemporary technocratic debate focused on accounting 
methods and organisational development, reflecting the view from the 1920s 
that public intervention and monopolisation could only be legitimately defended 
if service provision was of high quality, equally provided throughout the 
territory, and cost efficient to ensure optimal use of public resources, and that 
the state was the only organisation that could be guaranteed to act in the general 
interest. In the late 1960s defence of efficient public management was less 
frequently heard in public debate, but opposition to the contemporary model 
was not yet loudly voiced in public. In fact, the proposition in the 1967 budget 
negotiations to place the telephone service operator under private law provided 
a rare example of parliamentary debate about the status of the DGT. The next 
time a parliamentary report suggested a change in the service provider’s status 
was in 1974 -  and then the suggestions caused great social unrest because of its 
potential impact on the PTT employees’ status. The issue was subsequently laid 
to rest as politically hazardous, and remained so for a decade.
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Also the German public ethos of efficient management of infrastructure pro­
vision was challenged in the period studied in this chapter. The problem of the 
telephone service was initially seen as a legal/organisational and economic 
problem. In the 1960s there was a clear new emphasis on the perceived negative 
impact of political considerations. Factors that had been tolerated immediately 
after the war, such as the Ministry of Finance’s power and its ensuing conflict 
with the PTT ministry (particularly regarding tariffs, compulsory transfers to 
federal coffers, and subsidising of postal services), became more difficult to 
bear and were seen to cause much of the telecommunications services’ 
problems throughout the 1960s. Ideas launched in the public debate were to 
separate tasks perceived as ‘political’ and those seen as ‘non-political’ or 
‘managerial’, in particular to separate the operation of the services from their 
regulation. The political climate was not mature enough for these ideas to 
produce legislative change, but they were debated openly.
The fundamental change in Germany was thus one where certain tasks of the 
public telephone service operator were seen as incompatible with its 
requirements to act as a commercial enterprise, and that these incompatibilities 
could not be handled within the existing organisation. A political separation of 
tasks was required to ensure that the federal state provided the infrastructure as 
efficiently as possible, thus confirming the public ethos from the 1920s.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making and discourse did not change in either 
case. Thus, while France’s telecommunications policymakers continued to 
debate telecommunications as a service public, telecommunications in Germany 
remained a vital part of the federal infrastructure and thus fimdamentally linked
The post-war regime 207
to economic policy, indicating stability and continuity in the sectoral state 
traditions for telephone policy in both France and Germany.
208
Chapter 5
Changing the status of the public operators
The focus of this chapter is the telecommunications debates of the 1970s and 
the 1980s leading to the reforms of 1989 in Grermany, and of 1990 in France. In 
both countries, some competition was introduced (e.g., for mobile services, 
satellites, terminal equipment, and value-added services), and the former tele­
phone service administrations were transformed into publicly owned corpo­
rations, thus changing a 100 years old status quo.
The sectoral state traditions were challenged both in France and Germany. This 
chapter shows, however, that although many of the elements in the new 
telecommunications regimes in effect contradicted traditional practice, public 
discourse continued to refer to the traditional elements in the sectoral state 
tradition, implying continuity in the ideas legitimating state action. The public 
ethos 0 Ï service public in France remained central to legitimating state action, 
despite its content being dramatically changed. In Germany, discourse 
emphasised the state’s responsibility as economically efficient manager of 
society’s infrastructure, in line with existing traditions. The development in the 
1980s therefore paralleled what had happened in the 1920s in that central 
concepts constituting the sectoral state tradition were adapted to new 
technological and economic realities.
Both France and Germany were faced with similar external pressures for change 
in the 1970s and the 1980s. The period was characterised by increasing demand
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for telecommunications services and the development of new services. In 1987, 
the European Union issued its Green Paper on Telecommunications. This was, 
in effect, the first major public document on the possible future telecommunica­
tions policy within the EU, although European industrial firms had been 
engaged in debate since 1984 (see Eliassen, Mason and Sjovaag 1999). EU 
legislation fi"om 1988 and 1990 opened the terminal equipment and advanced 
services markets to competition, and established the principle of open network 
competition. Some of the directives were issued directly by the European 
Commission rather than the Council of Ministers, which made France take the 
European Commission to court, only to be overruled. Member states were, 
therefore, obliged to implement the EU legislation, thereby introducing 
measures that gave new impetus to national debate, particularly in France. 
Despite these similar external pressures, national policy debates showed clear 
continuity with their respective sectoral state tradition.
The case of France
Political consensus about the unsustainability of the telecommunications fi"ame- 
work in France dev^oped during the late 1980s. This chapter’s investigation of 
political discourse shows that the sectoral state tradition framed the debate, and 
that the concept of service public retained its central place in legitimating state 
action, whereas new actors were seen as relevant to poficymaking, and criteria 
for legitimate decision-making were changed by the novel ‘open consultation’.
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Parliament’s de facto authority over policymaking was challenged by supra­
national legislation from the EU in the 1980s. Although national government 
officials participated in the preparation of directives issued by the Council of 
Ministers, several of the central EU directives were issued by the European 
Commission under the auspices of the then Article 90  ^ of the Treaty of Rome.
The French state challenged the European Commisison’s powers to issue the 
terminal directive in the European Court of Justice, illustrating the continued 
perception of Parliament as ultimate authority in telecommunications policy. 
France’s challenge was overturned by the Court (Scherer 1995: 5-6), after 
which the European institutions were presented as the ‘scapegoats’ for new 
policies, seen as ‘inevitable’. This continued reference to the ‘inevitability’ of 
the liberalisation process, not only as a consequence of technological advances, 
but also as result of EU legislation (even more pronounced in the 1990s, as will 
be seen in chapter 6), can thus be interpreted as evidence of the profound 
difficulty in French policymaking circles to accept another institution than the 
French Parliament as final authority and source of legislation, which effectively 
contradicted the existing sectoral state tradition. National policymakers were, 
however, justifying the new policies by emphasising their role in ensuring 
provisions in European legislation that allowed the central elements of the 
French service public to be safeguarded at home, as well as being extended to 
other parts of the European Single Market.
 ^ The article (renamed Art 86 after the Treaty of Amsterdam) reinforces the EU’s rules on 
competition and permits the Commission to address directives or decisions to member states in 
order to ensure comphance (Kamall 1996: 89).
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The set of actors seen as relevant to policymaking changed in France in the 
1980s. Employees, telecommunications users, and industry, gained a new 
position through the consultation procedure used by the Prévôt commission.
The service public concept retained its place as public ethos in French public 
political discourse, despite that the content of the concept changed. In the 
1980s, as this chapter shows, it went from being a ubiquitous but badly defined 
defence of the status quo to being discussed in greater detail, emphasis being 
placed on continuity, equality, and adaptability, as well as its role for France’s 
international competitiveness. Even in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
as the Prévôt report showed, public perception was still that only a publicly 
owned operator could legitimately be trusted with service public obligations, 
and parliamentary control remained a legitimate argument for ensuring citizens’ 
rights in face of private enterprises’ profit-seeking and cream-skimming 
activities.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making changed in the late 1980s. Extensive 
consultation before official government policy was declared, which happened in 
the preparation of the legislative change of 1990, was definitely a novelty in 
French policymaking. Direct open involvement of a plurality of recognised 
interests negated a century-long tradition of closed decision-making circles 
where the government communicated policy decisions to the public as well as 
to industry at the end of an elitist, closed process. It is not suggested here that 
‘inner circles’ of power ceased to exist, simply that the consultation procedure
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was fundamentally new in the French sectoral state tradition and, as such, 
deserves attention.
The consultation procedure thus marked a change in what was considered 
legitimate decision-making procedures. Furthermore, it changed the nature of 
public discourse from purely communicative to more coordinative, involving a 
broader set of knowledgeable actors whose participation was central to the 
legitimacy of the new regime.
The situation prior to reform: telecommunications policy in the 1970s
The concept of service public, which had been defined “the activity of a public 
entity aimed at satisfying a need in the general interest” (Laubadère 1970: 40), 
became increasingly vague. Private enterprises started undertaking service 
public tasks, new organisational forms appeared within the public 
administration, and conflicts arose between administrative law and general 
competition law for organisations enjoying monopoly powers in certain areas 
while being exposed to competition in other areas. The myth of service public 
and its value as political symbol however remained strong (Chevallier 1997).
Public debate in the 1970s increasingly recognised the need for fundamental 
reform. Basic ideas about ownership and organisation were questioned, and the 
appropriateness of the state administration as sole and all-powerfiil provider of 
telephony as well as regulator for the industry was discussed (Bonnetblanc 
1985: 25-29). Parliament was not prominent among the discussants, which
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mainly comprised the DGT, the government, large business users, and trade 
unions (Thatcher 1999; 125). Parliament, although adopting the PTT budget 
annually, did not show any significant interest in the policy area, and was not 
presented with any legislative proposal for change until the mid-1980s, when 
the laws on the rights and obligations of the public administration (1984) and 
audiovisual communication (1986) were passed.
Changing environment o f  telecommunications services
The international environment for telecommunications services provision 
changed gradually throughout the 1970s, resulting in a perception among 
politicians across the political spectrum that the contemporary state of affairs, 
whereby the PTT organisation remained a public administration holding a de 
facto monopoly, was untenable. Four main incentives for change operated:
• The DGT as well as the PTT Ministry was in reality no longer a 
traditional public administration providing a service public because 
o The DGT was, contrary to ‘classical’ public sector institutions, 
operating with an inherent view to profit. Cost-covering require­
ments and budget balancing meant that prices, at least in theory, 
were related to costs rather than solely to politically determined 
prices.
o The budget annexe and cost-basing requirements made it
possible to measure success in economic terms, rather than only
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output-related, as would be the case for ‘standard’ services 
publics (such as health services and education), 
o Some of the DGT’s services, particularly the new ones, followed 
market principles where consumers’ demands and their willing­
ness to pay largely determined the DGT’s provision, 
o Since 1979, the organisation increasingly recruited from external 
sources, thus breaking with public administrative traditions 
(Bonnetblanc 1985: 4-13).
• Digitalisation implied that the formerly different sectors of 
telecommunications, information technology, and broadcasting would 
converge. The information technology sector was already exposed to 
competition and thus provided a legitimate entry point for private firms 
to break the telecommunications monopoly. Satellite and cable 
technology undermined the actual possibility of maintaining control 
over all signals received within national territory.
• International telecommunications regimes became more competitive, 
both judicially with the deregulation of the telecommunications markets 
in the USA, the UK and Japan, and in practice because of the new 
technological possibilities.
• The users of telecommunications services became increasingly 
sophisticated and demand fragmented. Business users in particular 
demanded tailor-made systems and seamless communications, which 
were difficult, if not impossible, to provide as long as service provision 
was undertaken by a public administration.
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Increasing political awareness
The telecommunications sector had, because of its delayed inclusion in govern­
ment Plans, received little attention from Parliament in the 1960s and the 
1970s. This had increased the bureaucrats’ de facto power, although Parlia­
ment’s ultimate authority was not formally questioned. In 1970 the establish­
ment of the Caisse nationale des Télécommunications had given the service 
provider greater financial flexibility (see chapter 4). The DGT’s internal , 
organisation had changed in 1968 and 1971 (Bertho and Carré 1984: 34-40; 
Ministère des postes, des telecommunications et de l’espace 1990: 270-273), 
with the particular aim of commercialising the local levels of the organisation, 
but the effects were hampered by what was perceived as the conflict between 
commerciality and the principles of service public.
Political awareness of telephone policy increased from 1967, when Giscard 
d’Estaing through the Commission des Finances had proposed to establish a 
^Compagnie Nationale du téléphone ’ as an industrial, commercial public 
corporation with financial autonomy operating under private law (Giscard 
d’Estaing, quoted in Libois 1983: 241). Parliament rejected the proposal, but the 
issue of institutional reform of the telecommunications sector was on the public 
agenda. “It is difficult to envisage that one can continue to administer a large 
organisation whose functions are partly those of a bank, of a transport and 
distribution company, and an industrial producer, with the traditional public 
administration rules and norms” (PTT Minster Galley 1969 quoted in Libois 
1983:241).
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In 1974 the Commission de contrôle de la gestion du service public du 
telephone [Control commission for the management of the telephone service 
public], discussing the organisation of the PTT services, concluded that 
privatisation of the telephone services organisation (i.e., making it a profit- 
seeking enterprise; Corrèze 1974: 55) was not a feasible option, and that the 
best solution in the given circumstances was to create an établissement public, 
as proposed by the Commission des Finances seven years previously (Corrèze 
1974: 154-155). Such a move would, however, have threatened the employees’ 
status as fonctionnaires (civil servants), and the proposal was met with large- 
scale strikes in October and November 1974.
The government argued that contemporary institutional arrangements were 
appropriate because the important 'ésprit de service public" could only be 
assured in an organisation similar to the existing one (see Chapuis 1987: 72-73). 
Furthermore, the 1923 regime was seen to provide sufficient flexibility “within 
existing political constraints” (Lelong 1974: 6779), i.e., the strong opposition 
among employees to a change in their legal status away from that offonction­
naires (civil servants), and the perceived need for parliamentary control over 
telecommunications services provision. The question of employees’ status 
remained problematic for French policymakers throughout the liberalisation 
process, and effectively hindered fundamental reform of the PTT organisation 
for more than a decade (Thatcher 1994: 457-458). As long as public debate and 
official statements neglected the opportunity to frame potentially radical new 
policies according to accepted and legitimate reasons for state action, stalemate 
remained.
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The impact of convergence between telecommunications and information tech­
nology was not lost on French policymakers. The government commissioned a 
report on the future possibilities of the growing information technology sector, 
which was presented in January 1978. The report promoted state pragmatism 
and regulation;
If France does not find the correct response to its new and serious 
challenges, its internal tensions will remove its possibilities to master its 
destiny. The growing information society is at the heart of the crisis: (...) in 
relations between the state and civil society.
Nora and Mine 1978: 9
The new technology was thus perceived a threat to the social consensus, as well 
as to national economic independence. Whereas the new technology would 
increase productivity, it would also threaten the sovereignty of the state through 
the impossibility of controlling communications (particularly through American 
firms’ market power concerning transmission of data; Nora and Mine 1978: 13). 
The solution, according to the report, was to be pragmatic and use (legislative) 
direct intervention to protect French industry in international competition, and 
to regulate to protect smaller firms threatened by larger enterprises (Nora and 
Mine 1978: 12-14).
Protecting French industry and the French economy were also central to the 
Socialists’ programme when they came to power in 1981, albeit with initially 
different methods (Hall 1994: 175-178). The socialist government renationa­
lised large firms, among them several in the telecommunications and electronics 
sectors, but recognised that fierce international competition necessitated a 
pragmatic approach to management methods and control structures in these
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companies. The government’s principles were to allow for managerial 
autonomy whilst maintaining political control through ‘long-term contracts’ 
{contrats de plan). Such contracts were perceived as allowing necessary politi­
cal influence to ensure the enterprises’ constructive participation in industrial 
policy, thus preserving the final authority of Parliament, without hampering 
their commercial activity (Ministère de l’industrie et de la recherche 1983; 46- 
53).^ The contrats de plan constituted a political instrument that had been 
politically legitimated with reference to Parliament’s final authority, in line with 
the sectoral state tradition, and that provided the possibility to enhance comer- 
cial flexibility of the state-owned France Telecom afl:er its corporatisation in 
1990.
Legislative action
Parliament had one of its relatively rare occasions since 1950 to debate 
telecommunications policy when in 1984 it adopted the ‘Law on the 
telecommunications service public" [Loi relatif au service public des 
telecommunications], introduced to redress the balance of rights and obligations 
between the public administration and users. The old conflict between 
Parliament and public administration again became apparent when Parliament, 
although it acknowledged the improved situation of French telecommunications 
over the previous decade (Haye 1984: 4-5), portrayed itself as prime defender of
 ^The nationalised industries were re-privatised under the Right’s government privatisation 
programme between 1986 and 1988. However, this privatisation programme excluded public 
service utilities and monopolies as well as firms with poor financial performance. Only firms 
involved in the competitive sector were involved (Bauer 1989: 51; Feigenbaum 1990: 273).
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individual citizens’ rights in face of an old-fashioned and arrogant (albeit
competent) administration.
In addition to the persistence of a non-satisfied demand, limited surely, but 
all the more sensitive because of today’s indispensability of the telephone as 
Avorking instrument and a commonly used good, thus of utmost importance, 
legislative affirmation of the right to access to telephone is strategically 
important for the rebalancing of rights and the relations between the public 
administration and users. This principle must accentuate the administra­
tion’s consciousness of its prime vocation as service public -  it has not 
always erased the memories or the habits of the regal prerogatives from the 
19^ century; and can assure the user elementary rights, which too often 
become opaque because of the complexity of the service and because of a 
sentiment of total dependency vis-à-vis the administration, whose quality is 
not being questioned.
Haye 1984; 10
Parliament’s need to assert its influence and criticise the PTT administration did 
not, however, disguise the fact that the real power over the policy-area lay 
within the DGT and the government, and that the legislator played a very 
limited role (Thatcher 1999: 188). Despite Parliament’s limited effective power, 
the debate provided information about the contemporary conception of tele­
phone policy issues, showing the continued adherence to the concept of service 
public, as well as a growing understanding of the impact of the incentives for 
change.
The first principle [of the current legislative proposal] is the will to open for 
new users’ rights. (.. .) It was indicated [in a letter from president Mitterrand 
to the telecommunications services users’ group in April ]981] that the 
notion of service public needed to be introduced in legislation. (...) The 
second principle (...) is the will to make the service public capable of 
fulfilling all its missions.
Mexandeau 1984: 2918
[This legislative project] was absolutely necessary. Necessary because the 
legal framework (...) must adapt to the new technologies that have appeared 
during the last decade. Necessary because it was time to improve the rights
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and obligations of the users, which until now had been in a disadvantageous 
situation vis-à-vis the administration.
Bonnet 1984; 2920
The law of 1984 was the first to state explicitly certain principles for the tele­
communications service public, previously, principles such as continuity and 
equality of service, had been derived from general service public jurisprudence, 
and the PTT Code made no reference to the service public aspect. The 1984 
law, therefore, “contribute[d], along with other dispositions to improve the 
protection of service public, to ameliorate the situation of the user” (Chevallier 
1989: 604). Ironically, it was as a result of the telecommunications service 
public obligations being specified in this first law that the state monopoly was 
first seriously questioned. The public monopoly was no longer used to support 
the service public status of telecommunications services (the argument once 
being ‘all state actions are service publics. Telecommunications services is a 
state monopoly and hence a service public" \ see chapter 3), but rather, the 
service public status was used to legitimate the monopoly (the argument 
becoming ‘the services provided by the DGT are so important to the population 
that the state is the only legitimate guarantor of equality, adaptability^ and 
quality of service’). This rationale proved illegitimate once market and demand 
fragmented and diversified.
European legislation and domestic competition
During the latter half of the 1980s it became clear that the EU’s interest in the 
telecommunications sector would have legislative repercussions at the national
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level (Sandholtz 1992). The EU issued directives in 1988 and again in 1990 
aimed at introducing competition in certain market segments, notably the 
terminal equipment and the advanced services segments, and later also in the 
mobile and satellite services segments (Eliassen, Mason and Sjovaag 1999).
The European debate had been closely followed in France and in 1988 a(nother) 
proposal to transform the DGT into a société nationale was put forward 
(LafFitte 1988)^, although fundamental reform did not take place until 1990. 
Limited competition had been introduced in the telecommunications sector in 
the 1980s, but the process had not touched upon voice telephony, which was 
securely in the hands of the monopolist. However, a cluster of forces came 
together in the 1980s that were able to wedge open parts of the DGT stronghold. 
For example, technological advances meant increased diversification of both 
equipment and services segments, which weakened the case for a single 
supplier (Fillioud 1982: 2). Further, large firms, particularly financial 
institutions, intensified their demand for advanced value-added services that 
were not necessarily provided by the DGT.
The DGT had several arguments to prevent extensive competition in the 1980s. 
First, the DGT had a reasonably good track record and its customer base was 
reported to be largely satisfied with the services provided (Haye 1984: 4-5; 
Thatcher 1994: 457). Second, large investments had made the French network 
highly sophisticated (in 1990, the rate of digitalisation of the French telecom­
munications network reached 75 per cent; Libois 1996: 173). Third, penetration 
rates were among the highest in the industrialised world in 1985, and both
Similar proposals had been launched in the 1920s and in the 1960s, see chapters 3 and 4.
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access charge and user tariffs were among the lowest in Europe (Dang-Nguyen 
1988: 148; OECD 1987: 231). Furthermore, French policy-makers wanted to 
maintain telecommunications as a service public, which constrained the intro­
duction of competition because of the need for cross-subsidisation between 
different telecommunications services. It was believed that competition could 
lead to ‘cream-skimming’, i.e., private operators could operate in profitable 
segments and reduce prices (and hence profits for the DGT), whilst not 
operating less profitable or loss-making services, leaving the less profitable 
services for an economically weakened DGT.
In order to retain its positive image achieved by extensive network expansion 
and quality improvement, the DGT would have to adapt to the changing market 
demands. This ‘commerciality’ found its expression in several contexts. A 
report from an international comparative study initiated by the DGT in 1979 
noted the increased emphasis on ‘marketing’ in the promotion of telecommuni­
cations services abroad, whereby the foreign telecommunications organisations 
were seen to “employ forceful and specific techno-commercial sales techniques 
and use publicity as well as discretionary tariffs” (En Direct 1979). PTT 
Minister Mexandeau claimed early in his term in office that he would “rebuild 
the role of the service public. The users should stop being considered as 
‘automatically equally uninteresting clients’. Everything will be put in place to 
meet the diversity of demands of all customers, without discrimination” 
(Mexandeau 1981).
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The concept of service public was thus hailed as the prime yardstick with which 
performance should be measured, implying, as before, high quality of service to 
all customers, even when their demands diversified. ‘Commercialisation’ did 
not, however, at this point entail the introduction of competition. Rather than 
debating the issues of privatisation and competition in the sector per se, the 
terms ‘modernisation’ and ‘efficiency’ were used (terms frequently used by 
policymakers in the 1950s and the 1960s), and referred to an organisation which 
was firmly anchored within the state administration, thus trying to appease 
criticisms which in 1974 had led to large-scale strikes (Thatcher 1999).
Direct incentives for more fundamental change of services publics came from 
the European Union. The establishment of the Prévôt commission was the first 
major initiative to launch public debate about telecommunications issues in 
France after it had become clear that EU legislation would challenge national 
legislation in the telecommunications sector.
Industrial action in 1974 had illustrated how attached PTT employees were to 
their status as fonctionnaires. Much emphasis was therefore put on consultation 
with interested parties (employees, users and ‘partners’ of the service public, 
parliamentarians, and local politicians) prior to the publication of the document, 
in itself a novelty in the French policy-making process, since “in France, 
ministry officials [had] virtually monopolized the policy-making process. 
Manufacturers, consumers, end users, and labor unions [had] relatively little 
input into the policy process” (Duch 1991: 186).
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The Prévôt commission
In 1988, the PTT Minister, Paul Qui lès, called on M. Hubert Prévôt to 
investigate and clarify the challenges and possible options for the future of the 
service public of the post and telecommunication services. The commission 
identified four areas to be addressed;
• A definition of the missions of the service public, its role and place in 
the state and in the nation considering the impact of ‘ 1992’ (the 
establishment of the Single European Market);
• The necessary {reglémentation) of a rapidly changing sector;
• Proper ways of motivating employees to give new career opportunities 
and re-evaluation of competence;
• Whether real autonomy of a service public was possible while 
guaranteeing the employees’ status as fonctionnaires (Prevot 1989:7).
The establishment of the Single European Market was identified as one of the
major reasons for change:
It is clear that the realisation of the Single European Market profoundly 
modifies the conditions for La Poste and for France Telecom [formerly DGP 
and DOT, renamed in 1988]. This market opens positive perspectives for the 
member states that know how to extract the best social consequences from 
an economic dynamic stimulated by the extension of markets and a 
coordinated co-operation in large scientific, cultural and social projects.
Prévôt 1989: 7
The report offered a synthesis of the interested parties’ views, as well as 
recommendations in the fields of regulation, the social role for the PTT, and its 
obligations towards its employees. The debate showed that the French
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population was relatively satisfied with its telecommunications service. The
service public status of the telephone clearly shaped the general public’s
evaluation, and private alternatives were perceived as less good;
Users have great confidence in the employees of the service public. 
Neutrality, objectivity, respect for confidentiality, concern over moral 
values, equal treatment of ‘small and large’; the employees’ values greatly 
contributes to the attachment of the service public. The public expresses the 
opinion that for basic services, private enterprise would be more expensive 
and sometimes less good.
Prévôt 1989: 20
However, diversification of demand resulted in a contradiction between
personalised services and equality of provision. A service public was to follow
three main principles: continuity of service, equality, and adaptability. “The
service public must be delivered continuously both in time and space. (...) [But]
the services must adapt to the new needs as well as to the new technologies”
(Prévôt 1989: 21, 22). Thus,
the public wishes to benefit from the values of the service public as well as 
the spirit of private commercial enterprise. The objective is thus to solve this 
kind of contradiction between an accepted commercial language and a 
resurgence of the normative administrative rigidity which must be applied to 
problems that arise.
Prévôt 1989: 28
Private enterprises were more critical than the general public. They demanded 
higher quality and cheaper services, flexibility, the option of negotiating on 
price, competition (except in network provision), and separation of operational 
and regulatory fimctions (Prévôt 1989: 30-44). Their most prominent preoccu­
pations were their own international competitiveness and the need for effective 
and efficient telecommunications infrastructure. Industrialists seemed to agree 
that network operation, because of its infrastructure character, was best left to a
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State monopolist. Other segments, however, particularly terminal equipment and
value-added services, should be as free as possible.
If this quoted opinion illustrates a highly liberal conception, one should 
admit that the exact limit between exclusive (monopoly) or reserved 
(regulated competition) services and free competition varies among the 
different interlocutors.
Prévôt 1989:38
Against this background, the Prévôt commission made certain recommendations
for the future organisation of the French telecommunications sector (pp. 143-
151):
• Separation of regulatory and operational functions, and the establishment of 
an independent regulator;
• Abolishment of the budget annexe\
• Creation of two autonomous organisations with their own legal personality 
-  France Telecom and La Poste, the latter including the financial services, 
and both to have a proper top management possessing ‘real’ powers (in e.g., 
budgetary matters, recruitment, and negotiations with the employees);
• Creation of a ‘National PTT Council’ to confirm the unity of the sector (ties 
between telecommunications and postal services), to supervise and control 
‘common services’ such as research and education, and to facilitate negotia­
tions between the two branches, for example, in budgetary matters;
• Integration of the "filiales", i.e. the DGT’s numerous subsidiaries that were 
mostly state owned but operating under private law.
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The report also treated the more general question of the legitimacy of the 
telecommunications monopoly. Theoretically the state monopoly had been for 
regulation only (the state could, e.g., grant operation licences to private 
operators) and this was its real basis of legitimacy, emanating from the 
sovereign state."  ^The Prévôt commission used this traditionally legitimate basis 
to argue for a rapid creation of a regulatory framework to create a stable 
business environment. Some monopoly areas (infrastructure and termination of 
communications) were envisaged within this framework but the specific 
definition of monopoly areas would necessarily be revised relatively often, in 
accordance with emerging technologies (Prévôt 1989: 79-82). ‘Monopoly’ was 
not understood as inevitable, but rather as a means to certain ends, particularly 
to ensure sufficient investments in infrastructure -  a ‘common good’ to which 
licensed service providers would have access in a non-discriminatory fashion. 
Non-discriminatory access by service providers necessitated clear rules and 
tariffs for interconnection, something the Prévôt report called for.
The Prévôt commission remained relatively pragmatic about service public.
Although the concept was extensively used to characterise the service, and the
‘morals and values’ of services publics were praised (particularly in the first
part of the report), the recommendations stressed the goals (excellency and
universal provision) rather than the organisational form:
The monopoly draws its legitimacy from its associated service public 
obligations. This implies equality, continuity and also openness of networks 
and services. The monopoly demands that the operator (...) offers a service
The fact that the French telecommunications monopoly was non-exclusive implied that the 
state had great flexibüity in its choice of how to organise and market different services. This 
feet had always been used in relation to the state subsidiaries, a tradition that was furthered by 
the establishment of Transpac and Telecom 1, DGT subsidiaries operating under private law 
(OECD 1987: 226; see also Vedel 1991).
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of excellent quality. (...) One must, in consequence, foresee that the 
ministry charged with the regulation can introduce competition as long as 
society can prevent its excess.
Prévôt 1989: 81
One should note the resemblance with parliamentary debates from the 
begiiming of the century, when speakers from across the political spectrum 
alluded to central constitutive elements of services publics with which they 
agreed, and avoided references to budgetaiy unity, which was the contentious 
point of the day. This corroborates the value of service public as political myth, 
a principle with which no politicians was prepared to disagree publicly, 
although severe divergence of views might exist with reference to details.
Written in a deliberately vague language, the Prévôt commission’s report gave 
room for various interpretations. Supporters of France Telecom’s monopoly 
could find arguments in the report’s emphasis on need for a clear interconnec­
tion regime, rebalancing of tariffs, and the need for universal service. Defenders 
of liberalisation, however, could find support for their view in the sense of 
‘inevitability’ of the development towards more competitive structures due to 
technological development and international regimes:
This conception [that France Telecom’s monopoly could include and 
continue to include transfer of both voice, text, data and images] is difficult 
to apply because of the technological developments mentioned, and it also 
meets resistance with adherents of liberalisation, which are active and 
powerful at the centre of the EEC.
Prévôt 1989: 81
The Prévôt commission became a reference document for policymakers in the 
telecommunications sector in France. Not all its recommendations were
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adopted, but the document nevertheless provided a synthesis of a multitude of 
views on the current development, ranging from social to technical to economic 
issues. It provided important background material for the two new pieces of 
legislation in 1990, the law on the organisation of posts and telecommunica­
tions, and the law on regulation of telecommunications.
The 1990 Law on the organisation of posts and telecommunications^
The law of July 1990 was the biggest legislative telecommunications sector 
reform in France since 1923, and was completed in December of the same year 
with specific legislation on sector regulation and on France Telecom’s new 
license conditions (Gensollen 1991). It transformed France Telecom into a 
public corporation {exploitant public) that was headed by a Board of 21 
members and was separate from the postal services, with financial and opera­
tional autonomy. Privatisation was not envisaged, but the corporation would 
from 1994 be taxed as if it were a firm, rather than being subject to random 
demands for transfers to the state coffers. As in Germany, the suggestion was to 
divide telecommunications services into three parts; the monopoly segment, 
provided by France Telecom (network provision other than switching, voice 
telephony and public phone boxes); mandatory or regulated services (mobile 
and cable); and services open to competition (particularly value-added 
services). The government, it was said, should regulate rather than engage in 
direct provision. The law established some general principles for the regulatory 
framework (territorial coverage, equality of users, neutrality of services) as well
 ^Loi relatif à l’organisation du service public de la poste et des telecommunications du 2 Juillet 
1990
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as a directorate responsible for supervising France Telecom’s and La Poste’s 
service piihlic obligations: the Direction du Service Public (DSP). Parlia­
mentary debates placed much emphasis on the continuity and strengthening of 
the service public of telecommunications, but the concept remained vague.
The government’s presentation (Rocard and Quilès 1990a), which underlined 
three challenges identified by the Prévôt report: diversification of demand; 
worsening of the financial situation; and increasing international competition 
(Rocard and Quilès 1990a: 2-3), presented four main goals:
• To strengthen the service public by confirming its fundamental mission 
towards the nation and allowing it to develop in a competitive 
environment;
• To give the PTT organisation managerial autonomy;
• To affirm unity of the postal and telecommunications services;
• To value human resources and improve social management (Rocard and 
Quilès 1990a: 4).
The ‘valuing of human resources’ pointed to the issue of the employees’ status. 
A large majority, particularly among La Poste employees, vigorously opposed 
any change in status and the government proposal -  and the new law -  retained 
their status as fonctionnaires. The issue remained tense and represented an 
important obstacle to more far-reaching reforms, particularly through rendering 
any form of debate on privatisation politically impossible. The trade unions and 
the communists in Parliament opposed privatisation, and their arguments 
referred to the state as the only legitimate guarantor of a strong service public.
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Maintaining the status of PTT employees as fonctionnaires was a concession in
a pragmatic introduction of new regulatory structures in the sector.
The modernisation and adaptation of the administration will lead to a 
strengthening of the service public. It is not a question, as some have 
claimed, to glide towards a privatisation. On the contrary, and this is a point 
to emphasise, the central characteristics of the PTT have been respected. 
Thus, the law transforms La Poste and France Telecom into two public 
corporations. (...) The strengthening of the service public will also take 
place through the confirmation of the two operators’ obligations.
Bockel 1990: 1126
‘Affirmation of the unity of the PTT’ was also a political solution to an ‘emo­
tional’ problem. The Commission de la production et des échanges maintained
that unity [of the PTT organisation] remains, thanks to the human bonds that 
unite [La Poste and France Telecom]. (. . .) It does not take long to recognise 
the exceptional richness of the social movement. A multitude of associations 
devoted to sports, culture, hobbies and solidarity create relations between all 
PTT employees that fonction as social cement in an immense society of men 
and women.
Fourré 1990a: 17
‘Managerial autonomy’ was perhaps the most important single outcome of this
legislative reform. De facto  cessation of political intervention in day-to-day
running of the enterprise, and a drastically lowered influence of the Parliament,
was perceived as a sine qua non for the continued viability of France Telecom
as a French service public.
This ‘tailor-made’ judicial construction will allow [France Telecom] to meet 
the aforementioned challenges while recognising the PTT activities’ special 
characteristics. It gives the service public true autonomy, by giving it more 
flexibility in management, in its relations with users, and in the implementa­
tion of its development. It renders possible a real contractualisation between 
the service public and the state. It also meets the European Communities’ 
recommendations regarding separation of regulation and operation.
Rocard and Quiles 1990a: 4^
® However, although full managerial autonomy was intended, it took some time for the political 
authorities to grant this autonomy in practice. Examples of continued parliamentary and
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The legal specification of the service public tasks that were introduced by the
July law and furthered in the Law on regulation of telecommunications and the
licence conditions in December was seen to strengthen the service public. The
government stated that it intended to continue to use the public corporations to
further political goals of equality and justice, thus safeguarding implementation
of the service public. The service public tasks included universal service
provision, provided equally throughout the territory and across user groups,
contribution to national education in telecommunications, as well as research,
security and defence. The list was extended in the licence conditions (Décret
relatif au cahier des charges de France Télécom et au code des postes et
télécommunications).
Generally, the legislative project gives La Poste and France Telecom wide 
scope for intervention and confirms the government’s will to reinforce the 
service public.
Rocard and Quilès 1990a: 5
The reinforcement of service public takes place through the affirmation of 
the missions that the two corporations will be obliged to undertake. Their 
activities can largely be undertaken under a competitive regime. The 
reinforcement is furthermore confirmed through a continued strong "tutelle" 
with the Ministry and through the introduction of a new type of 
parliamentary control over the two corporations.
Bockel 1990: 1126
Budgetary autonomy meant that France Telecom was no longer required to 
submit its budgets for government approval. The Direction de Service Public 
(DSP -  a directorate responsible for supervising France Telecom and La Poste’s 
service public obligations) would participate in the definition of the main 
strategic choices of the public corporation, and would define the main economic
governmental intervention came through enforced investment policies and continued financial 
transfers to other state enterprises. See e.g.. Le Figaro 1993a, 1993b; Le Monde 1993a.
Changing the status of the public operators 233
and financial objectives the operators must reach (Huret 1994). The directorate 
was composed of twelve members, of which the two chambers of Parliament 
appointed eight. The Direction de la Réglementation Générale (DRG) was 
given responsibility for defining the regulatory framework for the activities of 
France Telecom and other telecommunications service operators. Thus, by the 
beginning of the 1990s France’s telecommunications regulator was not yet 
politically independent, in that it formed part of the PTT Ministry.
The presentation of the new law, however, together with the preparation process 
by the Prévôt commission, showed politicians’ valuation of framing the 
proposals with reference to the existing sectoral state tradition. Radical new 
measures: splitting of posts and telecommunications (inhibiting cross­
subsidisation between the two); corporatisation and new taxation rules 
(removing substantial income to the state); and introduction of competition into 
certain segments -  all were justified in public political discourse with reference 
to a strengthening of the service public.
The 1990 Law on the regulation of the telecommunications sector^
The introduction of competition in certain market segments required an 
institutional framework for regulating competition. EU legislation, to be 
implemented in national law, required such regulation to be transparent, 
something that was also perceived (by both bureaucrats and industry) as 
indispensable for a stable and healthy business environment. To fiirther these
’ Loi sur la réglementation des télécommunications December 1990
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aims, the law on the regulation of the telecommunications sector (LRT) was 
passed on 29 December 1990.
The LRT outlined the regulatory competencies of the Minister responsible for
the telecommunications sector, and attempted to strike a balance between the
‘general interest’ through rights and obligations of the service public provider,
and ‘fair competition’ in the marketplace.
By proposing a law on the regulation (réglementation) of the 
telecommunications sector, the Government wishes to give the nation the 
necessary instruments to master the development of a complex strategic 
sector, through searching equilibrium between the economic and the social 
preoccupations of the present actors. In addition, this text effectively pro­
vides the basis for a real regulation (régulation)* of the activity of the tele­
communications sector.
Rocard and Quilès 1990b: 2
The law, which made France the first country to bring its national regulatory 
structure in line with the 1987 EC Green Paper on the development of the 
common market for telecommunications services (Huret 1994: 296), divided the 
provision of services into three areas; monopoly services; services subject to 
structured and controlled competition; and services fully open to competition. It 
also outlined the powers of the Minister, particularly in regulatory matters. A 
Commission supérieure du service public des postes et télécommunications was 
established to ‘oversee the balanced evolution of the development of the
* The apparition of the term "régulation" in French scientific and legal literature runs parallel 
with the criticism of the service publics. Traditionally, what Anglo-Saxons referred to as 
‘regulation’ was termed "réglementation" in France, i.e. a set of rules constraining the behaviour 
of actors in a specific area. One of the early appearances of the term "régulation" was in a 
decision by the Conseil constitutionnel in 1989, when it characterised the Conseil Supérieur de 
l ’Audiovisuel (CSA) as an "instance de régulation de l ’audiovisuel". Interestingly, the term was 
characterised as equalling the Anglo-Saxon ‘deregulation’, thus responding to the shift in 
thinking about proper and effective state intervention in the economy (Gandin 1995). One might 
therefore analyse the government’s wording in the above quote as a concession to the European 
principles of de-regulation, popular in the early 1990s.
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telecommunications sector’ (Art. L.32-2), through which Parliament re-gained 
some of the power it had lost when France Telecom’s budget had been 
exempted from governmental approval in the law of July 1990. The Conseil 
Supérieur de l 'Audiovisuel saw its powers in telecommunications matters 
abolished and transferred to the Minister and the DRG (Dandelot 1993; 24).
The existence of two regulatory bodies within the PTT Ministry, one regulating 
the market and the other the incumbent, was specific to France (Gensollen 
1991: 32). The lack of a regulator independent of government, which rendered 
long-term regulatory strategies more difficult, was the prime reason for the 
introduction of the long-term contracts between the incumbent service provider 
and government, the contrat de plan. This contract fixed tariffs as well as future 
activities, and constituted an important element of the French regulatory 
landscape in the early 1990s (Gensollen 1991: 32).
Although Parliament adopted the government’s proposal, it was conscious of
the fundamental political disagreement amid which the legislation was adopted,
and which effectively rendered the law a compromise between the two strands
of Parliament; the ‘free-marketeers’ and the ‘interventionists’.
I believe, Mr. Rapporteur, that we are defending two not compatible logics: 
on the one hand, yours and the one of M. Longuet [the PTT Minister], 
whom you seem to join in a speedy race -  long-distance or sprint, I do not 
know -  towards a total liberalism; on the other hand, ours, partisan of a 
strong service public to ensure equality of access, regional development, 
better investment, but also a service public open to competition and 
competitive.
Bellanger [MP] 1990: 3361
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During the process leading up to corporatisation of France Telecom in 1990, 
defenders of service public, when specifying what they perceived as essential 
components of the concept, not only repeated the list that had been in use from 
the turn of the century, they also included competitiveness of the public service 
provider (Rocard and Quilès 1990a; Fourré 1990a; Bockel 1990). Although the 
benefits of competition in general were not adhered to, as the continued 
monopoly in voice telephony and telex services demonstrated, the inevitability 
of competition in areas of an international nature was accepted (Fourré 1990b:
1127). The creation of the Single Market in the European Communities was 
perceived as the prime driving force for competition in segments such as 
terminal equipment and value-added services. Legislation for competition in 
certain parts of the French telecommunications market was therefore seen as 
unavoidable and this perception would play a decisive role for the process 
leading to the introduction of full competition in the 1990s.
The right wing and centre parties clearly perceived a future need for a common 
regulator and saw the introduction of competition across all segments as 
inevitable. The communists, however, criticised what they saw as the beginning 
of the privatisation process of France Telecom and a threat to the service public 
(Leyzour 1990; Carpentier 1990). The critics particularly argued on the basis of 
the following:
• Technological developments, particularly satellite services from abroad 
and digitalisation, would undermine the practical implementation of the 
law (Gouteyron 1990: 3357);
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• The framework was in reality a protection of France Telecom’s 
monopoly and thus protecting the status quo. 85 per cent of France 
Telecom’s revenues came from the monopoly segments, and approval of 
technical equipment, whose exposure to competition was the least 
controversial, was given by ministry officials with strong ties to France 
Telecom (Larcher 1990; 3356);
• The division of powers between the Minister as regulator and France 
Telecom as competing enterprise were insufficient. No institution was 
given final responsibility for dispute settlements, which was assumed 
giving greater than necessary weight to the European Court of Justice as 
last resort (Quilès 1990: 3354);
• The Minister was given too much power to ensure equilibrium between 
the general interest and fair competition.
The Law on the regulation of telecommunications was inspired by the compro­
mise at the European level whereby member states were able to maintain 
exclusive rights for infrastructures and voice telephony one the one hand, whilst 
allowing controlled competition respecting the service public for other services 
on the other hand. The law deliberately gave room for interpretation, which 
rendered it relatively flexible and hence adaptable to the developing 
international environment (Dandelot 1993: 25).
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The case of Germany
This chapter shows that ideas about the optimal organisational mode for tele­
communications services changed in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s. 
These ideas on organisation were, however, based on the same principles of 
ultimate authority, public ethos, and criteria for legitimate decision-making and 
discourse as in the post-war years, which indicates continuity in the sectoral 
state tradition.
No evidence has been found to indicate a change in the final authoritv of 
legislation. Convergence between telecommunications, information technology, 
and media technologies broadened the field of relevant actors in the policy­
making process. The Lander took a particular interest in the DBF’s operations 
where they saw local industries or their own competencies in media policy 
threatened. Through the Bundesrat and the Infrastructure Council they ensured a 
certain degree of continued control over the corporate DBF Telekom, but the 
corporatisation of the DBF implied a further reduction of Farliament’s direct 
control. Regulation replaced direct state provision with neutral state interven­
tion, ensuring fair competition between the DBF and other enterprises in com­
petitive sectors whilst safeguarding provision of basic services to the public.
After 1970, both academic and policymaking circles increasingly advocated 
competition as beneficial for the telecommunications sector (in line with the 
existing public ethos of economic efficiency in infrastructure provision). The 
challenges to the sectoral state tradition identified in the late 1960s (conflicts
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between democratic structures and economic efficiency, the need to relate to 
broader political issues whilst separating them from the daily management of 
the DBP) had been accentuated over time and the ideas about competition and 
separation of regulation and operation gained acceptance among a broader set of 
policymakers.
The fundamental rationale for state action was increasingly perceived as provid­
ing conditions for fair competition rather than ensuring correct and democratic 
decision-making methods, i.e., values that had been prominent in the immediate 
post-war era. Telecommunications services were seen as elements vital to the 
economic health of the Federal Republic. Not only did they provide infrastruc­
ture to other sectors and a general ‘social good’; in the 1980s, the telecommuni­
cations industry was increasingly seen as the locomotive for the German indust­
ry as a whole, whose research and development efforts the economy could not 
forego if it wanted to stay competitive in a global environment.
What had started in the 1970s was continued in the 1980s, namely a change in 
the organisational implications of the public ethos of efficient infrastructure 
provision. Rather than providing telecommunications services directly, the best 
way to fulfil the public ethos was seen to be through ensuring conditions for just 
and fair competition. In the process of corporatisation of Deutsche Telekom, 
budget balancing and cost-based tariffs were no longer the main issues, signi­
fying the state’s withdrawal from the daily management of the corporation.^
The commercial characteristics of the DBP were commonly acknowledged and
 ^Cost-based tariffs would reappear in regulation of interconnection charges, but then as a means 
to prevent abuse of market power by the DBP.
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the remaining political problems were how to safeguard basic services of high 
quality throughout the territory. Regulation as a function separate from service 
provision was introduced to solve this problem.
No change was found in criteria for legitimate decision-making. Discourse 
remained of the coordinative type.
The Postreform I can thus be seen as the institutional and legislative ‘solution’ 
to the challenge to the sectoral state tradition in the 1970s. Despite radically 
new structures (corporatisation of DBP Telekom, separation of regulation and 
operational tasks, introduction of competition), the public political discourse 
continued to refer to the established sectoral state tradition.
Telephone policy in the 1970s: changing ideas about organisationalframework
By the end of the 1970s the DBP had grown to become the largest single enter­
prise in Europe, whether measured in terms of financial turnover, employees, or 
investment (Klett 1979; 41). The first profound legal, organisational and admin­
istrative reform of the German telecommunications system after the PverwG of 
1953 took place in 1989, in what was popularly named ‘Postreform I’. The 
Ministry for Post and Telecommunications was then divided into three separate 
entities: Telekom; Bundespost; and Postbank. Limited competition was 
introduced in the terminal equipment market, whilst Deutsche Telekom retained 
monopoly rights in infrastructure (networks) and voice telephony. The PTT 
Ministry became a separate regulatory body. The public operator, whether a
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public enterprise (pre-1933) or a ministry (post-1953), had never had its 
monopoly powers seriously criticised since 1900, but this changed with 
Postreform I.
Political intervention was seen to be at the root of the DBP’s economic 
problems from the late 1960s and monopoly powers were perceived as 
unsustainable from the latter part of the 1970s (Kimminich 1976; Heyden 
1979). Early in the 1970s both the Christian-Democrats (the CDU) and the 
Social-Democrats (the SPD) advocated change in the DBP’s organisation, but 
reform attempts failed. This “lack of success (...) clearly reflected the highly 
complicated nature of the reform process” (Schmidt 1999; 211) with a large 
number of groups involved in consensus-seeking. The reform proposals had 
concentrated on the organisational structure of the DBP, searching for organisa­
tional forms that would give the public organisation sufficient managerial 
flexibility to manoeuvre in an increasingly complex environment without 
questioning the justification of the monopoly powers (see e.g. Gscheidle 1980).
The perception that political intervention was the cause of the DBP’s problems
signified a profound shift in ideas about the optimal organisational form for
state intervention. In the three decades after the Second World War, it was
increasingly recognised that the optimal organisational form for telephone
service provision and other telecommunications services was not a traditional
office within the public bureaucracy.
If one should create a commercially independent Bundespost, a solution 
which I hold for better than the current situation, one would achieve several 
benefits (...): on the one hand rationalisation measures and lowering cost.
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on the other hand a cost-focused and flexible management able to adapt to 
changing market conditions.
Ehmke [PTT Minister] 1974: 190
The previous decades’ focus on tariffs as the ultimate expression of the 
economic and organisational health of the public service provider changed to a 
general discussion on the adequacy and appropriateness of the DBF monopoly 
(see Bott 1984; Maschke 1984). Academic debate on telecommunications in 
Germany in the 1970s and early 1980s focused on economic theory. As the 
perception of the DBP’s problems changed from the degree of political 
intervention in a state-owned enterprise to the sustainability and suitability of its 
monopoly powers, so academic debate investigated whether the monopoly 
structure was beneficial for the pronounced goals of telecommunications policy 
in particular and industrial policy in general (Adelmann 1975). ‘Deregulation’ 
processes in the USA and the UK, increased international competition in the 
technological arena and the emergence of new services generated criticism of 
the DBF’s policies. During the 1970s, however, the political climate opposed 
liberalisation policies, and it was only with the coming to power of the Right in 
1982 that the possibilities for reform increased (Esser 1989: 61).
The theoretical thinking said to have the greatest influence on German policy­
makers and civil servants in post-war Germany belonged to the ‘Gemein- 
wirtschaflslehre Schule’, or the ‘Social Economy School’ (Pfeiffer and Wieland 
1990: 43), according to which the state should play a substantial part in 
industries where market results are not satisfactory. “The Gemeinwirtschafrs- 
lehre views public enterprises and regulation as powerful and benevolent tools
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of the government to implement various aspects of economic policy”
(Vogelsang 1988). Public enterprises should be substituted for private ones 
when political consensus exists that an industry is experiencing market failure.
The social economy school was increasingly attacked in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Several international and cross-national comparative studies on telecommunica­
tions policies and deregulation were undertaken at the WissenschaAsliches 
Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste (WIK), and the importance of telecom­
munications services for industry was investigated by the German Institute for 
Economic Research in Berlin. The Institute for World Economics in Kiel was 
“one of the most outspoken advocates for a total deregulation of German 
telecommunications” (Pfeiffer and Wieland 1990: 38). The University of 
Freiburg’s academics advocated competition in a free market, arguing that an 
appropriate institutional framework was the most decisive parameter for the 
success of an economy (Pfeiffer and Wieland 1990: 35-39), and normatively 
favoured “steps towards privatisation and deregulation” (Vogelsang 1988: 202). 
As the amount of normative academic literature advocating profound changes in 
the DBP’s structure and privileges grew, their ideas became increasingly 
incorporated in political parties’ opinions on the status of the public telephone 
service provider. Nevertheless, although central ideas about the organisational 
framework changed, the coordinative nature of public discourse in Germany 
where interaction between several knowledgeable actors was necessary for 
legitimacy, remained constant.
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Growing support for competition
In 1975 the "Kommission fu r  den Aushau des technischen Kommikationswesens'
(KtK) had been asked to work out proposals that would lead to an economically
rational and socially desirable technical communications system of the fiature
(Snow 1982; 12), and in particular, to investigate
what services at what time, by whom and under what technical conditions 
our country shall and should build and offer. The real challenge of this 
commission will be to incorporate all aspects of the necessary extension in 
long-distance data transfer and broadband communication.
KtK commission mandate, quoted in Werle 1990: 167
The commission’s report, published in 1976 (KtK 1976), concentrated on the 
consequences of telecommunications services for production, storage and 
logistics, and administrative organisation (Witte 1979: 361), and very little 
emphasis was placed on ownership, control, and financing of the services in 
question. However, it did provide an elaborate recipe for the technical 
development of the German telecommunications network, and stated that the 
DBP should be put in a position where it “technically and financially [could be] 
in the position to plan, direct and -  as much as possible -  implement the 
extension of the telecommunications services” (Werle 1990: 169). Economic 
difficulties, linked to the 1973 oil crisis, resulted in these technical recommend- 
dations not being implemented, and thus “unintentionally preserving the status 
quo in telecommunications” (Werle 1990: 169).
The central issues in German debate changed at the end of the 1970s. Instead of 
debating how to fulfil the DBP’s tasks through a state monopoly with certain
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financial and institutional constraints, more attention was given to the question
of the ‘real objectives’ of the DBP.
The Bundespost is no enterprise. (...) The DBP must be operating under 
different rules to private enterprise in the market place. (...) Whoever puts 
foot in the new areas of industrial policy [in particular microelectronics for 
the telecommunications sector] realises fairly quickly that the meeting point 
between public administration and private enterprise creates severe tensions. 
And the question then becomes; Is this the task of the Bundespost?
Klett 1979: 41-42
The increasing diversity of telecommunications services rendered the DBP’s 
complete monopoly more controversial than had been the case only a decade 
earlier.
The central feature of the Telecommunications Installations Act [of 1928] -  
and within it the concept of telecommunications installations itself -  as well 
as the management principles from the Postverwaltungsgesetz have shown 
themselves so vague and badly defined that the organisational and 
regulatory form of the DBP is increasingly being questioned, which leads to 
ever more frequent conflicts between the Bundespost and industry.
D m  1980: 4
Outdated telecommunications legislation and increasing friction between public 
service provider and private industry prompted several public reports on the 
telephone issue. Existing suppliers’ arrangements were seen to threaten 
technological innovation, which led to the terminal equipment market being 
first in line for introduction of competitive structures (Witte 1977). The 
innovation issue would be central to the government’s worries about the future 
of the telecommunications industry.
In 1981 the Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz der Lander (WMK -  Conference of 
the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the Lander) and the Monopoly
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Commission turned their attention to the question of competition in the tele­
communications sector. The WMK’s interest was spurred by emerging 
technology and its impact on DBP’s role in service provision (Graffe and 
Bilgmann 1980; 203-205). “The WMK report can be seen as a statement of 
concern by the Laender that economically detrimental effects might result from 
unreasoned DBP participation in or monopolization of markets created by new 
telecommunications technologies and services, particularly in the terminal 
equipment area” (Snow 1982: 13).
Hence, although the telephone monopoly had been introduced because of the 
telephone service’s role as infrastructure for the economy and, consequently, to 
encourage economic growth, the telephone organisation’s monopoly was now 
seen as a potential threat to national economic health if left uncurbed. This was, 
however, not contradicting sectoral state traditions, because the state had 
traditionally taken action only when private enterprise had in some way showed 
market failure, and development and provision of new services were undertaken 
by private firms. The debate was rather over the limits of the federal monopoly, 
as it had been on previous occasions, and shows that the German federal state’s 
ethos was still to provide economically efficient solutions rather than upholding 
the DBP’s monopoly.
Convergence between telecommunications and the media sector entailed 
another potential conflict between the federal and Lander authorities because 
the latter was responsible for media policy. According to the Deutsche 
Industrie- und Handelstag (DIH), the German association of Chambers of
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Commerce, the public discussion on the telephone monopoly was “pushed from 
two sides; on the one side through the problems in industrial policy related to 
new telecommunications services, on the other side through the media policy” 
(Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag 1980: 3). The media policy question was 
linked to the role of the Lander, whereas industrial policy issues were a 
continuation of the old dilemma between the public administration’s bureau­
cracy and the commercial nature of the telephone service. However, whereas 
the problem in the 1950s and the 1960s had focused on adequate financial 
arrangements for the DBP to provide a full range of services within the sector, 
the debates of the 1970s and 1980s questioned the sustainability of the 
monopoly powers in non-telephony segments. The ultimate goal for state action 
was therefore how to best correct economic dysfunctions to ensure optimal 
infrastructure for the German economy.
Voice telephony was the area least attacked by advocates of competition. The 
state was still perceived as the guarantor for universal basic services, and its 
"Daseinsvorsorge" characteristics increased the legitimacy o f its monopoly 
provision.
The most important reasons for state operation of industrial tasks is the 
special obligation it has towards the population. In the state administrative 
jargon this obligation is often called ''Daseinsvorsorge”. It embraces goods 
and services that are so important or so basic for the individual’s existence 
that their distribution (...) cannot be trusted to the unregulated market.
Gscheidle 1980: 31
Central arguments for making the DBP part of the state are (...) [that] the 
post and telecommunications are not only products, but indeed conditions 
for a fimctioning market and they belong thus to the infrastructure in the 
hands of the public sector. This definition is correct for part of the DBP 
tasks, which is to ensure secure and territorially equal services for the whole
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population. Concerning this part of the task, the DBP belongs to the ever- 
increasing branch of state activity called public Daseinsvorsorse.
Herrmann 1986; 103
Nevertheless, re-formulation of basic questions introduced new actors into the 
policymaking arena, among which the Monopoly Commission was the most 
influential. The DBP, by virtue of its telecommunications sovereignty and 
monopoly, was theoretically exempted from German anti-trust legislation as a 
supplier. However, the Monopoly Commission argued that procurement 
policies were fully subject to scrutiny and, “since the procurement policy of the 
DBP represented a reflection of its supply policy, its activities as a monopolist 
with telecommunications sovereignty could also properly be examined” (Snow 
1982: 15-16).
The Monopoly Commission commissioned several background studies on the 
various aspects of the role of the Deutsche Bundespost and issued ‘The Role of 
the Deutsche Bundespost in Telecommunications’ (Monopolkommission 1981). 
One sub-study, prepared by economists Knieps, Müller and von Weizsacker, 
was particularly influential in future debate and the Monopoly Commission’s 
own report to a large degree repeated its conclusions.
The report by Knieps, Müller and von Weizacker “argued persuasively in favor 
of distinguishing among the DBP’s various activities. (...) The report also 
argued that greater use of competition in providing telecommunications services 
could reduce costs, hasten innovation, and improve and increase the range of 
user services” (Snow 1982: 14). The report distinguished between four types of
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activities within the DBF: networks, services, terminal equipment, and 
certification activities (Pfeiffer and Wieland 1990: 32). The report was a 
cautious ‘yes’ to competition in certain of the activity areas. It was argued that 
the DBF should be allowed to continue its monopoly over the network (both 
services and operation) because o f ‘economies of scope’, but it should engage in 
competition with private suppliers in all terminal equipment markets.
The most radical of the policy suggestions, which was also followed up by the 
Monopoly Commission, was that the terminal equipment segment was ready for 
competition. Whereas the report by Knieps, Müller and von Weizacker had 
recommended DBF participation, the Monopoly Commission suggested it be 
excluded from taking part in this segment altogether (Snow 1982: 16).
Further debate on competition
The public administration had accepted the introduction of competition into the 
terminal equipment sector (Snow 1982: 16), and the subsequent debate focused 
on the exact provisions of a competition regime. The debate therefore indicates 
the continued relevance of the large set of actors, as well as the continuation of 
a coordinative type of discourse.
The government preferred to allow the DBF to compete in all areas, but without 
making its participation compulsory. They also drew attention to the financial
The terminal maiket was not monopolistic in the sense that there was more than one supplier, 
but the central role of the Bundespost as sole purchaser of network equipment, its monopoly 
over the first handsets installed with the telephone line, its uniqueness in servicing and 
maintenance of terminal equipment, and, not least, its role as setter, controller and certifier of 
technical standards, gave it the power to effectively determine entry barriers to new suppliers.
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responsibilities of the telecommunications organisation vis-à-vis the postal 
service (Nitsch 1981: 10). The Deutscher Industrie- und Handel stag (DIH) also 
wanted the DBP to participate in the terminal equipment market, but expressed 
doubts as to whether the Monopoly Commission’s recommendations would be 
politically feasible (Snow 1982: 16-18), due to political constraints from the 
corporatist environment.^*
In the early 1980s, the DBF’s administrative council was perceived as yet 
another forum for coalition building and partisan politics rather than the 
bureaucratic equivalent of a Board of Managers. “The choice of experts [to the 
administrative council] is, because of the relatively low prestige of PTT matters 
within government, often not subject to professional criteria, but to the 
arithmetic of coalitions and partisanship” (Herrmann 1985: 288). Furthermore, 
DBP employees and the telecommunications industrial giants were important 
power centres, who, together with the BMPF, had effectively controlled 
telecommunications policy after the Second World War (Duch 1991: 138-140).
The employees opposed change through fear of losing their status as civil 
servants, and the government used transfers from the DBP revenues both to 
subsidise the postal service and to improve the national economy. The PTT 
Ministry, the postal union and a handful of equipment producers “in effect 
‘joined forces’ to oppose a fast transition from the old order of a public 
telecommunications monopoly to a competitive mode of service provision
” The pattern of tight relations between politicians, trade unions and the industry has been said 
to be responsible for the political stability in West Germany in the post-war period, because 
opinions from all major interested parties were channelled into the decision-making process. 
The stability, however, has also been criticised for hampering necessary change, or at least 
significantly reducing its speed (Schmidt 1991; Junne 1989; Katzenstein 1987; Dyson 1996).
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through private firms” (Werle 1999; 110). Although these structures hampered 
earlier moves to reform, it is true to say that they slowed down the process 
rather than prevented it (Schmidt 1991; Werle 1999: 112). However, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, for a long period governed by a Minister from 
the liberal party (the FDP) had traditionally been in favour of liberalisation 
measures and pushed for reform.
New services, digitalisation, and fragmentation of customer demand, were seen
to drive the fundamental discussion of the DBF’s monopoly (Elias [PTT
Minister] 1983: 97-98; see also Herrmann 1985; Maschke 1984; Berger 1986;
Rottmann 1986). Scherer (1985) summed up the situation thus:
Telematics -  the merging of telecommunication with data processing -  
requires a new set of concepts for both telecommunication law and politics. 
(...) In Germany, the future organizational structure of the 
telecommunications field is being discussed with emphasis on its economic 
efficiency. (...) German telecommunication law has not yet provided the 
organizational, procedural, and substantive rules necessary to meet the 
social, economic, and political challenges of telematics. This legal deficit 
has permitted the telecommunications technology and industry to develop 
their own dynamics and to build up economic constraints that apparently 
reduce the choices for telecommunications law and politics.
Scherer 1985: 749-750
Thus, in the first half of the 1980s, strong forces advocated the introduction of 
competition into parts of the telecommunications sector (e.g., terminal equip­
ment). The employees’ civil servant status, the need for cross-subsidisation, and 
fears of privatisation, were central to those opposing competition. Although the 
issue of privatisation was less prominent in German debate than in French in the 
initial phase of the restructuring program, efforts were nevertheless made to
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emphasise that continued public ownership was a prerequisite for a high-quality 
universal service.
The public discussion about the role of the DBP in our organisation of the 
market is currently strong. Contradictory statements and assumptions are 
brought forward -  such as; the Post [DBP] will be sold; the Post will be split 
up; the Post will be privatised. (...) It is therefore necessary here to state the 
fundamental pillars of our policy: (...) Postal and telecommunications 
services are vital to our infrastructure and thus remain a central task of the 
state.
Florian 1986: 4
In October 1986, the PTT Minister, Schwarz-Schilling, denied any possibility of 
privatisation of the DBP (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2.10.1986). This was representa­
tive of government policy throughout the 1980s, which was conducted on the 
basis that the DBP would continue as a publicly owned company (Witte 1992: 
98-99). Changing the ownership status of the DBP would, apart from inciting 
strong negative reactions from its employees, require a change in the Basic 
Law. This could only be achieved with a parliamentary majority of two thirds in 
favour, which did not exist: “privatization of the Bundespost is simply out of 
question” (Vogelsang 1988: 196).
Report from the Government Commission for Telecommunications (The Witte 
Commission) and the Government’s Concept
The report from the Government Commission for Telecommunications (the 
Witte Commission) constituted the major policy document prior to Postreform
I. The commission was established in 1985 to consult relevant social actors and 
to formulate proposals that would be backed by a strong consensus: “It is 
expected that the Commission will endeavour to establish the opinions of all
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social groups concerned with this question and include them in its considera­
tions” (Witte 1988a: 9). The Commission’s 12 members comprised: representa­
tives of the political parties (4), of trade and industry, the industrial associations 
and trade unions (5), and of the sciences (3). The Commission’s task was to 
approach the following questions within the existing legal conditions imposed 
on the sector by Articles 73 and 87 of the Basic Law:
1. What are the future tasks in telecommunications?
2. What are the scope, limits and structure of the Government’s tasks in the 
sector?
3. What are the organisational, economic and legal prerequisites for an 
efficient fulfilment of government tasks by the DBP in line with 
requirements?
4. What framework should the government define for the fulfilment of 
private enterprise tasks? (Witte 1988a: 9)
The main motivation behind restructuring the sector was the perceived need for 
technical innovation in microelectronics, and in the information and communi­
cations technologies. The need for innovation was explained first in a 
government document on Microelectronics and competitiveness from 1984, 
thus preceding EU policy initiatives and policy developments. Such innovation 
was seen to be necessary to keep German telecommunications industry 
competitive at an international level. The Commission’s mandate stated that 
“[t]he objectives to be achieved are the most effective promotion of technical 
innovation, the development and observance of international communication
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standards as well as the safeguarding of competition on the telecommunications 
market” (Witte 1988a: 9), thereby mixing the goals (technical innovation) and 
the means (market competition). Such laxness in defining competition either as 
a means to an end or an end in itself would leave it open for interpretation by 
regulatory authorities at a later date.
The Commission judged the DBF’s record as relatively satisfactory given
existing political and legal constraints. However, it also felt that technological
developments, fi-agmentation of demand, and increased customer sophistication,
implied that “the dictates of the hour [were] not a mere change in the fulfilment
of tasks but a corrective adjustment or rather a greater differentiation of the
objectives” (Witte 1988a: 27). The ‘dictates of the hour’ were consumer-
oriented policies and flexibility in management and customer services, a view
echoed by the Government when it presented its ‘Concept for restructuring of
the telecommunications market’:
Rapid innovation in telecommunications technology and applications has 
fundamentally changed the telecommunications market (...) On the demand 
side users are constantly multiplying and specifying their requirements for 
quality, price and efficiency of the telecommunications offerings.
Federal PTT Minister 1988: V
In their report, finalised in late 1987, the Witte commission had not managed to 
come to complete agreement. Representatives fi'om the social-democratic party 
(the SPD) and the trade unions felt the proposals went too far in their 
liberalisation measures, whereas representatives fi'om the DIH, the liberal party 
(the FDP), and the Commerzbank wanted yet more radical proposals.
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The Commission put forward its findings and recommendations on the
following issues:
1. Networks -  Retaining network monopoly for networks and basic services 
(Witte 1988a: Rl).
Ten of the Commission’s twelve members favoured a proposal that DBF’s 
network monopoly should be upheld as long as it provided fixed leased lines 
on fair and competitive conditions, meeting governmental requirements on 
quality and quantity, and subject to reviews every three years (Witte 1988a: 
3). The Commission left some loopholes such as slow data transmission via 
satellite, one-way data distribution or fewer restrictions on the construction 
of internal networks, but basically the monopoly was left untouched 
(Pfeiffer and Wieland 1990: 48-49). It was recommended that competition 
be introduced, implying that the “existing powers for licensing private 
telecommunication installations [should] be exercised to the largest possible 
extent” (Witte 1988b). The Commission noted that the Basic Law did not 
exclude the possibility of competition.
2. Customer Premises Equipment -  Further liberalisation (Witte 1988a: R20- 
R29).
The Commission recommended that the CPE market be completely opened. 
Previously terminal equipment had been sold through the DBP, and pro­
duced mainly by one of four ‘royal suppliers’. The Commission recom­
mended that “each subscriber shall be entitled to have a network termination 
installed which will allow him to connect any equipment he wishes” (Witte
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1988a; 6). The DBP should be allowed to compete in this market, but 
without engaging in production of equipment, and equipment approval 
should be placed in a separate, independent authority reporting directly to 
the PTT minister. Prices of terminal equipment should not be subject to 
approval.
3. Services -  Separation between competitive and monopoly services (Witte 
1988a: R10-R19).
The Commission made a distinction between monopoly services, regulated 
(mandatory) services and unregulated services. DBP Telekom was to retain 
monopoly over voice telephony, but the enterprise should not be excluded 
from operating in any service segment. Telekom would be obliged by law or 
ordinance to provide ‘mandatory services’, but it would do so in 
competition with private service providers. Unregulated services would be 
open to all. Private service suppliers were to be permitted to interconnect 
with the public network, and Telekom’s means for cross-subsidisation 
would be limited by cost-based tariffs for monopoly and regulated services 
(Witte 1988a: 4-5)
4. Structural Consequences for the Deutsche Bundespost (Witte 1988a: R30- 
R47).
a) Separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities.
The Commission proposed to separate regulation from operation: “the 
sovereign task shall be separated from the entrepreneurial tasks as far as 
organisation is concerned” (Witte 1988a: 107). Regulatory functions should
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be put under the competence of the Federal Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, as an ‘independent ministry’, thus reducing the role of 
the ministry to regulation of the German telecommunications sector 
(Pfeiffer and Wieland 1990; 51.
b) Separation of telecommunications from postal and banking services in 
the DBP.
The commission’s recommendation to split the traditional PTT structure to 
control the flow of financial resources generated much controversy (Pfeiffer 
and Wieland 1990: 52). The Commission proposed that subsidies of postal 
activities by the telecommunications activities were to be phased out over 
five years in a stepwise procedure.
c) Increased flexibility in personnel management.
The Commission suggested that DBP Telekom could set up subsidiaries 
under private law for the provision of unregulated services, which would be 
exempted from the special funds arrangements governing the monopoly part 
of the activities. Such subsidiaries would not be under the same strict rules 
for personnel management as a public company. The Commission also 
indicated that the Board of Telekom, and the second management level in 
the DBP, should not be civil servants, because the “Commission attaches 
great importance to a strong Board of Managers vested with the capacity to 
act” (Witte 1988a: 114), in other words, there was to be less direct political 
control in the day-to-day running of the enterprise.
Changing the status of the public operators 258
A new law on telecommunications in Germany
The government issued its ‘Concept’ for restructuring the telecommunications 
market shortly after the publication of the Witte report (Federal Minister for 
Posts and Telecommunications 1988). In general, the government’s subsequent 
legislative proposal supported the Witte Commission’s conclusions, in that it 
included liberalisation of the terminal equipment segment and telecommunica­
tions services, the retention of the DBP monopoly in voice telephony and 
networks, a willingness to offset the supposed cross-subsidies between long­
distance and local charges, and support for the principle of separate accounting 
for DBP operations in monopoly and liberalised markets. Separation of 
regulatory and operational responsibility was incorporated into a whole new 
organisational framework for Deutsche Bundespost. DBP employees, however, 
would retain their status as civil servants.
The government’s main motivation for retaining the monopoly for voice
telephony was financial; if DBP Telekom was to be able to fulfil its public tasks
as defined in the mandatory services and to maintain a sophisticated network to
serve the whole telecommunications sector, it would have to benefit from its
monopoly revenues from the voice telephony.
Competition can (...) only bring about the desired effects for the national 
economy if an efficient infrastructure as well as a reliable and reasonably 
priced provision of basic postal and telecommunications services and 
facilities will continue to be guaranteed for all users. (...) [T]he Federal 
Government does not strive to introduce competition everywhere blindly. 
(...) Over 90 % of telecommunication’s revenues are earned by [voice 
telephony]. The surpluses of this service are used to finance today’s 
innovations and the infrastructure obligations of other telecommunications 
services. (...) The Federal Government assumes that the aforementioned 
tasks [covering the postal deficit, contributions to the federal budget, and
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paying infrastructure obligations] can only be financed in the future if the 
telephone service can maintain its profitability. During the coming years, 
innovations for telecommunications must be financed and pre-financed by 
the surpluses of the telephone service. The envisaged regional policy aimed 
at the rapid and nationwide offering of mandatory services will result in 
burdens that cannot be financed to the same degree without the telephone 
service monopoly.
Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications 1988: 2, 64
Thus, proposals to guarantee basic services at the same price across the country
were put forward by a government who saw itself as ideally a (commercially)
efficient manager of public resources. The cornerstones of the government’s
reform work were separation of political and managerial tasks, corporatisation
of the DBP, maintenance of cross-subsidies within the three DBP units,
increased flexibility in personnel policy, new regulations for DBP’s financial
matters, and the establishment of an ‘infrastructural council’ (Schwarz-Schilling
1988: 7). The Postreform aimed at
stimulating the market in posts and telecommunications and ensuring that 
the Deutsche Bundespost through an improved competitiveness can become 
closer to its customers and more efficient. It also ensures that the 
infi’astructures are keeping up with the times and that the general economy’s 
needs are seen to and financed. (...) Furthermore, the Deutsche Bundespost 
will better be able to meet the needs of smaller and rural users.
Schwarz-Schilling 1988: 15
The government’s main opponents in the decision-making process included the 
Lander, who would lose power if the Administrative Council were abolished, 
the Finance Minister, who would lose a substantial amount of money if the DBP 
Telekom would come under normal tax laws from 1992 instead of transferring 
10 per cent of its revenues to the federal budget, and the Bundestag which 
pressed for a common office responsible for social aspects of the DBP as a 
whole (BMPT 1989: 21-26; Le Monde 1988; La Tribune de l’Expansion 1988;
Changing the status of the public operators 260
Goodhart 1989). In the end, the Administrative Council was abolished, but a 
‘Council for Infrastructural Matters’ with representatives from the Lander and 
from the Bundestag was included, thus letting the Lander and the Bundestag 
regain some of their powers from the former Administrative Council (BMPT 
1989, §§32-35). An ‘Office for Welfare’ was introduced to ensure equal 
treatment of the workers in the three different units of the DBP.
The law, which came into force on 1 July 1989 (BMPT 1989), split the DBP 
into three public enterprises; DBP Banking, DBP Post, and DBP Telekom. Each 
enterprise had its own supervisory council consisting of 15, 21, and 21 
members, respectively, and each having financial responsibility for its own 
operations (Le Figaro 1989). The three enterprises remained branches of the 
Bundespost, which was a holding company rather than a service provider. The 
chair of each enterprise met in a Deutsche Bundespost directorate, responsible 
for consolidating the individual balance sheets, co-ordinating service between 
the groups and handling joint labour compensation issues.
Regulatory functions were removed from the operational units and exercised 
predominantly by the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications. Service 
provision was opened for competition, whereas transmission of signals via fixed 
line networks was held under the DBP monopoly, albeit with the Minister’s 
prerogative to licence competitors. This partial introduction of competition, 
where some areas were open to competition while others were classified as 
monopoly areas, was controversial from its introduction (Bauer 1993: 84). 
Opponents of the monopoly argued that cross-subsidisation within Telekom
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would hinder competition, as well as affecting other firms’ behaviour inasmuch 
as they were relying on Telekom to provide them with transmission facilities. 
Those in favour of a monopoly justified this by arguing “a monopoly is the best 
and only way to ensure the provision of socially desirable services such as rural 
telecommunications and cheap telephone services to poor people” (Bauer 1993: 
84-85).
The first private mobile operator, Mannesmann Mobilfunk, was licensed by the 
Ministry on 7 December 1989 (La Tribune de l’Expansion 1989). The transfor­
mation from a complete monopoly structure to an opening for competition and 
free market structures took a long time in Germany, longer than in many other 
Western European countries. However, once the new regulations were in place, 
they reflected not only a change in government policy, but also a change in the 
attitudes and interests of key actors in the sector. The ‘search for a consensus’ 
had led to a law proposal and a new law that in most ways avoided all difficult 
issues of liberalisation, but an important process was initiated.
In the process leading to Postreform I, the set of actors with a direct interest in 
telecommunications policy was extended, and the ‘old’ actors saw their interests 
change. It would be wrong not to recognise the role of European Community 
legislation in the process. However, whereas the European Commission’s Green 
Paper on Telecommunications was published almost simultaneously as the 
Witte Commission’s report, one should not conclude that German policy­
makers copied EC officials’ ideas. Rather, German policy-makers have been 
credited with an important exportation of ideas to the European process (Werle
Changing the status of the public operators 262
1999). European documents and the supra-national trend towards competition in 
certain segments persuaded national policy-makers that introduction of 
competition, particularly in the terminal equipment segment, was inevitable, but 
the origin of the new ideas was just as much within Germany as outside it.
Conclusion: Stability and change in the sectoral state traditions in the 
1980s
The institutional reforms in the telecommunications sectors in France and 
Germany in 1989/1990 showed significant similarities. Faced with similar 
technological change, the two countries established similar institutional 
structures for their telecommunications sectors: Institutional separation of 
telecommunications, posts, and banking; functional separation between opera­
tion and regulation; competition in value-added services, mobile, and terminal 
equipment. However, despite these similarities, important differences remained 
in national political discourse. These findings are summarised in table 4.
France Germany
Ultimate authority, 
relevant actors and 
their relative 
power
UA: Challenged by the EU, but 
fundamental idea o f Parliament as 
ultimate authority prevailed.
RA: Industry and users 
considered relevant in addition to 
the traditional actors.
UA: Legislation.
RA: N ew  business interests 
because o f  convergence between  
telecom m unications, information 
technology, and media. 
M onopolkom m ission central 
because o f  discussion on 
com petition.
Public ethos Service public  but better defined 
than in previous period.
Econom ic efficiency in 
infrastructure provision, ‘just and 
fair com petition’.
Criteria for 
legitim ate 
decision-m aking 
and discourse
Consultation procedure new in 
French policymaking. Increased 
relevance o f a multitude o f actors. 
Coordinative discourse.
Legislative circumscription o f  
federal rights. Participation o f  a 
broad set o f actors. Coordinative 
discourse.
Table 4: Summarised fîndings from the 1980s
Changing the status of the public operators 263
The notion of authority was not changed in either case, despite the challenge to 
the French Parliament posed by EU legislation. French policymakers’ actions 
after the adoption of the Commission directives in the late 1980s supports the 
view that Parliament’s final authority was unquestioned in French public 
political discourse. The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking in 
France changed in this period, as indicated by the open consultation process of 
the Prévôt commission. In Germany, new segments of the industry took an 
interest in telecommunications policy because of its convergence with 
information technology and media, but the most significant of these ‘new’ 
actors were the Lander, whose competencies comprised media policy, and who 
were already present among central actors in previous periods. The 
Monopolkommission, however, emerged as a significant actor in the 1980s 
when ideas about competition appeared on the agenda.
The French debate continued to be a debate about service public, which retained 
its central place as public ethos. In Germany, the discussion focused on the 
merits of competition. In both cases, the main point concerning arguments for a 
continuation of voice telephony monopoly was how the state could guarantee 
certain basic services and their quality to all citizens throughout the territory.
For the French this was the essential element of their service public, for the 
Germans it was a prerequisite for continued economic growth.
Competition as initiator of economic efficiency, international competitiveness, 
technological development, separation of regulation and operation; these themes 
were present in both French and German institutional reform debates.
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Parliament in both countries had seen its powers eroded since the 1920s, and 
particularly with the technocratic regimes after the Second World War.
However, these power reductions were not perceived in the same way in the 
two countries. Whereas in France a reduction in Parliament’s powers was seen 
as implying reduced democratic power of the population and, therefore, of each 
individual citizen, a similar reduction in federal Germany was interpreted as an 
increased opportunity for the DBP to engage in industrial activity without 
unnecessary political interference. The debate in the 1970s in Germany 
illustrated that tolerance of political interference was decreasing, thus re­
defining the main problem of the DBP from one where the question was to find 
an optimal organisational and financial framework within the existing 
institutional constraints, to one where changing these institutional constraints 
(through separating ‘political’ and ‘non-political’, or ‘managerial’ issues) was 
central.
References to the European Union as the new power centre in European 
telecommunications policy also differed. Domestic ideas had largely preceded 
European debate in Germany, whereas the opposite was true in France. In 
France, the EU was used as ‘scapegoat’ or to emphasise the ‘inevitability’ of th 
liberalisation process by effectively removing parliamentary and governmental 
responsibility for certain liberalisation measures. In Germany, technological 
development, globalisation of business activity, and increased economic 
competition were used to the same effect. The difference underlines two 
diverging views of rationale for state intervention in France and Germany. The 
French state traditionally, and particularly in the post-war period, acted as if it
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could determine its own economic development and conditions. Dirigisme, 
planning and strong direct relationships between state and industry indicate 
such belief, and the political debate from the 1980s telecommunications reform 
did not indicate a profound change. The federal German state, however, was 
traditionally managing an environment, ideally to the optimal benefit for its 
economic actors and subsequently to its citizens, but never primarily as direct 
service provider. The debate prior to Postreform I continued this trend.
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Chapter 6
Privatisation and full competition
This chapter analyses the French and German debates on legislation for partial 
privatisation of the incumbent telephone operators and for full competition in 
the sector to investigate whether the sectoral state traditions remained constant. 
The relevant French legislation dates from July 1996. In Germany two impor­
tant reforms took place in this period: the ‘Postreform IF in 1994 and the 
‘Postreform IIF in 1996.
In both countries, public debates were marked by legislative changes at the 
European level. Of particular importance were the 1993 decision of the Council 
of Ministers to open all segments of the telecommunications sector to competi­
tion from 1 January 1998, and the requirement to separate regulation and supply 
of telecommunications services.
Similar institutional structures developed in France and Germany in the 1990s. 
At the start of 1998 both countries had partly privatised telecommunications 
operators operating under private law and their former PTT ministries were 
either abolished or merged with other ministries. In both cases an independent 
regulator was established with responsibility for daily supervision of the sector.
Despite institutionally similar outcomes from the national reform processes, 
political arguments continued to display significant differences in line with 
existing sectoral state traditions. Service public continued to be the central
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concept in the French debate, and even if its content changed during the 1990s, 
its omnipresence suggests that it constituted the major source of legitimacy for 
state intervention in the sector. The German federal state, however, continued to 
be perceived as an infrastructure provider for the economy, and hence legiti­
mised and justified intervention through optimal management of telecommuni­
cations services. In Germany, therefore, debate focused on management 
problems, i.e. financial aspects and how to ensure fair competition in the market 
place. Social policy aspects such as universal service obligations evoked less 
interest in Germany than in France, and when debated the Lander representa­
tives, who were traditionally responsible for social policy, were the most active.
The case of France
Despite the radical institutional reform that took place in the French telecom­
munications sector in the late 1990s, French public political discourse continued 
to show remarkable similarities with former discourse, in line with the sectoral 
state tradition for telephone policy.
The notion of authoritv remained with Parliament, although more ‘subtly’ so 
than before. Parliament remained the legislative assembly, but the new indepen­
dent regulator was given much discretion over daily decision-making influen­
cing the telecommunications sector, comparable to the PTT Ministry in the very 
early days of telephony. However, very much contrary to the earlier situation, a 
larger number of actors were seen as relevant to policymaking (in line with the
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sectoral state tradition from the late 1980s), as illustrated in a speech from M.
Hubert, President of the ART, in July 1997;
I accept credit for our professional method and open dialogue. During the 
six months since its creation, the ART has been continuously in discussion 
with all market players. We have used ad hoc committees, public consulta­
tion and formal hearings as daily tools to enhance our capacity to make the 
right decisions and foster our independence. Just one word by the way: yes, 
we are independent.
Hubert 1997: 2
The introduction of full competition into a sector that had been monopolised 
since 1889, and the dramatic change in the state’s mode of action from direct 
service provision to regulation, were justified with reference to the existing 
public ethos for sectoral policymaking: service public. The concept of service 
public itself, however, underwent profound development between 1984 and 
1997, changing from a vague but ubiquitous term to one carrying specific 
meaning laid down in legislation. Its contents were specified and (pragmati­
cally) adapted to contemporary needs (as dictated by socio-economic and 
international political and legal requirements). The various elements of a service 
public were increasingly delineated and defined throughout this period, but the 
concept itself retained its crucially central place in French public political 
discourse on telecommunications policy.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making remained stable compared to the 1980s, 
involving the broad set of actors (not only Parliament, the PTT administration, 
and the finance ministry, but also industry, telecommunications services users, 
and France Telecom employees) in ‘continuous discussion’. The discourse type 
remained similar to that of the late 1980s, with a large set of knowledgeable
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actors discussing at a level of high technical detail, and thus coordinative rather 
than communicative.
Telecommunications and the state in the 1990s
The beginnings of the 1990s were turbulent times for telephone policy across 
Europe, including France. The sectoral state tradition had been challenged in the 
previous decade through the growing importance and influence of a broad set of 
economic actors, including industry (through their role as telecommunications 
users), as well as the general public. Legislative activity from the European 
Commission reduced national parliaments’ powers and in France was a major 
justification for the ‘inevitability’ of regulatory reform and the introduction of 
competition. French policymakers’ emphasis on the potential impact of French 
ideas about service public on European policymaking, however, illustrates the 
strength of the sectoral state tradition. A political consensus on the unsustaina­
bility of the status quo in telecommunications had developed during the late 
1980s, and continued during the 1990s.
The privatisation of France Telecom in the late 1990s was seen -  at least in 
France -  as a clear break with national traditions of public administration. Trade 
unions and employees feared that offering the enterprise on the stock market 
would be the end of service public guarantees (Le Figaro 1993a; La Tribune 
Desfossés 1993a; 1993b; Nexon 1993a), whereas the management of France 
Telecom considered a transformation to a limited company a necessity to sur­
vive in an increasingly competitive environment where the old state-centred
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model had outlived its role. Observers remained suspicious as to whether the 
French state would prove capable of giving France Telecom its independence 
and letting it engage in ‘fair competition’ with other companies, or whether 
‘alternatives’ would be found to enhance France Telecom’s competitive stance 
both domestically and in the European arena. This investigation shows that 
despite such public opinions about fundamental change, the justification for 
policies, the sectoral state tradition, remained constant compared to the end of 
the corporatisation period.
The aftermath o f corporatisation -  emerging issue o f privatisation
At the beginning of January 1991, France Telecom had been transformed into 
an ^exploitantpublic autonome ’, [an autonomous public corporation] under the 
guise of giving it more managerial and financial flexibility in an increasingly 
competitive international environment, as well as reducing the Ministry’s 
powers of direct intervention. The novel regulatory instruments were a licence 
{cahier des charges) stating France Telecom’s rights and obligations, and a 
Contrat de Plan running for four years. Regulatory functions were kept in the 
PTT Ministry, regulation of licences being the responsibility of the Direction de 
la réglementation générale (DRG), and the service public obligations being 
closely followed by the Direction du service public. These two offices were 
merged into one single unit, the DGPT {Direction Générale des Postes et 
Télécommunications) from 1994.^
 ^ The DGPT was responsible for ‘implementing the government policies in the areas of posts 
and telecommunications. (...) It ensure[d] conditions for loyal and fair competition between the 
different economic actors’. Décret relatif à l ’organisation de l’administration centrale du
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The new regime of 1990 had resulted in greater independence for the operator. 
“There was a clearer separation between France Telecom and the political 
executive. The participation of elected politicians (...) continued, but in 
diminished form, over issues which were politically sensitive or required co­
operation between France Telecom and the political executive, such as tariffs 
and internationalisation” (Thatcher 1999: 215). The legislation did, however, 
maintain important state influence over telephone policy through licence 
conditions. The telephone service was to remain in the service of the public and 
the general interest, and France Telecom was the state’s implementation tool. 
The decree’s preamble set out France Telecom’s major objectives:
[France Telecom’s] activities respond to the users’ needs provided in the 
optimal way for society. They contribute to territorial development, national 
defence and security issues, as well as the development of European 
industry.
Ministère des postes, des télécommunications et de l’éspace (1990): 16570
The public ethos of service public was therefore laid down and specified 
(although not necessarily exhaustively) in legislation. Service public ‘dr la 
française ’ thus implied more than universal provision of telephony, it 
comprised a guarantee that services were provided in an ‘optimal way for 
society’. Within the context of French policymaking this could only mean 
continued control by Parliament, which remained the institutional expression of 
the general will and thus guardian of what was socially optimal. It did however 
not imply ex ante supervision as opposed to ex post control, but emphasised the 
outcomes of France Telecom’s actions rather than procedural correctness as the 
important measure for success.
ministère de l ’industrie, des postes et télécommunications et du commerce extérieur, 1 
December 1993.
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It proved difficult for the political authorities to stop using France Telecom as a 
tool for broader industrial policies/ After the introduction of normal taxation 
rules in 1994 the state was criticised for pocketing too much of France 
Telecom’s profit/ Trade unions and political opponents condemned the 
government’s behaviour, claiming that they ‘[distorted] the initiated reforms 
[which should give autonomy to a state-owned France Telecom] and [opened] 
the way to privatisation’ (Le Figaro 1993a). Whereas politicians’ appetite for 
France Telecom-generated funds was perceived as a threat to the contemporary 
status of the operator, privatisation remained a sensitive issue. When, in spring 
1993, a government representative formally asked France Telecom’s board to 
consider ‘separating out the mobile activities’'^  of France Telecom, heavy 
protests followed from both top management and trade unions.^ The issue’s 
sensitivity, combined with the presidential elections of 1995, resulted in 
legislative proposals being postponed until 1996.
In 1993, however, the government instituted a ‘reflexion’ on the future of the 
telecommunications sector in France and the possibilities of partial privatisation 
through divestiture of the mobile activities of France Telecom, the so-called 
Dandelot report (Dandelot 1993).
 ^Until normal taxation rules were introduced in 1994, the company continued its direct 
contributions. In addition to direct transfers, politicians were seen to use France Telecom as a 
‘milk cow’ by obliging it to invest in other enterprises, sometimes substantially above the 
market price. In January 1993, the government obliged France Telecom to spend Ibn francs on 
shares in two insurance companies as a ‘pure financial operation’ into a sector where France 
Telecom had no immediate interest, thus using the telecommunications operator as a ‘milk cow’ 
for their industrial policies (Le Figaro 1993b; Fabre 1993; Le Monde 1993).
 ^Tax and dividends for 1994 amounted to approximately 16bn Francs, i.e. the same range as 
earlier direct contributions: 15bn France in 1992 and in 1993 (Le Coeur 1995a).
 ^The representative, M. Couture, gave two main reasons for the government’s demand; first, 
the increasingly aggressive competition m the mobile sector; and second, that mobile services in 
France lagged behind those in other industriahsed countries (La Tribune Desfossés 1993b).
 ^Top management was more ‘surprised’ about the form of the message rather than shocked by 
its content; trade unions opposed any possible privatisation (La Tribune Desfossés 1993a).
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The Dandelot repoit
Although not voluminous, the Dandelot report touched upon many of the major 
themes in contemporary telecommunications debate, with the notable exception 
of the fiiture status of France Telecom’s employees.^ The report focused on 
three aspects:
•  Competition -  its impact on the economy in general, on employment, on 
existing actors, and on the role of the European environment as
‘ stimulator or risk factor’ ;
• The actors -  their strategies, both internationally and domestically, 
relations between service providers and equipment manufacturers, and 
between service providers in converging sectors;
•  The role of the state -  the development of different forms of interven­
tion, regulation, means of ensuring equal treatment and respect for the 
missions of the service public (Dandelot 1993: 1).
Its main contribution was to recommend the introduction of private capital into 
France Telecom, subject to the state retaining more than 50 per cent ownership. 
Public ownership and state control were regarded as the best guarantee that 
short-term search for profit would not destroy longer-term policy goals. In 
addition to the political difficulties over selling a larger part of the company, 
constitutional constraints rendered selling more than 50 per cent impossible 
(Dandelot 1993: 48). The report maintained that
 ^“It is outside the scope of this report to investigate possible solutions for the problem with 
employees’ status in a reformed enterprise, because such considerations must be the object of 
internal consultation within the enterprise” (Dandelot 1993:49).
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in a competitive world, it is imperative that France Telecom maintains its 
international competitiveness. (...) This depends on (...) tariffs -  France 
Telecom caimot be exposed to an environment that can engage in cream- 
skimming; and (...) the enterprise’s status.
Dandelot 1993: 46
The report argued that technological development and European legislation 
rendered competition, and therefore French legislative reform, inevitable. 
Competition was expected to result in cheaper services for the consumer and 
stronger growth for the economy in general (Dandelot 1993: 13-21), which was 
not portrayed as an independent goal for French authorities, but rather as an 
unavoidable fact of the global market (see Chevallier 1989: 605-610). The 
report also considered greater financial flexibility and independence necessary 
for the public company to survive in a global market, and international 
partnerships were seen as essential as cross-border service-provision increased. 
In order to engage in alliances and joint ventures, France Telecom needed its 
own capital. Moreover, foreign operators had expressed doubts as to whether it 
would be possible to maintain good business practice as long as France 
Telecom was completely owned by the state and controlled by the public 
administration.^
The Dandelot report also called for clearer separation between regulatory and 
operational functions, and envisaged a regulatory authority independent from 
the Ministry:
The relations [of the state towards the enterprise] should be less as those of
the “tutor” (...) and more as those of a shareholder. However, it is
 ^The American company MCI’s search for an overseas partner culminated in it joining forces 
with British Telecom, particularly because of the French state’s direct involvement in France 
Telecom, and because the enterprise was neither flexible enough nor possessed sufficient capital 
(Monnot 1993a, 1993b; Quotidien de Paris 1993; Nexon 1993b).
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preferable to dissociate the role of regulator from that of shareholder. If the 
administration in charge of the "‘tutelle'' also holds the role as the 
shareholder, should one not consider developing towards an autonomous 
regulatory organism?
Dandelot 1993; 57
Such views echoed recent legislation at the European level. EU legislation 
required a regulatory entity independent from the service provider(s), and 
although not compulsory, all member states, including France, opted for a 
model with a regulatory agency independent from the Ministry (Eyre and Sitter 
1999: 55-56).
The Dandelot report also treated the issue of telecommunications as service
public, reflecting on the increasing vagueness of the concept (illustrated in this
thesis’s chapters 4 and 5):
The major difficulty which exists in telecommunications is that the impor­
tance of the missions of service public remain imprecise; the concept is used 
everywhere, but its substance is not defined. Competition will oblige us to 
do this.
Dandelot 1993: 53
Universality of service had always been an important element in any service 
public. For telecommunications this idea was perceived as fulfilled “with 
current [1996] penetration levels” (Ministère délégué à la poste, aux 
télécommunications et à l’éspace 1996b: 7). Full coverage had, however, been 
achieved by subsidising access charges and local tariffs through ‘overpricing’ 
long-distance and international telephone charges (Dandelot 1993: 54). A 
transitory system for re-balancing tariffs, which implied the relative cost of 
local calls would increase whereas long-distance and international calls would
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be relatively cheaper^ was recommended, and was seen as another inevitable 
consequence of increased competition. Other important elements in a service 
public, such as adaptability, continuity, and high quality services, were expected 
to occur as a natural consequence of exposure to competition (Dandelot 1993: 
22), but it was also recognised that for this to be the case, precise and high-level 
regulation would be necessary. A greater level of precision regarding the 
service public concept would also facilitate the development of licence 
conditions, which became the state’s main policy instrument vis-à-vis the 
telecommunications operators.
The ensuing debate
The Dandelot report met positive reactions from the incumbent operator. France 
Telecom’s president, Marcel Roulet, officially supported a change in status 
from public corporation to limited company, albeit with the state as majority 
shareholder, to ensure sufficient capital and flexibility to partake in international 
alliances and joint ventures (Monnot 1993d). However, the issue of France 
Telecom employees’ status constituted a major obstacle to reform, and the PTT 
Ministry asked the top management of France Telecom to instigate a 
consultation process similar to the one conducted by Prévôt in 1989 (Le Gales 
1993b). Here, the Minister had taken the initiative to conduct an ‘open 
consultation’ process with the employees, at the time a novel method for the 
French state to handle a reform. Throughout 1994 Marcel Roulet emphasised 
hh wish for “an internal campaign to construct a common project for the group
 ^Irance Telecom introduced new and more balanced tariffs in a reform that came into force in 
early 1994, when the two-zone system (local or national tariffs) was replaced with a three-zone 
syjtem (local, area and national tariffs), and access charges were harmonised throughout the 
teiitory (Monnet 1993c; Le Gales 1993a; Liberation 1993).
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and to open for a new social contract with the trade unions” (Le Coeur 1994). 
The approach, which previously had entailed a peaceful process, failed to 
prevent the industrial action of October 1993 (Nexon 1993c; Douroux 1993), 
but was still a clear indication that consultation as procedure had gained ground 
in the French telephone policymaking environment, not only between central 
politicians and the general public but also within the state apparatus itself. 
However, increased participation from a broad set of actors was not a sufficient 
condition for legitimacy of policies, as the industrial action indicated.
The major issue at stake for the employees was their status as fonctionnaires.
The trade unions DGT-PTT and CFTC expressed their qualms and opposition to
the proposed joint venture between France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom in
terms of fears for job losses and ultimately privatisation, which they saw as an
inevitable consequence of the alliance (Le Coeur 1993a). In November 1993, a
solution was presented whereby the Conseil d’Etat ruled that
the law creating a private enterprise [société anonyme] could maintain state 
employed fonctionnaires in this enterprise and give the enterprise’s 
president power to employ and manage these civil servants without breaking 
a constitutional rule or principle.
Conseil d’État quoted in Devillechabrolle and Monnot 1993
The employees would, however, need to provide a service public, implying that 
a law proposal would have to define the enterprise’s missions, that more than 50 
per cent of the ownership must remain with the state, and that license conditions 
would ensure the execution of the service public interests (Devillechabrolle and 
Monnot 1993). This again brought the need to define and clarify the content of 
the service public concept back into focus. The issue remained politically
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sensitive and the Contrat de Plan, the agreement between France Telecom and 
the relevant ministries for 1995-1998, made no reference to the future status of 
the enterprise, but obliged it to “keep the growth of personnel costs lower than 
its value added” (Le Coeur 1995b; Les Echos 1995a).^
The privatisation plans had supporters abroad. Giinter Rexrodt, the German 
Minister of Economics, demanded ‘substantial’ privatisation of France Telecom 
as precondition for any joint venture with Deutsche Telekom (Petit 1993a; 
Monnot 1993e). “Out of respect for competition it is not possible to join two 
state monopolies” (Giinter Rexrodt, quoted in Monnot 1993e). The domestic 
conflict regarding the employees’ status, however, induced the French PTT 
Minister to temporarily renounce his privatisation plans in the autumn: “France 
Telecom’s objective is not to be privatised, but to be a public enterprise, 
independent from the state” (interview with M. Longuet on Europe 1 29.10.93).
When France Telecom was transformed into a corporation in 1990, political 
debate emphasised the future ‘inevitability’ of competition in the 
telecommunications sector, not only globally but also in the French market. 
Globalisation gave France Telecom new competitors, companies that had
 ^Despite the temporary closure of the subject, it remained clear that a change in employees’ 
status was forthcoming, mainly due to the impossibility of a corporation without its proper 
capital to form alliances with other, notably foreign, companies (lack of proper capital had 
hampered a possible deal with MCI in 1993). The ruling by the Conseil d’Etat inevitably 
opened the question of how long employees would remain fonctionnaires, since one could 
envisage service public obligations being removed from France Telecom’s remit (Boiteau 
1996). The ruling therefore provided a means of delaying the transfer of all employees to the 
private sector, as well as signalling the state’s willingness to take on responsibilities for 
pensions and provide early retirement schemes (Boiteau 1996: 383). However, the issue of 
employees’ status remained largely untouched in French debate until 1995, when a new project 
for changing the status of the corporation was undertaking (Delion and Durupty 1995: 180). The 
PTT Minister emphasised the inevitable forthcoming competition and the need for clear rules 
(M. Fillon, Minister for technologies and information, quoted in Monnot 1995) and “the 
government considered that a change in status of [France Telecom] is necessary” (Le Gales and 
Saint-Victor 1995).
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“shown a much greater capability to adapt and change rapidly. These competi­
tors are not without weaknesses, but they correct them quickly” (Dandelot 
1993; 46). Technological developments, particularly satellite technology, 
threatened national monopolies, and European legislation required national 
governments to open their domestic telecommunications sectors to competition 
no later than 1998. The relative importance of the various driving forces for 
liberalisation was not agreed upon, but the inevitability of the development was 
found on both sides of the political spectrum.
Contrary to ideas held by some, this reform [ending the state monopoly in 
telecommunications] is less spurred by European legislation than by the 
development of technologies. (...) In such a promising field as 
telecommunications, both economically and industrially, we have no choice 
but to employ the current mutation to our advantage.
Fillon [PTT Minister] 1996
[The Minister] has presented the law proposal [on regulation of 
telecommunications] as the inevitable consequence of the holy scriptures of 
the European Union resolution of 22 July 1993. From there, everything 
hangs together, as if automatic.
Zuccarelli [MP, PS] 1996'"
The Member States of the European Union have in 1993 unanimously 
decided to open the whole sector of telecommunications to competition. 
This is the result of a long process of technical development and not the 
fruit of an ‘ultra-liberal’ ideology.
Ceussin [MP, UDF] 1996
With competition accepted as inevitable, it became paramount to ensure that 
France Telecom was given the best possible conditions to compete. Opening 
voice telephony to competition only from 1998, the latest date set by the
Even if  M. Zuccarelli (PS) was critical of the government’s handling  of the matter, he did not 
suggest at any point during his intervention in Parliament that the introduction of competition 
should or could have been ‘avoided’.
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European Commission, gave the incumbent operator maximum time to prepare 
for the new regime.
The ensuing debate was, however, focused around service public (vs. universal 
service) and the modalities of organisation and regulation of competition 
(defining the central actors and their relative powers). These foci correspond 
with two of the main elements of the sectoral state tradition. The authority of 
Parliament was only indirectly questioned through the emphasis on the 
‘inevitability’ of reform, and the decision-making methods employed, with 
emphasis on open consultation, were similar to those used in the late
Service public V5. universal service
EU legislation remained crucial in determining the timetable and central 
structural features of the new regimes. EU legislation did not make specific 
reference to the French service public, but rather to ‘universal service’, i.e. high 
quality voice telephony offered at affordable and equal prices throughout the 
national territory, free access to emergency calls, public phone boxes, and a 
directory enquiry.
The concept o f ‘universal service’ was not current in European legislation until 
applied by the European U nion.French politicians argued that their service 
public was a broader concept than the EU universal service requirement. Thus,
’ ’ The term itself was originally adopted from the US, where it was first used by T. Vail in 1907 
in the annual report of the ATT. For historical overviews of the concept both in American and 
European contexts see Mueller 1993; Dordick 1990. For the EU debate on universal service see 
e.g.. Hart 1998; Skogerbo and Storsul 1998.
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in a round table discussion on the new regulatory regimes in 1996, the president
of the DGPT stated that:
[The two concepts "servicepublic' and ‘universal service’] refer to cultural 
values, a judicial and social tradition. Universal service can be defined as a 
“basic service” (the telephone), which at a certain quality must be provided 
throughout the territory, affordable and equal for all. (...) Universal service 
as we define it is at the heart of the service public and respects its founding 
principles: equality, universality, continuity and adaptability of service. 
However, the notion of service public is broader than that of universal 
service because it includes compulsory services that the states can determine 
in order to ensure a minimum service. For example, leased lines and ISDN 
are not included in the universal service, neither are other tasks of general 
interest such as research and education, or even security and defence.
Ministère délégué à la poste, aux 
télécommunications et à l’espace 1996a: 7
The Ministry of Economies had in 1994 asked the group ‘Réseaux 2010’ (under 
the Commissariat Général du Plan) to study the conditions for industrial and 
commercial service publics in view of current European liberalisation measures 
(Stoffaës 1995b). In the group’s mandate, the Economics Minister listed certain 
characteristics of the French service public, equality and neutrality of customer 
treatment; territorial development; protection of consumers against abuse of a 
dominant position; sustainable development; and development of communica­
tions infrastructure (commission mandate, Stoffaës 1995b: 3-4). The list was 
not exhaustive, but indicated a much broader set of missions than the traditional 
‘equality, adaptability and quality of service’, including broad societal tasks that 
touched upon the services publics' role in the economy in general. Interestingly, 
it also suggested a broader approach than that used in subsequent debate on the 
telecommunications service public.
The Réseaux 2010 report identified a triple challenge for the French services 
publics:
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• The conceptual definition had become outdated, necessitating a 
profound rethink about the rationale for services publics',
• Organisational and regulatory practices had to develop -  the 
organisation would have to accommodate a certain degree of 
competition, and regulation would be needed;
• The timetable setting the pace for change was partly outside French 
control, which necessitated clearer lines of decision-making and control 
(Stoffaës 1995b: 274).
The report emphasised that the development of new regulatory regimes for the
public services in general and telecommunications in particular was a political
task. A legitimate regime needed general legislation at its root, emanating from
an elected assembly, and thus confirming Parliament’s ultimate authority, in
line with the existing state tradition. However, the report recommended a
pragmatic approach because regulatory regimes’ legitimacy would be judged
more by its outcome than by its intent.
France remains in many cases loyal to its administrative traditions, when 
these are legitimised by their technical and economic results. The 
modernisation must progress in a pragmatic manner, and not under 
simplifying and possibly ephemeral ideologies.
Stoffaës 1995b: 276
According to the report, new organisational and regulatory practice should 
distinguish between means (the instruments of regulation) and ends (its 
rationale). Accounting separation, in order to determine the real costs of a 
service, and the separation of regulator and service provider to ensure 
transparency and independence, were the new central instruments (Stoffaës
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1995b: 277-278). Defining and clarifying the rationale for services publics had 
to be the result o f ‘democratic exercise’, but should include modernisation of 
the principle of equality (Stoffaës 1995b: 280-282). The concept of service 
public was in France “associated with the social equilibrium of the Nation” 
(Stoffaës 1995b: 281).
For telecommunications policy, the central issues were how to ensure high- 
quality telephone services for all users throughout the territory at an affordable 
price. As re-balancing of tariffs would increase the rate of local calls, a certain 
cross-subsidy would be legitimate in the name of solidarity. Its extent and 
degree, however, would have to move according to changing political 
preferences in the population. The report did not cover other elements of the 
telecommunications service public, such as defence and security, and research 
and education. However, it did envisage future political debates at the European 
level to install a sense of a ‘European general interest’ based on consumers’ 
interests (Stoffaës 1995b: 352). The report, therefore, advocated a shift in focus 
from a centralised state determining the general interest and implementing its 
policy through a monopoly, to services publics (determined by convention and 
tradition more than anything else) answering to the needs of consumers and 
operating in competition with other service providers in Europe.
The report from Réseaux 2010 did not discuss the content of a service public in 
great detail. Other documents, however, tried to give a more precise definition. 
In a governmental report on the ‘information society’, Théry (1994) emphasised 
the need to allow the concept of service public to develop together with
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technological possibilities (p. 113). Gérard Larcher [a député] (1996) wrote in a
parliamentary report on the future of France Telecom;
It is therefore of utmost importance that the [forthcoming] legislation which 
will remove the monopoly in telecommunications gives an easily com­
prehensible definition of the telecommunications service public, so that by 
reading it one cannot be led to believe that the maintenance of this service 
will be questioned by opening the telephone markets for competition. This 
definition should clearly show the double character of service public “à  la 
française", i.e. one the one side universal service, and on the other side the 
general interests to be accomplished in telecommunications matters, con­
cerning defence, security, standards, international technical co-operation, 
research and higher education.
Larcher 1996: 97
These elements and the EU definition of universal service were subsequently 
largely used as a definition of the service public of telecommunications. Larcher 
and others^^ maintained that the double nature of the service public could not 
simply be equalled with ‘European universal service’, but that new instruments, 
particularly financial ones, were required to allow it to survive in a competitive 
environment:
• Tariff discrimination relating to volume of communication rather than 
geography;
• Compulsory contributions by all market actors towards research and 
development, education and standardisation;
“The universal service is thus not really an adding on to the ‘service public à la française 
but rather the translation of its founding principles onto the Community level” (Fillon 1996: 
2875). One could often hear in French policy debates argued that the inclusion of such standards 
at the EU level were thanks to the French, in particular their insistence under their presidency of 
the EU at the adoption of the services directive in 1990. E.g., “The Commission had first (...) 
adopted a text which certain Member States -  of which France -  judged too liberal. Thanks to 
the efforts of the French presidency, the PTT ministers could finally reach a compromise on the 
7 December 1989” (Montcharmont 1990: 10).
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• Channelling value added tax from France Telecom and its competitors 
directly towards higher education in telecommunications (Larcher 1996: 
92-96).
The report thus endorsed increased financial flexibility for France Telecom as 
well as transparent means for financing the service public elements that were 
assumed to be non-profitable. It also recommended that France Telecom be 
given “responsibility for the service public of telecommunications” (Larcher 
1996: 126). However, as the argument proceeded, the wording "service public' 
was subtly substituted with ‘universal service’ {service universel). The report, 
therefore, which gave no further clarification regarding organisation and 
financing of the service public tasks not included in the universal service, 
illustrates the shift in debate from service public to universal service, a shift that 
was more profound than only the change of words.
Larcher’s report recommended the establishment of a universal service fund, 
regulated by an independent authority, to which all operators would contribute 
(Larcher 1996: 125-140). In relation to the elements of a service public that 
remained outside of universal service, (notably higher education and research), 
it recommended that the state took direct responsibility without using France 
Telecom to implement its policies (Ministère délégué à la poste, aux 
télécommunications et à l’espace 1996a: 7-8). France Telecom might be
The change in language in public debate was not lost on the trade unions: “the term service 
public has progressively been substituted during the debate with that of universal service. For 
reasons of national traditions, we prefer the term service public.” M. Khalfa, representative of 
the Fédération Syndicale Sud des Postes et Télécommunications (Ministère délégué à la poste, 
aux télécommunications et à l’espace 1996a: 17)
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corporatised, commercialised, and eventually privatised, but the French state 
should still embrace all its traditional responsibilities for a broad service public.
By 1996 the debate had changed from the ardent opposition of trade unions 
(based on a vague concept of service public to which they pledged loyalty) to a 
more technical discussion on the modalities of the new regulatory regime. The 
mode of state intervention in the telecommunications sector was perceived to be 
in need of change, because of the sector’s importance to the rest of the national 
economy, and also (and for some, mostly) because of European legislation, 
which constrained France’s possibility to preserve a non-competitive 
telecommunications sector. Opposition to change remained notably in the 
Communist party and among some socialists (see Gayssot 1996; Sarre 1996), 
but the perceived inevitability of the project rendered this opposition less 
important. Furthermore, by launching public debates on the finer points in the 
future regulatory regime, such as interconnection and maintenance of the 
service public requirements, knowledgeable experts, not only within the state 
hierarchy but also from private enterprises and interest groups, brought the 
debate to a technological level at which agreement on the project’s realisation 
was assumed. Such change in level of debate meant that those fundamentally 
against the project of introducing competition were devoid of an arena in which 
to pronounce their views, thus further decreasing the audibility and power of 
their arguments in public debate.
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Regulation o f competition
When the telephone service was provided directly by the government, most 
relevant regulation was issued in the form of laws or government decrees and 
arrêtés, directly applicable to the public bureaucracy. In the 1990s, however, 
effective autonomy for France Telecom, competition between several service 
providers, the demand for flexible regulation (spurred by rapid technological 
change), and the EU requirement of institutional separation between regulator 
and supplier, altered the role of the state to that of regulator. The regulator 
DRG (pre-1994)/DGPT (1994-1996) had sought a reputation for impartiality 
(Thatcher 1999: 216), making policy-documents publicly available and holding 
public hearings on central issues. Its approach to policymaking confirms the 
trend that started with the Prévôt commission in 1989 that implied greater 
influence for a larger number of actors rather than an omnipotent PTT 
administration.
In the preparation for the post-1998 environment, the DGPT launched a public 
debate where it identified five major objectives for the new regime -  to:
• Guarantee everyone a high quality telecommunications service public at 
an affordable price;
• Respond to the increasing fragmentation of user demand;
• Enhance competition in the telecommunications sector;
In France, this change also found linguistic expression when academic and political debate in 
the 1980s and the 1990s gradually changed its focus from ^réglementation’ to ^régulation’. The 
former term would signify ‘traditional’, hierarchical reports where the State exercised its powers 
over society, whereas the latter was related to ‘modem’, more flexible structures, e.g. of die 
kind seen in the telecommunications field, where the legitimacy of the action was more judged 
by its outcome than by its organisation See Miaille 1995.
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• Enhance France Telecom’s competitiveness;
• Ensure effective regulation of the markets (DGPT 1995: 4-5).
These priorities form a succinct list of the central issues in telecommunications 
policy debate in 1996-97 and can be seen to arise from two separate sources. On 
the one hand, supranational legislation obliged the French state to ensure fair 
competition and effective regulation of markets. On the other hand, the service 
public tradition obliged the state to ensure high-quality, affordable services. As 
shown, the debate on the service public of telecommunications had by 1996 
clarified the difference between service public and universal service as being a 
greater inclusiveness of the service public concept, embracing a wider range of 
potential services eligible for universal provision, as well as certain obligations 
by the state regarding security and defence, and research and education. France 
Telecom’s hcence conditions from 1990 had specified that the services should 
be provided in an optimal way for society, which five years later translated into 
meeting increasingly fragmented user demands. Effective competition in the 
market and the competitiveness of France Telecom, as well as the authorities’ 
capability to meet both the traditional obligations developed over 100 years of 
telephone service provision and the new requirements from technological 
change and international legislation, would depend on the character and quality 
of regulation. Of particular importance was the institutional framework and 
rules on interconnection tariffs.
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The institutional framework
EU legislation required institutional separation of regulatory and supply
functions. However, whether the regulator should be independent from the state
was up to each EU member state to decide, and France never had a strong
tradition for delegating regulatory authority to an independent institution
(Quelin 1996: 136).^  ^Nevertheless, it was argued that:
The unique character of the European ‘de-monopolisation’ imposes a 
regulation based on stable principles, but with adaptable application. (...) 
The regulatory authority should be independent but leaning on the state.
Larcher 1996: 114-116
According to Larcher, the ‘independence’ referred to in EU legislation was a 
concept imported from the Anglo-Saxon tradition where the judiciary played a 
much larger role in political development than was the case in France. 
Constitutionally it would not be possible for France to delegate political 
decision-making powers to an institution not democratically elected, but it 
would be feasible to establish an administrative entity independent from the 
state to supervise regulation emanating from government (Larcher 1996: 120- 
121). Such an authority should, according to Larcher’s report, be responsible for 
the technicalities of interconnection tariffs, and they should have sanctioning 
powers.
The points raised by Larcher were later supported by most interested parties. 
Several actors called for a ‘strong and independent’ regulator at the round table 
discussion in January 1996 (Ministère délégué à la poste, aux télécommunica-
It is however true that there existed several ‘independent administrative authorities’ in France, 
such as the CSA and the Competition Council, but they were supervisory bodies, leaving 
policy-formation to the legislative assemblies.
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tions et à l’espace 1996a)/^ answering to the perceived problem of conflicting 
roles between a state being both owner and regulator. This problem had first 
been highlighted in 1994/^ but although new potential entrants, as well as 
consumer interests, were in favour of an independent regulator (Ministère 
délégué à la poste, aux télécommunications et à l’espace 1996a; 5), the political 
community was not entirely comfortable with what many saw as a ‘new model’ 
regulator (Chevallier 1996: 932).
In its preparation for new legislation, the DGPT argued that the authority would 
need sanctioning and litigation powers, and that the technical nature and 
economic importance of telecommunications regulation implied it was given 
greater independence than existing independent administrative entities.
However,
the minister in charge of telecommunications would, evidently, directly 
exercise the regal powers (international negotiations, preparation of 
regulatory and legislative texts) as well as the powers to issue licences, 
attribute public resources and control the implementation of licences.
DGPT 1995: 21
This argument was echoed by the Minister responsible for telecommunications
in his presentation to Parliament:
The law proposal establishes an independent regulatory authority. Why an 
independent institution? Because the principal operator in the market, the 
one that ensures the service public, remains under the control of the state.
This was the case for the representatives from the Competition Council (Ministère délégué à 
la poste, aux télécommunications et à l ’espace 1996a: 22-23), of new entrants (ibid. pp. 23-25), 
of competitors to France Telecom (ibid. p. 26), and in the general comments to the DGPT draft 
(ibid. p. 8).
Bruno Lasserre from the DGPT treated this point in his parliamentary report in 1993, 
published in 1994 (Chevalier 1996: 931). The point was also treated by M. Rousseau from the 
CSA: “The existence of a competitive telecommuitications market will necessitate a regulatory 
institutioa It is however difficult to imagine how a governmental agency, who would also have 
the '‘tutelle" of the public operator France Telecom, would be able to organise the market” 
(Peytavin 1994).
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This is the deciding factor: the state could not remain majority shareholder 
of France Telecom and claim to simultaneously ensure that the competition 
rules are followed with all the required impartiality. (...) Not only is the 
creation of the Autorité de regulation des télécommunications [ART] not a 
judicial innovation, also the division of powers between this organ and the 
government aligns well with our republican tradition, because the 
government retains the essential prerogatives, in particular those of deciding 
regulation, issuing licences and controlling the content and the tariffs of the 
service public.
Fillon 1996: 2877-2878
New legislative measures were thus once again justified with reference to the 
century-old sectoral state tradition: final legislative authority in the hands of a 
democratically elected institution (government, supervised by Parliament, 
representing the Nation), safeguarding the principles of service public. Despite 
dramatic institutional and legislative changes, political discourse communicated 
the advantages of the new regime using the same concepts as policymakers had 
done since the consolidation of the telephone service state monopoly. The fact 
that the content of the concept constituting the centrepiece of the public ethos, 
service public, had changed dramatically only emphasises its value for 
legitimating state action.
Observers diverged on the novelty of an independent regulator. Some referred 
to the growth of similar bodies since the establishment of the CSA in 1983 to 
emphasise continuity and tradition, others listed the extensive powers and 
irrevocability of the ART’s mandate to illustrate its unique character. Whether 
the independent regulator was a new invention or not, the participants in the 
public telecommunications debate throughout the 1990s came to see the 
institution as a potential impartial safeguard of the telecommunications service 
public.
Privatisation and full competition 292
Interconnection
The regulatory authority’s independence from the incumbent operator was 
particularly important regarding interconnection tariffs. However, in line with 
the existing sectoral state traditions, interconnection tariffs were linked to the 
economic viability of provision of service publia. An expert group was 
therefore established to investigate the conditions for interconnection, financing 
of universal service, and regulation of the local network in a competitive 
environment (Ministère délégué à la poste, aux telecommunications et à 
l’éspace 1996b). The group’s mandate emphasised the importance of effective 
tools to calculate interconnection tariffs for “the development of fair and 
effective competition respecting the service public‘s (Ministère délégué à la 
poste, aux télécommunications et à l’espace 1996b: ii).
The expert group’s report provided a balance between sectoral competition and 
service public requirements. The group identified two major elements of the 
service public in addition to universal service: a social element assuring access 
to telecommunications services for individuals; and a geographical element 
ensuring equal user conditions and prices throughout the territory. The social 
element was seen as best catered for through individual social support, whereas 
geographical price uniformity was suggested as being achieved through a 
‘universal service fund’ that would be transparent and related to the real costs of 
providing loss-making services (Ministère délégué à la poste, aux télécommuni­
cations et à l’espace 1996b: 7-8 and 54-63) -  echoing conclusions from the 
1994 ‘Reseaux 2010’ report.
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The expert group thus distinguished between the ‘technical’ issues of cost 
accounting and universal service requirements, and the ‘political’ issues 
connected to the broader service public concept. Whereas the former was 
treated in an objective analytical manner and could be handled objectively by a 
relatively autonomous administration under parliamentary supervision, the latter 
was referred back to political institutions and assumed best catered for in the 
democratic political channels. Although separation o f ‘technical’ and ‘political’ 
issues was not part of the French sectoral state tradition, the expert group’s 
proposal was in line with the tradition that ensured parliamentary authority and 
control with a service public seen as vital for ‘the life of the nation’ (see quote 
from De Gaulle 1946, chapter 4). Direct service provision was no longer the 
preferred means to guarantee continuity, equality and adaptability, but the goal 
as presented in public discourse remained the same.
The new telecommunications regulation regime
France legislated for a new regime for the telecommunications sector in 1996. 
The two significant pieces of legislation were Law on the regulation of the 
sector (96-659), and Law on France Telecom (96-660).
The Law on regulation of the sector (Loi de réglementation des 
télécommunications) established that:
• Telecommunications activities could be freely exercised, subject to 
certain objective, transparent, and non-discriminatory, rules;
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• Provision of services was subject to a licence issued by the minister 
responsible/^ Refusal to issue a licence could only be done with 
reference to public order, national security and defence, or if the 
applicant was judged not to possess the necessary technical and financial 
strength to provide the service;
• Interconnection demands could not in principle be refused, and 
interconnection tariffs to public networks had to be published (but 
agreements between service and network providers came under private 
law)'";
• The service public of telecommunications was defined, and comprised 
three elements:
o Universal services, i.e. high quality voice telephony provided 
throughout the territory at an affordable price, free emergency 
calls, directory services and public phone boxes. France Telecom 
was given responsibility for providing universal service, and its 
content was to be reviewed at least every four years; 
o ‘Compulsory services’, i.e. ISDN, leased lines, packet switched 
data, advanced voice telephony services, and telex. France 
Telecom was obliged to provide these services, but in 
competition with other providers; 
o Security and defence, and issues of general interest, i.e. higher 
education and ‘public research’, where the State was given 
responsibility for financing;
18For an overview of the initial licensing regime, see Maxwell 1999
For a discussion of the early interconnection regime see Andresen and Sjovaag 1997
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• Provision deficits resulting from universal service obligations should be
covered by a universal service fund to which all operators contributed;
• The Autorité de régulation des télécommunications (ART) was given 
responsibility as regulator of the sector.^®
The Law on France Telecom (Loi relative à f  entreprise nationale France 
Telecom) transformed France Telecom into a limited company from 1 January 
1997 subject to certain conditions:
• The State would remain majority shareholder;
• The State took on responsibility for providing and funding higher
education in the telecommunications sector;
• France Telecom’s employees could remain fonctionnaires if they so 
wished, and new employees could be given the status as fonctionnaires 
until 2002.
Under the law several provisions from the legislation of 1990 remained valid, 
notably:
• The contrat de plan’ remained -  but only to set out general objectives 
for telecommunications policy;
• The state continued to reimburse costs incurred by the service public 
obligations, notably for territorial development;
The ART was created on 1 January 1997. It consisted of five members appointed for a period 
of six years, three of which were appointed by governmental decree, one by the president of the 
Assemblée Nationale and one by the president of the Sénat.
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• The chapters on the enterprise’s missions, institutional design, fiscal 
matters, and relations with clients and suppliers remained intact 
(Chevallier 1996; 939).
The Law on France Telecom gave the company a multitude of functions 
{société cmonyme, société d ’economic mixte, exploitant public, entreprise 
nationale, operateur public), which were neither necessarily a priori compatible 
nor generated a unique judicial entity (Chevallier 1996). Legally, as long as the 
state retained more than 50 per cent of the capital, the enterprise would remain 
‘public’ and could be subject to (limited) direct intervention from public organs.
The case of Germany
The German debate on telecommunications policy in the 1990s was in line with 
the existing sectoral state tradition.
The final authoritv remained with legislation, and the set of actors perceived as 
relevant to policymaking did not change in the 1990s.
The federal government’s major task was seen to be provision of good 
management of federal resources, to the benefit of the German economy, thus 
indicating continuity in the public ethos of the sectoral state tradition. What was 
seen as the optimal organisational form to achieve this public ethos had changed 
in the 1980s from efficiency in direct service provision to provision of 
conditions to enhance just and fair competition. This change of organisational
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‘interpretation’, however, did not change the essential public ethos of the 
sectoral state tradition. Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, the public 
ethos remained constant, as well as the view that competition would be the 
optimal way to ensure implementation of the public ethos.
However, the government was criticised for the introduction of competition, 
and these criticisms, as well as the solutions they provoked from government, 
show the stability of the public ethos in Germany. Criticisms were made 
primarily with reference to universal service obligations, which had been a 
central element in the legitimacy of the former federal monopoly. Government’s 
proposal, however, was to solve this by a new financial tool, the universal 
service fund, which could be established in the case that no service providers 
would undertake provision. This move was in line with the sectoral state tradi­
tion of viewing the business community and private enterprise not as opponents 
to the state, but as valuable partners in attaining optimal telecommunications 
services.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making did not change in Germany in the 1990s. 
Discourse remained coordinative.
Telecommunications policy in Germany 1990-1998
German telecommunications legislation changed twice between 1990 and 1998. 
These two reforms (in 1994 and 1996) formed the last two parts of a sequence 
of three major legislative changes to restructure the telecommunications sector
Privatisation and full competition 298
(the first legislation was passed in 1989, see Chapter 5). The second part of the 
remaking of the legislative framework in Germany (Postreform U) came into 
effect in 1995, when the three administrative entities of the DBF were 
transformed into limited companies: Deutsche Telekom AG; Deutsche Post AG; 
and Deutsche Postbank AG The third legislative change (Postreform III) was 
the new law on telecommunications, the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG), 
adopted in 1996. The TKG abolished the public monopoly of the 
telecommunications network and of voice telephony. It also established a 
telecommunications regulator, the Regulierungsbehorde fiXr Telekommunikation 
und Post (RegTP).
Reunification in 1990 resulted in heavy financial burdens for the former West- 
German state, including the telecommunications ministry, and this led to a 
broad consensus among central actors of further rapid reform, particularly the 
necessity of privatising the DBF. The initial consensus did not include the trade 
unions and the social-democratic party, the SPD, but the latter reached a 
compromise with the conservative government in 1993. Debate prior to 1994 
was therefore largely a debate not about liberalisation but about the privatisation 
of the DBF in order to solve immediate financial problems. Later, between 1994 
and the adoption of the TKG in 1996, the debate concentrated on the modalities 
of competition; the debate’s links with the existing sectoral state traditions were 
evident. The concept of ‘just and fair competition’ remained a cornerstone of 
governmental policy, as it had been in the 1980s. Furthermore, the consensus 
view of the public administration and the federal government as ideally an 
efficient manager of federal resources did not change.
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The aftermath o f Postreform I  -  reunificatiorf^
The 1989 reform had opened mobile, satellite and value-added services to 
competition, but had retained the DBF’s monopoly in transmission facilities 
(network) and voice telephony. The new orgaitisational structure was operative 
from 1 January 1990. Only nine months later, the DBF, whose restructuring and 
increased competitiveness had been an important rationale for the first 
telecommunications sector reform, was merged with its East German 
counterpart Deutsche Fost. It rapidly became clear that the new organisation’s 
managerial and economic flexibility was insufficient to meet the enormous 
demands from the former East Germany, where investments necessary in 1991 
were estimated to be DM55bn and number of new lines was set first to 300.000, 
then doubled, and reached 758.000 in 1992.^^
Reunification significantly increased the telecommunications services 
expansion rate in the former East Germany, but also introduced profound 
changes into the former East German organisation. What had as late as 1989 
been a centralised, heavily bureaucratic organisation, spanning 
telecommunications network and services, postal services, and central 
communications products, such as broadcasting and newspapers, rapidly had to 
become market-oriented, flexible and efficient: all central elements in the West- 
German sectoral state tradition. East Germany chose to adopt West German 
structures, policies, organisational framework and legislation (Robischon,
Re-unification is only briefly covered. The study’s interest lies within the effect o f the re­
unification process on telecommunications debate rather than the details of the unification and 
merger process itself.
These numbers are not mentioned to make precise calculations but rather illustrating the 
enormity of the task. Source: Neumann and Schnoring 1994: 330; Peel 1993.
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Stucke, Wasem and Wolf 1995; Neumann and Schnoring 1994; 328), so that 
network operation and voice telephony remained monopoly areas, with 
contractors undertaking part of the physical extension work (Broichhausen 
1990). There was some debate on whether to allow competitors to the 
DBP/Deutsche Post (the Monopolkommission was in favour of competition and 
increased private investment, see Monopolkommission 1991; Goodhart 1991), 
but both financial and legal constraints favoured the contemporary West 
German regime. In particular, the Deutsche Post already held the rights of way 
for telecommunications infrastructure, which facilitated rapid network 
extension.
By 1992 the DBP was in severe financial difficulties and the promised results 
from the first Postreform -  sufficient flexibility for the DBP to meet fragmented 
demand and to drive technological innovation -  were hampered by the strain on 
the corporation’s financial and human capacities. Consensus evolved among 
central policy-makers on the need for further reform, and an introduction of 
private capital emerged rapidly as the favoured solution.
Postreform I I -  tranter o f public companies to private law
The restructuring of Deutsche Bundespost in the Postreform I had resulted in a 
“more progressive, competitive and customer oriented DBP Telekom” (Bauer 
1993: 84), and the mobile and satellite sectors experienced increased
^  “’There is no question of privatising Telekom’ [says PTT Minister Christian Schwarz- 
Schilling]. This is however a question of nuances. Because the minister admits that the 
possibihty o f introducing the partners of Telekom as minority shareholders in the public 
company is effectively being vigorously scrutinized” (La Tribune de l’expansion 1990).
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competition. However, both the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications, 
members of Telekom’s Board, and academia, agreed that “Telekom’s status as a 
government enterprise [was] causing severe problems” (Bauer 1993; 84). 
Continued political influence was not the only obstacle. International activities 
were hindered by constitutional constraints, the employees’ status as civil 
servants hampered flexibility and adjustment of the work force, and Telekom’s 
capital stock and reserves were decreasing.
The ensuing debate focused on three areas:
• Internationalisation of the sector, which led to other countries’ operators 
becoming more competitive, threatening Deutsche Telekom particularly 
through call-back and satellite services effectively bypassing the 
German monopoly;
• Financial problems, both in Deutsche Telekom itself and in the German 
state’s finances;
• The status of the employees of Deutsche Telekom.
German policymakers, therefore, in line with their sectoral state tradition, 
targeted the management issues, perceived from a perspective of economic 
policy.
Pro-privatisation
Internationalisation and increased competition, the government argued, were the 
main reasons for telecommunications reform:
Privatisation and full competition 302
In the past 20 years the industrial, organisational and regulatory landscapes 
in the telecommunications sector have fundamentally changed. Through 
internationalisation and increasing competitive pressures the trend towards 
privately organised enterprises, independent from the state, has amplified. 
(...) Telekom is currently, due to constitutional restrictions, limited in its 
international scope of activities. This can be negative for the German 
economy (...) It is crucial for DBP Telekom to be competitive at this date 
[31 December 1997] to survive in an open environment.
Ministerium fiir Post und Telekommunikation 1994a: 3-4
The DBP’s financial difficulties spurred key actors’ demand for further reform. 
“Reform was no longer merely seen to promote private-sector opportunities, but 
became necessary as a defensive measure to protect the long-term viability of 
Telekom” (Schmidt 1996: 54). The unification of the two telecommunications 
systems and investment in East Germany were already expensive, and in early 
1991 the Minister of Finance announced that he would raise a levy on the DBP 
by an additional DMSbn every year in the period 1991-1994 as an element in 
the general restructuring of East Germany. Introducing private capital through 
stock markets was therefore seen as a possible solution to the financial 
problem.
Re-unification has removed [political] taboos [of privatisation] in Germany 
and dug a budgetary deficit. (...) Everybody is waiting for a privatisation. 
The only questions are “when” and “how”.
Siegele 1992
One of the most ardent defenders of privatisation was Deutsche Telekom’s
management. Immediately after re-unification their most important argument
was purely financial.
Details of the extraordinary telecommunications investment programme 
were presented by Mr. Ricke [Deutsche Telekom’s chief executive]
A debt of DMlObn was issued in early 1992 to help finance the East German project (La 
Tribune de Texpansion 1992).
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yesterday, in a defence of the decision not to open the East German market 
to wider international competition. At the same time he warned that the 
planned privatisation of Deutsche Telekom was urgently needed “so that we 
won’t have to hold back our investments because of our capital base”.
Peel 1993
One should keep in mind that the German telephone provider since 1924 was 
under the obligation to cover its costs through telephone revenues. However, as 
illustrated in previous chapters, political realities hampered the possibilities of 
real cost-based telephone tariffs, which therefore largely continued to be set 
politically and to be financed through a complicated system of cross-subsidies 
within the DBP. In the early 1990s it was politically impossible to let the end 
users pay for the increased investments in form of higher telephone tariffs, 
which gave Deutsche Telekom no alternative but to build up debts and decrease 
its own capital base, a situation which could be remedied through privatisation.
Was the justification for privatisation contrary to what the sectoral state 
tradition would lead observers to expect? Since the invention of the telephone, 
the federal government had been required to utilise federal resources cost- 
effectively, their principal task in telephone policy being to provide German 
industry with crucial infrastructure without undue economic burdens. As the 
role of telecommunications grew the telephone authorities’ primary aim was 
expanded and comprised a certain element of social justice, which however had 
been transferred back to other political authorities in the 1980s. A major 
yardstick for DBP (and hence government) performance in the early 1990s was, 
therefore, the DBP’s financial viability. Political and economic realities 
excluded options that would put further strains on federal public finances and so
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the introduction of private capital presented itself as a logical option. The 
sectoral state tradition had by the 1980s changed to prefer the use of just and 
fair competition in the marketplace to ensure optimal use of resources, and the 
right and obligation to legislate ex ante and supervise ex post such competition 
remained with the federal government. Privatisation, therefore, was justified in 
line with the sectoral state tradition.
Reunification occurred as other telephone operators in Europe prepared for
global competition. The rebuilding effort temporarily implied less attention to
foreign expansion (La Tribune de l’Expansion 1992). However, if reunification
diverted some attention from internationalisation, its effect on available funds
was even more serious. The urgent need for capital was therefore used in favour
of privatisation of the mobile branch of Deutsche Telekom’s activities, which
was sold off in mid-1993:
“Deutsche Telekom as a whole needs 30 billion Mark to finance its 
expansion outside Germany”, says the president of the DBP, for whom only 
a privatisation can bring such a sum. (...) The pressurised budget resulting 
from re-unification make direct federal government capital injections 
unthinkable. However, with [weak] proper fimds (...) Telekom bets on a 
‘soft privatisation’.
Le Coeur 1993b
The need for capital was also an important argument in the government’s
presentation of the new legislation:
The necessary investments (...) have been and will be possible only because 
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom lowered its accounted capital share to 20 per 
cent. This share must be increased to approx. 40 per cent for the enterprise 
to be competitive. The Bund in its current stressed financial situation is not 
capable of transferring the necessary proper capital. The solution is 
therefore to introduce private capital via the stock market, a move that 
necessitates constitutional change.
Ministerium for Post und Telekommunikation 1994a: 2
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Arguments against privatisation
Despite the financial difficulties arising from re-unification and the political 
consensus behind it, trade unions within all units of the DBP opposed 
privatisation. The employees were civil servants and were afraid of losing this 
status if Telekom was transferred to private law (Siegele 1992).^^ The SPD 
traditionally sided with trade unions, and the case of Telekom privatisation was 
initially no exception to this rule (Huhn 1992).
Two of the main political parties, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, had declared 
themselves in favour of transforming Telekom into a limited company which 
would eventually be privatised, but the SPD was split on the issue. Some 
members stayed loyal to the postal union (the DPG), which opposed any form 
of privatisation,^^ whilst others were less hostile to the proposed change. The 
crucial points of contention were workers’ status and whether the main 
responsibility for communications infrastructure provision should remain within 
the federal state (Ministerium fur Post und Telekommunikation 1994a: 19;
Huhn 1992; Bolke 1992).
Article 87 of the Basic Law stated that operation of the telecommunications 
network and services was an exclusive task (hence monopoly) for a federal 
administration (hence public). In 1991, the Minister signalled plans to privatise
“The German postal trade union (DPG) vigorously opposes privatisation, because it fears 
large inconveniences for its members” (Huhn 1992).
^  The SPD suggestion early in the process was to transform the three DBP entities xrAoAnstalt 
des offentlichen Rechts, i.e. publicly owned corporations with the possibility to issue non­
tradable certificates to private buyers (Hill, Genillard, Rawsthom and Simonian 1993).
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Telekom before 1994,^  ^and a multi-party commission was established to 
discuss and search for a consensus on the issue (Ministerium fur Post und 
Telekommunikation 1994a: 6). Transferring DBP Telekom to private law 
would, however, imply constitutional change, which required a two-thirds 
majority in Parliament, and the SPD’s votes were crucial for the government to 
reach this.
The government and the opposition reached a compromise in June 1993 to 
establish a common holding company for the three DBP entities, through which 
the federal state would manage its ownership.Moreover, even though the 
Social Democrats from June 1993 agreed to transform Telekom into a separate 
company with possibilities for privatisation,^^ they demanded a prolongation of 
the monopoly concessions and that full liberalisation be postponed for a 
maximum of two years as allowed by EU legislation (Frankfiirter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 1994a). ‘“The Commission has stipulated that monopolies should end 
in 1998, but it might well change its mind before then, if the operators are not 
ready. There is therefore no reason for us to open our market faster than the 
others,” says the SPD’ (Petit 1994).
“Mr Schwarz-Schilling said he planned to privatise Deutsche Telekom in the next two years 
and was discussing the matter with the political parties” (Dixon 1991); “In March 1991 
Christian Schwarz-Schilling judged a debate on the privatisation of the pubhc enterprise 
‘completely misplaced’. But in October a thick document from his ministry discussed in detail 
mdicial problems linked with a privatisation of Telekom” (Le Monde 1992).
“The compromise which seems to emerge with the SPD envisages a possible modification of 
the modahties. ‘One might imagine creating a holding company comprising Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom, but also the Postdienst and the Postbank. The SPD would not be against 
an opening of this holding company’s capital’” (Petit 1993b).
^  The party’s official policy was in favour of the new legislation, but still a substantial number 
of MPs voted against the bill or abstained (Tremel 1994).
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Thus, the advent of competition was not perceived as ‘inevitable’ or ‘necessary’ 
in the German case (as became the case in France) and the debate during 
Postreform II was indeed largely not on liberalisation, but rather on means to 
solve the Bund’s financial difficulties. Again, the problems of the DBP 
Telekom were perceived as a matter of economics and finance rather than as a 
political issue.
The Lander’s influence
Giving the regions influence in the regulatory process was seen to facilitate the
Bundesrat’s approval of the constitutional change. However, some of the
Lander opposed the reform on the grounds that their role in telecommunications
policy would be fiirther reduced.^® There was however no question of removing
basic powers fi’om the federal level.
The regional minister for industry in Lower Saxony, Peter Fischer, had in 
negotiations [on the new telecommunications law] (...) demanded that the 
Lander be given decision-making powers in all important matters, e.g. the 
licensing of post and telecommunications service providers. This is not 
acceptable for the [Bundestag] coalition. (...) “That would be a 
development towards regional postal services (...) but the PTT will stay in 
the hands of the federal state” [said the federal minister for posts and 
telecommunications].
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1994a
The ‘sovereign tasks’, which remained in the power of the federal authorities 
‘for overriding political reasons’, included co-ordination of the three limited 
companies, general guidelines for their actions, and transitory measures for 
personnel, such as pensions and social benefit schemes (Ministerium fur Post
The Lander had before the 1989 reform influenced decision-making through their participants 
in the Administrative Council for the DBP. This council was abolished under Postreform I, 
although an Infrastmctural Council where the Lander were heard had been estabhshed.
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und Telekommunikation 1994a; 13). However, the Lander were granted certain 
powers through the establishment of a Regiilierimgsrat (a regulatory council) 
consisting of one member from each Land and an equal number from the 
Bundestag. The Regiilierungsrat retained decision-making powers on 
compulsory services, data protection, basic license provisions, and changes in 
the extent of monopoly powers. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1994b). The 
Regulierungsrat replaced the ‘infrastructual council’ from the 
Postverfassungsgesetz. It would assist the Bundesminister in his decisions, and 
if the Minister disagreed with the council he would need the approval of the 
government to overturn the council’s advice (Ministerium fur Post und 
Telekommunikation 1994b: 171, Art. 13).
The constitutional change to clear the way for privatisation of the telecommuni­
cations operator achieved parliamentary approval in June (Bundestag) and July 
(Bundesrat) 1994.
The two parliamentary chambers’ decision on the legal framework of the 
Postreform U marks the start of a change of the current public postal 
enterprise into a limited company and from there into a future privatisation. 
The result (...) is certainly not without compromise. But the absolute 
necessity for reform implied a compromise, a compromise that does not 
hamper the future reform needs. (...) The coming years will show that 
although changes both from the EU and from the global situation required 
decisive steps, the necessary constitutional change was possible only 
through a co-operation between broad political forces.
Ministerium fiir Post und Telekommunikation 1994a: 25
This second stage of telecommunications reform in Germany thus culminated in 
an amendment of the Basic Law, some new laws, and several amendments to 
existing legislation, which were approved by the Bundesrat in early July 1994. 
Changes were mainly organisational, and barely affected potential competitors
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OT customers. The three entities from the former DBP were to be transformed 
into limited companies at the beginning of 1995, and a holding company was 
established, the ‘Bundesanstalt fur Post und Telekommunikation Deutsche 
Bundespost’, to manage the state’s ownership responsibilities (Ministerium fur 
Post und Telekommunikation 1994a: 8-13). The state’s shares could not be 
traded on the stock market for the first five years, and even then the government 
would be legally obliged to keep a majority of the shares. A change to these 
provisions would need the approval of both parliamentary chambers (Werle 
1999: 113).
Liberalisation and regulation back on the agenda
The organisational structure established through the second Postreform was 
rapidly criticised for allowing too much political influence in the sector. The 
‘Bundesanstalt’, given the responsibility of negotiating employment conditions 
for a large proportion of Telekom’s 230.000 employees, was endowed with a 
3.500-strong bureaucracy, headed by a group of politicians. Important decisions 
needed political approval, and the supervisory board included more politicians 
than technocrats. Supply and regulation were formally under the same final 
authority, the Bundesminister, which gave rise to lack of transparency and 
potential conflict in the future liberalisation process (Parkes 1994; Nash 1995).
The process of privatising Deutsche Bundespost AG started shortly after 
parliamentary approval in autumn 1994. The first round of capital extension 
was to take place early in 1996, but lack of a precise regulatory framework
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raised heavy criticism from potential investors who demanded more information 
on the future licensing regime in order to value Deutsche Telekom (Marti
1995). Consequently, the new shares were not traded before autumn 1996.
The issue of further liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was kept 
separate from privatisation. The second Postreform was mainly a constitutional 
change to ease financial difficulties after reunification, and the debate on 
complete liberalisation of the sector reappeared mainly after privatisation was 
safely underway. New potential service providers started forming alliances and 
joint ventures to capture market shares in the post-1998 environment. These 
potential providers included big utility groups from other sectors, as well as 
large industrial enterprises, all of whom demanded clarification regarding the 
future licensing regime, thus marking the start of the debate on Postreform III.
Postreform III -  introduction o f fu ll competition
In March 1995 the government outlined its plans for the future liberalised tele­
communications market with competition in both voice telephony and network 
services. They included an unlimited number of licenses (subject to certain 
minimum requirements), and service providers would be allowed to operate 
regionally (De Peretti 1995a, 1995b; Lindemann and Cane 1995; Cane 1995; 
Picaper 1995; Les Echos 1995b; Le Monde 1995). Only service providers with 
more than 25 per cent market share would be obliged to provide universal 
service, thus opening profitable segments and niches for targeting in the hope of 
attracting infrastructure investment. The plans were, however, criticised for not
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treating the question of interconnection tariffs, characterised as the most central 
issue for would-be competitors to Deutsche Telekom.
The debate
The government’s announcements were criticised by the SPD, who wanted high 
technical standards for new licensed operators, amounting to restricting market 
access to “a handful of companies” (Lindemann 1995a). They were also 
opposed to the idea of regional licenses, and demanded all operators be subject 
to universal service obligations (Lindemann 1995a). Deutsche Telekom 
criticised the government’s plans for preparing too much regulation of their 
services whereas competitors would be left to exploit profitable parts of the 
market (Lindemann 1995b), and would-be new entrants feared the proposed 
new legislation would unnecessarily delay regulation and give Deutsche 
Telekom an unfair advantage (Milchener 1995). The government responded by 
promising to create “a special fund to compensate for provision of unprofitable 
nationwide telecommunications services after the 1998 watershed” (PTT 
Minister Botsch, quoted in Lindemann 1995c). The Lander demanded all full- 
service providers be obliged to provide universal service within the relevant 
region (Norman 1995).
This response from the government indicates stability in the sectoral state 
tradition. ‘Universal service’ had traditionally been important to the legitimacy 
of the federal monopoly, and so concerns about this issue were seen as serious 
for the legitimacy of the new regime. Its solution, however, also in line with the
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sectoral state tradition, was to be found by financial measures allowing for good 
management. A universal service fund, in France amounting to FrF5bn in 1997 
(ART 1999), did not exist in Germany, although the new regime gave the 
RegTP the possibility to require service provision of a dominant service 
provider if real demand was not met for economic reasons.
The German parliamentary debate on the liberalisation of the telecommunica­
tions sector opened in February 1996. EU legislation was instrumental in setting 
the timetable for reform, although the main drivers for reform had originated 
domestically:
With the decision from the Council o f Telecommunication Ministers of 22 
July 1993 on the liberalisation of voice telephony from 1.1.1998 and the 
decision from 22 December 1994 on liberalisation of networks, important 
basic conditions on the opening of markets in the telecommunications sector 
were established. [Postreform II] legislation is valid only until 31 December 
1997. This limit expressed the legislator’s wish to establish a new legislative 
framework adapted to the market liberalisation before 31 December 1997.
CDU/CSU, SPDundF.D.P. 1996: 1
The main points of the proposal were:
• The goal of regulation should be to ensure fair and effective competition 
in the telecommunications sector so that basic services were universally 
provided (§1);
• Regulation of competition and frequency regulation remained sovereign 
tasks of the federal state (§2);
• A sector-specific regulator would follow the general economic, 
competitive, judicial and social role of telecommunications as well as 
manage and develop the licensing regime, the regulation of universal 
services, of dominant actors, and the open network provisions (§67);
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•  The number of licences would not be restricted other than for reasons of 
jfrequency regulation (although licensees would have to satisfy certain 
technical criteria) (§§8-10);
• Operators would not be asked to pay for rights-of-way (§6).
Despite earlier disagreement on the government’s first draft legislation from 
March 1995, the SPD had through negotiations reached agreement with the 
governmental parties. Thus, the government coalition and the SPD defended the 
law proposal, whereas the Greens and the PDS (the former communists) 
opposed it. The Social Democrats, whose co-operation was vital to the reform 
because of their strong position in the Bundesrat, claimed responsibility for 
central measures such as legal requirements for interconnectivity of all 
networks, a definition of basic services including ISDN technology, and 
customer protection (Bury 1996a; Bomsen 1996). The smaller government 
partner FDP would have wished for stronger market opening, but appreciated 
that there was no proposal for establishing a universal service-fund (Stadler 
1996).
PTT Minister Botsch presented the government’s rationale for their relatively 
tight schedule for parliamentary treatment of the law proposal. It is clear from 
his presentation that the German government in its discourse continued to take 
the role of manager of the national economy and provider of infrastructure 
rather than provider of social goods to individual citizens, in line with the 
German public ethos. The Minister’s prime concerns were (in order): stability in 
Deutsche Telekom’s environment before floatation so that the share price could
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be maximised; innovation in German industry; and better and cheaper
telecommunications services.
We have a strong commitment to reach a final decision before the 
Parliament’s summer break. This schedule is connected with the fact that 
alternative infrastructure will be liberalised from 1 July 1996, and this is 
part of the new legislative proposal. The European Commission has given 
its approval to the co-operation between Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom subject to liberalisation of alternative networks. (...) This is not 
only the interest of the Bund, but really that o f ‘Standort Deutschland’, to be 
able to compete internationally. (...) Furthermore, the time of Deutsche 
Telekom’s introduction on the stock market, envisaged in November, is 
getting closer. For an orderly introduction it is important that potential 
investors know the future regulatory framework for the telecommunications 
sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me once again emphasise that we through 
the new telecommunications legislation will liberate the innovations 
potential present in the communications sector. Private and corporate 
customers will in the future benefit from a larger diversity of 
telecommunications services, the quality and price of these services will 
harmonize with international prices and quality, thereby making possible 
productivity gains for all sectors of the economy.
Botsch 1996: 149
Unlike in France, the issue of innovation was often used to justify the need for
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Germany. The reference to
innovation as an essential by-product of legislation for a prosperous industry is
also further illustration of how the federal German state was regarded as
facilitator and infrastructure provider rather than active supplier and provider of
goods and services. Although requirements to manage federal resources
effectively constrained and guided federal actions, the main aim of the
administration was to be judged by the economic success of its major customer,
namely, German industry and, subsequently, the German economy.
This step [towards complete liberalisation of the telecommunications 
market] is necessary (...). Only through competition can the dynamic of the 
telecommunications sector be liberated, and we benefit from the potential 
for growth and innovation and new jobs.
Fischer 1996a: 146
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I believe that the existing telecommunications legislations proposal, also 
thanks to improvements along the way, shows the way forward. We give the 
green light to the locomotive of innovation.
Bury 1996a; 7290
Criticisms
The main opposition in the Bundestag to the government’s proposal came from 
the Greens and the Communists (Jüttemann et al. 1996; Kiper 1996a; Jüttemann
1996). Their foremost criticisms were:
• The draft proposal established competition as the principal goal, rather 
than as a means to reach societal and political goals;
• Competition would lead to job losses;^^
• Liberalisation would lead to a division of society between those with 
access and literacy in computer technology, and those without;
• Basic universal service was not sufficiently guaranteed;
• Regulation should be governed by the primary goal of providing basic 
universal service.
Their opposition sought to pronounce the final goal of the federation’s telecom­
munications policy to be “a real growth of life quality for society as a whole as 
well as its individuals” (Jüttemann et al. 1996: 6). Accordingly, their recom­
mendations for change focused on universal service obligations. They 
demanded that all operators be subject to such obligations, that all licences be
“The biggest competitor of Deutsche Telekom plans today for 10 per cent market share a 
work potential of from 2.000 to 10.000 jobs. That implies that 100 per cent of the market will at 
best offer 100.000 jobs. At present Telekom employs some 210.000 persons. These numbers 
show that until year 2000 the announced job increase has not taken into account 60.000 job 
losses from Telekom” (Jüttemann et al. 1996: 2).
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national to avoid cream skimming, and that the content o f ‘basic services’ be 
open to change in line with technological development. Furthermore, the 
regulatory authority should be independent from both business and politics 
(Jüttemann et al. 1996: 3-4).
Universal service obligations
The Bundesrat gave much attention to universal service obligations. The Lander 
were responsible for social policy, and would therefore be expected to be 
vigilant concerning social goods for their citizens. The Bundesrat criticised the 
government’s proposal for not sufficiently ensuring territorial equality, and 
recommended “licences be awarded subject to its universal service commit­
ment” (Eichel 1996a: 144).^  ^They also held that universal service obligations 
should remain with the state, and not be given to private enterprise.
Communication is a basic human right. Participation in societal 
development and the political process belongs to its rights to personal 
expression. This right is not only depending on its capabilities to 
communicate, but also on the communications possibilities. As such, the 
content and extent of universal service is therefore constitutionally relevant.
Eichel 1996b: 267
As universal service could be seen as part of social policy, the Lander should be 
involved in its policymaking. Regulation of universal service was delegated to 
the new regulatory authority, so the question was whether this authority would 
be subject to specific control and supervision from Lander representatives. 
However, the parliamentary majority was in favour of defining maintenance of
The two expressions were used first in the Bundesrat debate, and then reappeared in the 
Bundesrat’s final criticisms of the law proposal in June. Bundesrat 1996: 5
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fair competition as the main regulatory goal, which implied the regulator should 
b«e independent both from business and politics. The Lander would thus have to 
influence the development of universal service through other channels. The 
parliamentary expert group recommended that operators with more than four 
per cent of the relevant market be obliged to contribute to universal service 
(Müller et al. 1996; 74). A separate fund could be established if cases arose 
where no operator was willing to undertake provision. This move was in line 
with the sectoral tradition of viewing the business community and private 
enterprise not as opponents to the state, but as valuable partners in attaining 
optimal telecommunications services.
The Regulierungsbehorde fur Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP)
The institutional design of a regulatory authority was seen as crucial for the 
development of competition in the telecommunications sector (Müller et al. 
1996: 74; Jüttemann et al. 1996: 3-4). However, there are relatively few referen­
ces to the design of the new regulator in parliamentary debates from the Post­
reform m . There seemed to be a near-to-unanimous agreement that the regula­
tor needed independence both from business and from politics.^^ One opposing 
voice to the plans, however, came from the Greens, who proposed the RegTP be 
organised as a ‘Bundesanstalt’ rather than a ‘Bundesoberbehorde’ (higher 
federal authority), in order to ensure sufficient independence from political 
influence, but even the party itself did not expect parliamentary approval for the 
plans (Kiper 1996b: 9793). The willingness to grant independence from
References to such independence are found in almost all interventions, e.g., Fischer 1996b: 
269; Bury 1996b: 9790; Jüttemann et al. 1996: 4.
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political institutions was in line with existing traditions where separation of 
commercial/industrial activities and wider political goals {'politische Lasten") 
were considered important.
The Telecommunications Act of 25 July 1996 established a regulatory 
authority, the RegTP, which answered to the Ministry of Economics. The Act 
did not determine the size of the RegTP, but established that the federal 
government would appoint a president and two vice-presidents. The authority 
comprised an advisory council, where both chambers of Parliament were 
represented.^^ Through the Advisory Council Parliament could influence:
• Appointment of RegTP members;
• Regulation of frequencies in granting of licences;
• Ensuring universal service (§69).
The RegTP was given responsibility in the areas of:
• Technical regulation (e.g. standards, allocation of frequencies and 
numbers);
• Universal service provision;
• Pro-competitive market regulation (§§71-72).
Decisions on network access and interconnection were taken by independent 
chambers set up by the Minister of Economic Affairs. These chambers’ 
members were higher civil servants (Werle 1999: 114-116), and complaints
Telecommunications Act of 25 July 1996, translated version, §§66-84 
§67: The Advisory Council consisted of nine members of the German Bundestag and itine 
members of the German Bundesrat. All members should be appointed by the government, 
reappointment was possible for all members.
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against any decision would have to be filed at Administrative Courts, thus 
strengthening the independence in the system. The RegTP was however 
criticised for not providing a clear break with previous regulation, as most of its 
2700 strong bureaucracy was simply transferred from the former federal PTT 
ministry, which had been abolished on 1 January 1998.
Conclusion: French and German sectoral state traditions in the 1990s
This chapter shows that the French and German sectoral state traditions in the 
1990s remained similar to what they had been in the 1980s, and thus continued 
to display significant differences with each other, despite the establishment of 
similar institutional frameworks. The findings are summarised in table 5.
France Germany
Ultimate 
authority. 
Relevant 
actors and 
their relative 
power
UA: Parliament
RA: DGT/DGPT, Parliament,
users, industry
UA: Legislation
RA: Bundestag, Bundesrat, DBP, 
users, industry (also from 
‘convergence’ industries), interest 
groups
Public ethos Service public but even more 
specified than in previous 
period.
Economic efficiency in 
infrastructure provision, ‘just and 
fair competition’
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision­
making and 
discourse
Consultation with interested 
parties. Coordinative 
discourse.
Participation of a broad set of 
actors. Coordinative discourse.
Table 5: Summarised findings from the 1990s
In France, the European impetus, international legal obligations, economic glo­
balisation, and technological imperatives were used to justify a liberalisation of
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the sector, which from the early 1990s, and particularly after the 1993 Council 
of Minister’s decision to open up the telecommunications sector in Europe, was 
perceived as ‘inevitable’. The feeling of obligation and inevitability was expres­
sed across the political spectrum, illustrating a fundamental discomfort with 
acknowledging ultimate authority from another institution than the national 
Parliament in public discourse.
In Germany EU legislation, although referred to by the government as 
specifying the timetable for reform, was not perceived nor presented as the 
ultimate reason for reform. Rather, the domestic political environment had 
gradually moved towards such reform since the 1970s. Liberalisation was not 
described as inevitable, but was presented as responsible policy to the benefit of 
the German economy.
Service public continued to be the central concept and the public ethos in the 
French debate, and even if its content changed during the decade, its omni­
presence suggests that it constituted the major source of legitimacy for state 
intervention in the sector. The concept was traditionally seen as guaranteeing 
equal treatment of all citizens, protecting them from unjust behaviour from 
profit-maximising private firms. Even throughout the 1990s, when the content 
of the telecommunications service public was specified and substantially 
changed, the concept continued to mark all public interventions on 
telecommunications policy. The European ‘universal service obligations’ 
concept was incorporated in the French debate under the service public heading.
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‘Just and fair competition’ were central to the German liberalisation debate. 
Having emerged in the 1980s, the concept remained the organisational implica­
tion of the public ethos of efficient management of infrastructure provision, 
emphasising that the main way to legitimate state intervention in Germany was 
substantially different from the French. Although there were opponents to the 
idea that competition should be an end-goal in itself (particularly the Greens 
and the PDS) there was no suggestion that the German state should ensure 
territorial coverage and ‘affordable high-quality telecommunications services’ 
through direct provision rather than regulation.
In France, ‘privatisation’ was not debated until very late in the legislative 
process, and never really adhered to. Even after France Telecom was floated on 
the stock exchange, politicians continued to emphasise its public character 
through legal requirements of state majority ownership. State involvement in 
service publics had traditionally been the guarantee of territorial and individual 
equality, continuity of service and affordability. To legitimise new organisa­
tional structures in the telecommunications sector politicians emphasised the 
continued state involvement, despite the fact that they were walking a tightrope 
between these demands and the demands of potential investors and other global 
players who wanted France Telecom to cease being a vehicle for the French 
state’s various policies.
In Germany, privatisation was debated prior to liberalisation. The Postreform II 
had opened the way for privatisation of the DBP and the federal government’s 
main argument for the development of the regulatory regime was not continued
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economic prosperity for the future private company, but rather to ensure the 
highest possible sales revenue for the German state. Although contemporary 
financial problems after reunification undoubtedly contributed to both the speed 
and the width of the political consensus on privatisation, the German sectoral 
state tradition (where both private enterprises and competition -  or, 
alternatively, threat thereof -  were important elements), helps to explain the 
relative ease with which privatisation was introduced. During the reform 
process none of the aforementioned elements of the sectoral state traditions 
underwent major change.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion
This thesis has presented empirical evidence to answer two questions:
• Did the sectoral state traditions of French and German telephone policy 
change over time?
• Is there evidence that these two sectoral state traditions converged in the 
period 1900-1997?'
Sectoral state traditions have been defined as a set of ideas about political 
authority and legitimate state action in the relevant sector. The theoretical 
literature addressed was therefore on the role of ideas in policymaking, and, 
more specifically, on ideas about the state and state action, as found in writings 
on state traditions.
The general literature on the role of ideas is often criticised for failing to 
distinguish between ideas and interests (Orren 1988; Kvistad 1999; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1994; Schmidt 2002; 2001; 2000; Kohler-Koch 2002; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Jacobsen 1997). This thesis has addressed this 
problem by using public political discourse, rather than policy output, as 
indicator of policymakers’ ideas. It is assumed that one of the major fimctions 
of public political discourse is to legitimate political decisions and political 
views for the general public. This thesis has therefore investigated public 
political discourse with the aim of identifying concepts, ideas, or values, that 
function as legitimators in the policy process.
 ^Change and convergence prior to 1900 is not discussed because it is considered the sectoral 
state tradition was consolidated only in 1900.
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The development of the object under investigation, the sectoral state traditions, 
was inspired by writings on state traditions (Dyson 1980; Laborde 2000; Grimm 
1991; Rohe 1993). However, because of the high level of generality in such 
literature, this thesis’s definition of sectoral state traditions has incorporated 
sector-specific elements to increase applicability of the concept of state 
traditions to empirical studies. Thus, although investigations of other sectors 
might necessitate adjustments of the essential elements in a sectoral state 
tradition, the analytical framework should provide sufficient generality to be of 
use also in analyses of other sectors, as well as in cross-sectoral studies.
A substantial part of recent writings on the role of ideas in policymaking has 
assumed that ideas change with policy, either as a prerequisite for, or as a 
consequence of, change (Hall 1993; Bennett 1991; Peters 1997; Ikenberry 1990, 
1997; Kohler-Koch 2002; see Chapter 1). Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 1, 
there exists an (often implicit) assumption that ideas in different countries 
converge over time (Dolowitz and March 2000; Eatwell 1997; Levy 1997; True 
and Mintrom 2001; Cemy 2000; Wolman 1992). This thesis has exposed this 
assumption to a long-term historical investigation, and found very little 
evidence to suggest a convergence of sectoral state traditions.
In order to draw general conclusions on the continuity and change of sectoral 
state traditions, the chapter first presents the findings from the separate 
empirical chapters (summarised in table 1) before answering the thesis’s two 
main questions.
Table 6: Essential elements in the sectoral state tradition ng
France Germany
Consoli­
dation
period
Ultimate 
authority (UA), 
relevant actors 
(RA) and their 
relative pOAver
UA: Parliament as the embodiment of the general will. 
RA: Parliament, PTT administration (much 
discretionary powers). Ministry of Finance through 
budgetary unity.
UA: Legislation -  Parliamentary output as opposed to 
the temporary assembly of representatives of a ‘nation’. 
RA: PTT administration, Reichstag, Lander, industry.
Public ethos Continuity and territorial equality of service, budgetary 
unity
Correction of economic dysfunctions.
Economic efficiency in infrastructure provision (cost- 
based tariffs).
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision-making 
and discourse
Procedural correctness. Private enterprise and general 
public no place in policymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of federal rights. 
Bureaucratic correctness. Coordinative discourse.
1920s Ultimate 
authority, 
relevant actors 
and their relative 
power
UA: Parliament.
RA: Ministry of Finance seen as increasingly relevant 
because of industrial nature of telephone service.
UA: Legislation.
RA: Ministry of Finance increased its powers in the 
Weimar republic. Establishment of a Verwaltungsrat.
Public ethos Service public, comprising continuity, territorial equality 
of service, adaptability, was no longer inherently 
contradictive to ‘efficient management’ and financial 
and managerial flexibility.
Principles of economic efficiency continue. ‘Autonomy’ 
and ‘consultative councils’ (proxy for enterprise 
management methods) specify organisational 
implications of public ethos. ‘Enterprise’ used for the 
first time.
Criteria for 
legitimate 
decision-making 
and discourse
Procedural correctness. Private enterprise and general 
public no place in policymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of federal rights. 
Bureaucratic correctness. Coord inative discourse.
U )
to
LA
France Germany
Post­
war
Ultimate authority, 
relevant actors and their 
relative power
UA: Parliament.
RA: Parliament, PTT administration, Ministry of 
Finance (despite that Parliament was neglected).
UA: Legislation,
RA: PTT administration, Bundestag, Lander, industiy, 
Ministry of Finance, Verwaltungsrat.
Public ethos Service public: continuity, equality, adaptability. 
Rationalisation and efficiency translation of these 
principles into practical policymaking.
Democracy and transparency at start of period. 
Changing to cost-efficiency and separation of political 
and managerial issues. Separation of operation and 
regulation.
Criteria for legitimate 
decision-making and 
discourse
Procedural correctness. Private enterprise and 
general public no place in policymaking process. 
Communicative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of federal rights. 
Consensus-seeking among a broad set of actors. 
Coordinative discourse.
Corpor
ati-
sation
Ultimate authority, 
relevant actors and their 
relative power
UA: Challenged by the EU, but fundamental idea of 
Parliament as ultimate authority prevailed.
RA: Industry and users considered relevant in 
addition to the traditional actors.
UA: Legislation.
RA: New business interests because of convergence 
between telecommunications, information technology, 
and media. Monopolkommission central because of 
discussion on competition.
Public ethos Service public but better defined than in previous 
period.
Economic efficiency in infrastructure provision, ‘just 
and fair competition’.
Criteria for legitimate 
decision-making and 
discourse
Consultation procedure new in French 
policymaking. Increased relevance of a multitude of 
actors, Coordinative discourse.
Legislative circumscription of federal rights. 
Participation of a broad set of actors. Coordinative 
discourse.
Full
compe­
tition
and
privati­
sation
Ultimate authority, 
relevant actors and their 
relative power
UA: Parliament
RA: DGT/DGPT, Parliament, users, industry
UA: Legislation
RA: Bundestag, Bundesrat, DBP, users, industry (also 
from ‘convergence’ industries), interest groups
Public ethos Service public but even more specified than in 
previous period.
Economic efficiency in infrastructure provision, ‘just 
and fair competition’
Criteria for legitimate 
decision-making and 
discourse
Consultation with interested parties, Coordinative 
discourse.
Participation of a broad set of actors. Coordinative 
discourse.
nI
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Empirical findings
Five historical periods were used as empirical material. Each empirical chapter 
treated public debate at times of major sectoral institutional change, with the 
exception of that covering the post-war period, when no institutional change 
took place, but when the role of the state was challenged (through factors such 
as increasing international cooperation and communication, and economic 
interdependence). The empirical evidence was thus drawn from periods when 
the sectoral state tradition in telephone policy was potentially challenged.
All chapters identified the central elements of the sectoral state tradition in the 
period under investigation: a notion of authority and of who should be the 
relevant actors and their relative power; a public ethos for sectoral policy; 
criteria for legitimate decision-making and discourse.
Chapter 2: Consolidation o f  sectoral state traditions
The first empirical chapter treated the ‘consolidation period’ for telephone 
policy, which lasted from the introduction of the telephone in 1876 until c.
1900. During this period legal frameworks were established to ensure state 
monopoly of service provision, the central actors were identified and a common 
understanding of the central issues of the policy area had emerged, as well as 
which issues were not being questioned (e.g., the state monopoly, ownership 
and competition between 1900 and the 1960s/1970s).
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Ultimate authority, relevant actors, and their relative power
In both countries, the notion of authority was closely linked to Parliament. 
Parliament’s source of authority, however, was very different in the two 
countries. In France, Parliament was the expression and the embodiment of the 
general will of the nation and constructed its legitimacy thereupon. The state 
was presented as the only institution that could pursue the nation’s general 
interest, which strengthened the choice of a ministerial administrative bureau­
cracy under parliamentary control as the appropriate organisation of telephony 
rather than leaving it to private enterprise, as had been the case before 1889. 
Private service providers, because of their inherent nature as profit-maximisers, 
were viewed as detrimental to the general interest.
In Germany the federal Parliament built its legitimacy on its capability of 
providing effective and efficient management of federal resources, rather than 
representing the general will of a nation (a concept that did not appear in 
sectoral debates in Germany). This emphasis on parliamentary output implied 
that legislation, rather than the (temporary) actual assembly of political 
representatives, retained ultimate authority.
Parliament, the PTT administrations, and the finance ministries, were relevant 
actors in both countries. In Germany, the Lander were among the central actors, 
as well as industry.
In France, Parliament’s ultimate authority implied that it should possess full 
control over policymaking. The possibility for the PTT Ministry to legislate
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through decrees, which Parliament could repudiate ex post, (in a time when the 
young Republic had many problems that were perceived as more pressing than 
telephone policy) left the PTT administration with much discretionary powers. 
This large de facto power did however not alter the perception that Parliament 
should have final authority.
In Germany, the ideal relative power of Parliament was less important than in 
France. The wide array of interests seen as relevant to policymaking meant that 
Parliament was not the only institution providing checks and balances for the 
PTT administration’s powers. Policymaking was therefore not, as in France, 
perceived as emanating from Parliament, and implemented (‘machinelike’) by 
the PTT administration. Rather, a multitude of actors contributed, and they 
would ideally all have an important role in the policymaking process.
Public ethos
The public ethos of French telephone policy in the consolidation period con­
sisted of continuity and territorial equality of service, two of the elements that 
would be characteristic of a service public after the turn of the century. More­
over, the doctrine of budgetary unity was applied to the telephone sector. The 
introduction of budgetary unity in 1892 corresponded with the early develop­
ments of an organisational theory of service public in which the concept was 
equated with a single organisational model for state action (Stoffaës 1995a).
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In Germany, one major task of the federal state was to correct economic dys­
functions. Moreover, the telephone service was supposed to be economically 
self-sufficient and not to burden the federal finances. Cost-based tariffs became 
central to German policymaking. Although not a public ethos, cost-based tariffs 
indicate a more fundamental quality that remained less explicitly expressed but 
nevertheless exerted an important influence on policymaking: economic 
efficiency of infrastructure provision.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse
The criteria for legitimate decision-making in France were based on parlia­
mentary procedures. Parliament was the ultimate expression of the nation’s 
general will, and political decisions taken through the proper channels as 
decided by Parliament would in principle be legitimate. Discourse was, as far as 
existing evidence indicates, typically ‘communicative’ as predicted in an elitist, 
highly centralised policymaking context (Schmidt 2002; 2001; 2000). As seen 
in Chapter 1, ‘communicative’ discourse is directed mainly towards the general 
public, and is prevalent in states where policymaking is predominantly 
centralised, determined among an inner group, and communicated to the public 
only when the decisions have been made. Public records show almost no debate 
on technical issues such as technology, operational guidelines for the public 
administration, or tariff modes. Industry and the general public had no place in 
the policymaking process (except through Parliamentary elections).
German criteria for legitimate decision-making procedures comprised legal 
circumscription of federal rights, bureaucratic correctness, and participation of
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interested parties. The relatively large number of knowledgeable and powerful 
relevant actors in the policymaking system resulted in a coordinative type of 
discourse. Coordinative discourse is more common in countries where policy­
making is more dispersed, and where larger parts of the population are involved 
in negotiating reform. Coordinative discourse is mainly aimed at knowledgeable 
co-deciders, and tends to be more technical than communicative discourse 
(Schmidt 2002. 2001, 2000).
By 1900 sectoral state traditions for telephone policy were consolidated both in 
France and Germany and showed significant differences in the notion of 
authority, public ethos, and criteria for legitimate decision-making and dis­
course. The set of relevant actors was larger in Germany than in France, and 
powers were ideally more equally distributed among these actors in Germany. 
Although territorial equality and continuity of service were important in both 
countries, the German emphasis on cost-efficiency indicated that economic 
efficiency in infrastructure provision was the basic idea in its public ethos. 
Practical differences in financing methods and legal potential for competition 
led to diverging emphasis on territorial coverage, consistent with diverging 
views about the state’s need to justify its monopoly through outcome. Public 
discourse was more technical in Germany than in France, corresponding with 
Vivien Schmidt’s (2002, 2001, 2000) models on communicative vs. 
coordinative discourse.
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Chcxpter 3: Challenges to the sectoral state traditions in the 1920s
Chapter 3 covered the debates around the financial reforms of the 1920s, as well 
as the FAG of 1927 in Germany. In this period ideas about ‘managerialism’ and 
‘modem and flexible management’ became fashionable both in France and 
Germany.
Ultimate authority, relevant actors, and their relative power
The ultimate authority of Parliament in France and legislation in Germany was 
not challenged. The set of actors seen as relevant to policymaking remained 
stable, although both the French and the German finance ministries increased 
their powers. In Germany this was a general trait of the Weimar republic, 
whereas the French finance ministry gained relevance as a result of the 
increased perception of the industrial quality of telephone policy.
The industrial nature of the telephone service was increasingly emphasised in 
French debate. Stability and long-term planning were hailed as indispensable 
preconditions for industrial success (Fayol 1921; Ministre des travaux publics 
1922) and were thus presented as a possible predicament for the PTT Ministry’s 
contemporary difficulties. The ideas of modem management methods and 
financial flexibility were contradicting the sectoral state tradition, something the 
public political discourse showed. Institutional stmctures that would negate 
parliamentary supervision and control over the policy area (as would the 
proposed financial autonomy and independence of the administrative council)
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would negatively influence the possibility to ensure execution of the ‘general 
will’, which was unacceptable to French policymakers.
Public ethos
In France, the nascent concept of service public became the centrepiece of the 
public ethos for telephone policy, incorporating continuity and territorial 
equality of service. However, the concept was dissociated from budgetary unity 
in the early 1920s, and policymakers argued it was no longer incompatible with 
industrial management methods, a development that rendered the concept of 
service public ubiquitous in French telephone debate for the next century. 
Coupling arguments about territorial equality and justice with calls for sound 
economic management proved a mélange to which French policymakers were 
highly positive. The theoretical development and increased precision of the 
concept of service public, mainly by legal scholars such as Rolland and Duguit, 
ensured that the principles of continuity of service, equality and adaptability 
remained central to telephone policy debates. The principle of cost-based tariffs 
was present in public political discourse, but the principle remained less rele­
vant than in Germany.
Ideas about economic flexibility and managerial autonomy were also present in 
the German context, which was initially more receptive than the French 
environment. Industrial methods and efficient management were viewed posi­
tively in Germany. This resulted in two new concepts appearing; ‘autonomy’ 
for the service provider, and ‘ consultative councils’ as proxy for enterprise
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management methods. The need for real independence of the telephone service 
provider conflicted less with the consolidated state tradition in Germany than in 
France, illustrated by the use o f ‘enterprise’ to define the DRP. The German 
public ethos of efficient management of infrastructure provision, therefore, did 
not change in this period.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse did not change in 
either country in the 1920s.
Thus, the study of the reforms of the 1920s showed that although formal 
institutional outcomes in the two cases contained important similarities, national 
political debates indicated that policymakers in the two countries framed the 
issues differently, and that national debates displayed strong continuity with 
earlier telephone policy debates in each country.
Chapter 4: The post-war period
The period under investigation in chapter 4 saw no major legislative reform in 
neither of the two countries. The role of the state in general was, however, 
increasingly questioned, particularly in the 1960s, and the telephone sector was 
not immune to these developments.
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Ultimate authority, relevant actors, and their relative power
In France, Parliament’s ultimate authority was not openly questioned in the two 
decades after the Second World War, even though its de facto influence 
decreased. Telecommunications were not included in the list o f ‘basic sectors’ 
for planning and received little attention from Parliament, and the bureaucracy 
dominated policymaking. The set of actors perceived as relevant to 
policymaking remained stable, despite the lack of parliamentary attention.
In Germany, ultimate authority remained with legislation, but the legislative 
reform from 1953 put stronger emphasis on democratic structures and 
transparency than its predecessor. No evidence was found to indicate a change 
in the set of relevant actors.
Public ethos
Despite technocrats’ dominance of the policy area in the 1950s and the 1960s, 
and their focus on ‘technical’ issues (e.g., cost-accounting, rationalisation of the 
state apparatus to reduce costs), it is not possible to argue that the public ethos 
in France changed in this period. Public political discourse from the 1940s 
(when attempts were made to include telephone policy among the ‘basic 
sectors’) showed references both to service public and to the general interest. 
Subsequent debates showed the bureaucrats’ adherence to the constituting 
elements of services publics', continuity, territorial equality, and adaptability. 
Contemporary political and economic constraints did however complicate the
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implementation of these principles, and the presence of concepts such as 
‘rationalisation’ and ‘efficiency’ in technocrats’ debate can therefore be argued 
to be the translation of the sectoral state tradition principles into practical 
policymaking terms.
In Germany, recent experience with the Nazi regime led to a perceived need to 
emphasise democratic structures in all parts of public administration and the 
DBP was organised as a public administration rather than a public enterprise 
(albeit with its own special fund, the Sondervermogen). However, these 
conditions proved unsustainable and two public commissions in 1965 and 1970 
called for a return to former practices where telecommunications were seen 
predominantly as an industrial sector in need of appropriate financial and 
managerial tools. The commissions’ reports signalled that ideas about the need 
for ‘democratic structures’ fi"om the immediate post-war period were challenged 
and that new ideas, in line with the pre-1933 public ethos, had taken hold in the 
policy community.
The traditional German view of the telephone service, and later telecommunica­
tions services, as an integral part of the federation’s infi’astructure provision for 
German industry was, however, challenged as the social importance of telecom­
munications grew and telephone policy makers were forced to consider social 
issues. Telecommunications’ potential impact on society was, in the latter part 
of the 1960s, seen as so important that a certain level of political interference in 
the name of social justice was not only legitimate but also required. This was a 
priori contradicting the German sectoral state tradition, which until then had
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required effective and efficient management of federal resources in economic 
terms, the social impact of its actions not being prominent in policy debates.
The overall German response to this development was not, however, to debate 
social policy issues under the heading of telephone policy, as was the case in 
France, but rather to envisage separation of operation and regulation of tele­
phone services, thereby bringing social issues into the political agenda under 
other, more specific (and perceived more appropriate) headings. Whereas the 
new enlarged role of telecommunications in society necessitated political inter­
ference to ensure optimal social benefits in a way that private enterprise could 
not be trusted to deliver, the operational side of service provision was still 
viewed from the same angle, i.e. ideally cost-based, efficiently managed 
through methods similar to those applied by cost-efficient (profit-seeking) 
private enterprises. Supply of telecommunications services could then be 
debated according to the established sectoral state tradition, namely as an 
industrial commercial activity much like any other industrial enterprise.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse
The investigation of French telephone policy debates in the post-Second World 
War period did not result in evidence to suggest a change in criteria for 
legitimate decision-making methods. However, it did offer interesting evidence 
on the use of different types of discourse depending on the issue’s place on the 
political agenda.
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Presentations to Parliament in 1948/9 included references both to service public 
and to the general interest, central elements in the French public ethos. Subse­
quent debates, however, which were not aimed at public political channels but 
rather at experts within the public bureaucracy, made no reference to the service 
public concept. This shows that the service public concept had a high symbolic 
but relatively low practical value, and that Parliament’s public political 
discourse in France was more about legitimating decisions towards the general 
public rather than about achieving consensus on practical issues.
In Germany, criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse did 
not change in this period.
It is therefore argued that by 1970 the national sectoral state traditions had again 
shown their strength both in France and Germany. Politically symbolic values 
of territorial equality and social justice in the guise of service public were 
expressed by the French Parliament, which remained focused on procedural 
correctness rather than detailed intervention in technical issues. In Germany, 
however, its tradition of viewing telecommunications as ‘any other industry’ 
forced itself back into political debate, despite a post-war emphasis on 
democracy, and resulted in calls for clearer separation between operational tasks 
and political considerations.
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Chapter 5: The 1970s and the 1980s: Corporatisation
Chapter 5 treated political debates in the 1970s and the 1980s, preceding 
legislative reforms of 1989 (Germany) and 1990 (France). The 1980s were 
characterised by a strong increase in demands for a wider array of telecommuni­
cations services (especially data transfers, satellite services, and value-added 
services). The European Union turned its attention to telecommunications 
policy in the mid-1980s, which provided a common external impetus for 
national reforms.
Ultimate authoritv. relevant actors, and their relative power
The European Commission’s use of its legislative powers, which constrained 
decisions within member states, conflicted with the established ultimate authori­
ty of the French Parliament. Parliament’s discourse to justify the corporatisation 
of France Telecom in 1990, where European legislation was used as a ‘scape­
goat’ to communicate the inevitability of domestic reform, illustrated the diffi­
culty French policymakers had in justifying the authority of an institution other 
than the French Parliament, and showed that the notion of ultimate authority 
remained with Parliament.
The set of actors perceived as relevant for policymaking in France changed in 
the 1980s. The Prévôt commission’s use of open consultations indicated that 
both industry and users were considered legitimate actors. The relative powers 
of the former central actors (Parliament, the DOT, and the finance ministry) 
decreased to the benefit of the ‘new’ groups. The overall de facto  powers of the
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French policymaking environment decreased because of EU legislation, but the 
latter was perceived as an external influence restricting the possible scope of 
action, rather than a relevant actor in the domestic policymaking process.
The ultimate authority of legislation in Germany was not seen to change in this 
period. Despite EU legislation effectively constraining also German authorities’ 
possibilities for action, this was presented as constraining the timetable for 
reform of national legislation rather than questioning its legitimacy. Supra­
national legislation was not in any way perceived as suppressing the need for 
national legislative reform, resulting from a national political process. The set of 
relevant actors in Germany was extended to include new business interests that 
had gained relevance because of the convergence of telecommunications, infor­
mation technology, and media. The convergence also implied a renewed interest 
from the Lander, which were traditionally central to media policy.
Public ethos
In France, the explicit public ethos for the telecommunications sector remained 
service public, adhered to by policymakers as well as the general public (as 
shown by the Prévôt commission’s findings). However, the concept itself was 
redefined, starting with the first specific law on the telecommunications service 
public from 1984 (which, paradoxically, later opened the way for the fundamen­
tal questioning of the state monopoly’s legitimacy). Rather than the ubiquitous 
but vague concept used in public debates in the late 1960s and 1970s, the
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service public of the 1980s emphasised continuity, equality, adaptability, 
excellence of service, and its impact on the French competitiveness.
The frequent references to how the French model and idea of service public was 
successfully being transferred by French politicians to the European level 
indicated that a challenge in one essential element of the sectoral state tradition 
(Parliament’s ultimate authority) was met with increased emphasis on the public 
ethos of service public.
In Germany, the public ethos of efficient management of infrastructure 
provision remained stable. However, the preferred policy instrument to obtain 
this goal changed from economic efficient direct provision to establishment of a 
legal framework to ensure ‘just and fair competition’. Telecommunications 
were no longer seen merely as infrastructure to other sectors and a general 
social good but rather as a locomotive for German industry as a whole, whose 
research and development efforts the economy could not forego if it wanted to 
stay competitive in a global environment. ‘Just and fair competition’ therefore 
became the main aim of public policy, and ‘political considerations’ were 
catered for through sector-specific regulation.
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse
Criteria for legitimate decision-making in France changed in the 1980s. The 
Prévôt commission used open consultations in the preparation of its report, 
where it involved actors from industry and user groups, as well as the general
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public. An open, public consultation on such a scale had never before been 
employed in French telecommunications policymaking. Although it is not 
suggested here that the ‘inner circles’ of elitist policymaking ceased to exist, the 
new forms of communication clearly indicated a change in the sectoral state 
tradition. The type of discourse and decision-making methods used in the late 
1980s corresponds more with a coordinative type than the former, clearly 
communicative discourse.
German criteria for legitimate decision-making and discourse remained based 
on the participation of a wide set of actors, employing a coordinative discourse.
Chapter 6: The 1990s: Full competition and privatisation
The new telecommunications regimes of 1996 (France)/1997 (Germany) 
brought full competition in all segments of the telecommunications sector, in 
line with European Union legislation. After more than a century of monopoly 
telephone provision, France and Germany both opened their markets to 
competition. Despite this big change in institutional terms, it is argued that the 
sectoral state tradition remained constant compared with the 1980s in both 
France and Germany.
Ultimate authoritv. relevant actors, and their relative power
In tiie process leading up to the competition regimes of the late 1990s the notion 
of authority in French telecommunications policymaking remained with 
Parliament, despite its de facto powers being reduced because of EU legislation.
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The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking remained similar to that 
of the late 1980s, although the role of the PTT administration was performed by 
the DGT/DGPT.
In Germany, legislation retained its role as ultimate authority, and the set of 
relevant actors and their relative powers were similar to the situation before the 
Postreform I of 1989. The reunification in 1990 did not alter this.
Public ethos
The public ethos of service public remained central in French public debates. 
Although introduction of competition in the sector was argued to be inevitable, 
important documents (including parliamentary reports) invariably referred to 
service public, often emphasised to be ‘dr la française'.
The German state again asserted its fundamental role as efficient manager of 
infrastructure provision, to the benefit of the German economy. The introduc­
tion of private capital and extended borrowing possibilities was in the debates 
on the Postreform II of 1994 presented as an obvious answer to contemporary 
financial problems, emphasising the role of the state as efficient manager. 
Regulation, however, remained a federal responsibility, as it had been back to 
the times of the Regal of the late 19^ century.
After 1994 ‘just and fair competition’ remained a cornerstone of governmental 
policy. The Postreform II had opened the way for privatisation of the DBP and
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the federal government’s main argument for the development of the regulatory 
regime was not continued economic prosperity for the future private company, 
but rather to ensure the highest possible sales revenue for the German state (as 
the rational manager of federal resources should do).
Criteria for legitimate decision-making methods and discourse
In France, the DGPT saw it as crucial to maintain an open and transparent 
process when developing the new regulatory regime, and therefore conducted 
several open consultations and issued draft legislative documents to ensure a 
wider participation in the policymaking process, in line with criteria for 
legitimate decision-making methods from the late 1980s. The industrial actions 
of 1993 showed that increased participation in the policymaking process was 
not a sufficient criterion for legitimacy of policies, whereas the continued 
emphasis from the DGPT on open consultations indicated that legitimacy was 
sought increased through participation from a wide array of interests, and, 
consequently, by using a coordinative discourse.
No evidence was found to indicate a change in German criteria for legitimate 
decision-making and discourse.
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Stability and change in national sectoral state traditions
It is now possible to answer the first of this thesis’s two main questions: 
whether the sectoral state traditions of French and German telephone policy 
changed between 1900 and 1997.
As the above argument indicates, sectoral state traditions are highly resistant to 
change. The ultimate authority of Parliament in France and legislation in 
Germany remained stable throughout the period, despite national legislation 
potentially being constrained by EU legislation in the 1980s and the 1990s.
The set of actors perceived as relevant to policymaking remained constant from 
the consolidation in 1900 until the 1980s. The telephone/telecommunications 
sector experienced important technological development in the 20* century, and 
the potential for the emergence of new policymaking participants (both from 
equipment manufacturers, fringe industries, and user groups) could be expected 
to be significant. The relative absence o f ‘new’ actors, therefore, illustrates that 
access to the policymaking environment has been limited, contributing to 
stability of the sectoral state traditions. In the 1980s, however, industry and the 
general public were incorporated among relevant actors in France.
The public ethos of sectoral policies also remained remarkably constant 
throughout the period under investigation. The two overarching principles, 
service public in France and efficient management of infrastructure provision in 
Germany, remained central in all public political discourse throughout the
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period, although the precise content of the service public changed several times 
during the 20^ century, and despite Germany’s temporary emphasis on 
democratic structures immediately after the Second World War.
The service public concept was adapted to contemporary demands for industrial 
management methods in the 1920s, and for a competitive regulatory regime in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The concept’s absence from debate among technocrats in 
the post-war era and its subsequent revitalisation in the 1970s and 1980s 
illustrates its inherent value as a political symbol and as a myth crucial to 
Parliament’s efforts to legitimate its actions vis-à-vis the general public. The 
introduction of a state monopoly in France in the late 19* century had been 
justified in public discourse by the state being the only organisation that could 
guarantee equal treatment of all customers and by its proven superiority in 
service provision, both subsequently central elements of service publics. The 
same list of arguments was heard in the 1980s when competition again was on 
the public agenda. At this time, however, the unambiguous rights of the state to 
intervene shifted from direct provision to regulation. Equal treatment of 
customers could only be guaranteed by the state through its service public 
obligations.
The content of the service public concept thus changed over the period 
investigated by this work, as has been confirmed by several other studies 
(Chevallier 1989, 1997; Bonnetblanc 1985). However, the fact that the concept 
retained its central place in political debate and as legitimating rationale for 
state intervention, for discussants from all sides of the political spectrum, from
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its early appearance in the 1890s and throughout the 20* century, is strong 
evidence for the stability of the French public ethos. This does not imply that 
policies remain the same, nor that French politics does not evolve, only that the 
ways in which policies are justified for the public, and implicitly, what is 
considered legitimate rationale for state intervention, has for telephone policy 
remained remarkably constant throughout the period investigated in this thesis.
The perception of the German administration primarily as a responsible econo­
mic manager of federal resources also remained constant throughout the period 
investigated. When the telephone was first introduced, the RPTV held that it 
was a potential competitor, as well as a cost-effective substitute to the telegraph, 
that any rational, conscientious manager would utilise to improve the financial 
situation of its overall services. The strong emphasis on democracy and ac­
countability in the early post-war period, as well as Parliament’s negligible 
participation, could be seen as a potential change in the German sectoral state 
tradition. However, the increased importance of social issues was subsequently 
met with demands to separate ‘business and politics’ (later regulation and 
operation). Thus, it can be argued that the public ethos remained constant 
because the increased societal importance of telephony and telecommunications 
was referred back to political institutions, insisting that the task of operating 
telecommunications networks and services could and should be separated from 
wider political considerations.
In the 1980s it was argued that voice telephony should remain a public 
monopoly because a monopoly remained the sole rational option to ensure
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sufficiently healthy finances to undertake future necessary investments. When 
legislation to open voice telephony to competition was introduced in 1996, 
political justification referred to established principles: maximising the 
Deutsche Telekom share price before floatation (rational, optimal management 
of federal resources); ensuring optimal conditions for German industry, 
particularly through its effect on innovation (infrastructure provision); and 
ensuring better and cheaper telecommunications services. The German 
authorities in the 1990s had no qualms about employing market competition to 
fulfil their task as efficient manager of federal resources, and were thus in line 
with a century old sectoral state tradition.
As shown in this chapter, the criteria for legitimate decision-making and 
discourse did not change in Germany throughout the period. In the case of 
France, however, the criteria for legitimate decision-making, and the type of 
discourse, both changed in the late 1980s. New actors were perceived as 
relevant for policymaking, and public discourse increasingly displayed features 
characteristic of the coordinative type. These new traits remained constant 
throughout the 1990s reform process.
Thus, with few exceptions (the abolishment of budgetaiy unity in France in the 
early 20* century, new relevant actors, criteria for legitimate decision-making 
and discourse in the 1980s, also in France), the elements of the sectoral state 
traditions of French and German telephone policy remained constant. One must 
therefore conclude that sectoral state traditions are highly resistant to change. 
Despite changes in preferred policy instruments (that can be seen as the
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translation of ideas into practical policymaking), the fiindamental ideas 
themselves, as presented in public political discourse, were largely the same in 
1997 as they had been in 1900.
Did the two sectoral state traditions converge?
Can the identified changes in the French set of actors, criteria for legitimate 
decision-making and discourse, be interpreted as a convergence between the 
French and German sectoral state traditions?
Decision-making traditionally involved business interests to a much larger 
extent in Germany than in France. German legal obligations to consult business 
interests and the involvement of the Lander ensured participation from a 
broader set of interests than the French centralist, elitist method of policy­
making. However, from the mid-1980s French policymaking incorporated more 
open consultation and more dialogue between government officials and 
business interests, similar to a German decision-making model. There were, 
however, important differences. Policymaking in France never reached the same 
degree of consensus-seeking as in Germany, and, more importantly, there were 
never any legal obligations on the public administration to consult the wider 
interests.
The use of open consultations in France was paralleled by a development in the 
type of French discourse. The increased level of specificity reflected that the 
relevant policymaking actors were perceived as knowledgeable interlocutors 
whose participation was important for the legitimacy of the new legislation, in
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line with V. Schmidt’s model of a coordinative discourse. Thus, from the late 
1980s onwards, a coordinative discourse was employed both in France and 
Germany.
Despite the use of coordinative discourse in both France and Germany from the 
late 1980s onwards, this is too weak evidence (in the presence of the stability in 
other elements of the sectoral state tradition) to conclude that the sectoral state 
traditions converged. French policymakers consistently referred to their service 
public whenever telephone policy entered public political debate, and German 
policymakers continued to view the state’s optimal role in telecommunications 
policy as one of efficient manager of infrastructure provision.
Final note
Sectoral state traditions have enabled a long-term empirical comparative 
analysis of ideas by making it possible to operationalise these ideas, as 
expressed in public political discourse. The long-term investigation made it 
possible to identify continuation or reoccurrence of modes of discussion and 
form of arguments in French and German telephone policy debates. It was also 
possible to assess how new ideas, which often had their intellectual origins in 
other countries, were shaped by national practice and traditions. The analysis 
has shown that French and German ideas about legitimate policymaking and 
discourse have remained highly constant throughout the 20* century.
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Summary o f findings and implications for theory
The empirical analysis has shown that sectoral state traditions, which were 
defined as a specific set of ideas about political authority and legitimate state 
action in the relevant sector, expressed and identified through public political 
discourse, are highly resistant to change. Despite important similarities 
(legislative reforms resulting in similar institutional structures and choice of 
policy instruments -  in later periods partly originating from the same supra­
national legislation, similar technologies and socio-economic development, 
common participation in international organisations), the public political debate 
in the two countries remained different, and showed continuity with former 
national debates. The empirical evidence does not support a convergence 
hypothesis.
This thesis identified two main problems with the current body of literature on 
the role of ideas in policymaking. First, there is no common agreement as to the 
relevant content of ideas, illustrated by the wide range of ideas studied, from 
narrow, programmatic ideas, to broad, general perceptions about the state. 
Second, there is a tendency to use changes in policy outcome to indicate 
changes in ideas (assumed rather than empirically substantiated) rather than 
studying ideas where they in this author’s view are more likely to be expressed, 
which is in political discourse.
The sectoral state tradition concept was developed to meet these two 
difficulties. It offers clarity regarding the content of relevant ideas: being 
broader than programmatic ideas but less so than fully-fledged political
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theories, it offers an instrument to study the development of specific ideas 
relevant to policymaking, and in particular, to separate ideas from policies.
This meso-level approach, combined with the use of discourse as main 
indicator of ideas rather than policy output, allows for operationality (which 
was identified as a problem with general, macro-level political theories) while 
at the same time avoiding the problem with confusion between the power of 
ideas and the power of their advocates (which was seen to be difficult in studies 
on narrow, programmatic ideas).
Regarding the second problem with the current literature on ideas, the 
empirical investigation has demonstrated the feasibility of using discourse to 
identify the existence and development of ideas in policymaking. By analysing 
large amounts of empirical material it was possible to show the prevalence of 
certain ideas throughout the 20^ century. Policy output was not used to indicate 
change in ideas; rather, periods of institutional reform were used to locate 
empirical material because of the prevalence of debate about ideas contained in 
the sectoral state tradition in such periods.
An evaluation of the empirical findings compared to the reviewed literature on 
the role of ideas in policymaking reveals certain interesting results. A major 
empirical validation offered by this thesis is that ideas about policy instruments 
are interpreted with respect to the national setting in which they are presented. 
This is here most clearly illustrated in chapter 3 on the financial reforms of the 
1920s. The basic ideas about ‘managerialism’, the advantages of financial and 
managerial autonomy, the importance of long-term objectives and plans, all had
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their roots in Anglo-Saxon academia, and the general ideas introduced to the 
policymaking environment in the two countries were originally similar. Despite 
these common roots, the ideas subsequently received very different comments 
and treatment in the two countries, treatments that showed great coherence with 
existing ideas about legitimacy of state intervention in the telephone sector. 
Similarly, the debate on competition in the 1980s showed that the concept of 
competition was interpreted with reference to the national sectoral state 
tradition (see chapter 4). Whereas French debate saw competition as ‘inevitable’ 
and used this to argue strong regulation of competition to preserve the tradition 
of service public, German academic debate -  and subsequently political debate 
-  investigated whether the monopoly structure was beneficial for the 
pronounced goals of telecommunications policy in particular and industry 
policy in general. These results emphasise the importance of a contextual, 
ideational understanding of policymaking.
The empirical analysis also showed that changes in choices of policy 
instruments do not necessarily indicate changing ideas. This finding is clearly at 
odds with some of the convergence literature, where general concepts’ (such as 
competition, privatisation, efficiency) presence in different countries’ 
policymaking are interpreted as evidence of convergence of ideas. The lack of 
convergence demonstrated here is all the more surprising given the nature of the 
policy area under investigation. Telephone policy is an area where external 
pressures for policy change are conventionally seen to be largely similar across 
countries. Technological inventions are generally internationally available, and 
the literature on convergence reviewed in chapter 1 presents technological
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means of fast communication, geographical closeness, and economic and 
political interdependence as the most important factors for explaining policy 
convergence. These conditions all hold for the cases studied here. Despite all 
these similarities, however, ideas as expressed in public political discourse 
remained different in the two countries.
One might envisage that part of the disaccord between this thesis’s findings and 
convergence literature is the failure of the relevant convergence literature to 
specify the content of ideas under discussion, which might lead to confusion 
about the limits of conclusions offered by the literature. However, there seems 
to be a more fundamental point to be learned from this evidence, which is that 
the relationship between ideas and policy outcome is in no way straightforward. 
This boosts the case for fiirther research into causal mechanisms between ideas 
and policies. Such research needs clarity and stringency regarding the ideas 
studied. Relevant ideas’ central features (such as stability and resilience to 
different pressures for change) should be studied separately from the causal 
process, and a priori assumptions about change in ideas should be avoided. 
While other approaches to the study of ideas have conflated investigations into 
ideas and their stability with analysis of their role in the policymaking process, 
this study advocates to separate the two tasks in order to achieve clarity about 
the possible stability or change in a certain set of ideas before embarking on an 
investigation about the role of ideas in the policy process. This thesis’s 
demonstration of the important resistance to change in sectoral state traditions 
can subsequently form the basis for a study of the role of ideas in policymaking.
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Another important result from the empirical investigation is the potential 
longevity of sectoral state traditions even through fundamental regime changes. 
Dyson (1980) stated that changes in the perception of the ‘state’ concept were 
seen as inevitable, because the ‘idea of the state’ is open-textured. However, his 
suggestion that the state concept was in a ‘crisis’ at the time of writing (late 
1970s) has by this thesis been demonstrated to be unfounded. This strength of 
sectoral state traditions over time and across changes in formal institutions was 
demonstrated particularly strongly in the case of Germany in the post-war years. 
The empirical evidence shows that despite being severely challenged for a long 
period of time, first over a decade during a war regime, then through new 
legislation (the PverwG), the public ethos of efficient management of federal 
resources re-emerged, after more than three decades, in a form very similar to 
that of the pre-1933 period. This phenomenon is strong support for studying 
sectoral state traditions in a long-term historical perspective and should serve as 
caution to studies on convergence, which have shown a tendency to analyse 
ideas and policy development over short periods only, typically as a result of 
increased international cooperation and supranational legislative activity or as 
result of rapid technological change.
These findings point to sectoral state traditions having a large degree of 
independence from policies, policy instruments, and from formal institutions, a 
fact that might indicate that the activity of legitimating political choices is 
fundamentally a different activity from policymaking. Such an implication is in 
line with V. Schmidt’s (2001) model on the role of discourse. She holds that 
‘when it comes to issues that affect the core beliefs and values of a society (...)
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public communication (...) is of central importance, to legitimate changes 
already taking place and to persuade the public of the values as well as 
necessity of proposed changes’ (p. 11). Legitimating political actions, therefore, 
is a necessary action in the political process, but it is not the same activity as the 
development of policies or political programmes. If this is so, as the empirical 
evidence presented here indicates, the task of legitimating policies can be 
studied as separate from (although intimately intertwined with) the rest of the 
political process.
V. Schmidt (2002) also claims that properly understood and used legitimating 
discourse can determine the success or failure of reforms, which is supported by 
evidence presented here particularly in chapter 5 and the case of France on the 
changing status of France Telecom. It is not a priori surprising that a more 
inclusive form of decision-making (as performed through the public 
consultations of the Prévôt commission) should be regarded positively in a 
centralist environment like French policymaking, and potentially increase 
legitimacy of the proposed reform. Whether the general public’s participation 
actually changed the outcome is a different question. The analysis undertaken in 
this thesis does not try to explain the “real” policymaking process. It does not 
aim at mapping de facto  power structures and chronological steps in the 
policymaking process, and can therefore not draw conclusions regarding the 
absolute value of the general public’s views in the decision-making. It might 
well be the case that the public consultation was playing for the gallery, but at 
the very least the case tells us that the form of public rhetoric influences the 
legitimacy of decisions (cf. the uproar and civil unrest when the same issue had
Conclusion 357
been discussed in 1974). The shown stability of sectoral state traditions 
indicates that the fundamental values of a country are also highly stable, which 
has implications for how legitimating discourse should be constructed.
Explaining stability
This thesis has not presented a causal model for the emergence, maintenance, 
and development of sectoral state traditions. Rather, the focus has been on 
empirical assessment of whether the sectoral state traditions remained stable or 
whether they changed. The main reason for this delimitation of the work is the 
amount of analysis required to evaluate stability or change of the object under 
investigation. However, certain potential causes for stability have emerged in 
this thesis, and although it is emphasised that what follows was not the focus of 
the empirical investigation, some factors might open up interesting avenues for 
future research.
First, as shown in chapter 2 on the consolidation period, the original sectoral 
state traditions were shaped by the general state traditions in place at the time. 
Arguments about the role of the state in the telephone policy field were coherent 
with contemporary ideas on the role of the state in general, and particularly with 
ideas on legitimacy of monopolies. The fact that the French and the German 
state perceived the economic potential of the new technology differently^ 
furthermore correlated with the respective state’s view on its own rationale. The 
coherence between the general and the sectoral state tradition was expected to
 ^In France, telephony was initially seen as an unknown technology whose economic potential 
was far too uncertain for the state to risk involvement with, whereas in Germany the telephone 
was seen as a direct competitor to the state monopohsed telegraph service, and thus perceived as 
representing potential economic losses to the state administration.
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remain, because policies that would be perceived to contradict the general state 
tradition would be seen as illegitimate. The general state traditions would 
therefore be expected to have a stabilising effect on their sectoral counterparts.
Another factor that can potentially contribute to the stability of sectoral state 
traditions is that they are sufficiently open to accommodate many different 
policy options. The service public concept, central to French policymaking 
throughout the 20^ century, is generally acknowledged to be flexible; an 
important precondition for its longevity. The concept has throughout the century 
been associated with a large variety of financing formulae, organisational 
forms, and also different judicial frameworks. It also has a strong position as 
political symbol and myth. However, the three core elements of the concept: 
territorial equality, adaptability, and continuity of service, have remained 
constant over the period investigated in this thesis, as has the role of the general 
interest as legitimating foundation. It is thus possible to argue that despite 
(radical) changes in how the concept has been interpreted into practical 
policymaking in terms of choice of organisation and other policy instruments, 
there has always been an emphasis on the outcome of policies in the 
legitimating process. The same holds true for the German sectoral state 
tradition: The principle of efficient management of infrastructure provision was 
used to justify the monopoly at the end of the 19* century, as well as 
corporatisation in the 1980s and privatisation and full competition in the 1990s, 
and a variety of financing methods during the 20* century.
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The clearest exception to the remarkable stability of sectoral state traditions 
took place in post-war Germany, with the German state’s need to distance itself 
from the recent Nazi experience, itself a highly exceptional circumstance. The 
resulting emphasis on democracy, parliamentary control and transparency was 
not a priori consistent with pre-1933 principles. However, the subsequent return 
to the principle of efficient management of infrastructure provision might be 
explained by this principle being embedded in wider administrative structures 
(at a lower level than central government), not necessarily changed during the 
war. This historical event could however be used for testing the power of ideas 
independently from the power of their advocates, because it seems plausible to 
assume that a substantial part of the decision-makers had changed between the 
early 1930s and the late 1960s.
Literature reviewed in chapter 1 lists several factors that are seen to potentially 
incite change in ideas; supranational legislation, economic globalisation, 
international co-operation, and technological change. For the sectoral state 
traditions model one would include sector-specific factors such as the result of 
technological change, in particular convergence between different technologies 
that brought new actors into the policymaking arena. What conclusion can be 
drawn from the fact that these factors have generally failed to change the 
sectoral state traditions?
One possible answer to this question is that sectoral state traditions as an 
example of ideas become institutionalised at the national level and experience a 
strong path dependency. Although supranational legislation and international
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co-operation take place outside the nation-state, they affect the national level of 
policymaking. Evidence from this thesis shows that the task of legitimating 
supranational legislation is done with reference to the specific country’s 
traditions, not only because the polity for whom these policies need to be 
legitimated are national, but also because of the strong position of the legislative 
assembly or national legislation as the ultimate authority for policymaking. 
Moreover, as this thesis suggests, although international co-operation might 
change the views on specific policy instruments among those partaking in the 
co-operation, there is no evidence to suggest that it impacts on the perceived 
need to legitimate policies with reference to established, institutionalised 
traditions at the national level.
Another answer to the resistance to change might be found in transaction cost 
analysis, which would argue that the sectoral state tradition would change only 
if the perceived benefits of doing so would be greater than its costs. However, 
such conditions are difficult to establish because of the large costs and the 
uncertain benefits involved. Moreover, such analysis of state traditions is 
problematic inasmuch as it depends on decision makers’ interpretations of 
transaction costs, and is not simply a matter of a competitive market punishing 
sub-optimal institutions. In terms of change in state traditions, new ideas about 
costs and benefits would therefore be more important than their actual changes.
Generalisations
As seen, the telecommunications policy area is characterised by a long list of 
factors that are often assumed to change what states do, how they do it, and
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also ultimately their rationale for action; complex and rapidly changing 
technology, close links with the general economic development, international 
co-operation, international and supranational legislation. If the sectoral state 
traditions do not change faced with this long list of factors, there are good 
reasons to believe that other fields much less exposed to one or more of these 
factors would show similar tendencies.
Examples of other policy areas where change in sectoral state traditions are less 
likely are the electricity sector, where supranational legislation has been much 
more difficult, and social, welfare and education policies, less directly 
contingent on technology and also with less binding international co-operation 
than telecommunications. Even the field of competition policy, seen (in a 
European context) as strongly driven by EU legislation (at least in periods), 
debate and legitimating discourse have happened at the national level, thus 
increasing the probability that the sectoral state traditions for competition 
policy have remained largely constant.
Geographical closeness is another factor put forward by some convergence 
literature as fostering the probability for convergence. France and Germany are 
geographically close. However, as argued in chapter 1, any developed, 
democratic states could have been used for comparison. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the results would have been very similar regardless of the cases 
used within the constraints of economic development and democratic systems. 
It might be interesting, however, to extend the same type of empirical research 
into countries that are not necessarily as economically developed as France and
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Germany, and/or countries that do not possess similar parliamentary 
democratic traditions. Such research might teach us much about the limits of 
sectoral state traditions and about their dependence upon democratic structures 
and long-term existence of state traditions.
To say that ‘French telephone policy debate is a debate about a particular 
service public whereas German telephone policy debate is a succession of 
technical debates on tariffs, technology and sector-specific legislation’ is 
obviously very crude and cannot be taken to represent the true and exhaustive 
nature of such a complex policy issue over a span of more than a century. This 
thesis, however, has provided evidence that the said themes are constantly 
reoccurring in national debates, and that they remained central throughout the 
20* century.
The way in which state action has been legitimated in public discourse in 
telephone policy has been shown to be highly constant throughout the periods 
investigated. Sectoral state traditions and national public political discourse 
have shown a remarkable resistance to change, despite being challenged by 
international (Anglo-Saxon) fads and fashions about administration and 
management, non-democratic regimes, and supra-national legislation.
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Appendix: Sources
Secondary material provided the first indications of which reforms had been the 
most important in the sector in both cases. The information thus obtained was 
subsequently confirmed through parliamentary debates, which often included an 
overview of former legislative changes. This evidence formed the basis around 
which the five empirical chapters were structured. For each of the five time 
periods, public documents were looked at in detail. The selection process was 
described in chapter 1. This annexe provides details regarding variation between 
the time periods, both regarding type of material available and its accessibility.
The institutions consulted for the primary source material for this research, and 
some of their relevant collections, were:
France:
Service Archives et Documentation historique, France Télécom, 7 Avenue du 
Général Sarrail, Paris 16ème
• Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1871-1900 (the in-house 
journal for the P&T administration)
• Revue Générale de 1 ’ Administration 1875-1900
• Annales Télégraphiques
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Le Centre des Archives Contemporaines, Fontainebleau
• Archives des Postes et Télécommunications (PTT ministry’s internal 
documents, personal collections)
• Collections consisting of both private and public correspondence
Librairie des Journaux Officiels, 26 rue Desaix, Paris 1 Sème
• Parliamentary debates and legislative texts 1876 -  1997
Bibliothèque Nationale, Quai François-Mauriac, Paris ISème
• Parliamentary debates
• Parliamentary and governmental reports
Librairie Sénat
• Legislation and parliamentary debates 1980s and 1990s
Institut d’Études Politiques/Sciences-Po, 30 rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7ème
• Newspaper articles on telecommunications policy both for France and 
Germany in the late 1980s and 1990s
Germanv
Bundesarchiv Berlin, Finkensteinallée 63, Berlin Lichtfelder
• Parliamentary debates and documents pre-1945
• Reichs-Gesetzblatt
• Jahrbuch der DRP
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• Amtsblatt des Reichspostministeriums
• Internal ministerial documents pre-1945
Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Potzdammerstrasse 1, Koblenz
• Parliamentary debates and documents post-1949
• Bundes-Gesetzblatt
• Archiv fur das Post- und Femmeldewesens
• Internal ministerial documents post-1949
Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, Paulstrasse 3, Cologne
• Archiv fur das Post- und Femmeldewesens
• Newspaper articles on telecommunications policy in Germany for the 
1980s and the 1990s
Wissenschaftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste
• WIK reports and analyses
UK
The British Library for Political and Economic Sciences (BLPES)
• French and German legislative papers and parliamentary reports
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The empirical periods
As shown in chapter 1, the selection of relevant material in parliamentary 
debates, parliamentary reports, governmental reports, and material found in the 
national archives resulted in a large corpus of empirical evidence, drawn from a 
variety of sources. The focus of the thesis being public political debate, 
parliamentary reports and debates remained the centrepiece of the empirical 
material, but bureaucratic documents found in the various archives provided 
important evidence to increase the understanding of the issues under discussion. 
Although it is practically impossible to study all documents pertaining to the 
telephone policy area from its beginning in the late 19* century, the research for 
this thesis aimed at achieving a good overview of the relevant sources for issues 
that could be particularly fruitful for an investigation of the ideas in a sectoral 
state tradition, as discussed in chapter 1. However, the different time periods 
presented different challenges for research.
Research into the pre-1900 period proved particularly challenging in the case of 
France, because of the scarcity of documents due to the flooding of the national 
archives around 1910. The monthly review for the P&T administration, the 
Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes, therefore provided the bulk of 
the material in addition to legislation and parliamentary debate in this period. 
Legislation and regulation pertaining to post and telegraph services were, 
however, published in the Bulletin Mensuel, together with the government’s 
presentation of major legislation. The closest to complete collection of the 
Bulletin Mensuel from the very early years of telephone policy in France (1876
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-  1890) was found in the archives of France Telecom. Other central documents 
available from this period include the report commissioned by the SGT from 
1882, which remains one of the rare documents that did not originate in govern­
ment or the ministerial bureaucracy. Its origin makes it interesting in its own 
right, but the document furthermore provided evidence on the contemporary 
view of the legitimacy of monopolies in general, which made it particularly 
useful for the discussion in this thesis.
The relatively limited amount of documents specifically showing the public 
debate on the legitimacy of the state monopoly, both because of the flooding of 
archives and because of the low attention given to the policy area by 
Parliament, was compensated by use of other ministerial documents such as 
instructions and regulations, whose focus was mostly highly technical, but that 
often included the expression of governmental rationale for their policies (see 
Bulletin Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1879b, c, d, 1881b, 1887,
1889). Moreover, preambles to legislation and regulation exposed the 
government’s view on the legitimacy of the form of state intervention in the 
sector. Examples are the preamble to the Arrêté of 1 October 1887 {Bulletin 
Mensuel des Postes et des Télégraphes 1887), the reports by Rouvier (1887a, 
b),and Coulon’s circular (1887).
In Germany, the relative abundance of legislative action (with the 
Telegrapengesetz of 1892, the Telegraphenwegegesetz and the 
Femsprechgebührer-Ordnung, both from 1899) ensured frequent and well- 
documented statements from both government and Parliament. The structure of
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the German national archives for the pre-1900 period made research an easier 
task than in France, because all documents relating to a particular Parliamentary 
Act were easily identifiable through central indexes, and obtaining all relevant 
parliamentary and governmental documents for all three laws was a speedier 
process than in France. The documents from this period were found in the 
Bundesarchiv Berlin. In addition to the parliamentary debates and legislative 
texts, the archive also provided material from the ministerial archives 
{Bestandssignatur R4701 and R601), which was selected according to the 
process outlined in chapter 1. Of particular importance to the understanding of 
the political process and the issues under debate were various issues of the 
Amtsblatt des Reichspostministerium and material originating in industry 
associations and chambers of commerce.
The 1920s provided a richer empirical material than the pre-1900 period, 
particularly in the case of France. Increased attention to the policy area in 
Parliament implied several consecutive years’ statements from the Commission 
des Finances, and the Parliamentary process culminating in the financial and 
administrative reforms of 1923 contained detailed interventions from politicians 
across the political spectrum. Moreover, both the difficult financial situation, for 
the telephone service in particular and for the state finances in general, and the 
increased clarity regarding the principles of service publics, resulted in debates 
in Parliament that proved highly relevant for the research question,^ thus 
providing ample material for this thesis. In Germany, the federal archive in
* The discussions in Parliament frequently touched upon not only the technicalities surrounding 
the financial and administrative reforms, but also on the issue of whether telephone policy 
should be regarded as an administrative task or as an industrial activity, central to the argument 
in this thesis (see chapter 3).
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Berlin contained public interventions from industry organisations, interest 
groups, and newspaper articles related to the policy area, in addition to 
parliamentary and governmental reports and debates. For the post-1924 years 
the annual reports of the Reichspostministerium and the Deutsche Reichspost 
constituted the main sources of information.
The absence of legislative reform in the 1950s and the 1960s^ implied that the 
material investigated for this period was of a slightly different nature than for 
the other four time periods. In France, the national archive in Fontainebleau 
provided most of the primary source material, including internal policy 
documents from the PTT ministry. The archive is organised as a set of personal 
collections (from ministers and higher public officials) donated to the archive at 
the end of their period in office. One is given access to a large number of 
documents which can be consulted in detail. The documents from each personal 
collection were grouped under thematic headings, and researching them implied 
going through each collection rather than being provided with lists of 
documents/collections relative to a specific theme. For example, the issue of 
international comparison of French telephone services, relatively high on the 
parliamentary agenda in the late 1950s, could be found under the collection of 
the Director General (F90 bis 7489), but also under ‘industrial and international 
affaires’ (F90 bis 3808-3831 and 3874-3875). However, the documents are not 
the same and research is time consuming. A greater methodological problem is 
the lack of certainty that all potentially relevant sources are consulted. This 
thesis’s focus on public political debate, however, ensures that the central
With the exception of the PverwG of 1953
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documents remain parliamentary debates and parliamentary and governmental 
reports, which have been relatively easily available for all time periods.
In Germany, the national archive in Koblenz was researched but relevant 
material was scarce, mainly consisting of a series of correspondence between 
the Finance Minister (Bundesminister der Finanzen) and the PTT Minister 
(Bundesminister fur das Post- und Fernmeldewesen) concerning conditions and 
regulations for tariff increases. The archive material is classified by theme, 
which in many ways facilitates research. However, contrary to the situation in 
France, it is necessary to order photocopies of individual documents, and these 
documents are subsequently sent by post, with the consequence for researchers 
spending only limited time in Koblenz (and in Berlin) that hard decisions must 
be made regarding what documents to consult in detail. However, valuable 
material was found in the various in-house publications of the PTT ministry 
(Archiv fiir das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Jahrbuch des Postwesens^ Jahrbuch 
des elektrischen Femmeldewesens), which were generously made available 
through the Max-Planck-Institut. Although strictly speaking secondary 
literature, the material presented in these forums does provide reliable evidence 
about policy debates in a period when legislative debate was lacking.
Throughout the 1970s telecommunications policy increasingly regained 
attention in France, reflected in a larger amount of empirical material available. 
Parliamentary debates were more frequent than in the preceding decades, and 
academia and independent observers produced several influential reports. 
Moreover, the increased focus on telecommunications in general also resulted in
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more newspaper articles and public interventions outside of parliamentary 
channels. This material was provided by the library of the lEP/Sciences-Po 
{Institut d ’Études Politiques) in Paris. Legislative action in 1990 provided rich 
material with interventions from discussants across the political spectrum, 
mainly found in the Librairie des Journaux Officiels.
In the 1970s, German social science researchers’ focus on competition and 
regulation provided important material for this thesis. Again, although strictly 
speaking secondary literature, the academic debate provided important frames 
of reference to public political discourse, and has therefore been included here 
as source material. Legislative debate in 1987 and 1988 provided public reports 
and governmental and parliamentary documents, made accessible through the 
government’s information service and website.
Source material for the last empirical chapter was voluminous for both France 
and Germany. Public attention implied a large amount of newspaper articles, 
and the fact that the period was relatively recent meant that most minutes from 
parliamentary debates could be accessed via the Internet. Moreover, central 
reports (Dandelot 1993, Stoffaës 1995, Larcher 1996, DGPT 1995, Bauer 1993, 
Witte 1988a, Ministerium fur Post und Telekommunikation 1994a, b) were still 
in print and were generously provided by the relevant institutions.
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